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This thesis examines the democratisation progress of Turkey during the period 2002 to 2014, 
a period in which the Justice and Development Party (the ‘JDP’) held continuous national 
office, in order to answer its central research question: How and to what extent has the JDP 
contributed to democratisation in Turkey? The JDP case illustrates the complexity of applying 
the democratisation concept in real human affairs. Since its foundation in 1923, the Republic 
of Turkey has seen democratisation as a necessary adjunct of a modernisation that the founders 
of the republic considered vital to maintain the Turkish nation and the republic’s territorial 
integrity after the Ottoman collapse. The new republic by its nature is secular albeit a 
superstructure to an Islamic foundation centuries old that remains vibrant. Since its inception, 
Turkey’s democratic journey has suffered set-backs due to tensions between the secular state 
and domestic political Islam. The Turkish state through its constitutional framework and its 
historic military tutelage has attempted to hold down political Islam. Around 2000, the Turkish 
state and domestic political Islam were in stalemate; the latter was contained but persistent. 
The JDP emerged out of political parties some of which had previously been Islamic in nature. 
The new party’s leaders publicly rejected its political roots and pledged to enhance Turkey’s 
democratic journey as a new way of resolving those tensions. What I have been looking for in 
my research are quantum advances in Turkey’s democratisation momentum under the JDP, 
advances not only insulating Turkey from recidivism but confirming the JDP’s democratisation 
credentials. I have used ‘liberal democracy’ as my yardstick to identify and assess these 
advances. Domestic events in Turkey in 2013 and 2014 sorely tested the latter. During my 
research, I have used the qualitative research method and operated on the societal/national level 
of analysis. I worked with academic books and articles, and researched primary documents. I 
also interviewed political actors, academics and journalists. My findings were mixed in terms 
of the JDP’s enhancements to Turkey’s democratisation, reflecting a challenging environment 
for the JDP after 2012, when electoral hubris and domestic events stymied the party’s 
democratisation momentum. However, I argue that key building blocks to secure a sustainable 
democratisation process were put in place by the JDP in its early years in office. Further, the 
party has flourished electorally since 2002, a testament to its skill at managing tensions. I have 
concluded that the JDP, notwithstanding challenges to its democratic credentials, has made 
significant contributions to democratic progress in Turkey by locking in fundamental reforms 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Purpose 
Democratisation is the process nation states adopt to develop sustainable political 
arrangements that embody the principles and institutions of a form of representative 
government that promotes and safeguards the individual freedoms of its citizens. This form of 
government is generally described as a liberal democracy.  
The development of a liberal democratic form of self-government has become an 
aspirational objective of most nation states, albeit with varying degrees of intent and success.  
This paper analyses the contribution of the Justice and Development Party (the ‘JDP’) 
to Turkey’s democratisation process in the period from its first election as the national 
government of Turkey on 3 November 2002 through to and including 2014. The party, known 
in Turkish as the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Party, AKP), held office throughout this 
period and continues to do so up to the submission date of this thesis. In my analysis, I discuss 
the successes and the failures of the JDP’s actions to further ‘democratisation’ in Turkey. I put 
forward my views on the democratisation process during this period, along the lines: why and 
was enough done by the JDP to embed the concept and reality of ‘democratisation’ in Turkey 
and, in hindsight, what actions and events hampered, even retarded, the JDP’s efforts?  
The central question of my research is: What is the contribution of the JDP to democratisation 
in Turkey? My analysis responds to the following associated research questions:   
 
1. Is it appropriate to consider Turkey a nation state that aspires to the 'democratic' 
ideal?  
2. Is it appropriate to measure Turkey's progress along the 'democratisation' path 
against the yardstick of European Enlightenment, in particular the political 
arrangement described as 'liberal democratic'?  
3. At the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and since, but prior to the 
first JDP national government in 2002, what events significantly impacted on 
Turkey's progress along the 'democratisation' path?  
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4. What was Turkey's democratisation 'scorecard' when the JDP first took office in 
2002?  
5. What policies did the JDP implement in government through to 2014 that 
significantly affected the democratisation scorecard that the party inherited in 
2002?  
6. Would the 'democratisation' policies implemented by the JDP in government up to 
2014 have been implemented by another party or parties had the JDP not been in 
government? 
7. What was Turkey's democratisation scorecard at the end of 2014? 
8. Were the democratisation policies adopted by the JDP up to 2014 a reflection of a 
party that has genuine democratic credentials? 
9. What is the impact on the findings and conclusions of this thesis of post 2014 events 
specifically in relation to the ongoing Syrian civil war? 
 
The findings from the central and associated research questions are set out in the body 
of the thesis discussion across Chapters 1 through to Chapter 6. The conclusions to the research 
questions are set out in the concluding chapter of the thesis, Chapter 7. 
In this case study analysis, the main focus is the process of democratisation in Turkey 
initiated and implemented by the JDP. The latest significant impetuses for Turkey’s 
democratisation process prior to the JDP taking office in 2002 were the 1997 Turkish military’s 
intervention in domestic politics and the European Union’s confirmation in 1999 that Turkey 
was a ‘candidate country’ for EU accession. The former gave rise to the JDP, the latter provided 
the JDP with the roadmap for its chosen democratisation path. Both events significantly shaped 
the JDP’s political outlook both in terms of its own modus operandi for political success and 
its retention of domestic political power. 
This thesis is sympathetic to the idea that the JDP genuinely aspired to deepen 
democratisation when it came power. It tests the commitment through change over a specific 
period. This is not a question of whether or not one adopts the neo-conservative presumptions 
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of JDP politics. Obviously conditions and outlooks, particularly of Prime Minister, now 
President, Erdoğan, shifted towards the end of the period, with damaging effects on the 
democratisation drive. His own presumptions were more radical than neo-conservative.  
In support of the purpose of my thesis, I conducted face-to-face interviews and email 
interviews with some leading politicians, academics, representatives of the civil society and 
journalists.1 The face-to-face interviews took place in Turkey in 2011. I have also incorporated 
information I received from the government representatives about their future agenda on 
topical ‘democratisation’ issues in relation to Turkey’s Kurdish issue, other minorities, 
women’s rights, and gender equality in Turkey. Further, I have provided historical background 
to the emergence of democracy, its varied definitions and manifestations, and its development 
in Turkey. In relation to the latter, I put forward some new perspectives on the performance of 
the JDP in terms of improving human rights; the rule of law; transparency and openness in 
government; and the separation of powers; as well as the personal performance of former Prime 
Minister, now President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.  
This study reviews the democratisation reforms undertaken by Turkey as a result of its 
European accession process, a process that has given rise to significant democratic amendments 
to Turkey’s constitution, laws and regulations. However, the study deals with Turkey’s EU 
accession process as one of a number of catalysts, albeit a significant and explicit catalyst, for 
democratic change in Turkey.  
This study provides an analysis of Turkey’s democratisation process as a whole by 
examining several democracy-related subjects such as the influence of the military in politics, 
human rights issues surrounding the Kurds, the Alevis, non-Muslim minorities, women and 
gender equality, and Turkey’s civil society. In analysing human rights in Turkey, this study 
does not include lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (‘LGBT’) rights because the thesis 
subject is democratisation in Turkey not the development of human rights. Though the latter is 
a fundamental component of liberal democracy, for reasons of space and focus, I have chosen 
the larger and more pressing human rights issues in Turkey to analyse and critique its 
                                                 
1See: Methodology section of this thesis. 
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democratisation process during the period under study. This choice on my part does not reflect 
adversely on the genuine rights of the LGBT groups in Turkey. 
 This study does not measure Turkey’s democratisation process using quantitative 
indicators, instead the study is based on the qualitative analysis and critical evaluation of 
relevant interdisciplinary academic texts and other secondary sources, government and JDP 
documents, as well as the interviews I conducted with senior politicians, academics and 
commentators in 2011. 
This study, due to its scope, does not analyse the significant domestic and regional 
security issues that have adversely affected Turkey since 2014 and which have arisen due to 
renewed Kurdish militancy and the Syrian civil war. However, such events are briefly 
addressed in relation to their bearing on the findings and conclusions in this thesis. 
Democratisation and the JDP 
The emergence of the JDP in August 2001 and its coming to power after the November 
2002 general election began a new chapter in the political development of the Republic of 
Turkey. For the first time since 1954, only two parties succeeded in gaining seats in Turkey’s 
supreme legislative body, the Grand National Assembly. In the 2002 election, 16 political 
parties failed to pass the party election threshold of 10 percent of the popular vote and, as a 
result, approximately 45 percent of voters could not be represented in the Turkish parliament; 
voters whose various parties had been involved in governments over the previous two decades. 
Notwithstanding its securing only 34.2 percent of the popular vote, the JDP ushered in single-
party government again, after approximately 50 years. The 2002 general election was a 
surprising result albeit an election made easier for the JDP by too many opposition parties for 
whom the unusually high party election threshold was unforgiving. But most importantly, the 
2002 election gave power to the JDP, a new political party that has shaped, and continues to 
shape, the functioning of the Turkish state and Turkey’s political landscape, during its twelve 
years in office to date. Up to December 2012, the party has retained political office through 
two national elections and one Presidential election, with increasing share of the popular vote, 
and has been supported by three local elections and two national referendums. This is unique 
in Turkish history. Two national parliamentary elections were held in 2015. The second 
election held in early November re-established the JDP’s parliamentary majority.  
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Parties and politicians in power respond in many different ways to existential threats. 
The December 2013 corruption allegations that swirled around Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
his entourage was a turning point for the Prime Minister, the JDP, and the democratic process 
that the JDP had been championing since its break-through national election victory in 2002. 
As the 2013 allegations unfolded, the Prime Minister’s response, for many, exposed the full 
Janus-like face of his JDP. Whilst the JDP had led a successful democratisation process during 
its first and second terms of office, the democratisation trend was reversed in its third term after 
the 2011 general elections, slowed down further and finally faltered due to the anti-democratic 
measures taken by the Prime Minsiter following the 17 December 2013 corruption allegations. 
Obviously, there were larger forces at play than corruption that culminated in the allegations 
eruption. The question is: Did Prime Minister Erdoğan’s response, swift and extreme that it 
was, reflect the response of a democratic leader to a self-perceived all pervading threat to the 
democratic process that he had led since 2002, or, the manifestation of a political leader whom 
his opponents believed was willing to dump the democratic process in order to retain power 
just as he and his party, in their opinion, had dumped Erbakan’s National Outlook2 ideology to 
gain power?  
Following the JDP’s coming to power in November 2002, several democratisation 
reforms were realised. Within the framework of a large number of constitutional amendments 
and law changes under the EU harmonisation process, most of which were passed by the JDP 
government in its first term, very important reforms were undertaken in order to further 
democratise the country. These reforms included: abolition of the death penalty; safeguards 
against torture and ill-treatment; extension of the scope of freedom of expression, association 
                                                 
2 Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), a leading politician for four decades, was Prime Minister of Turkey during 
1996 and 1997. His tenure as PM ended abruptly due to accusations that he was undermining Turkey’s secular 
constitution and he was subsequently banned from politics by the Constitutional Court. He had been repeatedly 
banned, and re-instated, from politics throughout his political career. See: Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Necmettin 
Erbakan”,  
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Necmettin-Erbakan.  
Erbakan was the leader of the Islamic oriented National Outlook Movement, a religio-political movement that 
promoted a number of Islamic political parties in Turkey from the 1970s through to his death. “The NOM’s 
discourse was based on the underdevelopment of Anatolia and the economic marginalization of the provincial 
bourgeoisie by the pro-Kemalist Istanbul-based capitalists. […] NOM was not only a critique of Kemalist cultural 
policies but also of Kemalist economic policies, but the criticism was never anti-modern or anti-free market. It 
aimed at conservative modernization, that is, becoming modern with Islam.” See: Yavuz, M. Hakan. Secularism 
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and the media; strengthening the role of the national parliament; promoting gender equality 
and improvement in women’s rights; improvement of religious and cultural rights; and most 
critically, restructuring civil-military relations in accordance with European norms. The 
successful democratisation process was continued into the JDP’s second term with its 2009 
Democratic Opening initiative and its 2010 constitutional reform package which was endorsed 
by approximately 58 percent of voters in the September 2010 constitutional amendment 
referendum. These reforms opened up the political system further.  
However, the democratic reform process slowed down in the third term of the JDP 
government due to measures taken by the Prime Minister some of which were a reaction to the 
perceived move against him and his close political circle by officials investigating the 
December 2013 corruption allegations. The measures were seen by political opponents and 
some commentators as anti-democratic, they included: the draft law on the closure of the 
dershanes (prep schools), a strong base of the Gülenist movement; the draft law on the Supreme 
Board of Judges and Prosecutors allowing the Justice Minister much greater influence over the 
judiciary, potentially undermining the separation of the executive and the judiciary; and 
restrictions on the internet, including temporary bans on Twitter and YouTube. Other 
undemocratic measures included the draft law on the National Intelligence Agency which gives 
the agency extraordinary powers in relation to electronic communications by citizens and 
groups, and a draft law on the Higher Education Board which further increases the Board’s 
authority over universities. In addition, media freedom has been under threat over the last few 
years.  
During the JDP’s terms of office, well known journalists such as Mehmet Altan, 
Metehan Demir and Ahmet Altan were either dismissed or resigned due to their dissenting 
publications against the government. Other journalists were arrested and imprisoned due to 
alleged links with terrorist organisations and alleged plots against the government. The 
European Commission’s Enlargement Report dated October 2014 drew attention to the legal, 
political and self-censorship restrictions that continued to “hamper” freedom of expression in 
Turkey, especially in relation to the media and noticeably increasing as a result of the events 
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of 2013, although the number of journalists imprisoned dropped from 49 to 40 from 2012 to 
2013.3 
In its 2013 report, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the New York based 
independent, non-profit organization dedicated to the global defence of press freedom, stated 
that the number of journalists in prison at 1 December 2013 was 211 worldwide, and that 
Turkey had the highest number imprisoned at 40. In 2001, the year before the JDP came to 
power, CPJ reported that 13 journalists were imprisoned in Turkey out of 118 worldwide, the 
third highest globally; an approximate three-fold increase in the number of journalists jailed 
under successive JDP governments since 2001, and an increase as a proportion of the global 
imprisoned from approximately 11% to 18%.4 
Further, Prime Minister Erdoğan promoted a polarising discourse during the 2013 
Taksim Gezi Park protests,5 accusing those Turkish citizens who protested against the 
government as being “looters”.6 Following the official announcement of the December 2013 
corruption investigation and the arrests of individuals connected to the Prime Minister’s inner 
political circle, he moved quickly and decisively against those within the police and the 
judiciary whom he perceived as promoting the investigation to topple his government. He 
declared the corruption investigation a conspiracy and the conspirators an illegal parallel state. 
He also put pressure on media organisations by tax and financial targeting.7 
All elected national governments have a right to respond to threats to the state. 
However, the 2013 protests and the corrupton investigation were seen by some as threats to the 
JDP government not to the Turkish state. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s response to both, and the 
introduction of anti-democratic measures in his third term, may reveal the two opposing faces 
of the JDP; the democratic face on the one hand, the autocratic one on the other. The question 
                                                 
3European Commission’s Enlargement Report dated October 2014 (page 4) as part of a summary of the findings 
of the Commission’s 2014 Progress Report on Turkey. 
4Sumit Galhotra, "Number of Jailed Journalists Sets Global Record," (Committee to Protect Journalists [CPJ], 
2012). https://cpj.org/reports/2012/12/imprisoned-journalists-world-record.php [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
See also: The Committee to Protect Journalists. 2013 Report: Second Worst Year On Record For Jailed Journalists 
https://cpj.org/reports/2013/ [last accessed on 19.02.2016].  
5European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," Commission Staff Working Document (2013): 2. 
6Jose Miguel Calatayud, "'Just a Few Looters’: Turkish PM Erdogan Dismisses Protests as Thousands Occupy 
Istanbul's Taksim Square " The Independent, 2 June 2013. 
7Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 13. See also: "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2014," 
Commission Staff Working Document (2014): 2&33. 
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is which face reflects the dominant personality of the party and which face reflects the need for 
temporary accommodation. My thesis, inter alia, addresses this question.  
Methodology 
This thesis is a case study analysis of the JDP’s role in Turkey’s democratisation 
process from November 2002 up to late 2014. The thesis is based exclusively on qualitative 
research. It is an analytical, explanatory and a descriptive study, and as previously mentioned, 
includes face-to-face in-depth interviews and email interviews I conducted with some key 
Turkish actors and observers. The face-to-face interviews were conducted in Istanbul and 
Ankara between 5 September and 15 October 2011.  
For the political arena, I interviewed senior JDP parliamentary deputies, including: 
Bülent Arınç, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey; Nureddin Nebati, Deputy for Istanbul and 
Member of the parliamentary Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, 
Information and Technology; Mustafa Ataş, Deputy for Istanbul, Chairman of the JDP’s 
Election Coordination Center, Member of the JDP’s Group Administrative Board, and Member 
of Parliament’s Examination of Human Rights Committee; Ünal Kacır, Deputy for Istanbul; 
Ayhan Sefer Üstün, Deputy for Sakarya and Chairman of Parliament’s Human Rights Inquiry 
Commission; Yaşar Karayel, deputy for Kayseri and Member of the Parliamentary Public 
Works, Development, Transportation and Tourism Commission; Metin Külünk, Deputy for 
Istanbul; Cemal Yılmaz Demir, Deputy for Trabzon; and Aziz Babuşcu, a representative of the 
JDP in local government and formerly the party’s Regional Chairperson for Istanbul.8 I also 
interviewed opposition Deputy Professor Süheyl Batum, the then CHP Deputy for Eskişehir 
and Member of the cross-party Constitutional Reconciliation Commission set up by the JDP 
government; and Ayşe Jale Ağırbaş, opposition former party deputy, and Vice President of the 
DSP.9 
For academic perspectives, I consulted: the renowned British specialist on Turkey, 
Professor William Hale of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of 
London; Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, Ankara Director of the German Marshall Fund of the United 
States; and Professor Othon Anastasakis, Director of South East European Studies at Oxford 
                                                 
8Please note that the JDP representatives held these positions when they attended the interview (2011). 
Currently some of them hold different positions. This also applies to other interviewees.  
9DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party). 
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University. Turkish academics interviewed included: Dr. Nilüfer Narlı, professor of political 
sociology in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Istanbul’s Bahçeşehir University; Dr. Eser 
Karakaş, professor of economics and Head of Bahçeşehir University's European Union 
department; Dr. Cengiz Aktar, professor in the Economic and Administrative Sciences 
Department of Bahçeşehir University and Chairman of the Department of EU Relations in 
Istanbul; Dr. Sabri Sayarı,10 professor of political science and international relations at 
Bahçeşehir University; and Dr. Burak Küntay, Director of the Institute of Social Sciences at 
Bahçeşehir University.11 
I also interviewed Ali Bulaç, the well-known intellectual and writer on Islam and 
contemporary Turkish politics, as well as a highly regarded columnist for Turkey’s national 
daily newspaper, Today’s Zaman, one of Turkey’s leading newspapers. Please refer to 
Appendix A for the list of the afore-mentioned interviewees. Also, please refer to Appendix B 
for the detailed questions I put to various Turkish parliamentarians, academics and 
commentators in Turkey during the period 5 September to 15 October 2011.  
The interviewees answered multiple-choice and open-ended questions on the JDP's 
position within the spectrum of Islamic political parties and its continuing ties, if any, with the 
National Outlook Movement. Questions also covered its reformist nature, political self-
identification with 'conservative democracy', relations with the media, and its involvement 
in the 2008 conspiracy charges against military officers (the Ergenekon case). The 
interviewees also commented on 'Kemalist secularism', and the 'hidden agenda' hypothesis that 
has followed the JDP since coming to power. 
In addition to the semi-structured interview method, this study is based on my analysis 
of the JDP’s official party programme and other party publications including statements and 
speeches of party leaders and officials, as well my survey of the publications of players, 
academics and comments in this area. I also reviewed interdisciplinary academic texts, 
                                                 
10Professor of Arts and Social Sciences of the Sabancı University (then) and Director of the Institute of Turkish 
Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Washington, DC and Chair of the Advanced 
Turkish Area Studies Seminar at the U.S State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (1994-2005), Member of 
Editorial Board of The Middle East Journal, Middle East Quarterly, South European Politics and Society, and 
Turkish Studies (ongoing). See: http://www.asmeascholars.org/professor-sabri-sayari/ [last accessed on 
19.02.2016]. 
11Dr. Burak Küntay is also President of the American Studies Centre, the International Leadership Application 
and Research Centre and, the Government and Leadership School at Bahçeşehir University.  
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newspaper and journal articles. The methodology used for this thesis does not include 
comparison with the democratisation process in other countries and for that reason it does not 
use quantitative techniques. This study does not define the democratisation process as a 
transition from authoritarian regime to advanced democracy, but as a transition from a 
democratic to a more democratic political environment. Turkey has been, despite setbacks, a 
democratic country since the introduction of a multi-party system in 1946. It has usually been 
categorised as a delegative12 or a hybrid democracy13 rather than a consolidated democracy.  
Throughout this study, liberal democracy is used as the main yardstick to measure 
Turkey’s democratisation progress in the period under study, a yardstick derived, sui generis, 
from the European Enlightenment. I have endeavoured to avoid a Eurocentric manner in my 
discussions. In addition, the JDP’s self-proclaimed identification with ‘the new conservative 
democracy’ is addressed as to its appropriateness in the Turkish setting and how much it 
informs Turkey’s democratisation process, as well as its validity in the wider context of 
political theory and literature. 
Outline of Chapters  
 Chapter 2 discusses the terms ‘democracy’, ‘democratisation’ and ‘secularism’ in order 
to provide historical and theoretical background for Turkey’s democratisation process under 
the rule of the JDP. Since the founding of modern Turkey in 1923, constitutional secularism 
has restricted the faith-based political aspirations of this deep-seated Islamic community within 
a republican constitutional framework that also guides Turkey’s ‘democratisation’ in its desire 
for modernisation.  
The need for societies to accommodate change through sustainable political 
arrangements is briefly discussed in the intoduction of Chapter 2. Democracy is one such 
political arrangement and liberal democracy a sub-set, one among many sub-sets, of 
democracy. I have chosen liberal democracy as my yardstick to ‘measure’ the JDP’s role in 
                                                 
12Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation 
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 181. 
13Can Turkey Consolidate Democracy?, 2, Available at:  
instructional1.calstatela.edu/tclim/f03_courses/550model1.pdf [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
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Turkey’s democratisation process but draw an important distinction between terms 
‘democracy’ and ‘liberal democracy’ for the purposes of this thesis.  
The ‘process of democratisation’ is discussed in Chapter 2 in light of the definitions 
and descriptions of leading political theorists such as Potter, Modelski and Perry III. The main 
theories identify the ‘drivers’ of democratisation including the roles of modernisation, elite-
orientated processes, external influences and political actors. The chapter discusses 
democratisation elsewhere and its relevance to Turkey. Chapter 2 also discusses the 
characteristics and development of secularism and its relationship with democratisation. I 
support the view that secularism is a sine qua non for democracy.  
 Chapter 3 examines democracy in Turkey. The examination of Turkey’s democracy is 
limited to its main contentious characteristics including: the role of Turkey’s military and 
military tutelage system in Turkish politics, as well as the bureaucratic manipulation of politics; 
the challenges of a secular constitutional framework in a faith-based society; and the ‘need’ for 
a new constitution. Turkey’s push for European Union membership and fledgling civil society 
are briefly discussed in this chapter in the context of human rights.  
Chapter 3 also looks at the Kemalist establishment of the new republic’s constitutional 
secularism and the development of Turkey’s democratisation process since the republic’s 
foundation. The chapter discusses the conflict between Turkey’s hard-core secularists, in their 
extreme anti political Islam standpoint, and Turkey’s conservative democrats who had held key 
roles in Turkey’s governments, military and bureaucracy since 1923. This is important because 
the thesis argues that the JDP from its inception in 2001, and for pragmatic political reasons 
including its own long term political survival, chose to manage and mitigate the resolution of 
this endemic conflict peacefully through the process of liberal democratisation. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the JDP itself. This includes the party’s formation as a result of 
its ‘official’ abandonment of political Islam by its founding members; the party’s political 
characterisation by others; and the JDP’s self-identification as ‘Conservative Democratic’. The 
chapter also addresses the ‘hidden agenda’ accusation that dogged the JDP since its inception. 
This accusation by its critics portrays the party as performing a game of dissimulation (takiyye) 
to achieve political legitimacy and sufficient political and constitutional power to realise its 
alleged ‘secret’ long term political objective, a political Islamic state. Is the ‘hidden agenda’ 
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real or something imagined by the JDP’s political opponents? If it is real, does it encompass 
the whole party or just those in the party who were yesterday’s genuine ‘fundamentalists’? If 
the latter, have they been biding their time, secure in place with the JDP’s continuing electoral 
successes since 2002 but well below the political ‘parapet’.  
 Chapter 5 sets out the JDP’s reforms, the subject of this thesis, from the party’s coming 
to power in November 2002 up to 2014, one year after the 2013 Taksim Gezi Park Protests. To 
analyse JDP rule and the reform process, firstly, its Democratic Opening Process is briefly 
addressed. The Democratic Opening Process, also known as the Unity and Fraternity project, 
was an initiative commenced by the JDP in 2009 to formally advance democratisation. It 
includes expansion of democratic freedoms and solutions to Turkey’s significant political 
issues in relation to the Kurds, Alevis, women and minorities, as well as economic issues that 
adversely impact on them. I then discuss the JDP’s Constitutional Reform Package, the 
September 12, 2010 Referendum and the debates on the proposed new constitution.  
Chapter 5 also includes an explanation of the democratisation reforms arising from the 
various EU harmonisation packages, and reforms of the military and civil-military relations in 
Turkey. The chapter discusses the situation of non-Muslim minorities and the new law for the 
protection of foreigners in the country. It addresses reforms in women’s rights, along with 
relaxation for civil society, and the reforms on human rights and freedom of expression.  
Chapter 6 sets out the events of 2013 that shook Prime Minister Erdoğan and his 
government. There is no doubt that 2013 was the JDP’s annus horribilis of its period-to-date 
in power. The events were the May Taksim Gezi Park demonstrations that spread throughout 
the nation, and the arrest of members of the Prime Minister’s close political entourage on 
corruption charges. It is the events’ underlying causes and the Prime Minister’s swift and 
egregious response that are relevant to this thesis. The relevance is the opportunity these two 
events provide to ‘road test’, in this thesis, the JDP’s democratisation programme, specifically 
the genuineness of the government’s reforms to date and, by implication, the party’s long term 
commitment to democratisation in Turkey.   
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Literature Review 
The literature on Turkey’s democratisation process under the rule of the JDP 
governments is extensive. Notable social scientists and writers such as William Hale, Ergun 
Özbudun, Ziya Öniş, Ümit Cizre, Ahmet T. Kuru, Carmen Rodriguez and Ömer Taşpınar have 
examined the JDP’s role in Turkish politics and its contribution to Turkish democracy.14 
Hale and Özbudun’s book, “Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case 
of the AKP [JDP]”, provides a broad analysis of the JDP’s political and social roots, policies, 
and its impact on Turkish politics and Turkey’s democratisation process. In Kuru’s review of 
the book, he states the authors portray the JDP as “a party of paradoxes, which constantly tries 
to keep a balance between generally contradictory processes”. Further, Hale and Özbudun 
argue that the JDP is not an Islamic democratic party but a party that represents the Turkish 
centre-right political tradition.15 They also propose that “the [JDP’s] commitment to liberal and 
pluralist values [would seem] stronger, and its sensibilities to religious values deeper than 
[other] centre-right parties”.16 I agree with the authors that the JDP had a strong commitment 
to liberal and pluralist values and this is supported by its actions in its first and second term in 
government. However, that commitment has been undermined by its subsequent actions. 
During its third term in power, and since June 2011, the JDP in government began to drift away 
from those values as it introduced measures in response to social unrest and internal threats to 
its political standing, measures that impinged on Turkey’s basic democratic rights and 
freedoms. I agree with Hale and Özbudun that the JDP appears to be more committed to 
religious values than the other centre right parties. Unlike other centre-right parties, the JDP 
openly declares ‘raising pious youth’ as a party goal and has an open agenda to make the 
Turkish public more conservative along religious lines.17 
Further, Hale and Özbudun posit that the vagueness of the JDP’s ideology, 
Conservative Democracy, may largely derive from the inherent ambiguity of ‘conservatism’ 
                                                 
14Further, political analyst Graham E. Fuller and academics such as Şerif Mardin, M. Hakan Yavuz, Ali Çarkoğlu 
and Binnaz Toprak analysed Democracy and Political Islam in Turkey, in relation to the JDP. All these intellectuals 
consider the JDP as an Islamic political party. 
15William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (New 
York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2010), 25. 
16Ibid.,27. 
17This is a similar argument with the one of Ziya Öniş.  
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since ‘conservatism’ developed in different forms “in different historical and cultural contexts” 
and does not have as an authoritative ideological blueprint compared with other political 
ideologies.18 The authors’ labelling of the JDP’s ideology as vague because of “inherent 
ambiguity” of conservatism does a disservice to conservatism. Unlike its extreme form 
(reactionarism), conservatism, like change, is a fundamental building block of necessary social 
development.  
In their book, Hale and Özbudun offer extensive analysis on the reform process 
undertaken by the JDP governments. They analyse the JDP’s democratisation reforms under 
several sub-categories including “freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of 
assembly, freedom of religion, prevention of torture and mistreatment, minority rights, 
international protection of human rights and civil-military relations” and emphasise the 
importance of the European Union in Turkey’s democratisation process.19 Further, they 
welcome the JDP’s desire for a new democratic constitution, its amendment of Article 301 of 
the Criminal Code relating to the denigration of the term ‘Turkishness’ and, “the adoption of a 
new, more liberal law on foundations (Law No. 5737, dated 20 February 2008) which replaced 
many restrictions on non-Muslim charitable foundations”. The book’s authors consider all 
these as “hopeful signs” for the “fate of the reform agenda”.20 They consider the 
democratisation reforms realised under the JDP as genuine and successful. However, they 
argue that the JDP, while taking important steps for the Turkish citizens with Kurdish ethnic 
origin, chose the “politics of avoidance” for the Turkish Alevi community, the significant Shi’a 
Muslim minority. The Alevis, comprising between 13% and 20% of the total population of 
Turkey, differ significantly from the Sunni Muslim majority in their religious practices and 
interpretation of Islam.21 In the field of minority cultural enhancement policies, the party’s 
                                                 
18Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP, 26. 
19Ibid., 57-62. 
20Ibid., 67. 
21Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Turkey: Alevis, 
2008, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749c9950.html [accessed 2 May 2015]. 
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attempts for its Alevi citizens did not go further than a “goodwill gesture”.22 The “Alevis’ 
justified expectations”23 remain unaddressed politically.24  
In the journal article entitled “Sharing power: Turkey’s democratization challenge in 
the age of the AKP [JDP] hegemony”,  
Ziya Öniş analyses the democratisation process under the JDP governments, from its 
coming to power in November 2002 to early 2013.25 Like Hale and Özbudun, Öniş puts 
emphasis on the role of the European Union as a catalyst for Turkey’s democratisation 
process.26 He argues that due mainly to the opportunity afforded by the enthusiastic EU 
accession policy of all governments since 1999, democratisation reforms undertaken by the 
coalition government (1999-2002) and the JDP government (2002-2004) have made Turkey 
more democratic than it was during the 1970s.27,28 Öniş considers the rise of the new Anatolian 
(conservative Islamic) business elites as a “challenge towards the dominance of the secular big 
business elite” and as an important step in transforming the Turkish system “towards a 
genuinely more pluralistic economic and political order”. He believes that “the elements of 
exclusion” of the old Kemalist regime were replaced by the “new elements of inclusion” under 
the leadership of the JDP government. He further considers the constitutional referendum held 
on 12 September 2010 as a challenge to the authoritarian legacy of the Kemalist regime’s 
military elites that established the current 1982 Constitution. He believes that, at the time, the 
                                                 
22Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP, 75-79. 
23Alevis’ expectations from the Turkish government are moderate. They seek official recognition of their 
community/worship venues (cemevi) and to make use of the same facilities as mosques. They demand the 
abrogation of the mandatory religious education at elementary and intermediary schools on the grounds that 
those courses are based on the indoctrination of Sunni Islamic teaching; If the abrogation cannot be realised, 
they expect, at least, the inclusion of the Alevi teachings to the religious course programme. Further, they 
demand the reorganisation of the Department for Religious Affairs (DIB) in a manner that also serves the Alevis. 
The DIB to date has exclusively promoted Sunni Hanafi Islamic teaching.  
24Ibid., 78-79. 
25Ziya Öniş, "Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony," Insight 
Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013): 103-22. Available at: http://www.insightturkey.com/sharing-power-turkeys-
democratization-challenge-in-the-age-of-the-akp-hegemony/articles/1419 [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
26Ibid., 105. 
27Ibid. 
28Refer additional discussion on the Kurds, Alevis and Non-Muslim minorities in Chapter 5, under section “Ethnic 
and Religious Diversity”.  
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constitutional referendum was “a genuine step towards further democratization” associated 
with the new constitution-making process.29 
Though acknowledging the genuine intentions of the JDP’s reforms, Öniş argues that 
Turkey’s democratisation drive under the JDP lost momentum after 2011 for a number of 
reasons. They included structural impediments such as the weak system of checks and balances 
in the Turkish political system, and the EU’s suspension of the accession negotiations relating 
to the Turkish judiciary and Turkey’s fundamental rights and freedoms. Other reasons, Öniş 
argues, included the poor leadership, and resulting mistakes, of the main opposition party, the 
Kemalist, liberal, left of centre CHP; and a decline in the support for EU membership among 
the elite and with the public. Öniş states that these ‘momentum losing’ factors need to be 
analysed using “a multi-dimensional holistic approach that tries to integrate structures and 
actors, domestic and external forces, rather than single-mindedly focusing on certain aspects 
while downplaying other crucial elements.”30 
Öniş is correct if only because his analytical template is all-encompassing. However, 
this approach merely shifts the critical aspect, causation, to the even harder subjective analysis 
of apportioning ‘weight’ to the many and varied elements that come in and out of play in 
political actions especially at the nation state level.  The “multi-dimensional holistic approach” 
is usually unwelcome in polarized political situations, no matter how fairly and appropriately 
put forward. The ‘tug of war’ between ruling leaders and those who aspire to take their place 
is as old as humanity and reflects the gregarious31 nature of the human condition. 
“Downplaying” that which does not serve one’s immediate political needs is ‘par for the 
course’ in politics which reinforces the need, as set out in this thesis in relation to Turkey, for 
established and effective principles of discourse and institutions that mitigate the natural 
excesses of day-to-day politics. 
Öniş further criticises the JDP’s “limited or majoritarian understanding of democracy” 
as another factor that led to the loss of momentum. He emphasises that a sort of “civilian 
                                                 
29Ziya Öniş, "Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony," 105-06.  
30Ibid., 104. 
31Gregarious “(mid-17th century), meaning ‘fond of company’, is also descended from grex, as are aggregate 
(Late Middle English) ‘herd together’;” Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/gregarious [accessed on 21.11.2015]. 
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tutelage” seems to have superseded the “military tutelage”. He suggests that the previous 
regimes’ restrictions on religious and conservative segments expressing their identity claims 
have been continued under JDP rule for several segments of Turkish society including 
“secularists or minority groups, such as the Alevites or others”.32 
Öniş lists other factors behind the decline in the JDP’s democratisation drive as: 
“controls over the press and freedom of expression; the lack of tolerance for opposition; the 
notorious [administrative] malfunctioning of the judicial system; long detention periods [for 
the Ergenekon suspects]; questions [regarding] the number of arrested people [due to] dubious 
connections to the alleged attempted coup process; [and as a result] the politicization of the 
judicial process”. Also, he states that the trials linked to the Ergenekon case,33 all under the 
JDP’s ‘watch’, demonstrated the lack of a “a genuinely autonomous” judiciary in Turkey,34 a 
crucial requirement, in his opinion, for the consolidation of Turkish democracy.35 It is fair to 
state however that the lack of genuinely autonomous judiciary in Turkey preceded the JDP by 
many decades.  
Öniş also criticises the JDP government for undertaking “large scale social 
engineering” to shape Turkish society in a more conservative manner and to allow an 
increasing role for Islamic cultural observances in public.36 Compared to the social engineering 
wreaked upon the Soviet Union in the 1930s and Cambodia in the 1970s by Stalin and Pol Pot, 
                                                 
32Ziya Öniş, "Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony," 107. 
33According to Freedom House: “Ergenekon is an alleged clandestine ultranationalist group that aims to 
overthrow the AKP. It is said to consist of elements of the military and police, terrorist or paramilitary groups, 
nongovernmental organizations, organized crime, journalists, politicians, judges, and government officials. 
While reminiscent of a conspiracy theory, Ergenekon is by no means the first such organization popularly 
believed to exist in Turkey. Clandestine nationalist organizations are said to have formed in the 1970s as a part 
of a CIA-backed effort to combat communism in Turkey, and continued to exert influence in Turkish society 
through criminal and political manipulation, including assassinations. Ergenekon is characterized as a successor 
of these elusive networks, dubbed the derin devlet, or ‘deep state,’ in the Turkish media. The current 
investigation began in June 2007, after an anonymous tip led police to a stash of explosives connected to two 
retired officers, whose computers allegedly contained information about an organization called Ergenekon. The 
resulting 2008 trial of 86 individuals, including retired senior military officers, was initially lauded as a success 
for civilian democracy.” See: E. P. Licursi, “The Ergenekon Case and Turkey’s Democratic Aspirations”, Freedom 
At Issue Blog, 7 February 2012, https://freedomhouse.org/blog/ergenekon-case-and-turkey%E2%80%99s-
democratic-aspirations#.VUgFvmOLTew [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
34The Ergenekon trials started on the 20th of October 2008. See: "Dokuz Soruda Ergenekon Davası [Ergenekon 
Case Explained in Nine Questions]," BBC Türkçe, 17 February 2013. Available at:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/ozeldosyalar/2013/02/130217_rengin_ergenekon [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
35Öniş, "Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony," 107. 
36Ibid., 108. 
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respectively, Öniş’s “large scale social engineering” characterisation of the JDP appears 
exaggerated in absolute terms. In an article on the 2013 Gezi movement, Nilüfer Göle discusses 
the restrictive measures taken by the JDP government which “have put a muzzle on public 
discourse” and led to the shrinkage of public space and “invasion of personal space”.37 These 
measures include restrictions on the freedom of expression and the media, and harassment of 
opponents, especially journalists some of whom have lost their positions.38 Further, the JDP 
made “moralizing intrusions” such as: a warning against “a young couple kissing on a subway 
in Ankara”; and limitations on the sale and promotion of alcohol. These measures were 
interpreted as the beginning of the government’s unofficial plans to “organize public life to 
align with Islamic values”.39 It is not that I disagree with Göle’s interpretation of the 
government’s “moralising intrusions”, but they are open to other interpretations. For example, 
the JDP government may have been merely giving a ‘nod’ to its political hinterland to show 
that it is ‘keeping the faith’, albeit in words only. But more importantly, and as part of the party 
leadership’s ‘democratisation’ balancing act posited by this thesis, a ‘nod’ to counter the latent 
but inevitable pressures from within the broader party and the government apparatus to take 
bolder pro political Islamic measures; pressures that were latent up to December 2013. 
Öniş also emphasises the importance of a new civil democratic constitution “for the 
consolidation of liberal democracy”, and to achieve this he believes there is a need, inter alia, 
for a consensus among “religious conservatives” and “secularists” with regard to “the 
implementation of secularism”.40 This consensus, he argues, “would facilitate genuine 
pluralism rather than limited pluralism under a majoritarian understanding of democracy, 
where the majority increasingly feels empowered to restrict the rights of various minorities”.41  
Likewise, Ömer Taşpınar, in his article “The End of the Turkish Model”, criticises the 
JDP’s “majoritarian and electoral conceptualisation of democracy” on the grounds that it is far 
beyond “the idea that liberal views should be legally protected and that minorities should have 
                                                 
37Nilüfer Göle, "Gezi – Anatomy of a Public Square Movement," no. 3:10. 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid. 
40According to Öniş, this would mean that “the weight of religion in public life as well as the mutual toleration 
of groups of different persuasions [will lead to] that all groups would be entitled to protection under the law as 
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some influence on policymaking”. This conceptualisation rather takes “the will of the majority” 
as a basis.42 Taşpınar claims that Turkish democracy, like “most [other] new democracies [such 
as] Thailand, Argentina and Hungary” “tend to be illiberal” since they lack established 
institutions and legal infrastructure “to divide power between the executive, legislative and 
judicial branches of government [and] to protect constitutional rights and liberties” effectively. 
Taşpınar argues that although Turkey is a democracy with “[its] elections and majority 
representation in parliament”, it does not sufficiently protect “minority and individual rights”.43  
Öniş and Taşpınar argue that ‘democracy’ is not limited to periodic elections in between 
which the parliamentary majority rules regardless, but it protects minority and individual rights 
foremost and continuously. I agree with the authors even though the argument, naturally, is 
more complex. Elected governments have to be allowed to govern,44,45 though at times the 
mandate some receive from their last winning election does not herald, let alone support, the 
radical policies they implement once in office; a local case in point being the 4th Labour 
Government in New Zealand between 1984 and 1993.46 
There is a consensus among intellectuals that the JDP has played a crucial role in 
dramatically reducing the presence of the military in civilian government in Turkey and 
eliminating the military tutelage system in the country and the paradigm that made it possible. 
In his article entitled “The Justice and Development Party and the military: recreating the past 
after reforming it”, Ümit Cizre offers an analytical framework for addressing the changing 
nature and route of the government-military relations since 2002. He discusses “the JDP 
                                                 
42Omer Taspinar, "The End of the Turkish Model," Survival 56, no. 2 (2014): 52. 
43Ibid., 59. 
44“Governments, especially democratically elected governments must be allowed to govern. The implication is 
that power-holders need to have powers to exercise; and must enjoy some discretion. The scope to exercise 
choices means an opportunity to make mistakes - which is why adequate institutions of accountability must exist 
and function well. But we cannot expect those institutions to eliminate the condition that makes their existence 
necessary.” Peter Burnell, ”The Relationship of Accountable Governance and Constitutional Implementation 
with Reference to Africa,” Journal of Politics and Law Vol 1, No 3 (September 2008): 22 
45Notwithstanding the robust constitutional checks and balances in the US Constitution, the political ‘gridlock’ 
in Washington since the current President took office in 2008 indicates that partisan politics can use those checks 
and balances in a manner that frustrates the spirit of that constitution. Refer: Thomas E. Mann “American 
Gridlock: Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of Polarization,” Keynote Address on Congress and 
Polarization, American University Conference, May 9, 2014: 2-3.  
46Jack Nagel, “Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalization in New Zealand,” 
British Journal of Political Science, 28(2). Cambridge University Press: 223–67. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/194306 [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
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government’s policy on the military” on the basis of two distinct time frames each having 
“opposite contents and outcomes”. The first time frame covers roughly the period from the 
JDP’s coming to power in November 2002 to the start of the accession negotiations with the 
European Union in October 2005. In this phase, factors such as “the JDP’s democratic 
mandate” and “the dynamism of the 2002 electoral process” paved the way for the curtailment 
of military prerogatives and tutelage as a main part of government’s “reform agenda”. To this 
end, as discussed later in this thesis, the government passed an important constitutional 
amendment, under the framework of the democratisation package of 7th August 2003, to reduce 
the powers of the National Security Council (NSC) and bring the civil-military relations into 
line with EU norms.47 
In the second phase from October 2005 until early 2008, Cizre points out that the JDP’s 
drive for democratisation slowed down and its will to continue reform of the military 
weakened. No doubt, Cizre asserts, the EU’s increasing resistance to Turkey’s membership 
was an important factor behind this process which stemmed, officially, from the then reported 
EU official accession concerns centred on the reported violations of fundamental rights and 
freedoms in Turkey. Cizre considers a further important factor was the increasing “chasm 
between Turkey and the EU and the USA” caused by “the JDP’s [ineffective] domestic and 
foreign policy discourse”.48 In this process, the Government prioritised “the state-centred 
security considerations” rather than “human security” and espoused a “hard-line approach 
towards the Kurdish question, Northern Iraq and the EU accession norms”.49  
In the book “Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey”,50 the editors, Ahmet T. 
Kuru and Alfred Stepan, included essays from contributors to conferences held at Columbia 
University in 2008 and 2009.51 The editors promote the collection of essays as a unique, non-
                                                 
47Ümit Cizre, "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming It?," in 
Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. Umit Cizre (Oxford 
& New York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2008), 132-33. 
48Ibid., 133. 
49Ibid. 
50Ahmet Kuru and Alfred Stepan, Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012). 
51"Changing Turkey in a Changing World: Analyzing Turkish Politics and Society within a Global Context," Book 
Review: Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred Stepan (eds.) “Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey” reviewed by Nikos 
CHRISTOFIS (2012), http://changingturkey.com/2012/09/17/book-review-ahmet-t-kuru-and-alfred-stepan-eds-
democracy-islam-and-secularism-in-turkey-reviewed-by-nikos-christofis/  
[last accessed on 19.02.2016].  
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stereotypical perspective within a broad and informative framework that analyses 
contemporary Turkey in comparative political and historical frameworks. The editors used a 
wide range of specialists who together, the editors assert, comprehensively address Turkey’s 
contemporary political evolution by analysing its key social and political systems to provide a 
comprehensive understanding. The book includes an essay by Özbudun on the constitution-
making process in Turkey. 
In his essay, Özbudun criticises the current 1982 Constitution for lacking democratic 
principles and giving supremacy to the state over its citizens.52 He sets out how, in his opinion, 
the Turkish state, at the time, used the 1982 Constitution and the mechanisms behind the 
constitution to protect itself against the unwanted actions of its citizens. He asserts how the 
Turkish state narrowed down “the legitimate area of democratic politics” by strengthening the 
state authority “at the expense of individual liberties” 53 The Turkish state unfairly stigmatised 
those with political Islam associations.54 In this regard, the JDP from its inception through to 
date has been similarly stigmatised for being Islamist by its opponents. In 2012, the year in 
which Özbudun’s essay was published, the JDP’s public intentions for further democratisation 
in Turkey would have been praiseworthy and supports Özbudun’s argument at the time. 
However, it would no longer be realistic to make a statement of that nature today given the 
JDP’s drift away from democratic reforms since 2012, regardless of the reasons for the retreat. 
However in politics, events can bring about political reactions from governments in the short 
term that contradict their long term intentions but do not necessarily indicate a change in the 
latter. 
One of the most recent academic works that covers the scope of my thesis is the 2013 
published book: “Turkey’s Democratization Process” which is edited by Carmen Rodriguez, 
Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yilmaz and Ana I. Planet. The book includes essays by distinguished 
contemporary Turkish, English, French, and Spanish scholars.55 The book uses methodological 
                                                 
52Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Constitutional Court and Political Crisis," in Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in 
Turkey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 149. 
53Ibid., 151-53. 
54Ibid., 160. 
55Carmen Rodriguez et al., Turkey's Democratization Process (Oxford: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern 
Politics, 2014). 
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pluralism to comprehensively analyse the complex process of democratisation in Turkey since 
1980.56 The theoretical framework of J.J. Linz and A.C. Stepan is used throughout the book.57  
Linz and Stepan’s framework for analysis of democratic transition and consolidation 
comprises the following interrelated questions: Do the basic legal and socio-economic 
conditions foster the development of a free and participant society; is there a relatively 
autonomous political society in the country; are legal guarantees provided for the various 
freedoms of the citizens; does the state bureaucracy positively respond to the democratic 
government; and is the nature and momentum of the society’s economic development 
conducive to the process and progress of democratisation? 
In their analysis, Rodriguez and colleagues use Freedom House’s categorisation of 
Turkey in terms of “political rights and civil liberties” which scores the country with three 
points out of the total seven points for the year 2012.58 They state that Turkey has a relatively 
long experience with ‘a form’ of democracy, a firmly established institutional framework and 
an active civil society. However, its democratic resilience had been weakened by military 
involvement in constitutional civil government as well as unconstitutional military 
interventions resulting, inter alia, in harsh restrictions being placed on the exercise of “political 
liberties and fundamental rights” up to mid-2007.59 They further criticise the extant 1982 
Constitution for bestowing a role for the military that dramatically restricted “individual rights 
and freedoms”. As a result, Turkey has gone through “an incomplete transition” in its transition 
to genuine and sustainable democracy and finds itself in a democratisation stage the authors 
describe as a “defective democracy”. This ‘defective’ democracy included elements of 
                                                 
56The term “methodological pluralism” could be defined as an “approach that advocates flexibility in the 
selection of social research methods, based on the principle of choosing the most suitable methods for the 
nature of the problem being researched.” In a broader sense, “methodological pluralism calls on the researcher 
to be tolerant of other people's preferred methods even when they differ from one's own.” For more 
information see: Geoff Payne, "Methodological Pluralism," in The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods, 
ed. Victor Jupp (SAGE 2006). Available at:  
http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-sage-dictionary-of-social-research-methods/n117.xml [last accessed on 
19.02.2016]. 
57Rodriguez et al., Turkey's Democratization Process, 9. See also: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: South America, Southern Europe, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
58In this categorisation of political rights and civil liberties, the score 1 represents ‘the most free’ and 7 ‘the least 
free’. See: Rodriguez et al., Turkey's Democratization Process, 8. 
59Ibid.  
See also: Ahmet T. Kuru, "The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and 
Communism," Insight Turkey 14, no. 2 (2012): 38-39. 
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“tutelary democracy” whereby the non-elected military establishment maintained reserved 
domain over parts of the government apparatus and held a veto in other parts, creating an 
“illiberal democracy” which placed harsh restrictions on “public freedoms and fundamental 
rights”, as well as “the effective rule of law”.60 The authors also mention the ban on political 
parties following the 1980 intervention,61 “institutional weakness” and “[the] lack of will and 
conviction” which altogether inhibited reforms to the political system. However, they express 
their conviction that reforms could be possible, even if limited in scope.62 
Rodriguez and colleagues underline the role of the European Union as a driving force 
behind Turkey’s democratisation process, in particular the decision of the Helsinki European 
Council which recognised Turkey as an EU candidate country in 1999 and accelerated the 
reform process in the country. Following that decision, substantial political and economic 
reforms were undertaken by the coalition government and by its successor, the JDP, the latter 
“with even greater intensity”. As a result, the political system opened up with public dialogue 
for the first time on issues such as the Kurdish question, issues that up to then had been 
considered taboo in Turkey. At the time, “the political elite and society” collaborated to further 
democratise the country.63 To this end, the attendant but necessary democratic requirements 
for accession have been used by successive Turkish governments, including the JDP, to further 
the non-EU parts of their own domestic political agendas. 
As Rodriguez and colleagues state, following the end of the 1980 military intervention 
internal and external factors played a crucial role in supporting Turkey’s democratisation 
process. An important example was the democracy-related demands made by women’s 
associations that paved the way for reforms of the civil and penal code in relation to women 
and gender issue. The European Union, as an external catalyst, played an important role in this 
transformation process.64 Despite the fact that the current Constitution of Turkey had been 
amended several times in favour of further democratisation, the introduction of a new civil 
democratic constitution remains essential in the opinion of the authors.65 Piecemeal 
                                                 
60Rodriguez et al., Turkey's Democratization Process, 8. 
61These political parties re-emerged in the Turkish political arena “over the course of a decade” after 1981. For 
more information see: Helen Chapin Metz, "Military Intervention and the Return to Civilian Rule," in Turkey: A 
Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Washington: U.S. Library of Congress, 1995).  
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constitutional reform eventually requires the imprimatur of consolidation to confirm the new 
era. 
In line with Öniş’s argument, Rodriguez and colleagues further point out that Turkey’s 
democratisation drive slowed down after the EU accession negotiations started in 2005. Several 
factors caused this loss of momentum including: Germany, France and Austria’s offer for a fast 
tracked, privileged partnership in lieu of full EU membership, seen in Turkey as a ‘second best’ 
rejection; and some “policies of the governing [JDP]” which failed in building “a legal and 
social framework” for the improvement of the freedom of expression in Turkey. The authors 
quote from Keyman that the JDP could not establish a dynamic equilibrium between its desire 
for democratic consolidation and the conservative character of the party in its second term. As 
a result, scepticism arouse about its capacity to maintain its programme of reform. 
For example, Rodriguez and colleagues state that the JDP’s ‘erratic policies’ phase was 
partly a consequence of the party’s response to the charge that its ‘intense’ democratisation 
policy was threatening Turkey’s “territorial and secular integrity”, the bedrock of successive 
constitutions since the establishment of the republic in 1923. The opposition claimed that the 
JDP’s policy opened Turkey to a pluralistic society which threatened the security of Turkey as 
‘one nation’. This could be considered a natural response, given that for any political party, 
whether in government or opposition, the charge of endangering national security is serious.66 
In an attempt to counter this charge the JDP, under a narrative of national security, signalled a 
slowing down of its reform momentum, a not uncommon tactical retreat in day-to-day politics.  
The authors also state that the JDP’s emphasis on democratisation, and the build-up of 
this policy’s momentum through its first two terms of office, triggered the re-emergence of a 
familiar Turkish polarisation – a polarisation between those groups in Turkish society that had 
in the recent past emphasised “greater democratic reforms [and] pluralism” and those who 
judged all major political proposals from a security based perspective to protect the country’s 
territorial integrity. The security based perspective is not inappropriate for a relatively young 
                                                 
66National security is an area of government that is carried out continuously and without fanfare, usually behind 
‘closed doors’. When domestic players resort to violence to achieve political objectives (as examples, the PKK in 
Turkey from 1984 and the IRA in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1998) national security becomes a 
significant political issue for the government, the political opposition and other domestic actors. In these 
situations, all actors are affected by the domestic law and order equivalent of the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ 
phenomenon and for politicians in particular, to be seen not taking national security seriously, can have 
significant adverse political consequences for them. 
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republic confronted with a significant minority, the Kurds, who want political and territorial 
independence, a few of them by violent means. Further, the potential contagious aspect of 
Turkey’s Kurdish issue for other minorities would also inform this perspective. This 
polarisation had been temporarily ‘buried’ under state pressure since the 1980 military 
intervention but the JDP’s greater push for democratisation in its first two terms has “forced 
[both sides] to openly confront their unresolved [...] conflicts.” In order for Turkish 
democratisation to succeed, these societal groups had to avoid exacerbating internal tensions 
and build a dialogue for peaceful co-existence. The nature and extent of this resolution will 
determine the quality and sustainability of democracy in Turkey.67 
I agree with the contention that the JDP, and in particular party leader Erdoğan, who is 
the dominant figure in the party, has exhibited an authoritarian trend. This trend supports Ayla 
Gol’s statement that “[Erdoğan]’s divisive and increasingly authoritarian policies pose a 
serious threat to Turkish democracy and secularism”. According to Gol, President Erdoğan’s 
“increasing personal power since his ascendance to the presidency in 2014” was the major 
driving force behind his increasing authoritarianism.68 While Yesilada agrees with Gol that he 
is authoritarian, Yesilda argues that his authoritarian intentions became apparent earlier than 
2014 through his political actions since the 2007 presidential election. Yesilada notes that soon 
after that election, the then Prime Minister clearly expressed his intention to establish a 
presidential system in Turkey “with extensive decision-making powers”.69 It can be argued that 
this significant proposal to establish a politically substantive presidential system in Turkey 
would mean replacement of Turkey’s current and well established parliamentary system with 
an untested new system. The current system is substantially parliamentary with a non-political, 
constitutional presidency. By untested, I mean not given adequate time to implement 
progressively such a significant change and, with time, the opportunity to evaluate and refine 
safeguards. This poses a significant risk to Turkey’s democratisation momentum and gains to 
date. 
                                                 
67Rodriguez et al., Turkey's Democratization Process, 9. 
68Ayla Gol, “Turkey’s Clash of Islamists: Erdogan vs Gülen”, openDemocracy, 3 August 2016. Available at: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/dr-ayla-gol/turkey-s-clash-of-islamists-erdogan-vs-g-len 
69Birol A. Yeşilada, “The future of Erdoğan and the AKP”, Turkish Studies 17, no. 1 (2016): 23. 
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According to Menderes Çinar and Çagkan Sayin, “[Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
authoritarianism] entailed a tendency to […] monopolize power and degrade the rest, defined 
as the elite or White Turks.”70 The authors further stated: 
The [JDP] elevated itself above the partisan politics, 
spared itself from political criticism, dismissed the 
opposition as redundant, and thereby wanted to dictate 
the terms of legitimate political debate in a self-
righteous and unilateralist manner. Other than 
dismantling the tutelary power structure, the [JDP’s] 
practice of normalization-cum-democratization 
entailed (1) delivering justice primarily by way of 
restoring/privileging the previously repressed/excluded 
identity and degrading the previously superior one, (2) 
generating supposedly non-political and non-
ideological resolutions to socio-political problems and 
(3) establishing an exclusive power structure based on 
a network of friendly or auxiliary organizations. In all 
these three aspects of ‘democratization’, the [JDP] has 
deployed populist dichotomies to legitimize its policies 
and eroded whatever ground existed for going beyond 
the limits of the paradigm of democracy.” 71 
 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s authoritarian trend included the age-old and undemocratic 
tactic of ‘silencing the opposition’. To this end, his government “used excessive force against 
the opposition forces in the country” including his reaction to the Gezi Park events of May/June 
2013; the arrest of hundreds of journalists; increased electronic surveillance of citizens by laws 
without judicial oversight or recourse; imprisonment of hundreds of senior military officers 
arising from unsafe judicial processes; and the dismissal of thousands of police officers, state 
prosecutors and judges on the basis of alleged ‘Gülen’ associations.72 Opposition acting legally 
is a vital component of liberal democratic nation states. Silencing the opposition, in whatever 
legal and non-violent form that opposition takes, is inimical to the maintenance and 
development of liberal democracy. 
Although Prime Minister, now President, Erdoğan shows an authoritarian tendency in 
his political actions, it would still not be appropriate to posit that he is a dictator, neo-fascist or 
                                                 
70Menderes Çinar and Çagkan Sayin, “Reproducing the Paradigm of Democracy in Turkey: Parochial 
Democratization in the Decade of Justice and Development Party”, Turkish Studies 15, no.3 (2014): 376.  
71Ibid., 376-7. 
72Birol A. Yeşilada, “The future of Erdoğan and the AKP”, Turkish Studies 17, no.1 (2016): 23. 
  
   27 
 
totalitarian, since there is no conclusive evidence supporting any of these assertions. It can be 
argued that his authoritarian trend is in part, a substantive part, due to the many and diverse 
threats to the Republic arising from internal terrorism and, the direct and immediate military, 
political, social and economic adverse consequences of the Syrian civil war. In this regard, I 
disagree with Cihan Tugal’s assertion that Turkey has slid from “soft to hard totalitarianism”.73 
 
Contribution to the Field 
The most prominent contribution of this study to the academic field is the interviews I 
conducted in 2011, and the main findings derived from them. 
This study provides a new framework for the analysis of Turkey’s democratisation 
process under JDP governments after 2002. This framework allows for a relevant and up-to-
date analysis of the progress of Turkey’s democratisation process, and the role played by the 
JDP, through this period both at the micro and macro political levels, in the short term and in 
the medium to long terms. This case study also facilitates an understanding of the main drivers 
of the JDP policies and political actions, specifically its promotion of democratisation in 
Turkey since its coming to power.  
Understanding the JDP’s main ‘drivers’ is of fundamental importance because the 
current JDP leadership, whilst publicly espousing, both in words and actions, secularism, grew 
up in the ‘kindergarten’ of political Islam. The party is an openly Islam-friendly party.74 
Anything less would be seen as disingenuous from within party and from outside, at home and 
abroad. As my thesis sets out, being genuine in its democratic intentions, even where the ends 
justify the means,75 is the realpolitik core of the Erdoğan-led JDP. 
                                                 
73Cihan Tugal, “In Turkey, the regime slides from soft to hard totalitarianism”, openDemocracy, 17 February 
2016. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/cihan-tugal/turkey-hard-totalitarianism-erdogan-
authoritarian 
74Having come from the core of political Islam in Turkey, the JDP leadership would be ‘beggaring belief’ if they 
espoused a new political outlook that is 180 degrees from where they used to be. Being “openly Islam friendly” 
gives a nod to the JDP’s political hinterland without endangering its appeal to Turkey’s political middle ground. 
75The JDP will take ‘temporary’ undemocratic actions in order to maintain power so that it can progress its 
political strategy of establishing a more advanced democratic nation than it inherited. Its desire for stability (to 
resolve in time the secular/ political Islam tensions) through democratisation is allied to its belief that stability 
will keep it at the centre of political power in Turkey for the long term. It sees the economic ‘train wreck’ that is 
Iran, and the dire consequences of electoral success for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and believes well 
established “democratisation’, in time, will avoid both scenarios in Turkey and allow the party to prosper.  
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Though the JDP upholds and welcomes Muslim aspirations it has, at the same time, 
undertaken significant democratic reforms, at least until its third term in power, and, it 
represented the co-existence of democracy and Islam in the Middle East, and to the Middle 
East, up to 2012. As a result, the party gained high esteem within the Islamic world and the 
West.  
While much academic work has been published on Turkey’s democratisation process 
under the JDP, stemming mainly from its ‘test case’ co-existence of secular democracy with a 
vibrant Islamic culture, the events of 2013 provide a real-time opportunity to ‘road test’ the 
genuineness of the JDP’s democratic credentials and its long term intentions. Like a prism that 
breaks up white light into its constituents coloured parts, so the JDP’s response to the 
unexpected events of 2013 allows a window-in on the party’s, or, maybe more accurately, its 
current leadership’s core drivers. The government’s response, necessary or disproportionate, 
was anti-democratic and, for some, was evidence of a tipping point towards an authoritarian 
JDP under the leadership of Prime Minister Erdoğan. I believe the analysis of the latter’s 
response to the events of 2013 should be more nuanced than ‘one day democrat, the next day 
authoritarian leader’: it has to be. The party’s leadership under Erdoğan has not come this far 
down the democratisation road to throw it all away in a bolthole labelled ‘authoritarianism’.76 
The events of 2013 in Turkey, the Taksim Gezi Park demonstration and subsequent 
national protests and riots, the corruption allegations that enveloped some senior JDP 
government ministers, and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s response, provide an opportunity to 
review the JDP democratisation programme. My conclusion is that though the events of 2013 
have indeed dented the government’s credentials in this important area for Turkey, the 
underlying long term political strategy of the party leadership remains in place and that is to 
maintain the momentum of democratisation.  
The JDP, led by then party leader Erdoğan, took the strategic political view at its 
formation in 2001 that Turkey, in steering between radical secularism and political Islam, 
needed stronger democratic institutions and personal liberties in order to become the regional 
power that its size, history and ‘new’ geo-political location demanded. Turkey’s EU accession 
                                                 
76See: Daniel Dombey, "Turkey’s Erdogan Lurches Towards Authoritarianism," The Financial Times, 6 May 2014. 
See also: Murat Akser and Banu Baybars-Hawks, "Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Model of Neoliberal 
Media Autocracy," Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 5, no. 3 (2012). 
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process is a key foundation of this regional aspiration. This strategic view is premised on the 
belief that both political extremes, if not moderated by well established-democratic institutions 
and a liberal democratic culture, albeit ‘conservative’ in nature, will consign Turkey to a 
continuation of the same military-political ups and downs of the first ninety years of the 
Republic’s existence. Such an outcome would further delay Turkey’s structural economic 
progress and would undermine its role at the region’s top table.77 
The historical development of democracy over the past four centuries, mainly in 
Western Europe and then in the ‘new world’ of North America, has been slow and at times 
violent. ‘Democratisation’ is the process of nation states becoming democratic and like all 
paradigm shifts in societal arrangements comes at a cost, even failure. Nation states change to 
meet changing needs in order to continue as nation states. Why nation states change is not the 
subject of this thesis and I have premised my analysis of Turkey’s democratisation under the 
JDP governments on the basis that the need for change is axiomatic to maintain nation states 
successfully and sustainably.  
Failure to change can lead to political, economic and social impoverishment for the 
community as a whole or significant parts of it. In societies with significant unresolved political 
issues, I argue in this thesis that increasing democratisation over time is the political 
arrangement that best achieves sustainable compromise with the best ‘tools’ to minimise risk 
of failure in the medium to long term.  
My review has identified a gap in the literature. The gap is the lack, or unwillingness, 
to consider the JDP leadership’s promotion of democratisation as genuine; a ‘promotion’ that 
recognises liberal democracy as the best political arrangement to steer Turkey away from the 
‘stop go’ democratisation of its republican past in order to address its current political and 
diplomatic challenges. These challenges arise from Turkey’s significant geo-political position 
that has increasing, and conflicting, regional and global interests. This is a pragmatic 
‘promotion’ of liberal democracy by the JDP and not based on the ideals that underpin this 
form of government. In addition, the literature reviewed in this thesis, as a consequence of this 
                                                 
77See: JDP’s Party Programme, “II. Fundamental Rights and Political Freedoms: 2.5. Democratization and Civil 
Society”, https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
See also: William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, "The AKP’s Ideology: Conservative Democracy," in Islamism, 
Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (New York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern 
Politics, 2010), 27-28. 
  
   30 
 
‘gap’, fails to acknowledge that the JDP has adopted liberal democracy because the latter 
provides the best political arrangement to reconcile Turkey’s secular constitutional framework 
with its faith based community at a time when radical political Islam has re-emerged. 
Further, the existing works on Turkey’s democratisation process under the JDP 
generally focus on specific periods such as 2002 to 2005, 2005 to 2011, or 2011 to 2014. 
However, in this thesis, these periods have been taken together as a whole and have been dealt 
with comprehensively in an all-inclusive manner. The timeframe for the analysis is determined 
as the period in which the JDP has been in power in Turkey, though excludes the years 2015 
and 2016. Thus it is the period between 2002 and 2014. 
Based on the evidence of this thesis, I believe the JDP, under Erdoğan’s leadership, has 
a democratic outlook for Turkey. It is a pragmatic outlook and not one imbued with the high 
ideals of the European Enlightenment. It is an outlook that looks to achieve political stability 
for Turkey, with the minimum of risk over the medium to long term if it is allowed to continue 
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Chapter 2: DEMOCRATISATION, DEMOCRACY AND SECULARISM 
Introduction 
In this chapter I define and discuss the terms democracy and democratisation as 
background for the objectives of this thesis, and the term secularism which, for some, is a sine 
non qua for the establishment of democracy. This chapter discusses these terms in general; in 
Chapter 3, I discuss these terms specifically in relation to Turkey. 
 Democracy is an ideal that can take many forms. Though this statement may appear 
contradictory, it has validity because nation states arrive at the present in significantly different 
stages of economic and social development. If we accept Aristotle’s concept of societal change 
as a journey of improvement to the ‘ideal’78 and the concept of permanent change in the affairs 
of human development as espoused by Heraclitus79 , then the ‘ideal’ political arrangement can 
never be attained by nation states. If this is so, then it is the process of becoming democratic, 
‘democratisation’, that is the real-world measure of democracy at any given time in the affairs 
of a nation state.  
Nation states compete for resources80 and develop political arrangements, both 
domestic and international, that best achieve their individual resource needs. Successful 
political arrangements allow nation states to meet their needs in the face of changing 
circumstances. Democracy is a form of political arrangement that has many sub-sets some of 
which are discussed later in this chapter. Nation states need to accommodate inevitable change 
in their competition for resources. Liberal democracy is a political arrangement that addresses, 
with manageable risk, the constant that is change in the affairs of nation states. Liberal 
democracy is the political arrangement that I have chosen as my yardstick in this thesis to 
measure the democratisation progress of Turkey’s JDP governments in the period 2002 to 
2014. 
It is important to root the JDP’s pragmatic political strategy of promoting its form of 
liberal democracy in something more than short term political expediency that its critics portray 
                                                 
78Miller, Fred, "Aristotle's Political Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/aristotle-politics/>. 
79Graham, Daniel W., "Heraclitus", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/heraclitus/. Section 3.1 Flux. 
80Micheal T. Klare (2007), “Resource Competition in the 21st Century”, Vol.3 Part 3, 293-301. 
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as its primary motivation. Political expediency and the search for the ‘sunny uplands’ of 
sustainable national stability are not mutually exclusive. The JDP government, in striving for 
Turkey’s rightful place at the crossroad between the old world (the Hellenistic Middle East) 
and the new world (post Roman Europe) and long overdue structural economic reforms, sought 
stability; stability that was at risk because of the still tangible and significant tensions between 
a constitutionally secular Turkey and domestic political Islam. 
Democratisation 
This section of Chapter 2 surveys the meaning, drivers, indicators and various scholarly 
views on the word ‘democratisation’ that is the key word in the title and the objective of this 
thesis in relation to Turkey’s JDP government. I define and elaborate on the word 
‘democratisation’ as I use it in my thesis in order to assess the JDP government’s success in 
the period 2002 to 2014, in promoting ‘democratisation’ in Turkey. I consider why 
‘democratisation’ is a good political process that nation states should aspire to, in particular, 
nations like Turkey that became democracies in relatively recent times having seen the slow, 
and at times violent, democratisation of some European countries since the late 18th century. 
When others pave the way, it is sensible to benefit from their experience. However, when 
building democratic institutions and a culture of democratic checks and balances, nation states 
need long lead times to get it right sustainably, and even then regression can be all too common. 
Meaning of Democratisation 
 The academic Rüya Lüleci explained the dynamic nature of democratisation as 
follows: “If we understand the concept of democracy as something that can be placed on a 
continuum, it is better to understand democratisation as a process that can be ever on-going”81 
She further stated that ‘democratisation’ occurred as movement along this continuum that 
traversed from authoritarian through to fully functioning and effective representative 
government. There is much along this continuum in the real world of nation states and, for any 
given state at any given time, the ‘traversing’ can be in either direction. If ‘democratisation’ 
implies progress, then going backwards along Lüleci’s continuum can be described as ‘de-
democratisation’. The latter was applicable to some post-colonial African states, former USSR 
                                                 
81Rüya Lüleci, "International Dimension of Democratization: The Impact of EU Credibility on Democratic 
Consolidation of Turkey" (Master's thesis, Bilkent University, 2008), 16. 
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satellite countries and North African and Middle East states. According to Potter’s definition, 
“the word ‘democratisation’, in the most general sense, refers to political changes moving in a 
democratic direction”.82 Supporting Potter’s definition, Renwick understood democratisation 
as “the outcome of complex, contingent and prolonged processes of interaction among actors 
and between actors and context”.83 Grugel, however, regarded the term solely as “the 
establishment of sets of governing institutions”.84 
University of Washington academics, Modelski and Perry III, described 
democratisation as follows: 
Democratization is the process of building, or creating, 
democracy. That process, too, moves along two 
distinguishable, if related, paths: wherever democratic 
techniques of macro-decision are discovered and spread, a 
process of diffusion of these innovations occurs. 
Alternatively, we see it also as the process by which 
democratic communities grow, via a form of clustering (or 
concentration) into larger communities of democracy; for 
the evolution of new types of community, too, is a form of 
innovation. The two processes are obviously 
interdependent: the diffusion of democratic procedures will 
produce no more than `formal' democracy unless rooted in, 
and nourished by, conditions of greater equality and 
freedom, where procedural rights are effectively exercised 
and are seen to work; a society of equality and freedom 
cannot last without observing democratic procedures.85  
Democratisation can be divided into three phases: the liberalisation phase, being the 
initial phase when political restrictions are removed and the former “authoritarian 
regime…crumbles”; a transition phase, evidenced by “regime change...often [brought about] 
when the first competitive elections are held”; and the consolidation phase, when most relevant 
                                                 
82David Potter, "Explaining Democratization," in Democratization, ed. David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul 
Lewis (Malden: Polity Press/Open University, 1997), 3. 
83Alan Renwick, "Why Hungary and Poland Differed in 1989: The Role of Medium-Term Frames in Explaining the 
Outcomes of Democratic Transition," Democratisation 13, no. 1 (2006): 36. 
84Jean Grugel, "The Changing Significance of Transnational Factors and Non-State Actors," in Democracy without 
Borders: Transnationalisation and Conditionality in New Democracies, ed. Jean Grugel (London: Routledge, 
1999), 11. 
85“Hikmet- i hükümetçi fikir” is a state-centred view and understanding, a philosophy that dominates the 1982 
Constitution. See: Mustafa Erdoğan, "1982 Anayasası’na Göre Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve Vesayet [the Presidency and 
Tutelage According to the 1982 Constitution]," Star Gazetesi, 27 June 2010. Available at: 
http://www.hurfikirler.com/yazi1353/1982-anayasasina-gore-cumhurbaskanligi-ve-vesayet.php [last accessed 
on 19.02.2016]. 
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actors accept the democratic practices. Kubicek described the consolidation phase as a 
“process, often a lengthy one and in a certain sense always ongoing, of stabilizing and 
institutionalizing democratic institutions and practices, as well as the internalization of 
democratic norms by elites and [the general population]”.86 Rakner, Menocal and Fritz consider 
the consolidation phase the most challenging phase for newly formed democracies and critical 
for creating “durable democratic regimes”.87 In Lüleci’s words, “… the process of democratic 
consolidation is a much lengthier process and has wider and deeper effects. The process 
involves the gradual removal of the remaining uncertainties surrounding transition and the 
internalization of rules and procedures …”88 and, according to Pridham, it also involves 
“dissemination of democratic values through a ‘remaking’ of the political culture”.89  
 Democratisation processes do not always progress in a linear path through the three 
phases described above. In some situations, nation states, having completed the liberalisation 
and transition phases successfully, fail to establish the consolidation phase, or fail to establish 
it sustainably, like the Russian Federation.90 In other situations, nation states fail to complete 
or maintain the transition after a period of liberalisation and revert to more or less authoritarian 
regime, such as Hungary.91 States that have these regimes are called unconsolidated or hybrid 
regimes and are the subject of interest for academics and policy-makers because they represent 
a sort of democratic ‘pathology’ from which lessons can be learnt to benefit the wider world 
of communities, as well as the non-democratic ‘patient’. 
                                                 
86Paul J Kubicek, "International Norms, the European Union, and Democratization: Tentative Theory and 
Evidence," in The European Union and Democratization, ed. Paul Kubicek (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2003), 21. 
87Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, "Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: 
Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned," 7. 
88Lüleci, "International Dimension of Democratization: The Impact of EU Credibility on Democratic Consolidation 
of Turkey," 17. 
89Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 12. Cited by: Lüleci, "International Dimension of Democratization: The Impact 
of EU Credibility on Democratic Consolidation of Turkey," 17. 
90Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2014 (New York: Freedom House, 2014), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/russia [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
91“... the landslide victory in Hungary in the 2010 parliamentary elections of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz [party, allowed 
Orbán] ... to rewrite the Hungarian constitution, strip back checks and balances and entrench his party ... deep 
in the state, media [and] civil society... as [is] his questioning of liberal democracy and formulation of a deeply 
illiberal nationalist project for the future of Hungary.” See: Sean Hanley, Dr Sean’s Diary 21 July 2015, 
https://seanhanley.org.uk/tag/democratisation/ [last accessed on 18.10. 2015]. 
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Drivers of Democratisation 
The main drivers of democratisation are considered to be modernisation, structuralism 
(having appropriate cultural processes in place) and, external influences and actors, 
‘exogenous’ factors.92 
The Modernisation and Agency/Process-Oriented (Structuralist) Approaches: The role 
of modernisation in democratisation was stressed by political scientists and sociologists of the 
1950s and 1970s, including Lipset, Almond, Verba and Moore93 who argued that nation states 
having a high degree of socio-economic development are more likely to be democratised.94 In 
1959, Lipset also used “a state-of-the-art quantitative test”95 to confirm his proposition that 
modernisation caused democracy. The economic transformation of China arising from its 
Communist Party government’s decision in 1978 to allow market principles to guide the 
economy may challenge the ‘modernisation’ explanation. However, to be fair to Lipset, it may 
be too early to confirm given the slow roll-out of the economic reforms and the need, both 
domestic and international, to maintain political stability in a nation that comprises 
approximately one fifth of the world’s population. Analysts such as Bollen, Jackman, Burkhart, 
                                                 
92Lise Rakner, Alina Rochal Menocal, and Verena Fritz, "Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of 
Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned," (London: The 
Advisory Board for Irish Aid, 2007), 8-11. 
93Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy, Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 8; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic 
Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); 
Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern 
World (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966); Cited by: Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, "Democratisation's Third Wave 
and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons 
Learned."8. 
94“Modernization refers to a model of a progressive transition from a 'pre-modern' or 'traditional' to a 'modern' 
society”. 
“The distinction between modernization and development is becoming increasingly blurred: a point has been 
reached when the two terms can be used interchangeably and almost synonymously. The intellectual history of 
modernization is rooted in behavioural sciences; but it does not take account the economic factor as a major 
variable in the modernizing process. Development, on the other hand, has drawn its main sustenance from 
economics, although the institutional and motivational dimensions have also explicitly figured – and continue to 
figure – in the discussions on the subject. […]” See: Shyama Charan Dube, Modernization and Development: The 
Search for Alternative Paradigms (London&New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1988), 35. 
95In this context, Lipset used “a table showing a relationship between various measures of development and 
democracy in a cross-section of countries”. See: Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization 
after Twenty Years?," Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 318. 
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Lewis-Beck, Gasiorowski, Barro and Przeworski96 supported the ‘modernisation’ hypothesis 
that there is a positive correlation between democracy and development.97  
The ‘structuralist’ approach to democratisation emphasised “the importance of cultural 
and religious factors, and of historical legacies (i.e. previous experiences with 
democratisation)”.98 Structuralists considered “the emergence of democracy” as a result of “the 
transformation of class structure, the emergence of a bourgeoisie economic development, 
increasing urbanisation, the prior development of democratic values and other socio-economic 
factors”.99  
The structuralist approach did not adequately explain the third wave of democratisation 
and this gave rise in the 1980s to a new literature on democratic transition which put forward 
a “process-oriented approach”.100 This new literature placed emphasis on the “importance of 
                                                 
96See: Ross E Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development 
Thesis," American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (1994): 903-10. See also: 
Mark J Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis," 889 (1995): 882-
97. See also: Robert J Barro, "Determinants of Democracy," Journal of Political Economy 107(S6) (1996): 158-83. 
See also: Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 
1950-1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
97“Przeworski and his co-authors have argued emphatically that development does not cause democratization; 
rather, development reduces the likelihood of democratic breakdown, thus increasing the number of rich 
democratic countries even though it has no causal effect on transitions to democracy. Other careful analyses of 
regime change, however, continue to find a relationship between development and transitions to democracy”. 
See: Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990; Carles Boix and 
Susan Carol Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," World Politics 55, no. 4 (2003); David L Epstein et al., 
"Democratic Transitions," American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006). Cited by: Geddes, "What Do We 
Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?," 117-8. 
Geddes adds: “… In a very careful re-analysis that extends the time period back to 1850, Boix and Stokes (2003) 
show that development does contribute to democratic transitions, though the average effect for the whole 
period is small relative to the effect of development on maintaining democracy. In fact, they note that a careful 
reading of Democracy and Development shows that even Przeworski et al. (2000) find statistically significant 
effect, albeit small, of development on the likelihood of transitions to democracy. Boix and Stokes (2003) show 
that, when the dataset is divided by time periods, economic development is an extremely important predictor 
of transition prior to 1950, but has only a small (though statistically significant) effect in the post-1950 period. 
Epstein et al. (forthcoming) also challenge the Przeworski et al. (2000) findings. They show that results are 
changed by using a trichotomous measure of democracy rather than a dichotomous one, as Przeworski et al. 
did. They find that development has strong predictive power for transitions into and out of the category they 
call partial democracy, but less effect on transitions from full autocracy to full democracy. Epstein et al.'s 
forthcoming findings should probably be interpreted as meaning that development is a good predictor of the 
softening or routinization of authoritarian regimes, though not necessarily of regime change.” See: Geddes, 
"What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?," 320. 
98Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, "Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: 
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decisions, ideas and the interaction among strategic political actors in bringing about transitions 
in 'unlikely places'".101 This approach also put stress on “the uncertainty and possibilities 
surrounding transitions to democracy”.102 To this end, analysts103 agreed that “economic 
development per se was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratic 
transition”.104 
The Role of External Influences and Outside Actors (Exogenous Factors): While the 
agency/process oriented approaches focus on actors (agency) in their analyses of 
democratisation, the exogenous factors mainly address “the international context or 
environment (structure)”.105 Indeed, the academic literature deals largely with the “domestic 
aspects of the [democratisation] process” and most theorists “under-examine and under-
theorise [the role of] international actors” in democratisation.106 In their attempts to promote 
democracy abroad,107 most of the political theorists in the West ascribed a secondary role to 
                                                 
“Process [oriented approaches] place a priority on ‘how’ things are done. [Process orientation] is a willingness 
to remain open and follow in new directions. It means setting aside mainstream ways of achieving results and 
instead following culturally respectful processes that also produce results.” See: BC Public Service Agency, 
“Process Orientation”, 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/myhr/article.page?ContentID=4f3b094d-ff23-5e8b-fc22-1bfb6d226e80 [last accessed 
on 25.02.2016]. 
101Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, "Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: 
Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned.", 9. 
102Ibid. 
103These analysts are O’Donnell, Schmitter, Limongi and Przeworski. See: O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies; Fernando Limongi and Adam 
Przeworski, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics 49, no. 2 (1997). 
104Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, "Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: 
Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned," 9; O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies; Limongi and Przeworski, 
"Modernization: Theories and Facts." 155-83. 
105Stephen Brown, "Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa," The European Journal of 
Development Research 17, no. 2 (2005): 180. 
106Nevertheless, several theorists such as those of Pridham (1995) and Whitehead (1986&2001) put stress on 
the role of the exogenous factors in democratisation. See: Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Dimension of 
Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective," in The Politics of Democratic 
Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. Gunther Richard, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, 
and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.) (Baltimore, MD. & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Laurence 
Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986); The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, 
ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
107“From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, an era of intense superpower competition, strategic alliance was the 
most common condition for development assistance. Security imperatives dominated the choice of aid 
recipients. While the USSR supported strategic allies, especially Marxist-Leninist regimes, the US and other 
Western donors provided economic assistance to developing countries that helped contain communism and 
Soviet ‘expansionism’. For the US, and, to a lesser extent, other bilateral donors, recipient allegiance usually 
eclipsed concern about the nature of internal political arrangements. A formal semblance of democracy was 
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the international aspects.108 Nevertheless, theorists such as Mendelson, Pridham, Quigley and 
Wedel put a stress on these aspects and examined the role of the international actors in the 
democratisation process of the post-Communist European countries.109 
In his work The Third Wave (1991) Huntington points out that “the actions of 
governments and institutions” external to a specific country (e.g. the Catholic Church) 
sometimes influence the democratic transition process.110 He gave Portugal, Spain and Greece 
as examples stating that these countries’ transition to democracy and membership to the EU 
went hand in hand. He also cited the democratic transition of Eastern European countries, the 
former Soviet Union and African nations. It is generally accepted that the policies of 
Gorbachev, and the end of the Cold War, played a major role in “the democratic transformation 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union”.111 External factors triggered the democratic 
transition of Africa “and possibly [other] low income and aid-dependent countries elsewhere” 
as well.112 All these transitions were the outcome of “external pressures and incentives (for 
example, withholding aid from repressive regimes)”, and not only the result of the efforts of 
the national political actors.113 However, Huntington states that external factors alone do not 
fully explain his democratic transition process. He includes the decrease of the domestic 
legitimacy of authoritarian regimes as an internal factor. The JDP government’s reaction to the 
                                                 
deemed sufficient; often, not even that was of concern to the donor. Still, donors sometimes used aid as leverage 
to pressure a developing country to carry out certain political and social reforms. The US, especially after the 
Cuban revolution in 1959, worried that conspicuous inequality in poor countries increased the chances of 
socialist revolutions paving the way for alignment with Moscow. Promoting democratic institutions abroad 
became an explicit goal of US development aid in 1961, with the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act.” See: 
Brown, "Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa," 180. 
108“These discussions tend to focus on Western attempts to foster democracy abroad. Historically, they have 
looked at democratisation in Latin America and the role of the US. Often, the poor results of democracy 
promotion have been attributed to the centrality of Latin American domestic conditions, relegating international 
aspects to a secondary role at best.” See: Brown, "Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa," 
180. 
109See: Sarah E Mendelson, "Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and 
Failure," International Security 25, no. 4 (2001); Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Stanford, Building 
Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe (London&Washington, DC: 
Leicester University Press, 1997); Kevin F Quigley, For Democracy’s Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance 
in Central Europe (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997); Janine R Wedel, Collision and 
Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989‐1998 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998). 
110Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
111Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, "Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: 
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‘events’ of 2013 may be an emerging example.114 Besides “deliberate conditionality”, another 
important international factor in democratisation is “so-called ‘snowballing’ i.e. the effects of 
diffusion”.115 As it was the case in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the transition to a 
democratic system often paves the way for “the subsequent transitions in other countries within 
the same region”.116 Further, just as the EU accession process has led to democratisation 
reforms in Turkey, for those nations who have joined recently, or want to join, the EU plays an 
external role driving if not imposing democratisation. 
Indicators of Democratisation 
To what extent is a country democratic? How can we measure the ‘democraticness’ of 
a country? Under which circumstances could a country be regarded as a democratic country? 
To answer these questions, we must know about the indicators of democratisation.  
In his work Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Robert A. Dahl examined two 
basic theoretical dimensions of democratisation, “public contestation and the right to 
participate”.117 Dahl aimed to use these features of political systems to differentiate between 
more democratic systems and less democratic ones. Tatu Vanhanen called these dimensions 
“competition”118 and “participation”.119 According to his democratisation index, there was a 
                                                 
114See: Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
115Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
116According to Rakner and her co-authors, “[t]his is one reason for the perception that regional organisations 
such as the African Union (AU) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) sometimes offer the potential to 
act as catalysts of positive change and transformation. In the particular case of Africa, the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), formally adopted in July 2001 by African Heads of State, is now widely seen as 
the continent’s main official development framework. Among other things, the Partnership states that Africa’s 
development ‘is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good 
governance’. It commits African leaders to promoting these principles in their own countries and regionally. In 
this context, the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has been created as an initiative to use peer pressure 
and demonstration effects to assess progress and performance among participating countries towards achieving 
agreed goals in areas such as democracy and political governance”. See: Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, 
"Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International 
Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned," 9. 
117Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, 22.  
118“The existence of legal competition means that individuals and groups were free to organise themselves and 
to oppose the government. It also implies the existence of some degree of equality in the sense that different 
groups were equally free to compete for power.” See: Tatu Vanhanen, Strategies of Democratization 
(Washington, D.C.: Crane Russak, 1992), 22. 
119“The degree of participation in crucial decision-making processes either through elections or by some other 
means is indicative of the relative number of people taking part in politics in general”. See: Tatu Vanhanen, 
Strategies of Democratization (Washington, D.C.: Crane Russak, 1992), 22. 
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positive correlation between the degrees of competition and participation, and the level of 
democratisation in a particular political system. 
Vanhanen made use of “the electoral success of the smaller parties, i.e., the proportion 
of the votes won by those parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections, to indicate the 
degree of competition in a given political system”.120 He also used “the percentage of the 
population that actually voted in these elections … as a measure of the degree of electoral 
participation”.121 In this regard, his explanation of the measurement of democratisation is of 
particular importance: 
The variables [competition and participation] could be 
combined in many ways, depending on how we weigh the 
importance of competition and participation. It seems to me 
impossible to determine which of them is more important 
or how much more important; therefore, I have chosen to 
weigh them equally in the construction of an index of 
democratization (ID). This is formed by multiplying the 
variables and dividing the outcome by 100. This means that 
a low value of either of the two variables is enough to 
indicate a low level of democratization. I believe that a high 
value of participation cannot compensate for a lack of 
competition, and vice versa. The ID is my principal 
indicator of democratization.122 
According to Modelski and Perry III, democratisation can be classified into two main 
categories: intensive democratisation and extensive democratisation.123 Intensive (vertical) 
democratization refers to “a change in the quality of the democratic experience in a given 
community” whereby we ask how good a particular democracy is. To answer this question the 
authors used the following factors in their analysis: “the extent of voting rights, the working of 
representative institutions, or the presence of democracy at the various levels or fields of social 
                                                 
120“This figure is calculated by subtracting the percentage of the votes won by the largest party from 100 percent. 
If both parliamentary and presidential elections are taken into account, the arithmetic mean of the two 
percentages is used to represent the smaller parties' share of the vote cast.” See: Tatu Vanhanen, Strategies of 
Democratization, 22. 
121“It should be noted that this percentage is calculated from the total population, not from the adult population 
or from the enfranchised population. Because these two variables are assumed to represent different 
dimensions of democratization, it is plausible to assume that a combination of the two would be a more realistic 
indicator of democratisation than either of them alone.” See: Tatu Vanhanen, Strategies of Democratization, 22. 
122Ibid., 23. 
123Modelski and PerryIII, "Democratization from a Long Perspective," 24. 
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organization (such as national, local, political, economic, etc.)”.124 Extensive democratisation 
is defined as ‘a change in the spatial level of a given democracy/democracies in relation to the 
following key factors: universal suffrage; free and fair elections; existence of a mechanism that 
holds government officials to account; recognition of generally accepted civil liberties such as 
freedom of speech, the press and assembly; and the prevalence of the rule of law’.125 The 
authors suggested another factor that indicated the level of democracy was “some general 
standard of ‘perfect democracy’ (analogous to ‘perfect competition’ in economics)”.126 In their 
words:  
Viewed from [one] angle, democratization may be either 
intensive or extensive. By intensive (or vertical) 
democratization we understand the change in the quality of 
the democratic experience in a given community; that is, 
we ask, how good is this particular democracy? We may 
wish to judge it, for example, by the extent of voting rights, 
the working of representative institutions, or the presence 
of democracy at the several levels or fields of social 
organization (such as national, local, political, or 
economic). We might also want to judge it by some general 
standard of “perfect democracy” (analogous to “perfect 
competition” in economics). That means that nation-states, 
and communities, might be seen as less, or more, 
democratic, and that the quality of democracy is subject to 
change over time, in both directions, positive and negative. 
Conceptions as to what is democratic might also change, 
and the point at which a given community is called 
democratic might therefore be a variable one.127  
The study by Modelski and Perry III also suggests that extensive democratisation 
measures “the quantitative extension of democratic communities and their global spatial reach” 
and deals with the question of how much democracy there is in the world.128  
Researchers holding the view that democracy can be measured, like R.H. Fitzgibbon 
and K.F. Johnson in their analysis of the political change in Latin America, applied a set of 
                                                 
124Ibid. 
125Erik Herron, Elections and Democracy after Communism? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 6. 
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criteria that measure the extent of democracy in each of country.129 These criteria are as 
follows:130 
a) An educational level that underpins the political process 
b) An appropriate standard of living  
c) National unity and solidarity 
d) A society that gives credence to the political power and talents of its citizens 
e) The absence of external pressure 
f) Freedoms of the press, expression, association and communication 
g) Free and genuine elections 
h) Freedom for political parties; a positive and effective opposition within the legislative 
framework; and checks and balances between the executive branch by the legislative 
branches of government 
i) An independent and impartial judiciary 
j) Freedom of information in relation to public administration 
k) Public confidence in legislators and the legislative process 
l) Civil authority over the military 
m) A secular society that guarantees freedom of worship and the organisation of religions 
to that end based on the premise that spiritual faith was a personal private affair. 
n) Public administration that is transparent, objective, technically and administratively 
competent, and ethical in its interpretation of legislation and regulations 
o) Integrated regional development and government 
                                                 
129Russell H Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," The American 
Political Science Review 55, no. 3 (1961): 125-26. Cited by: Çiçek, "Demokrasi Ve Türkiye'nin 1950 Sonrası 
Demokratikleşme Meselesinin Sosyolojik Tahlili [Democracy and Sociological Analysis of Turkey's 
Democratisation after 1950]," 44. 
130Ibid. 
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The main indicator of the existence of effective democracy in a given country is that 
only elected public officials take decisions about fundamental public issues and the officials 
who are not elected by the public are controlled by elected representatives. For that reason, 
some theorists of democracy regard the supremacy of the elected representatives over public 
officials, within the national legislative and cultural framework, as a fundamental principle of 
democracy.131 
Debates on Democratisation 
With the increasing number of democratic nation states since the middle of the 20th 
century, scholars have taken a renewed interest in the process of democratisation. Previously, 
American theorists generalised about the issue of democratisation and held, in one view, that 
“there was a necessary relationship between the growth of free enterprise … and the 
development of democratic government …”132 This reflected the long-standing American 
belief that “the destiny of the world is to see a convergence of all societies towards the 
American way of life”.133 This theory was criticised for being simplistic and inadequately 
supported by historical evidence.134  
Another generalisation, promoted by behaviourist academics, sought statistical 
correlations between the growth of democracy and several other variables. Paul Cammack, 
along with other behaviourists, considered this unfruitful.135 Other academics produced case 
                                                 
131Mustafa Erdoğan, "Türkiye’de Siyasal Sistem ve Demokrasi [Political System and Democracy in Turkey]," Yeni 
Türkiye, Cumhuriyet Özel Sayısı II 4, no. 23-24 (1998): 809. 
132Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, 90. 
133Ibid.  
134“When Germany followed the British and American examples by rapidly industrializing its economy in the 
period between 1871 and 1914, it did so under an autocratic system of government, not a democratic one. 
Despite the growth of a large and well-educated middle class, said by theorists to be the main factor that links 
economic progress with democracy, Germany did not become democratic (apart from the brief and [chaotic] 
interlude of the Weimar Republic) until pushed into doing so by the American, British and French occupying 
powers after 1945. Equally, Japan’s industrialization and economic progress did not lead to democratic politics 
until General MacArthur and his colleagues imposed democratic institutions on the country after its surrender. 
More recently the newly industrialized societies of eastern Asia, led by Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, have 
achieved very high rates of economic growth with political systems that [could not be described as democratic]. 
The Asian countries with the longest experience of democracy, namely India and Sri Lanka, have remained 
economically backward.” See: Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, 90-91. 
135Paul Cammack, "Democratization and Citizenship in Latin America," in Democracy and Democratization, ed. 
G. Parry and M. Moran (London: Routledge, 1994), 174-75. 
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studies on democratisation in several fields by simply using historical methods, with modest 
attempts “to generalise about them”.136  
Modelski and Perry viewed the evolution of democratisation as “remarkable”: 
The process of democratization occurs in an "environment" 
(or niche) of finite "carrying capacity". We conceive of it 
as unfolding within the limits of the world system, in the 
context of its evolution, and as part of it. That is, 
democratic procedures are diffused inside a ‘market’ that 
extends to, and is limited by, the social organization of the 
human race on this planet, and democratic communities 
grow as part of world system evolution. We assume that 
democracy is not limited in its reach to certain regions or 
cultural areas or special circumstances. Hence the limit of 
the process of democratization, its potential, is the world 
population but we also need to bear in mind that that 
population is a steadily expanding one.137 
Francis Fukuyama, in his 1992 study: The End of History and the Last Man, argued that 
the rise of liberal democracy is the final form of human government. Nevertheless, it was 
argued by others that the rise of economic liberalism has had a mixed effect on democratisation. 
For example, it was claimed that democratic institutions are constrained or “disciplined” to 
satisfy international capital markets or to facilitate the global flow of trade.138 Unsurprisingly, 
market experts, usually market actors, consider this appropriate. However, experts in the 
market are not necessarily expert, or interested in, the development and maintenance of 
political arrangements that best serve the medium to long term interest of nation states. 
Samuel P. Huntington’s well-received 1991 article, The Third Wave, defined a global 
democratisation trend in the world post World War II. Huntington argued that the historical 
expansion of democracy around the globe was distinguishable by three waves.139 He defined a 
wave of democratisation as a period of time during which more countries faced a regime change 
towards democracy than a change in any other direction. The first phase from 1828 to 1926 
brought democracy to Western Europe and North America and gained its momentum from the 
                                                 
136Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, 91. 
137Modelski and Perry III, "Democratization in Long Perspective," 24. 
138Alasdair S. Roberts, "The Logic of Discipline," in The Logic of Discipline: Global Capitalism and the Architecture 
of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
139Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
  
   45 
 
US War of Independence, the French Revolution and their founding documents. This was 
followed by the final demise of monarchical influence and the rise of dictatorships during the 
interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. Huntington’s second democratisation wave lasted from 
1943 to 1962 and comprised the “direct imposition of democracy on the defeated Axis powers’ 
... and elsewhere” following World War II; and “the decolonization occurring in Africa and 
Asia, which produced a huge number of new states […], many of which were at least initially 
democratic.” 140 His third wave, starting with the end of the non-democratic regime in Portugal 
in 1974, comprised regime changes towards processes of democracy and political liberalisation 
in Southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. This last wave is 
ongoing. The start of a fourth period of intensive democratisation was posited in the 1990s for 
some nation states. While Huntington referred to this as a second phase of his Third Wave 
explanation, others, such as Michael McFaul, Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain,141 
spoke of a Fourth Wave beginning around the end of the Cold War which included the large 
number of political liberalisation processes and democratisations after 1989. Countries 
involved in the Arab Spring were also considered part of Fourth Wave of democratisation 
though in many respects much removed from the conditions of the 1990’s albeit with the same 
fundamental issue of little or no democratic capital.142  
Democracy 
 This section considers what is meant by democracy in theory and in practice, as well 
as reviewing the form of democracy known as ‘liberal democracy’. The objective of this section 
is to show there are many forms of democracy and this plethora of forms is not a contradiction 
but merely a function of the many permutations and combinations, economic, social, political 
and diplomatic, that nation states go through to arrive at the time in their history when they 
                                                 
140Ibid.  
141See: Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the 
Postcommunist World," World Politics 54, no. 2 (2002). See also: Philip N Howard and Muzammil M Hussain, 
Democracy's Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
142Carl Gershman, "The Fourth Wave," Electronic Article, (2011), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/85143/middle-east-revolt-democratization [last accessed on 
25.02.2016].  
See also: Howard and Hussain, Democracy's Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring. These countries 
are “Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Oman and Kuwait”. 
See: BBC News, "Arab Uprising: Country by Country," News, (2013),  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482291 [last accessed on 25.02.2016].  
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‘measure’ themselves up for their democratic ‘coats’, if, in some instances, only in name. Given 
the global reach of modern European colonialism, the 20th century was the ‘fitting’ time for 
many nation states in the non-communist bloc. This section also sets out the reason why my 
thesis holds ‘liberal democracy’ as the yardstick for measuring the JDP government’s 
promotion of ‘democratisation’ in Turkey since 2002. 
Meaning of Democracy 
Some political theorists equate democracy with liberty whether the latter is based on 
“liberalism or individualism”.143 This thesis argues that, in a democratic country, laws must 
defend the legal interests of the individual even against the interests of the state, albeit 
democratic.144 Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), the French political thinker and historian, 
regarded democracy almost as a synonym to equality. In comparison, Andrew Carnegie (1835-
1919), an extremely wealthy Scottish-American industrialist and philanthropist, used the term 
democracy “to celebrate a highly mobile, free enterprise, market society with great differences 
in wealth but all justifiable as the product of talent driven by the iron laws of evolution”.145 
Carnegie, it would seem, believed in the ‘law of the jungle’ in that the strong would ‘eat’ the 
weak but not necessarily all of the weak as a sustainable economic ecosystem had to be 
maintained. The term democracy originated from the political and philosophical thought of 
ancient Greece. The word was derived from the Greek word demokratia and simply referred to 
people’s power (demos- “people” and kratos- “power”) or “rule of people”.146 It might be 
generally described as “[a form of] government in which the supreme power is [given to] the 
people to be exercised directly by them or by their representatives elected under a free electoral 
system”.147 In a wider sense, democracy is also regarded as “a public system based on 
voluntariness within all forms of life activity”. In a narrower sense, it has been interpreted as 
“a form of state where people have equal rights for power”.148 Democracy is also interpreted 
                                                 
143Bernard Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2002), 9. 
144“… Opposed to ‘constitutional democracy’ are the ideas of ‘sovereignty of the people’ or ‘the general will’, 
which should prevail over formal constitutional limitations interpreted by lawyers …” See: Bernard Crick, 
Democracy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2002), 9. 
145See: Andrew Carnegie, Triumphant Democracy (Cosimo, Inc., 2005).  
See also: Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, 9. 
146Josiah Ober, "The Original Meaning of “Democracy”: Capacity to Do Things, Not Majority Rule," Constellations 
15, no. 1 (2008): 3. 
147"What Is Democracy? - Defining Democracy," ed. U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International 
Information Programs. Available at: http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/docs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm 
 [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
148This is the ancient interpretation of democracy originated from Heredotus in the 5th century BC. See:  
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as “an ideal model of social structure, a certain world [perspective] based on values [such as] 
freedom, equality of rights, and human rights”. People and groups representing these values 
come together in various ways to realise ‘democracy’. In this respect, the word ‘democracy’ 
describes “a social movement, as a form of political orientation, integrated into [the] programs 
of some [political] parties.”149 
The modern understanding of democracy mainly evolved during the 19th century.150 It 
was described by the Youth Research Group BENE as follows:  
The term of ‘democracy’ implies a certain power system; 
in essence it represents a form of organization of political 
life that reflects free and competitive public choice of any 
alternative social development. With the participation of all 
segments of the population in ruling activities, the 
democracy is open for all variants of social choice. 
Democracy is a way a political system [can function], a 
way of social life organization based on recognition of 
people as the source of power, [their right] to participate in 
[the] solution[s] of state and public affairs, and [a system 
that vests in] its citizens [a] wide [and appropriate] range 
of rights and freedoms.151  
Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865), US President from 1861 to 1865, defined democracy 
as government “of the people, by the people, and for the people”.152 The definition of 
democracy formulated by Leonardo Morlino (1947- ), the Director of the Research Centre on 
Democracies and Democratisations at LUISS University in Rome, assumes that a democracy 
has the following minimum number of attributes: universal adult suffrage; recurring, free, 
competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of 
information.153 In order to evaluate the degree of democracy in a given country, it is also 
                                                 
Youth Research Group NOTA BENE, "Democracy. Definition, Characteristics and Forms of Modern Democracy," 
(2013), http://www.nbenegroup.com/democratic/democratic_en.html [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
149Ibid. 
150Maija Setälä, "Representative Democracy," in Deliberative Democracy and Authority, ed. Kenneth May & Mark 
E. Warren (North Texas: The American Political Science Review, 1996), 151. Available at: 
www.tampereclub.org/e-publications/vol3_setala.pdf [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
151Youth Research Group NOTA BENE, "Democracy. Definition, Characteristics and Forms of Modern 
Democracy". 
152Howard Cincotta, "Democracy in Brief," ed. U.S. Department of State (Washington, DC: Bureau of 
International Information Programs, 2007), 3. 
153Leonardo Morlino, "What Is a 'Good' Democracy? Theory and Empirical Analysis," Institute for International 
Studies, Stanford University (2002): 2. 
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important to make a further empirical analysis on the basis of the two main objectives of an 
ideal democracy: freedom154 and equality.155 According to Robert Alan Dahl and Thomas 
Humphrey Marshall, these two democratic ideals are “central to a normative definition of 
quality democracy”.156 
There have been other influential definitions of democracy. Joseph Schumpeter (1883-
1950) was an Austrian-American economist and political scientist whose definition of 
democracy, known as the “paradigmatic ‘minimalist’ definition of democracy” was accepted 
as one of the most noteworthy definitions. According to him, “Democracy is a political method 
… a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political, legislative and 
administrative decisions.”157 In this context, he defined the democratic “political method” as 
“that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.158 For this 
“democratic method” to exist, it is essential that fundamental freedoms are in place which are 
connected to “the legal and moral principles of the community”, and in most cases “for all”.159  
Another minimalist definition, which had ‘Schumpeterian’ underpinnings, was 
promoted by Adam Przeworski (1940- ), a Polish-American professor of Political Science, who 
stated: “Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections. There are parties, divisions of 
interests, values, and opinions. There is competition organized by rules. And there are periodic 
                                                 
154“Freedom and democracy are often used interchangeably, but the two are not synonymous. Democracy is 
indeed a set of ideas and principles about freedom, but it also consists of practices and procedures that have 
been molded through a long, often tortuous history. Democracy is the institutionalization of freedom.” See: 
Cincotta, "Democracy in Brief," 3. 
155These principles are reflected in all eligible citizens being equal before the law and having equal access to 
legislative processes. For example, in a representative democracy, every vote has equal weight, no unreasonable 
restrictions can apply to anyone seeking to become a representative, and the freedom of its eligible citizens is 
secured by legitimized rights and liberties which are typically protected by a constitution. See: Robert Dahl, Ian 
Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub, The Democracy Sourcebook (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). See also: 
Marcel Hénaff and Tracy Burr Strong, Public Space and Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2001). 
156See: Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 
1971); Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Sociology at the Crossroads: And Other Essays (London: Heinemann, 1963). 
Cited by: Morlino, "What Is a ‘Good’ Democracy? Theory and Empirical Analysis," 16. 
157Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 1942 ed. (New York: Harper Perennial Modern 
Classics, 1975), 242. Cited by: Guillermo O'Donnell, "Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics," Studies in 
Comparative International Development 36, no. 1 (2001): 5. 
158Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 242. Cited by: O'Donnell, "Democratic Theory and 
Comparative Politics," 5. 
159"Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics," 6. 
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winners and losers”.160 Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi offered a minimalist definition of 
democracy as “a regime in which [political authority in government is gained] as a consequence 
of contested elections” and, further, held that: “Only if the opposition is allowed to compete, 
win, and assume office is a regime democratic.”161 
Samuel Huntington (1927-2008), a leading US political scientist, and referred to earlier 
in this chapter, defined democracy as: “[A political system that exists] to the extent that its 
most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic 
elections in which candidates freely compete for voters and in which virtually all the adult 
population is eligible to vote.”162 Huntington asserted that democracy “also implies the 
existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that 
are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns.”163 Huntington’s 
definition follows the Schumpeterian tradition.  
Characteristics of Democracy 
It is important to set out the basic characteristics of the term democracy when applied 
to political institutions in a large-scale community.164  
As democratic nation states emerged, a set of minimum requirements were developed 
by political theorists to differentiate, in their opinion, the democratic from the non-democratic. 
They considered elections alone did not make a country democratic. They felt that a set of 
minimum requirements would provide a good definition of what democracy was, and a 
standard by which the ‘democraticness’ of a specific country could be measured.165 These 
                                                 
160Ibid., 8-9. 
161Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 (1996): 50-51. 
162Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7. Cited by: O'Donnell, "Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics," 9. 
163Schumpeter (explicitly) and Przeworski (implicitly) also drew attention to this point. See: O'Donnell 
"Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics," 9. 
164Dahl puts forward the following as charateristics  of modern representative democratic government:  “elected 
officials; free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information, [freedom 
of] association, [individual] autonomy and inclusive citizenhip”. See: Dahl, “On Democracy”, 85. 
165The Electoral Knowledge Network, “Minimum Requirements for a Country to be Defined as a Democracy”, 
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ve/vea/vea01 [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
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theorists considered the following basic principles, termed “regulative ideals”,166 are necessary 
if a country is to call itself, and be considered by others to be, democratic167  
I list the basic political principles that should underpin a nation state that aspires to the 
democratic ideal: 
Political Equality: Citizens are granted equal political rights and equal political 
opportunities. Discrimination on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, colour, age, 
ethnicity, religion, national origin is legally prohibited.168 Further, political and civic 
responsibilities are “exercised by all adult citizens, directly, or through their freely elected 
representatives”.169 
Alternative Government: Every voter is given the opportunity to select a government 
from among several competing parties. The party selected to govern rules as long as the 
majority of citizens give consent to that party or until another party is voted in. The principle 
of alternative government stresses “the need for an opportunity to select among several 
choices”.170   
Free, fair and regular elections: Free, fair and regular elections are mandatory as a 
mechanism by which public representatives are re-elected or voted out of office.171 ‘Free, fair 
and regular’ includes coercion-free elections and the right of voters to stand for elected 
office.172  
                                                 
166David Beetham, “Democracy: Key Principles, Institutions and Problems,” 21. 
167See: Fr.pekea-fr.org/Rennes/T-Onuoha.doc [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
168Robert A. Dahl lists these rights and opportunities as follows: “the rights: to vote in the election of officials in 
free and fair elections [one eligible citizen one vote]; to run for elective office; to free expression; to form and 
participate in independent political organizations; to have access to independent sources of information; and to 
other liberties and opportunities that may be necessary to the effective operation of the political institutions of 
large-scale democracy.” 
Dahl incorporates the afore-mentioned elements into the notion of “inclusive citizenship” to address political 
institutions of modern representative democracy. See: Robert A. Dahl, “On Democracy”, 86. 
169Cincotta, "Democracy in Brief," 3. 
170T. Popoola, Introduction To Government, (Lagos: Corporate Lifters International, 2001), 39. Cited By: Onuoha 
O, Sylvester, Mr, Acad, Philosophy, Nigeria, "Democracy as a facilitator of economic development", 2. 
171“… democracy may be seen as a political system that puts constitutional restraints even upon a freely elected 
(hence democratic) government …” See: Crick, “Democracy: A Very Short Introduction,” 9. 
172O'Donnell, "Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics," 12. 
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Majority Rule: Decisions of the government are taken in line with “the wishes and 
desires of the majority”. However, to avoid tyranny by the majority, the interests of the 
minority groups are not disregarded. There are mechanisms in democratic states that manage 
and minimise the possibility of tyranny by the majority. These mechanisms act as a protective 
shield, albeit not perfect at all times, against such tyranny and include: a formal democratic 
constitution that treats all citizens equally; full adult suffrage without hindrance; and effective 
‘separation of powers’.  
The Rule of Law: Strict obedience to the laws and regulations is required from all 
citizens; and, every citizen is equal before, and has access to, the law. 
Individual Freedom: Citizens are free to do or say anything as long as their actions or 
words do not infringe on the rights of other citizens or violate the provisions of the constitution. 
There is no absolute freedom in a democratic society but basic human rights of citizens are 
respected and recognised officially. 
Tolerance, cooperation and compromise: Democratic societies act in accordance with 
the values of “tolerance, cooperation and compromise”.173 As espoused by Mahatma Gandhi: 
“Intolerance is itself a form of violence and an obstacle to the growth of a true democratic 
spirit.”174 
Forms of Democracy 
Several forms of democracy are addressed in this section. Forms of democracy are not 
mutually exclusive; rather they specify different aspects of a democracy which can coexist in 
a certain system. With universal suffrage, some communities make group decisions on the basis 
of direct decision by the citizens, plebiscite or representation. 
Democracy has available various mechanisms including referendum, veto and law 
initiation. The referendum is a direct vote in which the citizens are asked to either accept or 
reject a particular proposal on a new constitution, a constitutional amendment, a law, the recall 
of an elected official or simply a specific government policies. The veto is an electorate’s 
                                                 
173U.S. Department of State, “Principles of Democracy”, (Updated April 2005), 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2011/07/20110727111122su0.8207318.html#axzz418lu
lfJt [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
174Ibid. 
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rejection of a decision taken by the elected officials, or the government. In this process, if the 
required numbers of people exercise the veto, an official decision or new law is rescinded. For 
a referendum, the electorate accepts or rejects a given decision; for a veto, only rejection is 
available. Law initiation gives citizens the right to propose new laws on certain subjects usually 
by signing a petition to the government or the parliament.175  
Direct Democracy: This form of democracy refers to a political system in which the 
citizens take part in the decision making process individually, as opposed to through 
intermediaries or representatives.176 This democratic model has roots in ancient Greece, 
especially in the city state of Athens.177  
Direct democracy allows citizen voting: to change constitutional laws; to create 
initiatives, referenda and suggestions for laws; to issue binding mandates on elected officials; 
recall elected officials; and theoretically but not realistically, the power to initiate legal 
proceedings for breaking an election campaign promise. According to its supporters, direct 
democracy is more than just a procedural issue. However, it is unrealistic to implement this 
model because large populations, with complex national economic and social structures, make 
it very difficult for every eligible citizen to actively participate in the processes of legislation, 
implementation and day-to-day government.178  
Representative Democracy: In this form of democracy, the legislature and the 
government are formed by representatives elected by eligible voters. If the head of the state is 
also elected, either by the electorate or its parliamentary representatives, then it is called a 
democratic republic.179 This is the main form of democracy practiced in the Western world. 
                                                 
175This right is granted to the citizens living in some cantons of the Switzerland. See: Ali Öztekin, Siyaset Bilimine 
Giriş (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2007): 66. 
176In this system there is no representation mechanism or legislature/chamber. The citizens are equal; there is 
an absolute equality among citizens in the sense that the ruler and the ruled are same people. Citizens not only 
have the power of legislation, but also the power of judgement and execution. They participate in the decision 
making process directly and continuously. See: Arif Çiçek, "Demokrasi Ve Türkiye'nin 1950 Sonrası 
Demokratikleşme Meselesinin Sosyolojik Tahlili [Democracy and Sociological Analysis of Turkey's 
Democratisation after 1950]" (Dissertation, İnönü Üniversitesi 1999), 17.  
177David Held, “Models of Democracy”, 18. 
178Çiçek, "Demokrasi Ve Türkiye'nin 1950 Sonrası Demokratikleşme Meselesinin Sosyolojik Tahlili [Democracy 
and Sociological Analysis of Turkey's Democratisation after 1950]," 17. 
179S. Sydenham & R. Thomas, "Some Different Forms of Government " kidcyber, 
http://www.kidcyber.com.au/topics/govtforms.htm [last accessed on 31.12.2015]. 
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Maurice Duverger (1917- ), a French jurist, sociologist and politician, explained the 
birth of representative democracy as a consequence of the US and French revolutions following 
the English tradition of parliamentary democracy. Both late 18th century revolutions extolled 
the innate ‘rights of man’ and universal suffrage, albeit initially qualified. Given the countries’ 
large voting populations and geographic size, representative democracy is the most practical 
solution.180 In this type of democracy citizens do not take part in the administration of the 
country directly, or individually as citizens, but elect representatives in the national parliament 
to represent the electors but not ‘slavishly’. Being ‘slavish’ to one’s direct electors is difficult 
on a practical level. With the formal formation of political parties, for elected representatives, 
being ‘slavish’ to one’s party is a much easier course and, in general, a strict requirement. 
 In representative democracy, the ultimate source of sovereignty is the citizenry as a 
whole acting through a representative group (parliament). According to classical theory, 
representative democracy transfers its use of sovereignty to the organs which represent the 
nation. Accordingly, the elected representatives, singly and as a whole, represent the nation 
rather than those who voted for them. The mandate is not given to each representative 
individually, but to the parliament, as a whole, to represent the nation.181 In representative 
democracy, political parties, elections and democratic grass-roots organisations constitute the 
democratic political institutions. When these institutions function appropriately, representative 
democracy fulfils its mandate.182  
This model emerged in England in the early 13th century. Then, the English king was 
assembling his nobles to consult with them about important issues. However, the opinions of 
the nobles were not binding. Gradually, over the following centuries, the political influence of 
the monarch declined, at times peacefully, other times violently. The nobles became the British 
House of Lords, the monarch became constitutional, the people voted for their representatives 
who formed the House of Commons, and political power now resides with the political party 
that has the majority of the people’s representatives in the Lower House of the British 
                                                 
180This explanation is not a quotation, it is rather a summary of the “birth of representative democracy” from 
Duverger’s perspective. See: Maurice Duverger, Siyasal Rejimler [Political Regimes], trans. Teoman Tunçdoğan 
(Istanbul: Sosyal Yayınları, 1986), 17. 
181Sezen, Seçim ve Demokrasi [the Election and Democracy], 39. 
182Sezgin Kızılçelik and Erdem Yaşar, "Temsili Demokrasi [Representative Democracy]," in Açıklamalı Sosyoloji 
Sözlüğü [Commented Sociology Dictionary] (Izmir Saray Kitabevi, 1996), 547.  
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Parliament. The British House of Lords is no longer the primary legislative body but instead 
plays a limited oversight role in reviewing legislation from the Lower House.183 
The representative democratic system went through two main changes in the recent 
past: the acceptance of the general ballot and the emergence of organised political parties. 
Initially, the franchise was heavily qualified in favour of property owners in order to protect 
and enhance their property rights against, inter alia, the encroachment of the property-less, and 
non-voting so-called ‘mob’, a particular fear following the excesses of the French revolution 
of 1798. With the increasing pressure for democratic principles from urban industrialisation, 
the franchise gradually expanded.184 
Representative democracy is the most common form of democracy. The key to its 
success is the need for effective and continuous accountability of its elected representatives to 
all who are not elected representatives. The latter group includes the civil service, the judiciary, 
the media, academics, civil society, business and labour representatives, individual citizens, 
other states both regional and global, and even non-parliamentary organisations of political 
parties themselves; they all have a role to play in holding political representatives to account. 
Failure, for whatever reason, to hold elected officials to account may lead to autocratic or 
oligarchic government.185  
Semi-direct democracy: The semi-direct democracy is “a mixture of direct participation 
of the citizens via initiatives and referenda, and the representative features of a parliament and 
executive”.186 In this form of government, the public elect their representatives who, sitting as 
a parliament, establish laws but allow the electorate direct decisions in some areas. These direct 
decisions are facilitated by the mechanisms of assent, referendum, veto and, law initiation.187 
However, the electorate cannot check and control its elected representatives arbitrarily. The 
                                                 
183Niyasi Kahveci, Demokrasi ve Islam [Democracy and Islam] (Ankara: TDV Yayınevi, 1994), 10-11. 
184Duverger, Siyasal Rejimler [Political Regimes], 17. 
185Çiçek, "Demokrasi Ve Türkiye'nin 1950 Sonrası Demokratikleşme Meselesinin Sosyolojik Tahlili [Democracy 
and Sociological Analysis of Turkey's Democratisation after 1950]," 20. 
Usually, such failure over a long period of time leads to impoverishment of the social and economic 
infrastructure of the state. South America through many decades of the 20th century, and Greece leading up to 
the recent Global Financial Crisis and sinceare examples of a failure of accountability. 
186Bruno S. Frey, Marcel Kucher, and Alois Stutzer, "Outcome, Process and Power in Direct Democracy–New 
Econometric Results," Public Choice 107, no. 3-4 (2001): 271-72. 
187Ibid. 
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check and control mechanisms are rendered possible through several constitutional and legal 
norms.188 Semi-direct democracy is implemented, to varying degrees, in some US states 
(California and Vermont)189 and in all 26 cantons of Switzerland.190 The use of the internet for 
polling and voting has facilitated those aspects of direct democracy that are used in this hybrid 
form of democracy. 
Semi-direct democracy is exercised in Sweden. The local Swedish political party, 
Demoex, has been experimenting with a hybrid of direct and representative democracy in 
Vallentuna, a suburb of Stockholm. The party representatives on the Vallentuna municipal 
council vote on council issues in accordance with the results of polling on the party’s website. 
Any local resident over the age of 16 years can register on the website in order to vote in the 
various polls.191  
The Demoex party was established on the 6 March 2002 and won a local election in the 
municipality of Vallentuna the same year. The Demoex system is “a political hybrid” which 
utilises e-democracy to bring “direct democracy into a system of representative democracy”. 
The system creates a semi-direct democracy which resembles the form of democracy that has 
been prevalent “in Switzerland since the late 19th century”. In a genuine direct democracy, 
“there are no representatives, or […] only proxy representatives with limited power”. By 
                                                 
188Öztekin, “Siyaset Bilimine Giriş”, 66. 
189For instance, referanda are being used extensively in California where there are more than 20 million eligible 
voters. On a much small scale, towns in the state of Vermont are famous “for their yearly town meetings 
[organised] every March to decide on local issues.” See: Tim Dickinson, "The Next Seven States to Legalize Pot 
Why Oregon, California and More Are Likely to Follow Colorado and Washington toward Legalization," Rolling 
Stone, 18 December 2012. 
190When it comes to direct democracy, Switzerland is usually cited as the country that is the closest to having a 
directly democratic system of government. Although Switzerland retains features of a representative democracy 
(e.g. it has an elected Parliament), various forms of direct democracy are used frequently at national, cantonal 
and local (commune) level. Direct democracy was introduced at federal level in Switzerland in 1848, although in 
some Swiss cantons forms of direct democracy have been used since the fourteenth century. A variety of direct 
democracy mechanisms are provided for at both federal and cantonal level, with Swiss voters given the chance 
to cast their votes in federal ballots on average four times a year. For more information on Direct Democracy in 
Switzerland see: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, “Swiss Direct Democracy”, http://aceproject.org/ace-
en/focus/direct-democracy/cs-swiss [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
191Tony Benn, "Direct Democracy ... Using Technology to Empower Ourselves .. Part Two," Electronic Article, 
(2013), http://takeourpowerback.net/2013/11/11/direct-democracy-using-technology-to-empower-ourselves-
part-two/ [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
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contrast, in a representative democracy, the elected representatives have full competence to 
decide on political matters.192 
Liberal Democracy  
Liberal democracy is a form of representative democracy that places the individual at 
the centre of its political ‘mission’ in law and, ostensibly, in practice. Following from this, 
liberal democracy espouses the philosophy that individuals should be, as much as possible, 
unrestricted in leading their lives and that the state’s role is supportive to this end. The ‘free 
market’ economy is a corollary to this philosophy. Liberal democracy developed in Western 
Europe to meet the needs of the new political and social structures required to advance the 
emerging secular, market driven economies. The US and French revolutions of the late 18th 
century were the beginning of the end for government by monarchs with self-styled ‘divine 
right’.193 The main principle of Western Democracy is “political liberalism”. Political 
liberalism is expressed in Article 1 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
(1789), a founding document of the French Revolution, which stated: “Men are born and 
remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general 
good”.194  
Early liberal democracy prioritised the rights and freedoms of the enterprising 
(economic) individual rather than those of the society as a whole, unless such priority enhanced 
the individual as an economic unit, and demanded the limitation of government in the light of 
the economic rights of individuals. This type of democracy did not prioritise social rights and 
welfare and was based on the philosophy of economic liberalism, according to which, it is the 
economic interests of the individual that mattered primarily.195 
 Liberal democracy is pluralist since the egalitarian and liberal notions of political 
liberalism reject the superiority of a single outlook or doctrine and enables free discussion and 
                                                 
192Ibid. 
193Esat Çam, “Siyaset Bilimine Giriş [Introduction to Political Science],” (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1995), 359. 
194[Also known as] The Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789, Issue 2002,  
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst2.pdf  
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
195Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer," Manuscript (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). 
  
   57 
 
organisation of many kinds of outlooks and opinions.196 One of the fundamental characteristics 
of liberal democracies is the regular election of public representatives in a competitive 
environment based on political equality.197 Political equality requires the principle of “one-
person/one-vote”, “equality before the law”, “equal rights of free speech”, free elections, and 
equality in nomination for elective office.198 
Western liberal democracies199 have fundamental principles and characteristics, albeit 
implemented differently in different countries such as Turkey. They can be summarised as 
follows:200 
 Participation through a general voting system which is based on equality and 
representation. 
 The existence of many political parties and competition among them. 
 Majority voting in the election and voting systems but with mechanisms to avoid 
oppression of minorities by the majority.201 
 Limitation of the power and the authority of parliament and the government through 
constitutional norms. 
 The constitutional assurance of citizens’ political rights and freedoms. 
                                                 
196Servet Tanilli, “Uygarlık Tarihi [Civilisation History]” (İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1999), 142. Cited by: Diren 
Kaplangil, "Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Demokratikleşme [Civil Society and 
Democratisation in Turkey During the Globalisation Process]" (Master's thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2010), 53. 
197Diren Kaplangil, "Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Demokratikleşme [Civil Society and 
Democratisation in Turkey During the Globalisation Process]" (Master's thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2010), 54. 
198Sidney Verba, "Thoughts About Political Equality: What Is It? Why Do We Want It?," Inequality Summer 
Institute, Harvard University (2001): 2. 
199The phrase ‘Liberal Democracy’ is “often used to describe Western democratic political systems, such as 
Australia, the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Canada and [most Western European] nations”. See:  
Malcolm Farnsworth, "Liberal Democracy," australianpolitics.com, http://australianpolitics.com/democracy-
and-politics/key-terms/liberal-democracy. [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
200Coşkun Can Aktan, “Liberal Demokrasi İçin Değişim Sancıları [The Pains of Change for Liberal Democracy]”, 
Diyalog, No: 1. (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 1996): 243-244. 
201One way to ensure this is through qualified majority voting, a voting procedure whereby “each member is 
assigned a weight (a number of votes); in order for a bill to be passed by the [Parliament] the total weight of 
those voting in favour must equal or exceed a set quota (also known as the ‘threshold’)”. This is particularly used 
in the European Union. See: Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover, "Qualified Majority Voting Explained," 
Homo oeconomicus 21, no. 3/4 (2004): 575. 
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 The rights of private property ownership and inheritance but not exclusive rights. 
 Functionality of the market economy and the limitation of the economic activities of 
the state in order to guarantee economic rights and freedoms (enterprise, choice) of the 
individuals. 
 Full functionality of competition in the market and elimination of imperfect and unfair 
competition through legal arrangements. 
 Elimination of the limitations and restrictions in international trade and realisation of 
free trade. 
 The limitation of the state’s duties and responsibilities and, in an extreme form, 
withdrawal of the state from the economic activities of the market.  
 Provision by the state of services protecting and overseeing orphans, elderly or mentally 
handicapped people and, fostering the establishment of volunteer organisations in these 
areas. 
 Setting economic and social rights as circumstances change for the state and its citizens, 
including the limitations, for the general good, of these rights. 
Devin K. Joshi, Assistant Professor in the Josef Korbel School of International Studies 
at the University of Denver, divides liberal democracy into two main categories: the thick and 
the thin varieties of liberal democracy. In his classification, the thick variety of democracy 
ascribes a larger role to the government “to coordinate, govern and intervene in society”.202 In 
line with David Held’s terminology,203 Joshi calls the thicker version of liberal democracy 
developmental and the thinner version protective. Since more of the society is reputedly 
involved in the democratic process, the developmental liberal democracy (DLD) is also known 
as social democracy by some scholars. Protective liberal democracy (PLD) is often described 
as minimalist or libertarian as its purpose is “to minimize the size and scope of the 
government”.204 
                                                 
202Thomas Meyer and Lewis Hinchman, The Theory of Social Democracy (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007). 
203David Held, Models of Democracy, 3rd ed., (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
204Devin K Joshi, "The Protective and Developmental Varieties of Liberal Democracy: A Difference in Kind or 
Degree?," Democratization 20, no. 2 (2013): 191. 
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Secularism 
In this section of Chapter 2, I explore the meaning of secularism, views on secularism 
taken by various scholars, and secularism’s role in the modern development of democracy since 
the beginning of the European Enlightenment. 
It is not necessary, or of any great import, for my thesis to try to sort out which of these 
two significant developments, democracy or secularism, of the past four centuries is the cause 
and which is the effect. It is sufficient that they address different issues of societal development 
but do so conjointly. The question is: does democracy, in its liberal democratic form, the form 
I am using as a framework in my thesis, need secularism in order to be a successful form of 
political framework, sustainably. 
In the case of modern Turkey, the above question has great importance if deepening 
‘democratisation’ is Turkey’s best path in to the future. By ‘best’ I mean the most effective 
path to take, with minimum risk, to meet its needs sustainably; needs that will change with 
time, both domestically and regionally. It is the ‘democratisation path’ that the JDP government 
has chosen to promote in Turkey since it came to power in 2002. This thesis addresses the twin 
questions: has the JDP, in government, done well enough in its capacity to advance 
democratisation in Turkey, as measured against the features of democracy discussed in this 
chapter; and are its efforts genuine for the medium to long term. 
In some countries, even regions, one of the main community issues is the relationships 
between religion, the individual, the community as a whole and politics. Given the strong 
social, intellectual and spiritual strands that run deep through this historical issue, an 
interdisciplinary approach is necessary. Before addressing the issue, it is important to give a 
general background to the term secularism. 
Meaning of Secularism 
In a general sense, the term secularism refers to the principle of separation of state 
institutions and government representatives from religious institutions and religious leaders. 
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Further, secularism asserts that the human activities and decisions, especially political ones, 
should not be influenced by religion.205 
In 1846 the term was used for the first time by George Jacob Holyoake206 to denote “a 
form of opinion which concerns itself only with questions, the issues of which can be tested by 
the experience of this life”.207 In his 1896 publication English Secularism, Holyoake's defined 
secularism as follows: 
Secularism is a code of duty pertaining to this life, founded 
on considerations purely human, and intended mainly for 
those who find theology indefinite or inadequate, 
unreliable or unbelievable. Its essential principles [...]: (1) 
The improvement of this life by material means. (2) That 
science is the available Providence of man. (3) That it is 
good to do good. Whether there be other good or not, the 
good of the present life is good, and it is good to seek that 
good.208  
According to Alessandro Ferrara’s classification, secularism has three dimensions: 
First, secularism denotes the right to be free from the influence of religious rule and teachings 
in which the state remains neutral towards different religions or beliefs and does not impose 
religion upon its citizens. According to this definition of secularism, religion and the state are 
rigorously separated and the state grants all its citizens the right to freely exercise their religious 
freedom and believe in one God, many Gods or no God.209 Secularism in this sense is 
sometimes, and tortuously, translated as “religious neutrality”, captured by the French term 
                                                 
205Barry A Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, Secularism & Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives (Hartford, 
CT Institute for the Study of Secularism in Society and Culture [ISSSC], 2007). 
206British secularist and co-operator George Jacob Holyoake (13 April 1817 – 22 January 1906), was born in 
Birmingham, England. It was Holyoake who invented the term “secularism" (1851). See: George Jacob Holyoake, 
The Origin and Nature of Secularism (London: Watts & Co., 1896), 50. 
207English Secularism: A Confession of Belief (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1896), 60. Cited by: 
Catholic Encyclopedia “New Advent”. 
208Ibid. 
209“In the classical version of the separation between the State and the Church, religious faiths are protected in 
their freedom to articulate revealed knowledge and paths to salvation, to administer the interpretation of what 
is holy, to regulate rituals, to infuse transcendence in daily life, to celebrate the bond shared by the faithful, as 
long as they never invoke support from the State’s coercive power, never pretend to turn sin into crime, and 
always allow their believers to change their mind and turn to another religion or no religion.” See: Alessandro 
Ferrara, "Philosophy and Religion: Three Meanings of Secularism," Reset DOC, 11 March 2008. This text was 
presented at the Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations round-table “What is Secularism?”, organised for the UNESCO 
World Philosophy Day held in Istanbul on 22 November 2007. 
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‘laïcité’ and incorporated into the First Amendment of the US Constitution in two clauses.210 
This notion of secularism is also known as “Political Secularism”.  
Ferrara regards the second type of secularism as a social, rather than political, 
phenomenon.211 In this sense, secularism denotes the fact that religiously biased communities 
of modern societies are not concerned with influencing law, politics, education or public life 
in general, instead they become sub-groups that are functionally specialised playing a role as 
“communities of like-minded believers”.212 Thus, “people less and less frequently use religious 
rituals and symbols to mark significant moments of their lives and religious boundaries of faith 
become of marginal importance in defining one’s social networks”.213 Further, this type of 
secularism denotes the fact that people’s thoughts, commitments and loyalties are influenced 
less and less frequently by religious groups “relative to other considerations” and that 
religiously driven actions become less and less important “for social life”.214 
Ferrara’s third notion of secularism consisted, inter alia, “of a move from a society 
where belief in God is unchallenged, and indeed unproblematic, to one in which it is understood 
to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace”.215 From the 
perspective of this notion of secularism, “belief and non-belief, theism and atheism” are 
considered “as different ways of being in the world, of living one’s life” rather than as rival 
theories in cognitive terms.  
It is also important to distinguish between Secularism and Laicism. They are two 
different ways to organise public policy and religion. These concepts have similarities as they 
both deal with the separation of the state from religion (separation between the political 
                                                 
210“Two clauses in the First Amendment guarantee freedom of religion. The establishment clause prohibits the 
government from passing legislation to establish an official religion or preferring one religion over another. It 
enforces the ‘separation of church and state.’ Some governmental activity related to religion has been declared 
constitutional by the Supreme Court. For example, providing bus transportation for parochial school students 
and the enforcement of ‘blue laws’ (A blue law is a state or local law that prohibits ‘certain secular activities on 
Sunday’) is not prohibited. The free exercise clause prohibits the government, in most instances, from interfering 
with a person's practice of their religion.” See:  
"First Amendment: An Overview," (Cornell University's Legal Information Institute 2010). For more information 
on blue laws see: "Blue Law," in Britannica (britannica.com, 2014). 
211Ferrara regards the first type of Secularism, which was addressed above, as a political phenomenon. 
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authority and religious authority) and freedom of religion. However, these concepts are not 
identical and are different in relation to the publicly “visible appearance of religion. In 
secularism, the state is tolerant towards religious symbols in the public domain and allows 
public visibility of religion; the state plays a passive role in religious affairs. In laicism, the 
state plays an active role in which it bans religious symbols in the public domain and confines 
“religion to the private domain”.216 
Debates on Secularism 
Holyoake argued that there is an important distinction between secularism (and secular 
ethics217), free thought and atheism. He believed that secularism should never interfere in 
religious matters. He differed with the secularist Charles Bradlaugh and this disagreement 
created two secular factions: one faction held that anti-religious activism is necessary and 
desirable, the second faction held that it is not. 
It has been claimed that the definition of secularism has been misinterpreted in the 
main.218 In an article published by Huffington Post in 2012, titled Secularism Is Not Atheism, 
Jacques Berlinerblau, Director of the Program for Jewish Civilization at the Edmund A. Walsh 
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, stated: 
Secularism must be the most misunderstood and mangled 
term in the American political lexicon. Commentators on 
the right and the left routinely equate it with Stalinism, 
Nazism and Socialism, among other dreaded ‘-isms’. In the 
United States, of late, another false equation has emerged. 
That would be the groundless association of secularism 
                                                 
216“Laicism or laicité in French is usually defined as a unique feature of French political culture. It emerged after 
the 1789 Revolution as a way of separating state and religion. Today, it is accepted as the foundation of the 
French Republic, which ensures national unity by securing tolerance towards different religious groups and by 
unifying citizens as rational, enlightened members of a collective unity. [...] Turkey, following the French 
tradition, defines its policies toward religion as laiklik in Turkish.” See: Ferrara, "Philosophy and Religion: Three 
Meanings of Secularism." 
217Theistic ethics holds that God makes the rules, whereas secular ethics holds that humans make the rules. For 
more information see the article “Secular Ethics-Introduction to Moral Theory”, available at: 
http://www.allaboutworldview.org/secular-ethics.htm [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. Rendered with 
permission from the following book: David Noebel, Understanding the Times: The Collision of Today’s Competing 
Worldviews, Rev. 2nd ed. (Manitou Springs, CO: Summit Press, 2006). 
218Jacques Berlinerblau, "Secularism Is Not Atheism," Electronic Article, (2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacques-berlinerblau/secularism-is-not-atheism_b_1699588.html.  
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
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with atheism. The religious right has profitably 
promulgated this misconception at least since the 1970s.219  
The secularist website Concordat Watch also criticises a ‘secularism which reflects 
one's personal religious views’ stating: 
Some opponents of church-state separation redefine 
‘secularism’ as ‘state neutrality’ to allow their group, 
among others, to get state funding. Others try to discredit it 
by conflating ‘secularism’ with ‘atheism’. But it's a 
political rather than a religious doctrine and its purpose is 
to help level the playing field in order to give a better 
chance for human rights.220 
In a secular state, politics and public administration, as well as legislation and principles 
that frame public matters, are based on the needs and realities of life, rather than on religious 
ideas and ritual. However, legislation and principles are based on religious dogma in a non-
secular state. Therefore, secularism means neither atheism nor antagonism towards religion. 
Rather, it means adaptation to the worldly principles by confining religious dogma and 
guidelines to the religious milieu and individual conscience. In short, secularism is exclusive 
to the realm of worldly life and is devoid of spiritualism and revelation. Secularism does not 
contradict the private and spiritual life of the individuals, nor does it ban religion or the 
trappings of religion. Accordingly, secularism is not identified with atheism. An individual can 
be secular in business life, in which he behaves in accordance with the secular laws created by 
the state, but religious in his personal and family life.221 This is the situation for many Jews and 
Christians.222 This is not always the case for Muslims, especially in Muslim countries (except 
                                                 
219Ibid. 
220Concordat Watch, "What Is Church-State Separation (Aka Political Secularism)?," (2013), 
http://www.concordatwatch.eu/showtopic.php?org_id=1551&kb_header_id=15791 
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
221Ali Fuad Başgil, Din Ve Laiklik [Religion and Secularism] (Istanbul: Yağmur Yayınları, 1962), 157-58. Cited by: 
Çiçek, "Demokrasi Ve Türkiye'nin 1950 Sonrası Demokratikleşme Meselesinin Sosyolojik Tahlili [Democracy and 
Sociological Analysis of Turkey's Democratisation after 1950]," 95. 
222In the New Testament Jesus states: "Render unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's, and unto God the 
things that were God's." [Matthew 22:21]. This was in response to a question of whether it was lawful for Jews 
to pay taxes to Caesar. Though this was originally about Christians submitting to earthly authority, it also applies 
to the balance individuals of faith must strike, on a daily basis, between the tenets of their faith and the demands 
of daily life, both economic and social. Jesus did not hand out the ‘how to manual’ at the time but, instead, led 
by example as set down in the Judeo/Christian/Islamic traditions. 
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for a few such as Turkey), although some current solutions, yet to be fully scrutinized,223 have 
been created to carry on a life in business without impinging on the principles of Islam. 
Secularism and Liberal Democracy 
Secularism  developed in the political thought of nation states in order to replace a 
legitimacy principle arising from faith based revelation and its attendant authority over social 
and economic matters.224 It is argued that liberal democracy, as a form of government based 
on the protection of its citizens’ rights in all spheres of their activities by the state which is 
legitimised by majority representation and accountability, can only flourish in a secular 
environment. In this regard, secularism is a sine qua non of liberal democracy.225 
Ideally, individuals should be able to choose and profess their religion freely in a secular 
environment; the state cannot interfere with their choice. Where the state does interfere, it 
violates the freedom of conscience, a fundamental tenet of liberal democracy.226 
Can democracy survive without secularism? A well-respected Turkish journalist, Hasan 
Cemal, is of the belief that it cannot. He stated the main condition for democracy to exist is: 
In democracies, political legitimacy comes from reality, 
not from divine sources. In other words, the basis for the 
sovereignty lies within the [will] of the people, rather than 
a divine being.227 
                                                 
223Emmanuel Smith, “Islamic finance: Academics note the importance of a focus on social justice”, Financial 
Times, 20 June 2011, Management, Business Education, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6d0cca6a-993f-11e0-
acd2-00144feab49a.html [last accessed on 22.11.2015]. 
224 Faith based authority over the governance and adminsitration of European nations, and their later colonial 
empires, declined in step with the rise of mercantilism and industrialisation. The English economic historian R.H 
Tawney (1880 to 1962) stated: “The secularization of political thought, which was to be the work of the next two 
centuries, had profound reactions on social speculation, and by the Restoration [1688] the whole perspective, 
at least in England, has been revolutionized. Religion has been converted from the keystone which holds 
together the social edifice into one department within it, and the idea of rule of right is replaced by economic 
expediency as the arbiter of policy and the criterion of conduct.” R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism 
(1926) (London: Pelican Books, 1938), 273. 
225Çiçek, "Demokrasi Ve Türkiye'nin 1950 Sonrası Demokratikleşme Meselesinin Sosyolojik Tahlili [Democracy 
and Sociological Analysis of Turkey's Democratisation after 1950]," 95-96. 
In this context, democracy refers to “liberal democracy”.  
226Türker Alkan, 12 Eylül ve Demokrasi [12th September and Democracy], vol. 74 (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 
1986), 125. 
227Çiçek, "Demokrasi Ve Türkiye'nin 1950 Sonrası Demokratikleşme Meselesinin Sosyolojik Tahlili [Democracy 
and Sociological Analysis of Turkey's Democratisation after 1950]," 96. 
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If Cemal is correct, then secularism is the only foundation for a sustainable democracy. 
However, if secularism is the sine qua non for a sustainable democracy, it did not always 
guarantee a sustainable democracy. In other words, all sustainable democracies are secular but 
not all secular democracies are sustainable. The corollary, arising from Cemal’s axiom, is that 
all faith based states, excluding nominally faith based states like the United Kingdom, do not 
have the potential to be sustainable effective democracies. The flow of history, at least 
European history since the Reformation, confirms Cemal’s argument.  
Secularism is not against religion per se. However in a secular state, those who oppress 
people, or use force, in the name of religion, are subject to the law and face criminal charges. 
Therefore, secularism is a prerequisite for democracy.228 We know that democracy is effective 
to the extent that the legislative, executive and judicial branches of a democracy formed checks 
and balances with each other. In situations where religious and state affairs are managed by the 
same authority, a religious authority, political power will be unified, not pluralistic; in these 
situations, it is difficult to realise democracy.229 In a theocratic state, such as Iran, only 
unvarying and permanent truths are valid. Thus, it is to be expected that freedom of thought 
and democracy are not taken into consideration in such a state. Moreover, different 
interpretations within a religious system are sometimes not tolerated. This can be achieved by 
formal vetting of candidates for office on the basis of their religious commitment as is the 
situation in Iran currently. Therefore, secularism is a precondition for the development of 
democracy and for the co-existence of the people with different political as well as religious 
beliefs.230  
The eclipse of secularism would severely undermine democracy and pose a major threat 
to political arrangements based on reason, and a threat to individuals and groups of differing 
faiths. A non-secular state may subject its citizens to official sect-based ideology that can 
become a tyranny for other parts of the community. This form of government would cause 
great, if not insurmountable, difficulties for citizens who regard religion as a private matter or 
                                                 
228Ibid. 
229Ibid. 
230Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Siyasal Çatışma ve Uzlaşma [Political Conflict and Reconciliation], 3rd ed. (Ankara: İmge 
Kitabevi, 1995), 65-70. 
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are not of the official faith.231 In this respect, the promotion of secularism is the best guarantor 
of religious freedom, protecting both religious and non-religious people in a given society.232 
A Democratisation Yardstick 
Assessing the democratisation ‘balance sheet’ of a nation state at any period in its 
history can be carried out in absolute terms or as a comparison between the beginning and the 
end of that period. These methods of assessment do not stand alone but are complementary. 
Whichever method is used, the resultant assessment only has meaning for the individual nation 
state in conjunction with the other assessment method. A nation state that scores ‘well’ on its 
absolute democratisation scorecard currently, might have scored ‘very well’ on its scorecard 
five years ago i.e. it has gone backwards on its democratisation path. A nation state that has 
improved its relative democratisation scorecard over five years may have only moved from 
‘very poor’ to ‘poor’ on its relative scorecard, a significant improvement but from a very low 
base and a misleading absolute measure on its own.  
For the scope of this thesis, my yardstick to measure the progress of democratisation in 
Turkey is the ‘period beginning versus the period end’ comparative method of assessment and 
I have used Turkey’s EU accession outcomes during the period as a supporting absolute 
assessment measure. 
The characteristics of democracy I have chosen to assess with my ‘democratisation 
yardstick’ have been discussed earlier in this chapter under the heading ‘Characteristics of 
Democracy’ and include: 
  
 Political equality 
 Alternative government  
 Free, fair and regular elections  
 Majority rule  
 The rule of law  
 Individual freedom 
 Tolerance, cooperation and compromise  
 
In completing my ‘scorecard’ using the above characteristics, I have adopted the following 
calibration when comparing the beginning with the end of each period:  
                                                 
231Çiçek, "Demokrasi Ve Türkiye'nin 1950 Sonrası Demokratikleşme Meselesinin Sosyolojik Tahlili [Democracy 
and Sociological Analysis of Turkey's Democratisation after 1950]," 97. 
232Mümtaz Soysal, "Gerçek Tehlike [Real Danger]," (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 1991): 145. 
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 Significant advance 
 No significant change (advance or reversal), or 
 Significant reversal  
 
I have applied my ‘scorecard’ characteristics to the following sections of Chapter 5: 
o EU Accession  
o Military Tutelage   
o Ethnic and Religious Diversity   
o Gender Equality and Children’s Rights  
o Civil Society   
o Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
o Democratic Opening Initiative  
o Constitutional Reform  
 
Not all characteristics will be applicable to every area of discussion. Please refer to the end of 
each section of Chapter 5 for my scorecard discussion and score.  
Turkey made democratic advances in all these areas between 2002 and 2014 but the 
advances were not solidly embedded and were vulnerable to being overridden in circumstances 
of political turbulence. This is not unusual in the political development of nation states that 
journey along the democratisation road. Hard fought ‘advances’ can take time, decades, to 
embed solidly and with time comes the uncertainty of change, welcome or not, controlled or 
beyond control. For the JDP since 2013, its democratisation advances have been tested in 
extremis and continues to be so tested at the date of this thesis. 
Conclusion 
In discussing ‘democracy’, this thesis holds liberal democracy as the yardstick. 
However, regardless of which view is taken, a true democratic government is one that is 
capable of protecting the rights of its citizens and that offers freedom and equality for its 
citizens within the certain limits determined by law.  
The state exists to serve its citizens for it is the citizens who built up the state, not vice 
versa. In the case of a conflict between the state and the interests of its citizens, the state should 
take all the necessary measures that will help to ensure the rights of its citizens, rather than 
restricting their rights in a disproportionate and undemocratic manner; for example in matters 
of national security.  
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In order for the state to function democratically, the main branches of the government 
(legislature, executive and judiciary) should act independently but in cohesion with each other 
within the limits set out by law and laid out in the doctrine of separation of powers. These 
separate components of the whole should hold each other reciprocally responsible to the 
assertion of powers within the boundaries of law and/or limit one another, if necessary. In doing 
so, for the sustainability of democracy, any branch’s dominance over the other(s) should be 
prevented through effective mechanisms such as the afore-mentioned separation of powers 
mechanism, checks and balances mechanism, a democratic Constitution and regular elections.  
Concerning the forms of democracy, direct democracy is impractical for nation states. 
Semi-direct democracy, at a lower level of government, is used in some countries. 
Representative democracy is the most common form of democracy in today’s world, being 
prevalent in most Western countries. Despite the widespread adoption of the processes and 
institutions of representative democracy, the need for continuous and effective oversight of 
elected officials by the citizenry is a matter for ‘eternal’ vigilance. 
I have argued in Chapter 2 that a liberal democratic state provides the most effective 
framework to ensure government accountability and the protection of the civil rights and 
liberties of individuals and groups of individuals. ‘Perfect’ democracy does not exist in the real 
world. All democracies have their strengths and weaknesses. What matters is that there is a 
close relationship between democratic institutions and the nature, needs, and priorities of the 
people. When the relationship is less than optimal, reform, or its extreme harbinger, revolution, 
come into play. The path, reform, civil unrest or revolution, to the eventual outcome is a 
function of the democratic principles of tolerance and negotiation brought into play, or not into 
play.233  
Democratisation is a dynamic process of liberalisation, transition and consolidation. 
The focus of this thesis is the consolidation phase that Turkey is currently experiencing. Turkey 
has been a democracy since 1946 and went through the first two phases well before the year 
                                                 
233Compare the nationalisation of health in the UK in 1948 (reform), the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland between 
1969 and 1995 (extreme civil unrest), and Ukraine currently, suffering annexation and civil war (a revolution 
from in and from out). All three examples comprise democratic states but the paths taken to resolution were, in 
the cases of Northern Ireland and the Ukraine, pyrrhic. 
  
   69 
 
2002. However, the consolidation phase lost momentum in mid-2011, the start of the JDP’s 
third term in office.  
In relation to the role of religion in modern nation states,, and given the many 
mainstream religions and their inter and intra doctrinal divisions, as well as  the unelected 
nature of religious leaders, a single-faith based government and state structure would, de jure, 
be unable to provide the same level of protection of religious freedom for both religious and 
non-religious people as a secular democratic state. Faith based groups and individuals have a 
role to play in secular democratic nations, however,  it is not an exclusive or veto role. Rowing 
back against centuries of ‘enlightenment’, and slow and bloody democratisation, is  always an 
option but one which, in its extreme guise, risks authoritarianism. The secular ‘cat’ is well and 
truly out of the bag. The question is not whether secularism is good or bad for democratic 
‘progress’ but whether secularism undemocratically impinges on individuals and groups in 
their religious beliefs and practices. 
My democratic yardstick is substantively comparative, comparing democratisation at 
the beginning of the JDP rule in government in 2002 through to the end of 2014. 
Finally, in relation to the many and varied vicissitudes that change brings to bear on 
nation states who take the democratisation path, the Preface of the Church of England’s Book 
of Common Prayer, in its warning as far back as 1662, has relevance:  
There is never anything by the wit of man so well devised, 
or so sure established, which in continuance of time hath 
not been corrupted.234  
Then, it was about the corruption of prayers to their God. It applies equally to the 
corruption of the ‘democratisation’ journey for nation states, consciously or by inadvertence. 
Its warning is universal and timeless for societies who aspire to a democratic ideal. 
 
                                                 
234William Keeling, Liturgiae Britannicae: Or, the Several Editions of the Book of Common Prayer of the Church 
of England, from Its Compilation to the Last Revision; Together with the Liturgy Set Forth for the Use of the 
Church of Scotland: Arranged to Shew Their Respective Variations (William Pickering, 1851). 
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Chapter 3: DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 
 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to set out the constitutional and political framework that the 
JDP found itself in when taking office for the first time in 2002. At that time Turkey enjoyed at 
first glance an advanced democracy although there were significant undemocratic parts to its 
constitution and its politics in practice. The JDP targeted these undemocratic parts in its policy 
to resolve, sustainably, Turkey’s polarisation between Western secular modernisation and 
domestic political Islam. 
The chapter sets out briefly the democratic development of Turkey including its main 
institutions and legal framework from political reforms in the late Ottoman Empire through to 
2002. Though constitutionally liberal democratic, the fabric of the republic’s successive 
constitutions in law and practice has been heavily influenced by various domestic tutelages 
whose aim has been to guard the Kemalist style of modernisation.  
The most significant tutelages have been the military tutelage which I discuss in this 
chapter, as well as the civil service tutelage. The former has used the full spectrum of its 
constitutional and unconstitutional ‘weapons of persuasion’. The bureaucracy has worked 
silently in the background using delay and attrition to maintain a semi-tutelage of the political 
system. Both were assisted immensely by the ‘still-in-place’ 1982 Constitution, which I 
examine. The chapter considers how military and bureaucratic steerage affected Turkish human 
rights and freedoms, and discusses the influence and limitations of Turkey’s nascent civil 
society. I also provide a summary of Turkey’s democratic strengths and weaknesses and discuss 
secularism in Turkey. 
Democratic Development  
The initial attempts to introduce democracy in Turkey were the various measures to 
modernise the Ottoman Empire in the four decades from 1839, known as the Tanzimat 
(Reorganisation) period. These reforms “heavily influenced by European ideas, were intended 
to effectuate a fundamental change of the empire from the old system based on theocratic 
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principles to that of a modern state”235  a well-worn path in the development of democracy in 
Europe.236 The next democratisation ‘push’, known as the Young Turks Era, 1908 to 1918,237 
together with the Tanzimat period, was a significant ‘democratising’ period in the empire’s 
history, albeit with significant temporary set-backs and against a backdrop of an empire in 
collapse.238 With its surrender at the end of World War I, the empire was distributed among the 
victors.  
The Republic of Turkey was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on 29th October 
1923239on the basis of the Tanzimat reforms, both actual and aspirational; the Republic is 
considered the heir to the Tanzimat period.240 However, notwithstanding the preceding multi-
party Second Constitutional Era,241 it was not until 23 years later in 1946 that Turkey the 
republic moved from a one-party state to a nominal pluralist state with the formation of a new 
political party, the Democratic Party (DP) that won 62 seats in the national election that year.242 
                                                 
235Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. "Tanzimat Ottoman Reform Movement",  Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Tanzimat [last accessed on 5.11.2016]. 
236Zuhal Yeşilyurt Gündüz, “Der Einfluss der Europäischen Union auf die Demokratisierung der Türkei”, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung e.V (ed.), Auslandsinformationen, Sankt Augustin, 1. October 2004, 49. available at: 
http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.5398/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
237Hasan Kayalı, “Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-
1918”, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997, 291. Reviewed by: Yücel Güçlü, 
“Perceptions”, Journal of International Affairs 4, No. 4, December 1999 – February 2000, available at: 
http://sam.gov.tr/arabs-and-young-turks-ottomanism-arabism-and-islamism-in-the-ottoman-empire-1908-
1918-book-review/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
238In late 1876, the Basic Law was passed that established the nearly 600-year Ottoman Empire as a constitutional 
monarchy and created the General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire. The assembly was seen as a voice of the 
people and was not, in its brief existence, a forum for political parties. This period has been described as Turkey’s 
First Constitutional Era and it came to an end in early 1878 with the suspensions of the Assembly and the Basic 
Law, the latter in effect Turkey’s first constitution. Absolute Manarchy was restored. However, by the first decade 
of the new century the empire was under significant threat and internal political, and eventually internal military 
threat, was brought to bear on the Sultan to reinstate the Basic Law which he did in 1908 to usher in what is 
known as the empire’s Second Constitutional Era as well as, for the first time, parliamentary party politics See: 
Official Web-site of the Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: 
The Ottoman Period”, 2011, available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/constitution-of-the-republic-of-turkey.en.mfa [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
“The Young Turk Revolution of July 1908 inaugurated the Second Constitutional Period, which lasted until the 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. Today the Young Turk Revolution and the decade that followed it are 
typically regarded as if enclosed in historical brackets, as a sort of transition period from late Ottoman history to 
the Republican era…” See: M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918 " In Turkey in the 
Modern World ed. Reşat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008): 62-111.  
239Erik Jan Zürcher, “Turkey: A Modern History,” (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010): 167. 
240Mesut Yılmaz, “Türkei und EU. Die Suche nach einer ehrlichen Partnerschaft,” (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-
Verlag, 2004): 17. 
241See: Naim Turfan, “Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse,” (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2000). 
242The general election in 1946 was a major breakthrough in Turkish democratic history; it put the single party 
rule of the CHP on notice with the surprising, albeit limited, electoral success of the Democratic Party (DP) 
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The State had been autocratically ruled by the Republican People’s Party (the CHP) between 
1925 and 1945.243 
Turkey is a unicameral parliamentary representative democracy based on its secular and 
unitary republican constitution. The socio-political characteristics of the Turkish republic are 
set out in its, still in force, 1982 Constitution as follows: 
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social 
state under the rule of law (hukuk devleti, Turkish 
equivalent of état de droit), resting on the basic principles 
enunciated in the preamble, attached to the nationalism of 
Atatürk, and respectful of human rights, within a 
framework (lit.,‘within an understanding’) of social 
tranquility, national solidarity and justice.244 
Despite less than effective application, separation of powers is guaranteed by the 
Constitution.245 Executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Council of 
Ministers who form the government. Legislative power is constitutionally vested in the 
unicameral parliament, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (the Parliament).246 Judicial 
                                                 
founded earlier that year as a small break-away from the ruling party. The DP went on to a sweeping success in 
the 1950 national elections. Prior to which, in July 1948, the Nation Party (Turkish: Millet Partisi) had been 
established. See: Bernard Lewis, “Demokrasinin Türkiye Serüveni [the Adventure of Democracy in Turkey]”. 
Translated by: Hamdi Aydoğan & Esra Ermert (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Publications, 2003): 10. 
243Ibid., 9-10. 
The CHP is today’s main opposition party in Turkey, but it was the ruling party between 1923 and 1950. 
244English translation of Art. 2 of Turkey’s 1982 Constitution by Andrew Mango. See: A. Şeref Gözübüyük, T.C. 
1982 Anayasası [1982 Constitution of the Turkish Republic] (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000): 21-2 Cited by: 
Andrew Mango, “Kemalism in a New Century” in: Brian W. Beeley (editor), Turkish Transformation: New Century 
New Challenges (England: The Eothen Press, 2002): 23.  
See also: Kemal Gözler, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey]” (Bursa: Ekin 
Kitabevi, 2010). Available at: 
http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
245Ibid. 
246With respect to the quorum for meeting and decision making in the Turkish Grand NationalAssembly, Article 
96 of the Turkish Constitution of 1982, as amended by Law no. 5678/3 on the 31st May 2007 provides the legal 
framework as follows: "Unless otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
shall convene with at least, one-third of the total number of members and shall take decisions by an absolute 
majority of those present; however, the quorum for decisions can, under no circumstances, be less than  a quarter 
plus one of the total number of members" (the first paragraph of Art.96 in English). See:  
Turan Yıldırım, “Election of the President of the Republic of Turkey”, International Journal of Human Sciences 6, 
Issue 1 (2009): 875, available at: https://www.j-humansciences.com/ojs/index.php/IJHS/article/view/819/384 
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
For the original version of Art.96 see: 1982 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [The Constitution of the Turkish 
Republic of 1982], Art. 96, Cited by: Gözler, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [the Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey]”, available at: 
http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. See also:  
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powers are constitutionally vested in independent courts. The Judiciary is, at least in theory, 
independent of the Executive and the Legislature. Additionally, the Constitutional Court 
assesses the conformity of laws and decrees with the Constitution; the Council of State acts as 
the tribunal of last resort for administrative cases; and, the High Court of Appeals for all 
others.247 
Free and fair elections have been held in Turkey since 1950.248 The President is Head 
of State and represents the Turkish nation, oversees the implementation of the Constitution and 
ensures the proper and efficient workings of the organs of state.249 The President is elected for 
a five year term by direct elections.250 Article 101 of the Constitution on the election of the 
President was amended by Law no. 5678/4 on the 31st May 2007, after a nation-wide 
referendum, and states: 
The President of the Republic shall be elected by the public 
from among the [members of the] Grand National 
Assembly [of Turkey] who are over 40 years of age and 
have completed higher education or from among ordinary 
Turkish citizens who fulfil these requirements and are 
eligible to be deputies. The President's term of office shall 
be five years. The President of the Republic can be elected 
to two terms at most. Nomination of a candidate for the 
Presidency of the Republic from among the members of the 
Grand National Assembly or from outside of the Assembly 
shall require a written proposal by [twenty] members of the 
Assembly. Furthermore, political parties with more than ten 
                                                 
Official Web-page of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası”, Art.96, available at: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa82.htm [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
For comprehensive information about the Grand National Assembly of Turkey see: "The Constitutional Tradition 
and Parliamentary Life. Turkish Grand National Assembly and Its Working Order. Legislative Immunity." See also: 
https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/ [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
247Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, “The Constitution of the Republic 
of Turkey” Archived from the original on 03.02.2007 Retrieved 16.12.2006. Available at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070203170110/http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm 
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
248Zürcher, “Turkey: A Modern History,” 217. 
249Article 104 of the 1982 Constitution of Turkey regulates the powers and duties of the President. 
For the full text of Article 104 see: Official Web-page of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, “Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [The Constitution of the Turkish Republic]”, Art.96, available at: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa82.htm [last accessed on 25.02.2016] & 1982 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Anayasası [The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of 1982], Article 96, Cited by: Gözler, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Anayasası [The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey]”.  
See also: Yıldırım, “Election of the President of the Republic of Turkey,”876. 
2501982 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of 1982], Article 101, Cited by: 
Gözler, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey]”.  
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percent of the eligible votes in sum in the latest 
parliamentary elections can nominate a joint candidate.  
The president-elect has to sever his relations, if any, with 
his political party, and his status as a member of the Grand 
National Assembly shall cease.251 
Abdullah Gül was the parliamentary elected President of Turkey from 2007 to 2014. He 
was elected by a large majority of the Parliament and succeeded Ahmet Necdet Sezer on August 
28, 2007.252 The President authorises the chairman of the party having the majority of members 
of Parliament to form the government. The key aspect of the referendum was that the President 
was now to be elected by popular vote instead of by parliamentary deputies sitting as members 
of the Grand National Assembly. The change turned Turkey into a mixed representative 
government: part Parliamentary and part Presidential, albeit with limited powers for the latter, 
but still, an opening for an ambitious politician with the requisite parliamentary numbers. On 
the 28 August 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, former Prime Minister since 2002, became the 
12th President of Turkey.253 President Erdoğan is the first to hold the office through direct 
popular elections, as mandated by the constitutional referendum in 2007. Mr. Erdoğan, standing 
on the JDP ticket won with 51.79% of the vote,254 a majority, albeit slim. 
                                                 
251See: Yıldırım, “Election of the President of the Republic of Turkey”, 873. 
‘Article 102 of the Turkish Constitution of 1982’ on the election of the President of the Republic stipulates: “The 
President of the Republic shall be elected by a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly and by secret ballot. If the Turkish Grand National Assembly is not in session, it shall 
be summoned immediately to meet.” This provision was interpreted by the Constitutional Court as quorum for 
the meeting of the Parliament.  
The re-election of the President is possible for the following term of office (5+5). See: 1982 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Anayasası [The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of 1982], Article 101, Cited by: Gözler, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Anayasası [The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey]”. 
252BBC News, "Turks Elect Ex-Islamist President" (2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6966216.stm  
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
Although the 11th President of the Turkish Republic, Abdullah Gül, was elected after the entry into force of the 
amendment of Law no. 5678/4 on the 31st of May 2007, he was elected as per the former provision of the 
Constitution at a later time; on the 28th August 2007. See: Faruk Bilir, "Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Cumhurbaşkanı 
Seçimi Kanunu İle İlgili Kararı [the Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Law of the Election of the 
President]," (2012),  
http://www.ankarastrateji.org/yazar/prof-dr-faruk-bilir/anayasa-mahkemesi-nin-cumhurbaskani-secimi-
kanunu-ile-ilgili-karari/. [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
253He was sworn in as the 12th President of Turkey on 28 August 2014. 
254Official Web-Page of the YSK,  
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/HaberDosya/2014CB-Kesin-
416_d_Genel.xlsx [last accessed on 18.03.2015] 
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The Prime Minister is “designated by the President of the Republic from members of 
the Parliament]” and is generally the leader of the party having most seats in parliament.255 The 
Prime Minister is the head of government and has the duty to ensure the Council of Ministers, 
the Cabinet, functions in a coherent manner, as well as oversee the implementation of 
government policy. Members of the Council of Ministers are accountable to the Parliament and 
to the Prime Minister who in turn ensures that Ministers fulfil their tasks in accordance with the 
legal framework of the state.256 
Turkey’s current Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, has held office since 28 August 
2014. He has been leader of the JDP since 27 August 2014 and served as Turkey’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs between 2009 and 2014.257 
Parliamentarians258 are directly elected by the public for a five year term.259 
Parliamentary elections occur through a party-list proportional representation system260 
                                                 
255For more information see: "Political Structure of Turkey: Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers," (2007). 
Available at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070203025134/http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/Structure.htm 
[last accessed on 06.01.2014]. 
256"Political Structure of Turkey. Duties and Responsibilities of the Prime Minister," turkishelections.com, 
http://www.turkishelections.com/political_structure/executive/ [last accessed on 06.01.2014] 
257Official Web-Page of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ahmet-davutoglu.en.mfa [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
258The parliamentarians of the TGNA are given legislative immunity. Article 83 of the 1982 Constitution regulates 
the legislative immunity of the deputies. 
See: "Government Plans to Change Turkey's Justice System", Hürriyet Daily News, 2 January 2014. See also: 1982 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of 1982]. 
The translated version of Art. 83: 
“Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall not be liable for their votes and statements concerning 
parliamentary functions, for the views they express before the Assembly, or, unless the Assembly decides 
otherwise, on the proposal of the Bureau for that sitting, for repeating or revealing these outside the Assembly...” 
See: Anadolu Agency, "Justice Minister Slams Judges Board over Statement on Judicial Police Regulation" Hürriyet 
Daily News 27 December 2013.  
“The TGNA is formed with 550 members of parliament who are elected with the general vote of the people. 
Parliamentary elections are held once every five years, are free, equal, single step, in accordance with the 
fundamentals of the general vote and are held under the general management and control of the judicial organs.” 
The TGNA denotes the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Turkish: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) See: Fulya 
Ozerkan, "Turkey PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan Sparks Furor by Saying He Wants to ‘Raise a Religious Youth’," 
National Post, 9 February 2012. For the functions and powers of the TNGA see also: ibid. 
259"Turkey PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan Sparks Furor by Saying He Wants to ‘Raise a Religious Youth’." 
260Dirk Tröndle, “Turkey’s Party Democracy-Discussion About Political Parties, Electoral Legislation, and the 
Political Culture”, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung e.V., July 25, 2007: 3, available at:  
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_11374-544-2-30.pdf?070712125457 [last accessed on 07.03.2011]. See also: 
http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.11374/ [last accessed on 07.03.2011]. 
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whereby 85 electoral districts261 represent the 81 administrative provinces262 of Turkey. The 
cities of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir are divided into several electoral districts because of their 
large populations.263 In order to avoid excessive numbers of parties in Parliament and the 
increased risk of instability in governance, a ten percent election threshold264 has been in force 
since 1983.265 Only political parties that win at least ten percent of votes in a general election 
have the right to be represented in Parliament. This party election threshold has been criticised 
by various internal and external commentators on the grounds that it is too high and prevents 
democratic representation of minority parties.266 
Only Turkish citizens aged eighteen years or older can vote in the national elections. 
Voting is compulsory for all Turkish citizens and cross border voting is possible for those 
citizens living outside the country. Citizens aged 25 years or older are eligible for election to 
public office. On 16 April 1930 women gained the right to vote for community councils, and 
on 8 December 1934 they were granted the right to vote for the National Assembly.267 
Moreover, universal suffrage has been applied since 1933.268 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the 
“Father of the Turks”) played a major role in these electoral reforms.  
The political party system is very fragmented in Turkey and the internal party structures 
have an oligarchic and top-heavy character, as highlighted by William Hale.269 The leader of 
                                                 
261Yasama Derneği (ed.), “TBMM’nin Yapısı, Görevleri ve İşleyişi [The Structure-, Duties- and Operation of TGNA]”, 
18, available at: http://www.yasader.org/web/stk_el_kitabi/son/1-birincibolum.pdf [last accessed on 
25.02.2016]. 
262See: Yasama Derneği (ed.), ibid.,18. See also: Tröndle, “Turkey’s Party Democracy-Discussion About Political 
Parties, Electoral Legislation, and the Political Culture”, 3. 
263Istanbul is divided into three electoral districts whereas Ankara and İzmir are divided into two electoral 
districts. 
264Turkey's 10 percent election threshold is the highest in Europe. See: Hürriyet Daily News, “Parliament refuses 
to even debate election threshold”, Ankara, 30 May 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/parliament-
refuses-to-even-debate-election-threshold.aspx?pageID=238&nid=47857 [last accessed on 18.02.2016] 
265US Library of Congress (ed.), “Military Intervention and the Return to Civilian Rule. Politics and the Return to 
Civilian Rule”, available at: http://countrystudies.us/turkey/17.htm [last accessed on 18.02.2016]. 
266Sevgi Akarçeşme, "High Threshold Prevents Full Representation in Turkey," Today's Zaman, 4 August 2013. 
267Günter Endruweit, “Turkey and the European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?”, in: Nezihi Çakar (ed.), 
Perceptions. A Strategic Overview of Turkey, Journal of International Affairs, Volume III. Number 2, Istanbul, 
June-August 1998, 60. 
268Turkish Directorate General of Press and Information (2004-08-24). "Political Structure of Turkey". Turkish 
Prime Minister's Office. Archived from the original on 2007-02-03. Retrieved 2006-12-14. Available at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070203025134/http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/Structure.htm  
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
269William Hale, “Democracy and the Party System in Turkey”, In: Brian W. Beeley (ed.), Turkish Transformation. 
New Century New Challenges, (England: The Eothen Press, 2002): 166.  
William Hale is one of the most popular specialists on Turkey and Turkish Politics, as well as a Professor of Politics. 
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the party plays a major role in determining the candidates for top list positions,270 as well as in 
“vetoing ‘undesirables’”.271 The intra-party structure is, both in theory and practice, 
substantially undemocratic.  
The Military Tutelage 
The Turkish military has been a major player in state politics since the period of the 
Ottoman Empire enabling the formation of the nation-state. Atatürk was a military officer. 
However, he supported the exclusion of the military from overt interference in politics. He was 
the first leader in Turkish modern history to ban the military from civil government.272 
The Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, the TSK) proclaimed itself the 
guardian of Kemalist laicism in 1960.273 The TSK has intervened at times when it perceived 
that Islamic/centre right parties were gaining ascendancy in the Turkish body politic and 
threatening the Kemalist secularism of the state. The major military interventions occurred on 
27th May 1960, 12th March 1971 (memorandum), 12th September 1980, and on 28th February 
1997 (postmodern intervention).274 According to some sources, the statement issued by the 
military on 27th April 2007275 could also be considered as a memorandum, i.e. as a military 
intervention. At times, clashes between the political parties in Turkey was so out-of-hand that 
many Turks considered military intervention a better option than continued political conflict.276 
                                                 
270The party members were displeased by this situation: just ‘2 per cent’ of the members were of the belief that 
the party leader should determine the candidate list, whereas ‘42 per cent’ supported the idea that the party’s 
members should do this. See: Hale, “Democracy and the Party System in Turkey”, 188 
271Ibid. 
272As the first leader in Turkish modern history to remove the military from the institution of politics, Atatürk 
made a statement after the 1908 Revolution, after the military were tempted to intervene politically, in which 
he warned the military officers to stop interfering in politics and to return to their military duties. See: Hikmet 
Özdemir, “Atatürk’ün Liderlik Sırları”, (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007): 114-5. 
According to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Atatürk was an army officer who devoted himself to civilian will and 
considered the military interference in politics to be contrary to the honourand dignity of the army. See: Özdemir, 
“Atatürk’ün Liderlik Sırları”, 115. 
273Leonidas Oikonomakis, “Political Islam and Kemalist Laicism: New Tango on Turkey’s Old Battlefield”, 22 June 
2010, http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/3576.cfm#down [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
Kemalist laicism is the interpretation of the laicism principle according to the ideology of Kemalism. Kemalism 
will be addressed later in this chapter. 
274Gündüz, “Der Einfluss der Europäischen Union auf die Demokratisierung der Türkei”, 49. 
275Workers’ Struggle (ed.), “The fifth military intervention of Turkish history”, 27 April 2007, 
http://www.iscimucadelesi.net/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=1 
[last accessed on 22.02.2011]. 
276Klaus-Detlef Grothausen (ed.), “Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Band IV:Türkei”, (Göttingen: Vandanhoeck & 
Ruprecht Verlag, 1985): 305-15.  
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As a result, military interventions became part of the political scene.277 In one Turkish political 
scientist’s judgment, a number of politicians, intellectuals, civil servants and military officers, 
acting in loose coalitions, supported the military intervention.278 These were the groupings 
which had been defenders of the state till 1950 and who now tried to oppose change.279 The 
afore-mentioned interventions, except the latest intervention, fall outside the time period of the 
thesis discussion. Given the role of the Turkish military in Turkish politics, it could be stated 
that the history of Turkish democracy is “embarrassingly interruptible.”280 However, it is 
important to emphasise that the power of the military in Turkish politics was dramatically 
diminished after 2002 due to various reforms under the rule of the JDP reforms that are 
discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Turkey’s military tutelage after the establishment of the Republic was premised on the 
belief among Turkey’s secular elites that the nation’s armed forces were the guardians of its 
secular Constitution not the people. In order to fulfil this guardianship role, the Turkish military 
has played a significant political role in the affairs of the nation both legally, through its non-
military statutory roles, and illegally, ranging in form from undue influence through to military 
intervention. The military tutelage system in Turkey over the past 50 years has undermined 
Turkish democracy and hindered its democratisation progress. 
The 1980 military intervention strengthened the military tutelage system in Turkey. The 
1982 Constitution, which arose from this intervention, expanded the control of the Turkish 
military over politics and also strengthened the autonomous and centralistic structure of the 
military.  
When speaking about the military’s former significant role in Turkish politics, 
Associate Professor Ahmet T. Kuru from San Diego State University is of the opinion that 
ideological allies of the military, specifically in the judiciary, political parties, and the media, 
along with some segments of society, strengthened the political power and encouraged the 
                                                 
277Endruweit, "Turkey and the European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?", 65. 
278Toker Dereli, “Aydınlar Sendika Hareketi ve Endüstriyel Sistemi”, (İstanbul: Fakulteler Matbaası, 1974): 255-
65. 
This support derived from the wish to maintain stability and the status quo, avoid politics inspired tensions and 
clashes, and to not increase the risk to their professional positions. 
279Endruweit, "Turkey and the European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?", 65. 
280Economist, 1991, 4, Zitat John Redmond, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: 
Turkey, Cyprus and Malta? Dartmouth 1992, 43. Cited by: Gündüz, “Der Einfluss der Europäischen Union auf die 
Demokratisierung der Türkei”, 50. 
  
   79 
 
Turkish military to intervene in politics. These influential civilian actors supported assertive 
secularist, Turkish nationalist and anti-communist ideologies by raising the spectres of ‘Islamic 
reactionism,’ ‘Kurdish separatism,’ and ‘communism’. They considered the military’s 
oversight of politics as the most effective way of preventing these threats. This does not mean 
‘that the Turkish military reluctantly intervened in politics as a result of civilian pressure; on 
the contrary, the military used these three threats to keep its allies constantly alert and its 
political role justified.’281 These strong influences on the military, together with the latter’s 
excessive centralisation, virtual self-regulation and non-accountability, significantly increased 
the risk of military control over Turkish politics, as has occurred regularly.282 
Until recently, the Turkish military had a high degree of financial, administrative, as 
well as political autonomy with minimal oversight by parliament or the executive. The 
military’s administrative autonomy meant the virtually exclusive self-regulation of its internal 
structures and control mechanisms.283 Civilian authority and control over the military fell far 
short of its Western European counterparts: The accountability of the General Staff Committee 
to the Prime Minister was ineffective and provided the basis for the military’s autonomy from 
civilian control. In effect, the Turkish military, free of political, financial and administrative 
accountability, was a state within a state.284 The military regarded itself as a guardian power 
over Turkey’s civil authorities, a military tutelage over Turkey’s Kemalist laicism as referred 
to above. 
As previously noted, the Turkish military is excessively centralised. The military head 
of the Turkish Armed Forces has had supreme and exclusive authority over military matters. 
Further, unlike its European counterparts, the Turkish military held, until recently, significant 
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supervisory positions throughout Turkey’s civil administration, discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter. 
The Navy, Air Force and Army, as well as the General Gendarmerie Command (the 
state’s armed military and security police), are under the authority of the Chief of the General 
Staff in terms of military, some security, and all related administrative activities. This has led 
to an excessive centralisation in the military system that strengthens the autonomous nature of 
Turkey’s military, making civilian accountability, as well as the military’s own internal 
accountability, significantly less than expected in a democratic state.285  
In the Turkish state tradition up to the early 2000s, the authority-responsibility 
mechanism functioned in accordance with the tenets of the military tutelage system.286 This 
tradition separates the domain of the state from the domain of politics. The domain of the state, 
controlled by the state actors and the military bureaucracy, refers to a domain where the 
unchangeable policies, definitions and components of the National Security Policy 
Document287 are determined and from which official policies were created.288 The domain of 
politics ensures the operation of those principles of the National Security Policy Document 
including response to internal threats (political, separatist movements, extreme nationalism, 
extreme left) and external threats (diplomatic and economic, regional and global).289 There was 
a hierarchical relationship between these domains whereby the domain of state ranked higher 
than the domain of politics.290 Twentieth century Turkish political history had experienced 
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287It refers to the document where the national security policy of the National Security Council (Turkish: Milli 
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continuous expansion of the domain of the state and the narrowing of the domain of politics; in 
other words, political issues were nationalised, gradually. While areas such as secularism, 
education, the Kurdish question and external policy were already considered the domain of the 
state, other areas were incorporated into the latter at times of crisis or whenever possible. Hence, 
these topics were no longer discussed politically, but brought under state control.291 In this way, 
politics acted as a platform to simply implement of the main guidelines of the state.  
On 7 July 1997, a protocol was signed between Turkey’s Interior Ministry and its 
Military General Staff, the purpose of which was an agreement to amend the Turkish 
administrative law that allowed civilian authorities to request support of the military under 
certain circumstances relating to national security and civil order. The protocol amended the 
law to allow the military to intervene without request from, or warning of, the civil authorities. 
The protocol has been named the ‘EMASYA’ protocol for short. EMASYA is the acronym for 
the protocol’s formal title in Turkish (Emniyet Asayiş Yardımlaşma Protokolü), in English, the 
Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order.292 This carte blanche effectively 
allowed the Turkish military to intervene in matters that were the first-call responsibility of 
Turkey’s political authority and civil administration and further strengthened the military 
tutelage in Turkey.293 In addition, the protocol established security and intelligence agencies in 
all military garrisons in the country for the assessment of internal threats, the co-ordination of 
which is still carried out by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (MİT: Milli İstihbarat 
Teşkilatı) and local police headquarters. The result has been the militarisation of public order 
and a relationship between the military authority and civilian administration that can, at times, 
impinge on the prerogatives of the government’s political leaders. Nevertheless, Turkey’s 
military tutelage has been significantly eroded since 1999294 especially with the military 
reforms after 2002.295 
                                                 
291Ibid. 
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In relation to civil-military relations in practice, there have been several tensions, as 
well as tactical salvos between the two actors over the past fifty years. The power struggle is 
continued today as indicated by the Ergenekon case.296 However, the Turkish military no 
longer plays a decisive role in Turkish politics; the result is the growth of the government’s 
political influence in the nation’s military affairs.297 The military interventions undermined the 
military’s internal legitimacy and its popular support with all sections of Turkish society. 
Discussion, including criticism, of its political role and military activities is now an accepted 
part of state/public discourse.298 
Finally, it should be emphasised that elimination of Turkey’s system of military tutelage 
is a complicated task. While countries such as Argentina and Brazil have successfully managed 
to put an end to the military’s role in politics, this has taken twenty to thirty years; Turkey’s 
journey to demilitarisation started relatively recently.299 
The Bureaucratic Tutelage  
Bureaucratic tutelage can be defined as unconstitutional intervention by unelected state 
officials, acting alone or together, including judicial officials, to block, delay or hinder the 
implementation of policies of elected governments.300 According to the notable Turkish 
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journalist and politician, Hasan Celal Güzel: “Bureaucratic tutelage was used to monopolize 
the power of the state and oppress the people with its own totalitarian minority”.301 
Sovereignty in Turkey has always been divided, in law and in practice, between the 
elected government and appointed military and civilian officials. The civilian bureaucracy had 
the dominant influence in setting Turkey’s ‘democratic’ principles and parliamentary 
framework during the Republic’s early years: determining whose voices were legitimate, or 
not. The civilian bureaucracy derived its legitimacy from the Kemalist ideology but was never 
held accountable by the public.302 It became independent of its political masters. To conform to 
generally accepted democratic principles, a civilian bureaucracy, including its jurisdiction, 
personnel and competence, should be accountable to the citizens through their political 
representatives and an independent judiciary. An independent civilian bureaucracy should not 
result in a domination by that same bureaucracy.303 
As one of the protectors of Kemalism, the civilian bureaucracy secured its own power 
and position, but more importantly, sought to control the ruling government in accordance with 
the state ideology. For this purpose they used and manipulated the media, the military and the 
judiciary. In protecting the state’s Kemalist ideology against the potential threats of politicians, 
Turkey’s civilian bureaucracy was in turn protecting its own power and privileges.304 
In his well-known article “Bureaucratic tutelage and politics”, the notable columnist of 
Zaman and Today’s Zaman newspapers, Ali Bulaç, emphasises the importance and necessity 
of the state and underlines the fact that only elected civilians should make decisions in a state 
and rule the state in accordance with these decisions. Where the military or civilian bureaucracy 
intervenes unconstitutionally in the state’s affairs, that unconstitutional administration becomes 
oligarchic. In his words: 
It is, of course, impossible to maintain a complex social life 
without a state. In this regard, a state indicates a historical 
reality and a social necessity. In terms of its classical or 
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modern functions, the state is the most [wonderful] 
apparatus of social life. This apparatus is made functional 
by the bureaucracy, which is not supposed to change with 
every new government. However, the bureaucracy’s 
mission is not/should not be restricted to making the state 
apparatus functional. The right and authority to make 
strategic decisions about today and the future and to 
administer the state in line with these decisions belongs to 
the [elected] civilians. Today’s much advertised democratic 
ideal suggests politics should be carried out solely by 
[elected] civilians. When the military or civilian 
bureaucracy oversteps its authority to shape the state’s 
administration, this is called an oligarchy, irrespective of 
the form or regime of the state. Despite differences in scope 
and magnitude, all oligarchic administrations are, in the 
final analysis, totalitarian and authoritarian.305 
Following the 27 May 1960 military intervention, rather than setting up an authoritarian 
regime, the military established a tutelage system which rendered the bureaucracy a partner to 
the government, not a servant. In this way, those who were elected by the public had to rule the 
country under the tutelage of the military and civilian officials. This tutelage was codified in 
autonomous institutions that were created by the 1961 Constitution, including the National 
Security Council, the State Planning Organisation and the Constitutional Court.306 As a result, 
the power of the elected government was constrained by those autonomous institutions, a form 
of bureaucratic tutelage albeit at the behest of the Turkish military. In addition, the 1961 
Constitution created a second parliamentary chamber, the Senate, in order to moderate the 
legislative power of the existing chamber. As a result, the determination of permanent policies 
of the regime including security were ascribed to the new autonomous institutions, and political 
decisions that facilitated the day-to-day activities of the citizens, were ascribed to the elected 
government.307 
It was the military tutelage that created the bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey. The former 
controlled the political life and political parties through the various military interventions of 27 
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May 1960, 12 March 1971, 12 September 1980 and 28 February 1997. It was these interventions 
that gave rise to a military sponsored, and ultimately military controlled, bureaucratic tutelage. 
The result was a state outwardly enjoying democracy but, beyond the democratic trappings, a 
state under the control of a military tutelage. Throughout Turkish political history, governments 
maintained their office so long as they did not move against, or even question, this tutelage. 
When elected governments challenged the status quo they were dismissed. Political parties 
whose policies were considered incompatible with the founding philosophy of the Republic 
were closed down. The same struggle lies behind some ongoing political tensions. What is 
more, Turkish political history and the ongoing political developments show that some 
politicians and their civil society representatives did not learn from these negative events of the 
past.308 
Political scientists have attempted to analyse bureaucracy in the Turkish state from 1980 
until to date mostly as an anti-democratic phenomenon, regarding bureaucrats as representatives 
of the elitist approach in the democratisation process. Feroz Ahmad argues there are two main 
groupings (Ahmad uses the word ‘cults’) when identifying the Turkish power elite and the rest, 
they are, respectively: the secular ascendant Westernised minority, the bureaucracy; and the 
overwhelming majority of the population who embrace Islam.309 The bureaucratic elite favours 
the dominance of the secular cult. In summary, there is a disjoint between the bureaucratic elite 
and those it is supposed to serve in terms of political values. Justifying itself, the bureaucratic 
elite reacts to the reform actions of the various selected governments by stating: ‘[The Turkish] 
public has not reached the level of maturity that is required for a democracy that is modern and 
participatory’. This dismissive reaction indicates that undemocratic structures and tensions 
among bureaucratic elite persist today.310 Turkey’s bureaucratic elite continue to have some 
influence on state affairs.311 
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The 1982 Constitution, like its predecessor the 1961 Constitution, is based on an 
acknowledgement of an ideological tutelage over Turkish society. The ideology is Kemalism, 
the initial aim of which was to maintain and modernise the Turkish state. Kemalism combines 
the political philosophy of hikmet-i hükümetçi fikir312 and the economic philosophy of etatism. 
The former is a state-centred understanding of society whereby society is a product of the state 
and exists by courtesy of the state and though derived, in liberal democratic nations, from the 
electoral will of the people, the state is not a tool of the people. This political philosophy regards 
the continuation of the state as the main aim of the ordering of society. For the new Republic 
of Turkey, the constitutional adoption of this philosophy was driven from a fear that the terminal 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 heralded a break-up of Turkey itself. ‘Hikmet-i 
hükümetçi fikir’ was the means to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new 
state although, this philosophy could give rise to an authoritarian state is virtually beyond 
domestic legal accountability, intrinsically independent from morality, law and justice.313 
Etatism was seen by the early Kemalists in power as the means to modernise the new 
republic. Etatism is the state ownership of the main areas of the domestic economy primarily 
for the purposes of allowing the state to compete internationally and, through economic growth, 
improve the living standards of its society. But the choice of economic etatism by the early 
Kemalists was primarily in the context of a ‘war battered’ new republic whose overriding aim 
was to secure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It has been argued that both ‘Hikmet- i 
hükümetçi fikir’ and etatism were short to medium term strategies of the early Kemalists and 
that their use would diminish as Turkey matured into a liberal democratic nation and domestic 
private enterprise stepped in to take the place of the state in the economy. The latter has been 
happening mainly due to economic imperatives not political. The former, as this thesis attests, 
is a work in progress. 
In the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, power was allocated between the political elite and 
the bureaucratic elite. One of the prominent features of this semi-tutelage arrangement was that 
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the political elite were accountable for their actions but had limited authority, while the 
bureaucratic elite was not accountable but had significant power. As a result, elected 
governments did not have exclusive power and this resulted in significant political instability 
at times.314 
Turkey’s Constitutional Court was established in 1961 to control the elected political 
elite, effectively restricting the latter’s powers. The Court was given an unusually wide 
jurisdiction, unlike modern Western democracies where such institutions are restricted to 
examining the constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature. In Turkey, the Constitutional 
Court’s competencies work to ensure that the decision making authority of the state is exercised 
by a non-elected elite. This Court has functioned mostly as a second legislative Chamber.315 
As late as the early 1990’s, the bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey was still in place and 
influential as a result of “the security considerations of the Cold War era”. With the end of the 
latter, political forces, previously stymied by the bureaucratic tutelage, found a new platform, 
the European Union, to express their needs and increase their influence for “social identity and 
civil society demands”. “The essence of this transformation” was alien to both the bureaucratic 
elite and centre-right parties. As bureaucratic power failed to meet expectations and needs of 
several social groups, but instead resisted reforms of the political system, new political rifts and 
tensions emerged. It became more and more difficult for the bureaucratic elite “to neutralize a 
bourgeoning social consciousness”. As a result, the bureaucracy and their allies, the centre- 
right political parties, weakened.316  
With the emergence of the JDP in 2002, a new era commenced in Turkish politics. The 
probability of a military intervention was significantly reduced by the new government’s policy 
that “intensified legal arrangements to bring the public will into the political scene by first 
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relying on the European Union integration process and then focusing on wider social demands”. 
However, as the military bureaucracy’s power and influence waned, the judicial bureaucracy 
“began to take over the job of ‘system guardianship’ and started to make overtly political 
decisions”. The Turkish Constitutional Court blocked “numerous draft laws and legal 
amendments initiated by the JDP governments” on the grounds that they had an anti-secular 
character contrary to Turkey’s Kemalist Constitution but this was perceived as “overstepping 
its authority and interpreting the law through a partisan lens.”317  
The 1982 Constitution  
Turkey’s 1982 Constitution (the “Constitution”) was formulated “under the aegis of the 
military regime”;318 based on the tutelage319 system and is a stumbling block for further 
democratisation of the country. The Constitution has been the subject of criticism for a number 
of reasons. 
Firstly, it incorporates anti-democratic elements. It is not firmly in line with human 
rights standards or universal democratic principles enshrined in international treaties. The 
Constitution does not favour the ideological principle of individualism and gives precedence to 
the Constitution itself and the codes (1982 Preamble) over universal principles or international 
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law.320 In addition, the Constitution restricts democracy and liberty within its existing legal 
framework.321 
Secondly, the Preamble and the 85 Articles of the Constitution have been subject to 
amendment or amendments sixteen times in the past twenty-eight years; critics have argued that 
it has lost its internal consistency.322 Further, it lacks the effectiveness to meet public needs323 
and individual rights and freedoms.324 According to the Constitution, the state takes precedence 
over the citizen;325 a significant handicap to Turkish democracy. The Constitution proclaims 
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on individual rights 'in times of war, martial law, or state of emergency'." However, "like its predecessor, [it] 
includes a detailed bill of rights covering the social, economic, and political rights and liberties of citizens. 
According to Article 5, all individuals are equal before the law and possess 'inherent fundamental rights and 
freedoms which are inviolable and inalienable'."  
"Article 24 guarantees freedom of religion, provided that the exercise of this right does not threaten the 
'indivisible integrity of the state.' [...] Secularism, a primary principle of Atatürk's reforms, is reaffirmed in the 
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Turkey to be “a liberalist democracy”, however, it sets out this ideology through a very limited 
set of statements.326 It regards the state as a kutsal devlet, a sacred nation state (a non-religious 
‘sacred’ in that it will exist for time immemorial as exclusively defined by the Constitution’s 
Preamble and its irrevocable first three articles) which implies that each citizen, and society as 
a whole, depend upon the State.327 In the West, it is the first and the only Constitution that 
considers the state as a kutsal devlet.328 For these reasons, the 1982 Constitution has been 
criticised by several sections of Turkish society.329 
Unlike the constitutions of Western liberal democracies, the 1982 Constitution of 
Turkey “does not depend upon the limitation concept of political power.” It is “the first and 
only Turkish Constitution” whose main aim is “to strengthen ‘the political power’, rather than 
‘the liberty or democracy’”. It does not achieve “a good balance between freedom and 
authority”, and “provides a [high risk of] restrictions of basic rights and freedoms to the 
legislation”. “It has a limitation system [significantly different to all] other Western 
constitutional systems”. Fendoğlu, a prominent Turkish Professor of Constitutional Law, 
describes the authoritarian and restrictive nature of the Constitution as follows: 
In the Constitution of 1982, the basic novation is the multi-
restrictions system. The first phase is the general 
restrictions provision (art.13). The general restrictions may 
be realized in [some cases]. All of the basic rights and 
freedoms can be restricted in case of each of these reasons 
with no [exemption] .These nine cases are neither clear nor 
concrete statements. There is not such a general restriction 
case in any of Western countries. These are not in 
accordance with The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).330 
                                                 
provision forbidding 'even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the 
state on religious tenets'."  
See: U.S. Library of Congress, “The Constitution. Provisions of the 1982 Constitution”, (no date or page number 
available), http://countrystudies.us/turkey/71.htm [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
326Fendoğlu, “Liberty and Turkish Constitutions. The Constitution of 1982 and the Individual (It’s Political 
Philosophy)”. 
327Ibid.  
For a critical analysis of kutsal devlet see the following article:  
Ihsan Dağı, “Devlet kutsal mı?”, Zaman Newspaper, 20 March 2012, available at:  
http://www.zaman.com.tr/ihsan-dagi/devlet-kutsal-mi_1261242.html [last accessed on 31.12.2014]. 
328Ibid. 
329AK Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (ed.), “Anayasa Değişiklik Paketi İle İlgili Sorular ve Cevaplar”, 7. 
330“In the West, feudal monarchism had unlimited and non-responsible rules in the past. Constitutions aimed to 
struggle with them. In Turkey, the 1876 and 1909 Parliamentary monarchism constitutions tried to limit 
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In addition to the “special restriction cases”, a further restriction, Article 14, acts as a “general 
prohibition and sanction provision”, stating: “The defined constitutional prohibitions and the 
orders can directly be exercised even when there is not any provision in Codes.”331 
The former 1961 Constitution had safeguards around changes to its human rights 
provisions which required legislation to implement and, for those rights which were considered 
core human freedoms, no change was allowed even by legislation barring a new constitution. 
The new 1982 Constitution watered down these safeguards by allowing change by 
administrative regulation and the lifting of the ‘no-go area’ for core rights. The Constitution 
was written under the strong influence of the then military junta, in control of the state as a 
result of its coup d’etat in 1980. It was ‘sold’ under the propaganda of the time which stated 
that “freedom in the Constitution is very large, [however] freedom has lost its attractiveness 
and the people wish security, not terror.” The rights and freedoms granted by the Constitution 
“were taken back by the provisions, beginning by the word ‘but’”, hence one of its popular 
names: “The Constitution of But”. As Turkey was under martial law at the time, extra-ordinary 
administration procedures were invoked by the military junta to draft, scrutinise, and pass the 
Constitution. Also the exemptions on the judiciary were further expanded by new amendments. 
So, the 1982 Constitution is also well-known as “The Constitution of Exempt”.332 
When analysing Turkish democracy and the 1982 Constitution of Turkey, a number of 
essential elements of a liberal democratic society should be taken into consideration. They 
include a liberal and pluralist base, free and active political parties, elected political 
representatives and political questions subject to popular referendums.333 The Constitution 
lacks most of these elements. It is not similar to that of “liberal democratic constitutions” or 
“the young Mediterranean democratic constitutions (Spain and Greece)” but similar to some 
Latin American Constitutions for the following reasons:334 
1. The Constitution was not prepared by an assembly that had legal authority to 
represent the state. It was arranged by an Assembly of Consultation which consisted 
of non-elected members who were appointed by the military government at the time. 
                                                 
monarchism. But 1924 and 1961 Constitutions aimed to find liberty and democracy.” See: Fendoğlu, “Liberty and 
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In effect, the National Security Council had the primary drafting role. Furthermore, 
a council similar to the Council of National Security Council had participated in the 
preparation process of the Constitution, along with an assembly having some 
representational character. The Council of Consultation had no authority to represent 
the people legally or sociologically. 
2. Rather than amending the “wrongful articles” of the former Constitution, the 
“Constitutive Assembly” preferred to form a new constitution. 
3. There was limited public consultation on the draft of the Constitution due to 
considerable pressure from the then military government. The draft was only 
allowed to be discussed in restricted form in the press and then only within a very 
short period of time. 
4. Contrary to popular belief, the legality for the Constitution was provided through a 
plebiscite, rather than through a referendum.335 It was not clear what would happen 
if the draft Constitution was rejected in the plebiscite. Further, given the limited 
publicity and consultation, many voters did not know whether they were voting for 
a President, a Head of the National Security Council or a new constitution. 
To conclude the Constitution fails to protect the individual, freedoms and liberal 
democracy in Turkey. Instead, it is based on the continuation of the supreme authority of the 
state. It is undemocratic and is referred to by its critics as the “anti-constitution”.336 
Civil Society  
The role of civil society337 is important in analysing Turkish democracy. A robust civil 
society could be considered a prerequisite for the development and the consolidation of 
democracy.  
                                                 
335“A referendum is a popular vote on an issue, law, or policy, which is binding on the government; it must abide 
by the outcome of the vote. A plebiscite is non-binding, but as an expression of popular will, it can carry 
considerable weight. Although a government is not bound by the outcome, it is generally accepted that acting 
against the finding of a plebiscite will carry political penalties. Referendums tend to be mandated, whereas 
plebiscites are generally at the discretion of a government.” See: Larry Johnston, “Politics: An Introduction to the 
Modern Democratic State (4th edition)”, University of Toronto Press: Higher Education (ed.), 13 September 2012. 
336Ibid. 
337As stated by the World Bank, “[t]he growth of civil society has been one of the most significant trends in 
international development”. Thus, the civil society organisations play a significant role in the development of 
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What do we understand by genuine civil society? A civil society must, first and 
foremost, be independent of the state. Independent in this context means that social groups338 
are able to establish themselves from their own resources; sustain their existence without state 
support or assistance; and, keep themselves immune to the manipulations of government, state 
organs, political parties and well-entrenched official views. Only then can the social groups 
forming Turkey’s civil society create alternative and valid discourses. Moreover, they can 
validly criticise, as well as influence, the state because of their independence from the state.339 
Large, well-known civil society organisations in Turkey include:  
• The Association for Kemalist Thinking (ADD),340 
• The Association for Supporting Contemporary Life (ÇYDD),341 
• The Association of Women of the Republic (CKD),342 
                                                 
Turkey’s democracy. See: Official web-page of the World Bank, “Civil Society: The World Bank and Civil Society”, 
Published by the World Bank Group, Last Updated on 28 November 2013, available at:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,menuPK:64272791~pagePK:220469~piPK:22047
5~theSitePK:228717,00.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
United Nations Global Compact, which is “a strategic policy initiative [of the UN] for businesses”, defines the civil 
society organisations as follows: “Civil society organizations — also known as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) — are critical actors in the advancement of universal values around human rights, the environment, 
labour standards and anti-corruption. As global market integration has advanced, their role has gained particular 
importance in aligning economic activities with social and environmental priorities.” See: Official web-page of 
the United Nations Global Compact, “Overview of the UN Global Compact”, available at: 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. See also: Official web-page of the 
United Nations Global Compact, “Non-Business Participation”, available at: 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/join/who-should-join/non-business  
[last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
338In this context, ‘civil society’ refers to social groupings such as associations including trade associations, trade 
unions, foundations, business institutions and cooperatives who are not primarily political but engage politically 
in achieving their objectives. See: Özkan Yıldız, “Sivil Toplum Örgütleri, ‘Özerklik’: Kavramsal Bir Açılım [Civil 
Society Organisations, ‘Autonomy’: A Conceptual Opening]”, Gaziantep Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 6, 
No.1, 2007, 58. Available at: 
http://www3.gantep.edu.tr/sosyal_bilimleri_enstitusu/Sosyal%20Bilimler%20Dergisi/Cilt%20Listesi/2007/C6Sa
yi%201/PDF/SBD2007-03-6.pdf [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
339Ibid., 56-8. 
340“ADD is a secular organisation striving to protect the ideas of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (the founder of modern 
Turkey) and to ensure that religion and state remain separate in Turkey. The organisation initiated court cases 
several times against those web-sites and links which insult Ataturk and is credited with organising the 2007 
Republic Protests.” See: http://www.add.org.tr/ 
341“ÇYDD is a non-governmental organization, working voluntarily with its competencies and experience, aiming 
to protect Atatürk’s principles and revolutions, to reach contemporary society via contemporary education for 
contemporary people and to carry Turkey above the contemporary civilization level.” See: 
http://www.cydd.org.tr/eng/sayfa.asp?id=22  
342“CKD is a secular women association which strives to protect the issues of gender, Kemalism, and secularism.” 
See: "Turkey's Coup Plotters: Lies and Whispers," The Economist, 25 February 2010, 8. 
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• Human Rights Association (IHD),343 
• The Women's Rights Association against Discrimination (AK-DER),344 
• The Association for the Freedom of Thought and Educational Rights (ÖZGÜR-
DER),345 
• The Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (MAZLUM-
DER),346 
• The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV),347 
• Economic Development Foundation (IKV),  
• The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB),348 
• Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD)349 
• The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD).350 
                                                 
343“IHD is a secular NGO aiming to improve the human rights standards in Turkey.” See: http://www.ihd.org.tr/ 
344“AK-DER is an Islamic organisation focusing on gender, education, and human rights issues.” See: "Turkey's 
Coup Plotters: Lies and Whispers," 8. 
345“ÖZGÜR-DER is also an Islamic NGO which addresses education, gender and human rights issues.” See: 
http://www.ozgurder.org/ 
346“MAZLUM-DER is an Islamic organisation which aims to improve human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Turkey.” See: http://www.mazlumder.org/main/pages/hakkimizda-ilkelerimiz/8 
347“TESEV is an independent, non-governmental think-thank analyzing Turkey’s most pressing social, cultural, 
political and economic issues. Based in Istanbul, TESEV was founded in 1994 to serve as a bridge between 
academic and research and the policy-making process in Turkey by opening new channels for policy-oriented 
dialogue and research. Institution operates under three programme areas: Foreign Policy, Democratization and 
Good Governance.” See:  
http://www.euromesco.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=5&id=1408&Itemid=39
&lang=en [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. See also: http://www.tesev.org.tr/hakkimizda/Tesev/2.html 
348“TOBB is the highest legal entity in Turkey representing the private sector.  
Similar to the patterns of guilds and syndicates, which traditionally organized and represented tradesmen and 
producers throughout the Turkish History, TOBB, too, adopted a representative role in a democratic and modern 
society.  
Today, TOBB has 365 members in the form of local chambers of commerce, industry, commerce and industry, 
maritime commerce and commodity exchanges.” See: http://www.tobb.org.tr/Sayfalar/Eng/Tarihce.php 
349“As the representative organization of the Turkish business world working for public interest, TÜSİAD strives 
to support entrepreneurial activities in conformity with the universal principles of business ethics; TÜSİAD 
constantly aims for progress and enhancement based upon continuous improvements in Turkey's 
competitiveness, social welfare, employment and productivity, as well as the country's capacity for renewal and 
the scope and quality of education and training during the globalization process.” For more information see: 
http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad/tusiads-vision/ 
350“MÜSİAD, an Islamically-oriented business association, is a group which must be studied within the context of 
both the business associations that constitute an essential element of civil society and the Islamic movements in 
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In Turkey, civil society has been relatively weak and often under pressure from the 
state.351 Notwithstanding increasing official tolerance since the 1990s,352 civil society 
organisations have been perceived, according to Ulvi Saran, as: 
Actors that will undermine the organic integrity of the 
society and pose a threat to the very existence and unity of 
the state because of their different approaches and 
discourses rather than institutions that will make 
contributions to social integrity and democratisation owing 
to their roles to increase political participation and represent 
different tendencies and worldviews. In a social and 
political process interrupted by military coups almost every 
10 years, it is not hard to understand this pessimistic and 
sceptical approach toward civil society.353 
The relationship between the state and civil society organisations in Turkey is 
developing. It is evident that external, especially European, as well as internal influences and 
dimensions play an important role in this development. To become, and remain, influential, 
civil society organisations need to get close to the political process. The risk for these 
organisations is that ‘getting close’ can lead to ‘being too close’ to government. Integrating 
with the political process leads to a loss of autonomy (particularly for individual associations) 
and undermines the unity of the civil society as a whole in Turkey. The civil society 
organisations should consider themselves to be active actors of the interactionist understanding 
of politics without losing their autonomy.354 No doubt, this understanding of politics is a 
prerequisite for a democratic society. Özkan Yıldız analyses civil society in Turkey as follows: 
Civil society in Turkey has in general a fragile structure. A 
civil society structure arising within cultural polarization 
makes autonomy problematic. In such a situation, non-
                                                 
Turkey.” See: "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan," in Encyclopaedia Britannica, ed. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(britannica.com, 2013), 2. Available at: http://ejts.revues.org/3696 See also: http://www.musiad.org.tr/tr-tr 
351Nonetheless, the significant civil protests that broke out in May 2013 in Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park, and related 
protests in other parts of Turkey “reflected the emergence of a vibrant, active citizenry”. See: European 
Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," Commission Staff Working Document (2013): 11. 
352“A series of substantial amendments were made in the 1990’s and 2000’s in order to liberalise the legal 
framework for the civil society in Turkey.” See: İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (ed.), “Turkey: Past, Present and Future”, 
Economic Development Foundation Publications No: 243, 1st ed., October 2010, 44.  
353Ulvi Saran, “Do Turkey’s civil society organizations accurately represent the public?”, Today’s Zaman (ed.), 10 
April 2008, available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_do-turkeys-civil-society-organizations-accurately-
represent-the-public-by-ulvi-saran-_138546.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
354Yıldız, “Sivil Toplum Örgütleri, ‘Özerklik’: Kavramsal Bir Açılım [Civil Society Organisations, ‘Autonomy’: A 
Conceptual Opening]”, 58. 
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governmental organizations sometimes find themselves in 
closer positions to government in various periods.355 
However, from the mid-1990s onwards, state policy towards Turkish civil society has 
been liberalised to allow civil society organisations to become much more involved in the 
political scene leading to a sharp increase in their numbers.356 The “end of the Cold War and 
the emergence of a less stable world” created a paradigm shift in government policy towards 
civil society; it become “increasingly difficult” for state elites “to form homogenous 
worldviews to influence societies accordingly”.357 In addition, the European Union accelerated 
the liberalisation process in this area by abolishing legislative restrictions in setting up and 
funding civil society organisations.358 This flowed through to Turkey in its accession 
negotiations as well as the democratic capabilities of the organisations.359 
Despite the liberalisation of the state policy towards civil society, civil society 
organisations in Turkey have been facing some major challenges which could be considered a 
serious stumbling block in the way of Turkey's democratic progress.360 
                                                 
355Ibid.,53.  
356İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (ed.), “Turkey: Past, Present and Future”, 45. 
357Ibid. 
358Brian Pratt, “Jordan enhancing CSO accountability. The links between legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability: the wider challenges”, INTRAC May 2010. 
359Ibid. 
360First of all, they are not widely seen as "legitimate stakeholder[s] in democracy" "by those traditionally 
involved in politics". The government also did not sufficiently consult stakeholders at the stage of determining 
main politics and legislations. Thus, the relations between the government and the civil society and the relations 
between the parliament and the civil society should be strengthened; "through systematic, permanent and 
structured consultation mechanisms at policy level, as part of the legislative process and with regard to 
nonlegislative acts at all levels of administration." 
The weak legal framework hinders effective "functioning of [the] civil society organisations" and "the extensive 
bureaucracy" often deters the CSOs from active participation in the policy making process. Despite the fact that 
a consultation process was initiated with the CSOs in the preparation of a law on the collection of aid for 
Associations by Turkey’s Ministry of Interior, the legislation such as social and tax legislation fails to facilitate the 
funding of civil society organisations and guarantee freedom of association according to European standards. 
The implementation of the legislation on associations and foundations should be compatible with ad hoc 
approach, being often limited to specific phases of policy design rather than addressing the entire policy cycle 
including the monitoring of implementation. The CSOs face problems also in terms of penalties and auditing and 
the interpretation of the legislation that is mentioned under the sub-section of Freedom of association, is still 
restrictive in relation to CSOs. Further, in order to improve the quality of the legislation, the conduction of the 
impact assessments needs to be strengthened. 
In addition to the challenges mentioned above, in its Turkey 2013 Progress Report, the European Commission 
draws attention to the problems of "restrictive primary and secondary legislation", the dependence of the CSOs 
"on public (often international) project grants" due to insufficient tax and other incentives for private donations 
and sponsorship, insufficient transparency and rule based public funding for CSOs, the rare allocation of the 
public funds through grant allocations or service contracts, insufficient granting of tax exemption and public 
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One organisation, however, is an outlier in Turkey’s civil society. The organisation, 
known to its followers as Hizmet (“The Service” in English), is led by the US based Turkish 
preacher Fethullah Gülen (1941- ).  It does not have an official name but it is usually referred 
to as Cemaat (“The Community” or “Assembly”) by the broader public in Turkey. Hizmet 
promotes itself as “[an Islamic] worldwide civic initiative…inspired by the ideas and activism 
of Mr. Fethullah Gülen” and  has grown into a global socio-political movement since the 1970s 
significantly due to the schools, associations and media outlets it has opened in Turkey and 
around the world. The movement asserts “its support of democracy, its openness to 
globalisation, its progressiveness in integrating tradition with modernity, and its humanistic 
outlook”.361  
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  
In analysing Turkish democracy, we should review its human rights’ record, as well as 
those fundamental rights and freedoms which are of particular importance because they attract 
scrutiny domestically and internationally. 
Article 2 of Turkey’s Constitution states: “The Republic of Turkey is a State which 
respects human rights”.362 In addition, the preamble to that constitution guarantees all citizens 
the right to exercise fundamental rights and freedoms in order “to lead an honourable life and 
to develop his or her material and spiritual assets under the aegis of national culture, civilization 
and the rule of law”.363 
                                                 
benefit status and the need for a Council of Ministers decision for the granting, the lack of legal entity of the 
social enterprises in the legislative system, as well as the relatively weak support by the Turkish society for the 
CSOs and their lobbying power. 
"The EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue programmes" which involve "more than 1 600 CSOs in Turkey" are 
welcomed by the European Commission as these enhanced the enabling environment for the "civil society 
development" and "a greater recognition of CSOs at local level" and also contributed to the "increase [of] the 
capacities, partnerships and visibility of individual CSOs". Further, the need for a greater sustainability of the 
contacts "between EU and Turkish CSOs" is underlined. See: Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 
11-12. 
In Latin means “done only when needed for a specific purpose, without planning or preparation”. See:  
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/ad-hoc [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
361 See: What is the Gülen Movement, http://www.gulenmovement.us/gulen-movement/what-is-the-gulen-
movement 
362See: The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Part 1: Article 2, available at: 
http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/part_i.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. See also: İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı 
(ed.), “Turkey: Past, Present and Future”, 23. 
363 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Preamble, as amended on 17.10.2001: available at: 
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Further, human rights in Turkey are protected by various international treaties364 such 
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949)365 and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1954).366 The Copenhagen Criteria, as laid down at the June 1993 European 
Council in Copenhagen,367 require, inter alia, that a candidate for accession must “have stable 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities” 
in order to become an EU member.368 Moreover, reports on Turkey, prepared by the European 
Commission (Progress Reports), European Parliament, Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch record the situation of human rights in Turkey regularly, whereas the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) acts as a legal recourse of last resort for individuals whose 
human rights have been violated or deemed to be violated by the parties to the Convention.369In 
the history of ECtHR judgments, Turkey has apparently one of the worst records among the 
members of the Council of Europe.370 
                                                 
http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/preamble.html 
364Turkey is party to the following Human Rights Treaties: 1) International Bill of Human Rights 2)Women’s 
Human Rights 3)Protection from Torture, Ill Treatment and Disappearance 4)Terrorism and Human Rights 
5)Regional Conventions 6)Protocols 5 to 8 of the ECHR 7)Protocols 9 to12 of the ECHR. For more information see: 
University of Minnesota. Human Rights Library (ed.), “Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties-
Turkey”, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts//research/ratification-turkey.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
According to Article 90 of Turkey’s 1982 Constitution, these international law treaties, amongst others, take 
precedence over domestic legislation. See: The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, “Functions and the Powers 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly”, D.Ratification of International Treaties (as amended on May 22, 2004), 
Article 90. 
365The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 10 December, 1948. For the full text of the declaration see: Official web-site of the United 
Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights”,  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
366See: Official web-site of the European Court of Human Rights, “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. Summary of the Treaty”, Open for signature by the members of the Council of 
Europe, in Rome, on 4 November 1950. Entry into force: 3 September 1953, ETS no. 005, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/005.htm [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
367See: Official Web-site of the European Commission, “European Commission - Enlargement - Accession 
criteria”, last updated on 07.09.2012, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm [last accessed on 
19.02.2016]. 
368Ibid.  
369For more information see: Official web-site of the European Court of Human Rights, “European Court of Human 
Rights: Questions and Answers”, 3-6, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Questions_Answers_ENG.pdf [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
370"Having ratified the Convention in 1954, Turkey holds the worst record in the ECHR. Between the years 1959 
and 2012, Turkey topped the list of human rights violations committed (2521 violations out of 2870 total 
judgments), followed by Italy (1687/2229) and Russia (1262/1346). More than half of these violations involve 
Article 6, which is on the right to fair trial. That in itself is telling in that the individuals who exhaust options 
offered by the Turkish judiciary often end up having to turn to international law as the legal field of last resort. 
In other words, many cases go to Strasbourg simply because they do not receive proper attention in Turkish 
courts." See: Oguz Alyanak, “Cashing in on the human rights regime”, 2 October 2013, openDemocracy (ed.), 
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The main human rights issues that have aroused criticism domestically and 
internationally include: rights of ethnic groups (e.g.: Kurdish question); minority rights; torture; 
ill-treatment; personal inviolability; civil rights and freedoms; political rights; discrimination 
based on race, gender, religion and language; rights of employees; rights of women and 
children; lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights; freedom of assembly; freedom of 
thought; freedom of expression; and, dissemination of thought.371 Such criticism damages 
Turkey’s prestige and weakens its relations with other democratic countries; an important factor 
in maintaining democratisation progress. The various Progress Reports of the European 
Commission have emphasised that Turkey needs to legislate and implement the necessary 
reforms for democratisation in order to achieve better compliance with the Copenhagen 
Criteria.372 In this regard, the European Commission criticises Turkey primarily “within the rule 
of law, preparation of a civil constitution, the lack of dialogue and spirit of compromise between 
the political parties.”373 Despite the fact that Turkey is considered as a country “which did not 
complete the necessary reports to meet the Copenhagen criteria”, Turkey has been rapidly 
improving its democratic standards since its recognition as an EU candidate country (1999), 
which has given further impetus to the democratisation process in the country. Nonetheless 
these issues, among others, remain unresolved. 
Democracy in Turkey: Strengths and Weaknesses  
In Chapter 2, I set out the basic characteristics of a modern democracy. Within these 
characteristics are a number of fundamental requirements, one can call them framework 
requirements and they include: individual liberty; a secular constitution; separation of 
constitutional powers; Rule of Law; universal adult suffrage; a multi-party body politic; free, 
fair and regular elections; and, rule by majority but protection of minorities. 
The strengths of Turkey’s democracy can be summarised as follows: 
                                                 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/oguz-alyanak/cashing-in-on-human-rights-regime [last 
accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
"In 2010, Turkey was the worst human rights violator among the 47 signatory states of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. In terms of complaints filed, Turkey ranked second only to Russia (a country with twice the 
population)." http://hellenicleaders.com/issues/turkey/#.VsZ0w8tBV-x [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
371Some of these issues were briefly addressed in Chapter 5.  
372İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (ed.), “Turkey: Past, Present and Future”, 46. 
373Ibid.  
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Turkey is a representative democracy based on universal suffrage with a multi-party 
system and regular free elections at national level to determine 550 parliamentary deputies who 
meet as the Grand National Assembly, Turkey’s supreme legislature subject only to Turkey’s 
republican constitution. The Turkish Grand National Assembly is active and independent.374 
While the electoral system and electoral politics have democratic deficits, “elections in Turkey 
are indisputably democratic.”375 
Though Turkey has a large and stable Muslim population,376 it has a well-established 
secular constitutional framework. In this regard, democratic Turkey is unique in the world for 
the level of co-existence of Islamic values and secular democratic values, albeit not in complete 
harmony. Many journalists, academics and civil society organisations consider Turkey to be 
the only middle-eastern country to accomplish “a successful democratic revolution”, 
advocating “the Turkish model as an exemplary example of what a [Muslim] democracy and 
modern Muslim society could and should look like”377 In this regard, the journalist Stephen 
Kinzer, author of the book Halbmond und Stern: Die Türkei zwischen zwei Welten states: 
‘Building a democratic country in a region, wherein democracy is traditionally uncommon, is 
the historical success of Turkey.’378 These are generous comments on Turkey’s commendable 
developments as a republic, however the journey at times has been less than commendable and 
is far from over. 
The above fundamental political and social strengths not only define Turkey as a 
democratic state but also underpin the robustness of its ‘democratisation’ process especially 
under successive JDP governments since 2002. Its determined efforts to join the European 
Union is testament to its democratisation momentum. I list below a summary of Turkey’s 
continuing weaknesses as a democratic state but point out that these are features of a state new 
                                                 
374Council of Europe. Parliamentary Assemby, Resolution 1256 (2001), “Honouring of obligations and 
commitments by Turkey”, par.5,  
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=9343&lang=en  
[last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
375Agnes Czajka & Bora Isyar, “Turkish democracy: a flawed model”, OpenDemocracy (ed.), 5 October 2011, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/agnes-czajka-bora-isyar/turkish-democracy-flawed-model [last accessed on 
19.02.2016]. 
376According to the CIA’s World Factbox, 99.8% of Turkey’s population is Muslim (mostly Sunni) and the remaining 
0.2% are mostly Christians and Jews. See: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The World Factbox, “Middle East: 
Turkey. People and Society: Religions”, 13 November 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-Factbox/geos/tu.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
377Czajka & Isyar, “Turkish democracy: a flawed model”. 
378Yılmaz, “Türkei und EU. Die Suche nach einer ehrlichen Partnerschaft”, 19. This is the author’s translation of 
Kinzer’s statement. 
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to the democratic fold since 1923 that, after twelve years of JDP rule, do not include the above 
fundamental weaknesses that it inherited — fundamental weaknesses that undermined Turkey’s 
democratic credentials in the past but do not now. In relation to the remaining points of 
‘weakness’, these are work-in-progress on Turkey’s democratisation journey and though 
important issues to address, do not have the destructive potential of past democratic weaknesses 
that gave rise to military coups, political party banning and less than fully democratic 
constitutions. 
Despite Turkey’s democratic credentials, the 1982 Constitution is a stumbling block to 
Turkey’s democratisation process and progress. For an effective democracy, a new constitution 
is essential; one which conforms to internationally accepted standards for human rights and 
those universal democratic principles enshrined in current international treaties.379 The current 
constitution underpins the continuing political polarisation in Turkey.380 This polarisation 
between assertive secularism and political Islam, the latter arguably of the mild but nonetheless 
important variety, has manifested itself in the banning of Islamic parties and politicians381 and 
military interventions. It has been and continues to be an obstacle to the democratic reform 
process.  
Other fundamental weaknesses were the military and bureaucratic tutelage systems. The 
military held an active position in Turkish politics. It played a fundamental role in framing the 
Turkish political system by non-military statutory provisions, influence and military 
                                                 
379For the main critics on the 1982 Constitution of Turkey see the following article: Fatih Vural, “System change 
debates should not mar new constitution”, Sunday’s Zaman (ed.), 01 May 2011, available at: 
http://hizmetmovement.blogspot.com/2011/05/system-change-debates-should-not-mar.html 
[last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
380In recent Turkish political history, these groups are the JDP and Kemalist forces, formed by the followers of 
the main opposition party of Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the judiciary.  
381“Once the 1982 constitution had been approved but before it was implemented, the NSC in April 1983 issued 
a Political Parties Law (Law No. 2820) that placed further restrictions on political activities. This law, which was 
intended to regulate the formation of political parties in advance of the November 1983 National Assembly 
elections, stipulates that political organizations cannot be based on class, religion, race, or language distinctions. 
To qualify for registration, a political party is required to have at least thirty founders, each of whom must be 
approved by the minister of interior. New political parties are prohibited from claiming to be continuations of 
any parties in existence before 1980. The law also requires each party to establish organizations in at least half 
of the country's provinces and in one-third of the districts within those provinces. Further, political parties are 
prohibited from criticizing the military intervention of September 1980 or the actions or decisions of the NSC. 
The Political Parties Law empowers the NSC and its successor, the Presidential Council, to investigate all party 
members and candidates for office and to declare any unsuitable.” See: U.S. Library of Congress, “The 
Constitution. Provisions of the 1982 Constitution”, 
http://countrystudies.us/turkey/71.htm [last accessed on 19.02.2016].  
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interventions, thereby weakening Turkish democracy. However, this political role significantly 
diminished in the last ten years. In line with internationally accepted political norms, 
elimination of the military tutelage system is essential for an effective democracy. Similarly, 
the state bureaucracies had a significant influence over Turkish politics by means of blocking 
and/or delaying government policy. The system of bureaucratic tutelage undermined Turkish 
democracy. Even the Constitutional Court had been criticised for acting outside of its 
Constitutional authority. 
The Turkish electoral system contains an unusually high 10% election threshold;382 
which prevents the democratic representation of smaller parties in the parliament, thus, 
disenfranchising millions of Turkish voters. Furthermore, “the persistent banning of political 
parties and individual candidates”383 became a blatant problem but that was addressed by the 
23 September 2010 Constitutional Amendment Package which made it much more difficult to 
close down political parties. At the local level, Turkish local government has not emerged as a 
consequence of local development and it is not strong enough.384 However, the JDP government 
aims at strengthening the local government through the local government reform, and for that 
purpose, it has undertaken important reforms.385 
                                                 
382The electoral threshold, introduced in 1983 by Law No. 2829, "mandates that a political party must obtain at 
least 10% of the [nationwide valid] vote" in a national election for its winning candidates "to be admitted to 
Parliament". Where a party polls less than 10%, not one of its successful candidates will be allocated a seat in 
Parliament. Turkey’s high election threshold, the highest in Europe and approximately double the European 
average, has been a focal point of criticism and the subject of court cases in the Turkish Constitutional Court and 
the European Court of Human Rights, as well as numerous legislative reform efforts. See: Sinan Alkin, 
“Underrepresentative Democracy: Why Turkey Should Abandon Europe’s Highest Electoral Threshold”, 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 10, Issue 2, Washington, 2011, 347. Available at: 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=law_globalstudies 
[last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
383Czayka & Isyar, “Turkish democracy: a flawed model”. 
384The provision of public services is inefficient and ineffective. “The inadequacy of central agencies and their 
field units in handling public services, their inability to respond quickly to problems, and the government’s efforts 
to decrease the size of the central administrative apparatus have meant local government has had to find 
solutions to such problems...” See: Aykut Polatoğlu, “Turkish Local Government: The Need for Reform”, Middle 
Eastern Studies 36, No.4, (London: Frank Cass, 2000): 156, available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284119?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. For the 
entire article see: ibid.,156-71. See also: Hüseyin Yayman, “Hükümet, seçim öncesi belediyeleri neden kapatır?”, 
Zaman, 4 March 2008, available at: 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/yorum_yorum-yard-doc-dr-huseyin-yayman-hukumet-secim-oncesi-belediyeleri-
neden-kapatir_659865.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
385These reforms were elaborated in the book “Sessiz Devrim [Silent Revolution]” which was published by the 
Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security of the Prime Ministry of Republic of Turkey in 2013: “Sessiz Devrim: 
Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim ve Dönüşüm Envanteri (2002-2012) [Silent Revolution: The Inventory of Turkey’s 
Democratic Change and Transformation], T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı 
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Though human rights are protected by several international treaties that Turkey is party 
to, such rights continue to be an acute issue that needs special attention to ensure further 
progress in Turkey. As noted earlier, Turkey’s human rights shortcomings have been criticised 
formally at the international level by the European Council, European Commission, European 
Parliament, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch; all identify the need for further 
improvement.386 Judged by the number of cases before the European Court of Human Rights 
recently,387 Turkey’s record of human rights violations against its citizens has been one of the 
worst among the countries of the Council of Europe.  
The relations between the JDP and Turkish media, in particular JDP’s confrontational 
attitude towards the media and the arrests of numerous journalists, have been subject to 
criticism. Turkish broadcast media and press are under the pressure from the state. That the 
“media’s regulatory framework poses complex challenges for journalists, broadcasters and 
regulators”388 undermines freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Currently, numerous 
journalists, some of whom were arrested, stand trial along with some media outlets; for some 
the trials have opened.389 Some intellectuals I interviewed stated that the media in Turkey was 
restricted by the government in order to suppress criticism of the government. In particular, 
concern was expressed over the long arrest periods for some journalists in Turkey. Opposing 
                                                 
[Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security of the Prime Ministry of Republic of Turkey], August 2013. See 
also: Rabia Karakaya Polat, “Beyond local elections: local government reform in Turkey”, Today’s Zaman (ed.), 
29 March 2009. 
386See: Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
387According to the 2010 Annual Report of the European Court of Human Rights, "278 judgements were made 
against Turkey for human rights violations in 2010, of which 228 were of at least one violation". It was the worst 
record before the ECHtR in 2010, "followed by Russia (217 judgments against) and Romania (143 judgments 
against)". See: Council of Europe. European Court of Human Rights, “2010 Annual Report. Provisional Version”, 
130-31, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2012_ENG.pdf [last accessed on 19.02.2016].  
However, against this measure the human rights record of Turkey has improved slightly over the past 3 years. 
See: Council of Europe. European Court of Human Rights, “2010 Annual Report. Provisional Version”, 157. 
388Ibid. 
389“Currently, there are more than 2,000 open court cases against journalists and media outlets and over 4,000 
ongoing investigations against journalists in Turkey. 
On 13 March 2011, thousands marched in central Istanbul calling for the release of 68 arrested journalists and 
freedom for the press in Turkey.  
Thousands of journalists and their supporters from other professions marched down İstiklal Avenue in Istanbul’s 
Beyoğlu district for more than an hour, demanding the immediate release of all arrested journalists and 
amendments to the Turkish Penal Code.  
The notion that journalists are persecuted in a place such as Turkey does raise serious concerns; the whole world 
will be keeping an eye on what happens next.” See: Talk about Turkey, “Press freedom march takes place in 
Istanbul”, 14 March 2011, http://talkaboutturkey.blogspot.co.nz/2011/03/press-freedom-march-takes-place-
in.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
  
   104 
 
those views, the JDP representatives stated that the journalists were arrested on the basis of 
their alleged links with illegal organisations.390 Whatever the (true) reason for these legal 
cases,391 the situation is undemocratic and subject to trenchant criticism domestically and 
internationally. Further, the state, through the Radio and Television Supreme Council, 
rigorously monitors the broadcasts of private channels. The Council has used sanctions and 
heavy financial penalties in its monitoring of channels, and their journalists, who have found 
themselves out of favour politically; as well as by financial and tax related pressures through 
other state agencies. The state-owned channel, TRT, has not been monitored by the Council 
since 2002, however, being state owned brings less open forms of political pressure.392 
Turkey’s civil society does not always act independently and is often constrained by the 
state. However, as noted earlier, state policy towards civil society has been liberalised since the 
mid-1990s in accordance with European standards. 
Secularism in Turkey 
This section discusses the conflict between hard-core secularism393 and conservative 
democracy in order to give a clear picture of the mainstream secular resistance to the 
                                                 
390Author’s interview with JDP representatives, Istanbul and Ankara, September-October 2011.  
See: Appendix A and B.  
391Critics of the AK Party government in Turkey, as well as in Europe, claim that the Erdoğan puts the media under 
pressure, and prevents the media from criticising government actions. Erdoğan rejects these criticisms stating 
that trials were necessary against media representatives solely because they committed illegal actions such as 
cooperating or having ties with the illegal or terrorist organisations, or members of these organisations, for 
example, the Ergenekon suspects. Erdoğan also responds by challenging his critics, asking: “Hangi gazeteci 
hükümeti eleştirdi diye tutuklu?”. In English: “Which journalist was arrested for criticising [my] government?”. 
See: CNN Türk.com (ed.), “Hangi gazeteci hükümeti eleştirdi diye tutuklu?”, 08.03.2011, 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/03/08/hangi.gazeteci.hukumeti.elestirdi.diye.tutuklu/609271.0/ [last 
accessed on 19.02.2016]. Along with some important international organisations, “… Amnesty International has 
expressed concern over past prosecutions of some of the journalists, including Ahmet Şık, who faced charges for 
‘denigration of Turkishness’ in 2007 and was acquitted in April 2008, and Nedim Şener, who faced charges for 
‘attempting to influence the judiciary’ ‘insulting a public official’ and ‘violating secrecy of communications’ and 
was acquitted in December 2010.” See: Amnesty International, “Turkey Must Review Legislation Restricting 
Freedom of Expression”, Al Index: PRE01/113/2011, 4 March 2011, available at:  
https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2011/03/turkey-must-review-legislation-restricting-freedom-
expression/ [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
392Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Early Parliamentary Elections, 22 July 2007: 
Needs Assessment Mission Report”, 12 June 2007, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/25669 [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
393Yavuz uses the phrase “militant secularism” to refer to “hard-core secularism”. 
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democratisation process led by the JDP. Before dealing with the main issue, I explain the 
meaning of secularism in the context of Turkey especially the main formations it has taken. 
Secularism is used in a broader sense to refer to the separation of religion from public 
affairs, but it has been subject to different interpretations in Turkish political literature. In line 
with this definition, John L. Esposito regards secularism in Turkey as “a distinctly anti-religious 
or anti-clerical doctrine seeking to control all religious expression and symbols, and abolish 
them from the public sphere.”394 Esposito terms this “secular fundamentalism”.395 Similarly, a 
prominent academic at the University of Utah, Hakan M. Yavuz, considers this form of 
secularism to be the end product of exclusive secularism.396 
Yavuz points out that there are three modes of Secularism in Turkey:397 
1) “A rigid Kemalist version of militant secularism” which is based on “the ‘freedom 
from’ religion” through legal bans and restrictions on religion; 
2) “The conservative Turkish-Muslim understanding of secularism” that implies “the 
control of religion” by the state but not with the aim of suppressing religion; and, 
3) “The liberal conception of secularism” which is based on “the separation of politics 
from religion” (freedom of politics from religion) but allows freedom of worship including the 
                                                 
394John L. Esposito, “Retreat from the Secular Path: The Democracy-Secularism Debate in the Muslim World”, 52. 
395Ibid. 
396Exclusive secularism “is hostile to religion and atheistic in form and does not tolerate any form of religious 
symbol in the public sphere. On the other hand, a more inclusive understanding of secularism, which does not 
try to eliminate religious symbols and norms from the public sphere, seeks to accommodate a diversity of 
religious perspectives. Moreover, inclusive secularism would use religious values to support the existing social 
and political order. It does not exclude any framework of understanding, whether religiously rooted or not. When 
the first form of secularism becomes dominant with its goal of cleansing religion from the public sphere and 
denies any role to religion in terms of informing the meaning of the good life for citizens, it inadvertently 
promotes the politicization and assertiveness of religion, especially in countries like India and Turkey. In short, 
there are inclusive and exclusive forms of secularisms and the exclusive one produces what one may call secular 
fundamentalism.”  
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organisation of religious groups on the basis that membership is on a voluntary basis (freedom 
of religion).398 
The first mode regards secularism “as a comprehensive way of life” and as such 
exclusive. The followers of this mode of secularism, also known as militant secularists or 
laikçiler, adhere strongly to the tenets of the Enlightenment but oppose the role of Islam and 
the Ottoman past in the formation of the Turkish identity. They insist on rigid public policies 
to eliminate the role of Islam within the public sphere, and support government control over 
religious education and institutions in order to protect secularism against the threat of political 
Islam.399 
In light of Yavuz’s statements, the main assumptions of militant secularism could be 
summarised as follows:400 
1. Secularism is “Turkey’s philosophy of life” which aims to reach the level of 
contemporary civilisation and totally assimilate into European culture; 
2. Secularism is an efficient tool for modernisation, it “provides the compass of the 
state for modernising society.”  
3. Secularism is an integrated part of the state’s identity formation; 
4. Islam has a political character and, as such, is in ‘conflict’ with Turkey’s 
constitutional secularism. As a consequence, Turkish secularism is strongly anti-
religious and is different from the secularism in other societies. For example, 
Christianity has deep roots and is practised as a private matter in the US or holds a 
very limited constitutional role in the United Kingdom, or holds a constitutional role 
limited to specific social matters in the Republic of Ireland. 
                                                 
398This version is defended by Istanbul-based big business elites, some politicians and the Alevi community. See: 
Yavuz, “Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey”, 153. 
399The view of laikçiler “is based on the Enlightenment notion that the authority of law lies in reason, as opposed 
to religious texts or tradition”. See: Yavuz, “Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 154. 
These are the members of the Turkish Constitutional Court, other branches of the judiciary and military, and 
some left-wing parties such as the CHP and TKP. See: Yavuz, “Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 156. 
400In this regard, modernisation refers to “an inevitable evolution from traditional backward (Islamic) societies 
to developed modern (read secular) societies.” See: Yavuz, “Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 156. 
  
   107 
 
The second mode, “the conservative Turkish-Muslim understanding of secularism”,401 
which is also known as “Turkish Muslim understanding of Secularism”, is firmly in line with 
“the sociology of Turkish society” and “the political philosophy of the Ottoman and the Turkish 
state systems.”402 This mode of secularism regards religion as a private matter which should 
have a major role in society, but excludes its representation in the public sphere.403 It defends 
the control of religion by the state through the Directorate for Religious Affairs (DIB).404 The 
state intends to create its own understanding of an enlightened Islam in accordance with its 
modernisation project. It uses Islam as an essential part of the state’s understanding of the 
Turkish identity; at the same time “employs Islam to provide legitimacy for its governance and 
to prevent opposition groups from using religion against the state.”405 The main supporters of 
this mode of secularism are “the centre right and religious right parties” in Turkey.406 Yet even 
for hard-line Kemalists (e.g. in the army) religion has its uses as part of national identity.407 
Yavuz’s third mode of secularism aims at the “total separation of religion and politics” 
through the re-arrangement of the relationship between them. However, this viewpoint does not 
see “freedom of politics [from religion]” and “freedom of religion” as mutually exclusive. The 




404The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs (DIB) is one of the first and primary organisations founded by the 
Turkish Senate (TBMM) in accordance with the fundamental principles of the republican regime, during the War 
of Independence. The establishment of such a religious organisation came out of the necessity to make people 
well-informed about religious issues on the one hand, and to carry out the religious services within a sound 
knowledge as well as properly maintained public unity and order on the other. For more information on DIB see: 
Official Site of the DIB, “The Presidency of Religious Affairs”, http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/en/home 
[last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
405Yavuz, “Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey”, 146. 
406Ibid.,157. 
407“In its bid to stabilize the country, legitimize the state, and counter the threat of leftist radicalism, the military 
authorities turned to what they called the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. As Eligür writes, the plan was essentially to 
utilize Sunni Islam to create an 'Islamic sense of community and prevent a recurrence of ideological clashes and 
the political violence of the 1970s.' While always viewing explicitly Islamist groups with suspicion, the military 
regarded Sunni Islam as a unifying instrument against anarchy and as the source of the nation’s moral life. The 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was originally formulated by the right-wing nationalist Intellectual Hearths (Aydınlar 
Ocakları) in the 1970s, but after the 1980 coup it rose to become the de facto state ideology. In practice, this 
meant more than just General Kenan Evren reciting Quranic verses during public speeches. It also meant huge 
budget increases for the Religious Affairs Directorate, rapid building of new mosques and opening of Quran 
courses, the introduction of mandatory religion classes in state schools (only on Sunni Islam), more tolerance for 
religious bureaucrats, active encouragement of religious organizations, and a widening of opportunities for 
graduates of religious imam hatip high schools. In this way, the professedly secular military 'tactically open[ed] 
up a social and political space for Islamist mobilization in Turkey.’" See: William Armstrong, “The mobilization of 
Turkish Islamism”, Hurriyet Daily News, 27 March 2014, available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-
mobilization-of Turkishislamism.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64129&%20NewsCatID=474.  
[last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
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third mode’s main thrust is not to remove direct faith-based considerations from political 
discourse and public policy setting but instead to base them on reason and democratic processes. 
Its corollary, freedom of religion that is restricted to the private sphere of society, is as much 
about freedom from other religions as it is about freedom from the state. For example, some 
followers of this mode of secularism such as the Alevi community support “the freedom of 
religion from politics”, but also “from the predominant Sunni understanding of Islam”.408 
William Hale and Ergun Özbudun classify secularism in Turkey into two categories: 
Assertive Secularism and Passive Secularism.409 
Assertive Secularism aims “to privatise and individualise religion and to ban or limit its 
visibility in the public sphere.”410 It is supported by the military, judiciary and the CHP in 
Turkey.411 As referred above, this type of secularism is termed Militant Secularism by Yavuz 
and Secular Fundamentalism by Esposito. The well-known academic and writer Binnaz Toprak 
regards this conception of secularism as Radical Secularism.412 All these different terms 
describe the same notion of secularism. 
Passive Secularism “implies state neutrality towards various religions and allows the 
public visibility of religion.”413 This type of secularism has influenced most of the Western 
democratic countries and is supported by the centre right parties in Turkey. Hale and Özbudun 
draw the distinction between assertive and passive secularism as follows: 
Passive Secularism opposes any established doctrine that 
defines the ‘good’ for its citizens, either religious or non-
religious, whereas assertive secularism regards secularism 
itself as an established doctrine to be promoted.414 
                                                 
408M. Hakan Yavuz, “Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey,” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009): 158. 
409William Hale & Ergun Özbudun, “Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey,” (New York: Routledge Studies 
in Middle Eastern Politics, 2010): 22. 
410Ibid. 
411Ibid. 
412Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey”, Turkish Studies 6, No. 2, June 2005, 170.  
413Hale & Özbudun, “Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey”, 22. 
414Ibid. 
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In relation to the conflict between secularists and conservative democrats,415 Turkey has 
been strongly polarised between the secularist and the Islamist/Centre Right forces since the 
foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923.416 The CHP, which implemented anti-religious 
measures417 to control Islamist opposition to its radical reforms’418 for secularising/westernising 
the country, has had a significant influence on this conflict, along with the military and the 
judiciary. With the republic’s foundation, Atatürk instigated “a cultural revolution [by 
abolishing] the caliphate; [closing] all religious schools, orders and institutions; [replacing] 
Islamic law with a Swiss-based civil law, German trade and commercial law, and Italian 
criminal law; [replacing] the Arabic script with the Latin script; [introducing] compulsory 
education and female suffrage; and, [banning] the display of religious symbols in public 
institutions”.419 With these reforms, Atatürk aimed to “to subordinate religion to the state”.420 
He believed that Islam should not play a role in public affairs but instead should be considered 
as a private matter.  
The driving force behind the viewpoint of mainstream secularists is Kemalism. 
Kemalism refers to “the ideology promoted by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his associates after 
                                                 
415For a detailed analysis on conservative democracy see Chapter 4 of this PhD thesis.  
416Mango, “Kemalism in a New Century”, 24. 
417“The reforms and modifications undertaken by Atatürk represented an upheaval of the political and societal 
system of Turkey. From the [caliphal] state grew a secular state with a new state form and legal system. Islam 
was considered as an obstacle in the road to a modern republic. Thus, the Islamic educational system of the 
madrasahs was abrogated and replaced by secular schools with uniform teaching curriculum and the popular 
religious meeting places were closed. Between 1933 and 1948, religious study was officially banned. There were 
sanctions against individuals wearing items of a religious nature. Regulations on apparel were enacted for the 
purpose of transformation into the western clothing style. The ‘azan’ sounded in the 1930s in Turkish, and 
pilgrimage to Mecca (hadj) was not allowed from 1934 to 1947. Linguistic reforms were carried out and the 
creation of a national history instituted in order to strengthen the national-turkish identity, and to 
correspondingly weaken religious identity through the same measures.” See: Nilay Baycar, Turkish Identity: The 
Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe? (Norderstedt Germany: GRIN 
Verlag, 2009), 70-71. 
418“[Atatürk’s] reforms included the abolition of the Sultanate, Caliphate and Ulema; the renunciation of Sharia 
law; the adoption of a new Civil Code modelled on that of Switzerland; the replacement of the Arabic by the 
Roman alphabet; the elimination of words of Arabian and Persian origin; the switch from the lunar to the solar 
calendar; the substitution of Friday by Sunday as a day of rest; and, the granting of political rights to women. 
These measures should not be construed as aiming at the elimination of Islam and Islamic values altogether from 
Turkish society. Atatürk’s project was to terminate the political functions of Islam and the powersof religious 
institutions in Turkish law and administration, and to turn religion into a matter of personal conscience, and in 
this he was successful. With his reforms, Turkey began to develop into a modern secular state.” See: European 
Commission, Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?”, 
Brussels, 2004, 12, available at: 
http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/report_2004.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
419Oikonomakis, “Political Islam and Kemalist Laicism: New Tango on Turkey’s Old Battlefield”. 
420Ibid. 
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the creation of the Republic of Turkey”.421 This ideology sets out the six founding principles of 
the new republic, also known as the “six arrows (Turkish: Altıok)”.422 They are:423 
 Republicanism  
 Secularism 
 Nationalism  
 Populism  
 Revolutionism  
 Statism (in economic policy) 
Within the framework of Kemalism, I will mainly deal with secularism424 and 
nationalism in this thesis. As I wrote earlier: 
The Constitution of the new state was to be based on the 
pillars of Kemalism: ‘Nationalism’ together with ‘Laicism’ 
implemented the irreversible withdrawal of Turkey from 
the Islamic world. Islam was no longer to be the primary 
source of identification of the state. That was now to be 
Nationalism according to the European model.425 
                                                 
421Barbara Allen Roberson, “Kemalism”, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
"Kemalism (Atatürkcülük) is the main structure of realistic ideas and principles about the state, ideologies, 
economics and the society’s fundamental institution that assure the Turkish Nation’s full independence, peace 
and welfare for the present and the future, the state’s being dependent on the nation’s solidarity, and the Turkish 
culture’s standing over the modern civilization with the guidance of reason and science. The individual and 
national identification of Kemalism and its defence against the deviative and conservative movements of the 
present and the future is the guarantee of the Turkish State’s development, strength and gilded future.” See: 
Erkut Aldeniz, “What is Kemalism?”, http://www.erkutaldeniz.com/what-is-kemalism/  
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
422Burak Sansal, “Ataturk’s reforms”, All About Turkey, 2009, http://www.allaboutturkey.com/reform.htm  
[last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
423Ibid.  
424"The Turkish understanding of secularism has also important ideological parallels with French laicism. France 
has always served as a source of inspiration for Turkish reformers, since the beginning of the Tanzimat era. 
Laicism, in both the French and Turkish contexts, became an integral part of first establishing and then protecting 
the Republics. In both the Jacobin and Kemalist contexts, laicism became a dividing line separating progressive 
from conservative, modern from traditional, enlightened from obscurantist, and revolutionary from reactionary. 
Both the Turkish and French republics were keen on taking religion and religious symbols out of the public sphere. 
The Turkish and French reaction to headscarves is a case in point. In this respect, Turkish andFrench laicism 
acquired characteristics that went well beyond the less confrontational parameters of Anglo-Saxonsecularism.” 
See: Omer Taspinar, “Turkish laicism”, Mavi Boncuk Blogspot, April 12, 2008, 
http://maviboncuk.blogspot.co.nz/2008/04/article-turkish-laicism-by-omer.html [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
425Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe? 49-
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The Kemalist principle of secularism manifested itself first in 1928426 with the removal 
of Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution which promoted Islam as “the religion of the state”.427 
This Constitutional amendment could be regarded as a triumph of Turkish secularism, however, 
at the time, its purpose and impact lacked a wide and clear understanding. In 1931,428 the six 
arrows of Kemalism were integrated into the CHP’s party programme, and in 1935429 these 
became tenets of the state, and, finally, in 1937,430 they were incorporated into the constitution.  
With the emergence of the DP in the political arena in 1946,431 Turkey entered the new 
phase of multi-party system,432 this in turn started Turkey’s transition to democracy, as 
mentioned earlier. The first free and honest elections in Turkey were held in 1950433 which 
ended the rule of the single party regime led by the CHP, and the DP came into power.434 The 
CHP believed laicism to be under threat from the DP, thus, “it assisted the military” to protect 
laicism.435 
The transition to democracy in Turkey led to a paradigm shift in the Kemalist notion of 
secularism/laicism. Laicism henceforth became defined as “the arrangement of religion by the 
state.” In spite of the “anti-religious measures” taken in the “early Republic”, Islam maintained 
                                                 
426Niyazi Berkes, “The Development of Secularism in Turkey”, (New York: Routledge, 1998): 482. 
427Ibid. 
428Bekim Agai, “Islam und Kemalismus in der Türkei”, in: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, B 33-34, Bonn, 2004, 18. 
429Ibid., 19. 
430See: Andrew McGregor, “Turkey at the Intersection of Islam and Kemalism”, Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
Volume: 4, Issue: 159, August 15, 2007, available at: 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32954#.VsbHe8tBV-w  
[last accessed on 19.02.2016]. See also: Agai, “Islam und Kemalismus in der Türkei”, 19 & Ellen Madeker, “Türkei 
und europäische Identität. Eine wissenssoziologische Analyse der Debatte um den EU-Beitritt”, VS Verlag, 
Wiesbaden, 2008, 23 & Berkes, “The Development of Secularism in Turkey”, 482. 
431See: Lewis, “Demokrasinin Türkiye Serüveni [the Adventure of Democracy in Turkey]”,10. 
432“With the foundation of the Democrat Party (DP) on 7 January 1946, a multi-party system started in Turkey.” 
See: Erik Jan Zürcher, “Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi [Turkey, a Modern History]”, (Istanbul: İletişim Edition, 
2003): 308. See also: Agai, “Islam und Kemalismus in der Türkei”, 19.  
433John M. Vanderlippe, “The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party 
System, 1938-1950”, State University of New York Press, Albany 2005, 137 (available online as google book). 
434Kemal H. Karpat, “Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70”, in: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.8, No.3, October 
1972, Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 349, available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282436?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents [last accessed on 19.02.2016]. 
435Endruweit, “Turkey and the European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?”, 65. Cited by: Baycar, Turkish 
Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe? 74. 
“The [1982] Constitution stipulated that the Turkish army was supposed to act as the ‘guardian of Turkey’s 
secularism’, hence the numerous military coups and interventions in post-war Turkey.” See: Can Erimtan, "The 
End of ‘Secular Turkey’ or Ottomans Re-Emergent?," (2015), https://www.rt.com/op-edge/221835-turkey-
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“its meaning in Turkey”. The state “depoliticised” Islam and made it an integral part of “the 
civilisation project”.436 In this process the centre left CHP, but not the centre right parties, 
played a significant role, provided religious freedom and services for the public. Previously, I 
had explained the dilemma as follows: 
The nationalist, conservative and rightist parties were not 
the only ones that are suspected of coming to terms with 
religious influences. It was in fact the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP) of [Ismet İnönü] which between 1946 and 
1950 launched religious instruction, sponsored the 
founding of Imam-Hatip religious schools, and allowed the 
pilgrimage to Mecca (hadj) which had been prohibited from 
1934 to 1947. It also gave priority to the education of 
theologians, preachers and prayer leaders. The repressive 
political influence over religious affairs which had existed 
until that time had not weakened religious attachments, but 
had actually strengthened the religious authorities to which 
the state had no access and whose training it could not 
control.437 
Two criticisms have emerged of Kemalist secularism:438 One, that it denotes a strict 
separation between state and religion, similar to the French style of secularism (laicism); the 
other, that it is an anti-religious ideology, an objective of which is the systematic elimination 
of Islam from Turkish society.439 This latter criticism states that Kemalist secularism portrays 
religion as anti-science and anti-reason; attempts to restrict religion to the private sphere 
“without any social implications”;440 and, postulates that “religion controls the inner aspect of 
the individual, while secularism controls the outward aspect of the individual.”441 
If we consider Kemalist secularism as the clear separation between religion and state, 
which in turn implies a lack of state religion, at least on the constitutional level, and also accept 
secularism as a constitutional principle, then the first criticism “would be a most valid 
inference”.442 Further, if we agree with Islamic culture that separation of state and religion is, 
in effect, the abolition of religion from politics and, in turn, the dismantling of a society based 
                                                 
436These occurred through the acception of the religious tasks by the government. See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: 
The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe? 74-5. 
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440Yavuz, “Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey”, 156.  
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on Islamic principles, then the second criticism “would be a natural judgment.”443 Based on 
these arguments, Kemalist secularism can be validly criticised on the grounds that it was 
inconsistent: that it could neither “separate state from religion” nor “let religion have its own 
autonomous existence”.444 In a nation state where approximately 99 percent of the population 
comes under one active faith, albeit with various denominations, to aim for a clear state/religion 
separation, and the self-quarantining of political thought and actions from one’s faith, especially 
a faith that has historically treated politics as an inherent part of its day-to-day ministry, 
Kemalist secularism would appear to require time, tolerance and creative politics to secure its 
aims. 
Kemalist secularism is interpreted by mainstream Kemalists in such a way that the state 
has the authority to interfere, “domesticate and control” even the private beliefs of the public. 
This discourse gives “no public role for religion”, and intends to create “a homogeneous nation 
and a secular state”, as well as a society free of religion.445 According to Yavuz, the main 
drawback of this discourse could be identified as “its inability to comprehend non-rational 
elements of Islam and its constant and dogmatic attempts to engineer a society in accordance 
with traditional Kemalist teachings.” The discourse has created a polarisation among the secular 
and Islamic segments of Turkish society over the years and caused “many Islamic groups” to 
think that secularism is an anti-Muslim ideology.446 
The political Islamist segment of Turkish society believes that Kemalist secularism 
“was not true secularism”, but a “shoddy legitimization for the persecution of Islam”.447 
However, as a secularist jurist confirms, the state shall not aim to eliminate religion completely, 
but “let religion to follow its own course”.448 
Conclusion 
                                                 
443Ibid. 
444Ibid. 
445The Ministry for Religious Affairs which was founded by the (Kemalist) CHP in 1924 is an exception to this 
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The fundamental characteristics of democracy in Turkey have been examined in the 
preceding discussions. Up to and until the JDP took office in 2002, the military played a 
significant role in Turkish politics, either directly or by mere presence, either legally or by other 
means. With the reforms undertaken by the JDP government, the military’s role in politics has 
been reduced, so much so that today the military does not play a decisive role in politics and 
the possibility of a military intervention is remote, although not extinguished.449 Thus, Turkey’s 
military tutelage system has been weakened, if not totally eliminated. This in turn, despite the 
other factors undermining the quality of democracy, has strengthened democracy in Turkey. 
Also, the bureaucratic tutelage over the Turkish political system has weakened dramatically, 
another positive development for Turkish democracy. Though not as dramatic as the military 
when it was ‘on parade’ during Turkey’s strong military tutelage periods, the bureaucracy, by 
virtue of its ‘insider’ nature (policy advice, implementation and on-going administration) 
retains some influence but not the subverting influence that it at times brought to bear on 
Turkish political life. 
In relation to Turkey’s civil society, it is fair to state that the sector is growing rapidly. 
Up to the 1990’s, due to the pressure from the state, civil society in Turkey tended to be 
connected to the political process to remain effective and survive. As a result, some CSOs lost 
their autonomy and were unable to act independently from the State. However, with the 
liberalisation process led by the end of the Cold War, there was a paradigm change in the 
policies of the government towards Turkish civil society and it became easier for CSOs to 
challenge the policies of the state and to establish and fund themselves. However, despite the 
liberalisation process in the field of state policies towards Turkey’s civil society, the CSOs still 
experience challenges. 
In the area of human rights, Turkey’s current Constitution and its international treaties, 
provide an absolute protection, in law, for such rights. The European Commission believes 
Turkey has made good progress in terms of establishing human rights mechanisms and 
institutions,450 but mechanisms which still have to “develop a track record as regards 
                                                 
449See: The Economist, "Turkey's Coup Plotters: Lies and Whispers.", Istanbul, 25 February 2010, 
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effectiveness and impartiality”.451 Turkey’s human rights record continues to be criticised both 
domestically and internationally.  
Turkey’s 1982 Constitution could not be considered a democratic constitution as it 
entrenches an authoritarian state structure as well as military and bureaucratic tutelage. It is an 
anti-democratic constitution in terms of its gestation and some of its content. Moreover, the 
features of the 1982 Constitution including the official state ideology, which is a component of 
the constitution, “its hierarchical [system] that renders the society subject to the state”, “its 
unionist-uniformist structure that [regards] differences and diversity illegitimate” make it a 
constitution that is far behind in meeting “the standards of today’s democracies” and the 
expectations of the citizens of Turkey.452 Regrettably, the Parliamentary Constitutional 
Reconciliation Commission missed an opportunity to reform the Constitution. The Committee 
was dissolved in November 2013 due to the lack of compromise between the parties on 
controversial articles. Indeed, the sudden decision of the Commission’s president, Cemil Çiçek, 
JDP’s deputy from Ankara and the current speaker of the Turkish Parliament, to dissolve the 
Commission was perhaps an irrational decision. The dissolution disappointed the Turkish 
citizens, as well as the parties of the Commission. Despite the 12 September 2010 referendum 
that made changes to the undemocratic 1982 Constitution, the 13 year promise to make a new 
constitution, made to the Turkish public by the JDP, remains unfulfilled. The 1982 Constitution 
remains a stumbling block to Turkey’s democratic progress.453  
In summary, the main strengths of Turkey’s democracy are: the existence of a multi-
party political system; an active and independent legislature; an established parliamentary 
system; a relatively new but secure secular tradition; democratic elections; a grass-roots 
workable co-existence of Islamic and democratic values; and, a widespread desire to play its 
regional role as well as join the democratising EU.  
The main weaknesses of Turkey’s democracy are: the 10% threshold for national 
elections that in effect disenfranchise great swathes of the Turkish voting public; the Political 
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Parties Law that is restrictive on political activities; and the lack of a fully democratic 
constitution. Further weakness stems from: the highly centralised nature of political parties; the 
supreme power of the political party leaders which leads to the lack of a robust internal party 
democracy; and local government that is resistant to change and hinders grass-roots political 
activity. Though diminished, the military and bureaucratic tutelage systems still throw a shadow 
over Turkey’s democratisation process, a concern not helped by the continuing polarisation 
between Kemalist and Islamist/centre right political factions. Other weaknesses are: the lack of 
a robust and fully accepted civil society despite its increasing influence on the state; state 
restrictions on the media; violations by the state of freedom of expression; and, continued 
shortcomings and violations in the field of human rights.  
Secularism is a key foundation of democracy. This has challenges for Turkey, a nation 
that is overwhelmingly Islamic in its faith and actively so. In the early days of the republic, the 
new state’s guiding philosophy was Kemalism which saw Islam in its political manifestation as 
a threat to the secular Turkish state and acted accordingly whether, constitutionally, legally and 
or administratively; and when that failed, the Kemalist Turkish military stepped in. That is no 
longer the case. Since 1946 there has been a paradigm shift in the Kemalist attitude to 
secularism, not so much the extreme Kemalists but with those realistic Kemalists who 
acknowledge that the nation’s historic and cultural faith was not going to be extinguished and 
needed to be accommodated. Turkey’s democratisation process over the past three decades has 
reconfirmed, admittedly with some serious ‘wobbles’ since 2012, that secularism is not anti-
Islam and that freedom of religion can co-exist with freedom of politics from religion.  
The transition to a religion-friendly form of secular democracy has accelerated the re-
emergence of political Islam throughout the region and the threat this poses to Turkey. The 
momentum of democratisation in Turkey is well placed to address this threat just as Turkish 
democratisation since 2002 has allowed the nation to distance itself from the military and 
bureaucratic tutelages of its past. Democratisation does not extinguish these past and present 
threats to Turkey’s stability, however, democratisation is considered the best political 
arrangement that can manage these threats with minimum risk for Turkey in the short to 
medium term, a period in which the democratisation process may become more established in 
the Turkish state and society. 
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Chapter 4: THE JDP 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the JDP by looking at the context in which it was established 
in 2001 and the political parties from which it came. To understand the JDP, one has to examine 
political Islam in the relatively new and secular Republic of Turkey and the competing role for 
control of the Turkish state in the second half of the 20th Century that the Turkish military 
played. The military was well supported by Kemalist secularists who pervaded the key points 
of authority and influence within the state apparatus, the media and Turkish society. Secularism 
was entrenched, in the superstructure that was the Republic and its administration, but not 
sufficiently in its cultural foundations to ‘feel safe’. Why the JDP arose late in the story of 
Turkey’s longstanding tension between modernism and faith, and how the JDP has steered 
itself, and the nation, through a ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ of radical secularism and political Islam, 
are the subjects of this chapter. My analysis focuses on the influences on the emergent JDP, its 
relationship with political Islam, its political ideology and the ‘hidden agenda’. The latter is an 
issue that will follow any party that governs Turkey and whose roots, albeit publicly 
disavowed, grew in the potting shed of political Islam. It is a litmus test issue for the JDP not 
only on the political surface but deep in its reason for being. All societies have political 
arrangements that give rise to claims of ‘hidden agendas’. For the JDP, this thesis argues that 
the ‘hidden agenda’ is much more nuanced than the superficial interpretation of the party’s 
opponents. 
Origins of the JDP 
 To understand the JDP, it is necessary to know its ideological formation process and 
the factors that led to this formation. The major factors include the military intervention of 
early 1997454 (the ‘28 February Process’); the “judicial and military constraints”455 on the pro-
Islamic Welfare Party (the Welfare Party); and, the lessons taken from the weaknesses in the 
political discourse of the National Outlook Movement (the ‘NOM’). It was these factors that 
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led a group of younger politicians from the Welfare Party to change their political language 
and “undergo transformation”.456 The ‘anti-secularist discourses and activities’457 of the 
Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan and ‘some other Welfare Party politicians’458 led to 
the military intervention on 28 February 1997. In the 28 February Process, a memorandum was 
issued by the Turkish Military which declared Political Islam as the major threat to the Turkish 
state. The government’s reaction to mollify the military was significantly symbolic: the 
wearing of headscarves in universities was banned; and moves were made to reduce the 
influence of Islamic groups on the educational system and to close the Islamic Imam-Hatip 
                                                 
456Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 75. 
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Ministers dare not reveal their world-outlook inside their Ministries. This morning I too attended a ceremony in 
my official capacity. When you see me dressed up like this in all this finery, don’t think it’s because I’m a 
supporter of secularism. In this period when our beliefs are not respected, and indeed are blasphemed against, 
I have had to attend these ceremonies in spite of myself. The Prime Minister, other Ministers and MPs have 
certain obligations. But you have no obligations. This system must change. We have waited, we will wait a little 
longer. Let us see what the future has in store for us. And let Muslims keep alive the resentment, rancour and 
hatred they feel in their hearts.” 
Further, in a ‘Jerusalem Night’ organised by the Sincan municipality, the anti-Zionist Welfare Party Mayor Bekir 
Yıldız stated: “We will inject Sharia to Laicists by force”. See: Tuğçe Gürel, "Türk Siyasi Tarihinde ‘Muhafazakârlık’ 
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(Doctoral thesis, Marmara University 2007): 88. The Jerusalem Night was “an anti-Zionist and pro-Shariah 
protest” which took place “on Jan. 30, 1997”. “The protest resulted in newspaper articles focusing on stories of 
rising Islamic fundamentalism. The publications culminated in the military’s decision to roll tanks through 
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schools.459 The 28 February Process reached its most dramatic point with the resignation of 
Prime Minister Erbakan; the banning of the Welfare Party (later, in June 2001460, its successor 
party was also banned); and, the instigation of ‘judicial cases’461 against the Welfare Party 
politicians which led to their dismissal from office and a ban on their involvement in politics.462 
In addition to these events, the Turkish parliament was dissolved, ‘Erbakan’s coalition 
government’463 was pressured to resign and an early election was called.464 In Guida’s words, 
“the ‘28 February Process … strongly reaffirmed that the Kemalist establishment still 
represented the strong elite in control of key areas of the state apparatus and education”.465  
Unlike previous military coups in Turkey, the 28 February 1997 military intervention 
did not result in “the replacement of civilian government by a military government”.466 It was 
a very post-modern military coup in that the military achieved its political aims without stirring 
from its barracks but instead by issuing its views by memorandum to the government of the 
day. 
The 28 February Process was a crucial event in Turkish political history because it 
attested, at the time, to the resolve of the Kemalist establishment to protect Turkey’s 
constitutional secularism against internal Islamic political forces. As a result, the pro-Islamist 
business sector, the so-called green businesses, was deliberately obstructed by the Kemalist 
elements in the apparatus of government from completing contracts and involvement in public 
                                                 
459Bekim Agai, "Islam und Kemalismus in der Türkei [Islam and Kemalism in Turkey]," Aus Politik und 
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bids, and at a time of economic crisis.467 Further, the Islamic oriented private schools were 
significantly disrupted by oppressive inspections by the National Education Ministry (MEB) 
and other bureaucratic routines and redtape.468 In connection with the closure of the middle 
section of the Imam Hatip Schools (classes 6 to 8),469 the period of compulsory education was 
extended to eight years,470 and “a ‘coefficient application’ was brought to the university 
entrance exam for students from vocational schools”.471  
The 28 February Process led to the prohibition of the headscarf in public and private 
universities (including the faculties of theology), strict control over religious communities by 
the state, and, victimisation of ‘some journalists’.472 The latter victimisation involved false 
accusations of links with the terrorist organisation, the PKK, and false accusations of support 
for political resistance473 to the 28 February Process. Further, on July 7, 1997, the General Staff 
and the Interior Ministry signed the controversial Protocol on Cooperation for Security and 
Public Order (EMASYA) which granted authorisation to the army “to conduct operations and 
intelligence gathering in cities without the authority [or prior notice] of the civilian 
administration”.474 
                                                 
467Guida, "The new Islamists’ understanding of democracy in Turkey: the examples of Ali Bulaç and Hayreddin 
Karaman," 350. 
468Ibid. 
469Arnd-Michael Nohl, Arzu Akkoyunlu-Wigley, and Simon Wigley, Education in Turkey, ed. European Studies in 
Education, vol. 26 (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2008): 121. 
470See: Hasan Gürkan, "28 Şubat Sürecinin Türk Eğitim Sistemine Etkileri Ve İktidar- Muhalefet Partilerinin 
Tutumu [The Effects of the February 28 Process on Turkey's Education System and The Attitude of the Ruling-
Coalition Parties]" (Master's thesis, Çukurova University 2011). 
471The coefficient application was a discriminative application which decreased the score of vocational school 
students in the university examination. See: Nohl, Akkoyunlu-Wigley, and Wigley, Education in Turkey, 26: 121. 
“Eight-year compulsory education and vocational high schools, especially the decisions in the middle parts of 
the closure of Imam Hatip Schools, created a great debate. In this process, the Welfare-Way Government with 
the Prime Minister of Necmettin Erbakan separated and then latter governments had to implement these 
decisions.” See: Gürkan, "28 Şubat Sürecinin Türk Eğitim Sistemine Etkileri Ve İktidar- Muhalefet Partilerinin 
Tutumu [The Effects of the February 28 Process on Turkey's Education System and The Attitude of the Ruling-
Coalition Parties]." 
472These journalists were as Nazlı Ilıcak, Mehmet Barlas, Mehmet Altan, Cengiz Çandar and Fehmi Koru who were 
dismissed from their work as a result of the suppression by the military and buraucratic forces though restarted 
to write in different newspapers after some time. See: Özgür Uğur, "28 Şubat'ın mağdur gazetecileri anlattı: 
Neler Yaşadılar? [Mistreated Journalists of February 28 Process Explained: What Did They Experience?]," 
HaberTurk.com, 28 February 2011. Available at: www.haberturk.com/medya/haber/605547-28-subatin-
magdur-gazetecileri-anlatti [last accessed on 29.05.2013]. 
473In this context ‘political resistance’ refers to ‘irtica’. 
474"Erdoğan vows to abolish EMASYA protocol, revise security priorities," Today's Zaman (Online Edition), 1 
February 2010. Today’s Zaman (ed.), “Erdoğan vows to abolish EMASYA protocol, revise security priorities”, 
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The JDP and Political Islam 
Having briefly examined the 28 February process, I wish now to consider the 
‘transformation of Political Islam in Turkey’ which ran parallel to the military intervention. 
Political Islam was represented by the National Outlook Movement (‘NOM’) of which many 
of the JDP leaders were former members. The NOM could be described as “an Islamic political 
movement with a strong anti-Western/European stance”.475 Levent Basturk explains the vision, 
goal and strategy of the NOM as follows: 
The most important accomplishment of the [National 
Outlook Movement (Millî Görüş)] was its ability to 
become a mechanism that carried demands of religious 
segments into the public realm in a country where religion 
and religious segments were suppressed since the 1920s. 
The political vision of the [movement] was built upon a 
particular reading of Muslim history and Western influence 
in the world. According to the National Outlook, the 
Muslim World has experienced a moral and material 
decline for several centuries although it used to be more 
advanced than the West in administrative, military, 
scientific, and technical fields. The basic source of this 
greatness was the moral and spiritual strength derived from 
the nation’s faith [iman]. [...] The present backwardness of 
Turkey in every realm was caused by the blind imitation of 
Western values and inappropriate Western technology by 
the Western oriented [Turkish] elite who made the country 
a satellite to the West. In order to create a glorious future 
again, Turkey must realize the right and consistent 
blending and synthesis of moral-spiritual and material 
development. In order to realize that, the Turks must 
embrace moral and spiritual [Islamic] consciousness with a 
distinguished historical mission in order to be a great power 
again like what the Ottoman Empire used to be. In other 
words, the National Outlook, which represents truth 
[haqq], provided an outline in order to return to origins of 
the nation and to build a new civilization as an alternative 
to materialistic Western worldviews, which have always 
represented [a false philosophy].476 
                                                 
Ankara, 1 February 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-200260-100-erdogan-vows-to-abolish-emasya-
protocol-revise-security-priorities.html [last accessed on 29.05.2013]. 
475Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 62. 
476See: Levent Basturk, "The National Outlook Movement," (1999),  
http://siyaset-toplum.blogspot.com/1999/07/national-outlook-movement.html. [last accessed on 21.05.2015].  
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According to Usul, the NOM has been “one of the most important and controversial 
movements in Turkish democratic history within the Islamic circles in Turkey”.477 The NOM 
sustained itself during Turkey’s democratic period of the 1970’s through to the 1990’s by 
comprising ‘different political parties’.478 
As a result of the 28 February Process, the former Welfare Party now current JDP 
politicians, Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç, came to the conclusion that challenging the secular regime 
of the Turkish state creates “serious political, economic and personal risks”; they were not 
alone. This ‘sea-change’ in strategic outlook was adopted by other former Islamists who had 
previously adopted an anti-Western stance under the leadership of NOM’s leader Erbakan. 479 
Not unnaturally for politicians on the rise whose demographic hinterland covers a significant 
portion of the nation’s citizens, the JDP leaders had a lot to lose if they could not manage these 
‘real and present’ dangers, for the country as well as for themselves personally. This was a 
pragmatic assessment that forced modification of the radical aspects of their political discourse 
in order to accommodate wider segments of Turkish society. This was preferable to the 
significant risk of political marginalisation stemming from their continued use of radical, pro-
Islamic, anti-secular political language.480 The former Islamist Mehmet Metiner, who was a 
                                                 
477Ali Resul Usul, "The Justice and Development Party and the European Union," in Secular and Islamic Politics in 
Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics (ed.) 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2008): 177. 
478These parties were the National Order Party (NOP), National Salvation Party (NSP), the Welfare Party (WP), 
the Virtue Party (VP) and the Felicity Party (FP). The NOP was established by Necmettin Erbakan and his friends 
on January 26, 1970, the NSP was founded on October 11, 1972, in the NOP’s place, under the leadership of 
Suleyman Arif Emre, and on May 16, 1973 Erbakan became the leader of the party. The WP was founded on July 
19, 1983 by Erbakan as a continuation of the NOP-NSP line of politics. The VP was established to take place on 
the WP on December 17, 1997 under the leadership of Recai Kutan.  
See: Basturk, "The National Outlook Movement".  
As for the FP, it was founded on 20 July 2001 after the Virtue Party (FP) was banned by the Constitutional Court.  
479William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," in Islamism, democracy and 
liberalism in Turkey: The case of the AKP, ed. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics (ed.) (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 27. 
A further “consideration on the part of former Islamists might have been to safeguard their social and economic 
networks that suffered considerably during the 28 February process. Thus, it is argued that ‘the threatened 
Islamists have become more interested in keeping Islam’s social and economic structures intact as the bases for 
social ‘conservatism’. Therefore, ideas for a ‘social’ rather than ‘political’ Islam have gained ground …” See: Hale 
& Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy”, 28. 
480Similarly, the successor Virtue Party (Turkish: Fazilet Partisi, FP) politicians adopted “a much more moderate 
and circumspect discourse” than the former NOM parties. The FP was led by Recai Kutan. See: Hale & Özbudun, 
"The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy”, 27. 
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member of NOM in his early years, then an adviser in the Welfare Party, critically explained 
his Islamist past, and that of former Islamists like him, as follows: 
We were in a political struggle. We used to believe that 
working for the party was a requirement of Islamic jihad. 
We used to call Erbakan hodja, ‘the unique leader of 
Islamic world’. Our party would come to power, erase all 
obstacles in front of Islam and reach our goal … Our goal 
was to re-Islamisize society by establishing the Islamic 
state.481 
Likewise, the Turkish political scientist’s explanation on “the sudden pro-Western and 
pro-EU turn of Turkish Islamists”482 is noteworthy: 
Islamists realised the legitimizing power and virtue of 
democracy… They saw that they could survive only in a 
country that is democratically oriented, respects civil and 
political rights, and moreover is integrated into the Western 
world, particularly the European Union.483 
Following the dissolution of the Welfare Party in 1998,484 the Virtue Party, its successor 
and also a part of NOM, de-radicalised its political position in order to survive. It was a political 
party which had a much more moderate political face than the Welfare Party in pursuing a 
market-friendly economic policy and close relations with the West, and especially with the 
EU.485 R. Quinn Mecham summarises the factors behind the softening of the Virtue Party’s 
political position as follows: “the possibility of military intervention, a fear of legal closure by 
the courts, and the need to maintain and expand their electoral constituency”.486 As discussed 
above, these factors are also applicable to the JDP’s foundation and the formation of its political 
discourse. 
                                                 
481Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 73. 
482Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 27-28. 
483Ibid. 
484Mecham, "From the ashes of virtue, a promise of light: the transformation of political Islam in Turkey," 350. 
See also: Burhaneddin Duran, "The Justice and Development Party’s ‘new politics’. Steering toward conservative 
democracy, a revised Islamic agenda or management of new crises?," in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. 
The making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics (ed.) (London 
and New York: Routedge, 2008): 80. 
485Öniş, "Globalization and party transformation: Turkey’s Justice and Development Party in perspective," 126-
28. 
486Mecham, "From the ashes of virtue, a promise of light: the transformation of political Islam in Turkey," 350. 
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The Virtue Party’s accommodation to the new reality did not prevent the party from 
getting banned by the Constitutional Court in June 2001 for unconstitutional activities. Soon 
after the party’s ban, the party MPs split into two groups: the ‘traditionalists’ led by the NOM 
leader Necmettin Erbakan and the ‘reformists’ led by Turkey’s future Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan.487 Erdoğan and his close party colleague Abdullah Gül, a future President of 
Turkey, played a key role in this transformation of Islamist politics by initiating a fundamental 
debate within the Virtue Party.488 Criticising “the polarizing discourse and party politics of the 
NOM”489 and the faults of the former Welfare Party490 particularly, the reformists broke their 
ties with the NOM and founded the JDP on 14 August 2001.491 The traditionalists, in turn, 
formed the Felicity Party. 
Yalçın Akdoğan, the creator of JDP’s ideology of Conservative Democracy, points out 
that the proposition that the JDP can never break its ties with the Islamism of the NOM due to 
its past is groundless.492 According to Akdoğan, this argument is only based “on the past 
histories of the JDP’s political leaders” but not “on their current attitudes and actions”.493 Using 
‘Erdoğan’s statements about the party’s agenda’494 as a supportive argument and underlining 
the non-Islamist nature of the JDP, Akdoğan emphasises that the JDP leaders pursue a different 
political path from that of the NOM.495  
Since its foundation in 2001, Kemalist circles have accused the ‘reformist’ JDP of 
continuing to be of the NOM. The JDP leadership has strongly rejected this accusation, and its 
                                                 
487Ibid. See also: Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 62. 
488Öniş, "Globalization and party transformation: Turkey’s Justice and Development Party in perspective," 125. 
489Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 62. 
490‘Erdoğan’s statements’ for the weekly magazine Türkiye Bülteni, which are based on the relations between 
the 28 February process and the JDP, are remarkable: “The Refahyol government and the 28 February process 
led us to re-think many issues.” With these words, Erdoğan acknowledges that their cogitation (the cogitation 
of Erdoğan and other JDP representatives) about the 28 February process played a crucial role in his sitting on 
the prime minister’s sofa. See: Sedat Ergin, "AKP'nin ikinci yıldönümünde [The Second Anniversary of the JDP]," 
Hürriyet 19 August 2003. available at: 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=166122 [last accessed 31.05.2013]. 
491Ibid.  
492Yalçın Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," in The Emergence of a New 
Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.) (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
2006), 63. 
493Ibid. 
494“In the speeches given at the party’s General Congress, JDP leader Erdoğan articulated the party’s agenda, 
which demonstrated the party elite’s commitment to inclusive politics based on conservative rather than 
religious criteria.” See: Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 63. 
495Ibid. 
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implications, at every turn. During ‘the lifetime of the Virtue Party’,496 there had been an 
irreconcilable ideological conflict between the traditionalists and the reformists.497 Leading 
politicians of the reformist faction continually espressed their concerns about NOM policies.498 
For instance, the Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, who had previously been the Speaker 
of the Turkish Parliament, strongly criticised the pre-1980 NOM parties for having adopted a 
“religious and radical discourse” and drew attention to the “lack of intra-party democracy” 
within the Welfare Party.499 
On 11 May 2003, in a parliamentary plenary session organised immediately after the 
lifting of his political ban, Erdoğan, by then Prime Minister of Turkey and leader of the JDP, 
stated clearly that the JDP does not support the NOM: ‘No, we are not followers of the National 
View. However, nobody can accuse us of being collaborators and against national view.’500 He 
added: ‘Within us there are surely some people who did have connections with some other 
parties. Yet we removed those ‘clothes’…’501 Likewise, on another occasion, he summarised 
their break away from the NOM as follows: ‘We took off the national vision (NOM) shirt.’502 
However, what still remains unclear is whether the JDP is an Islamist party or not? Many 
academics and Kemalist circles consider the JDP to be an Islamist party; the party rejects this 
characterisation. This is discussed in the next section.  
Unlike the NOM politicians, leading JDP politicians such as Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç 
never define themselves on the basis of religion, notwithstanding their former adherence to the 
                                                 
496The Virtue Party existed between 1997 and 2001. 
497Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 27. 
498Ibid. 
499Ibid.  
500This is the author’s translation of Erdoğan’s statement. The original statement is in Turkish language and 
reads: “Evet biz Milli Görüşçü değiliz. Ancak kimse bizi gayri milli görüşçü, işbirlikçi olarak nitelendiremez”. See: 
Gürel, "Türk Siyasi Tarihinde ‘Muhafazakârlık’ Kimliği ve AKP Örneği İncelemesi [Conservatism Identity in Turkish 
Political History and a Study on AKP Sample]," 141. 
501This is also a translation by the author of this thesis. The original statement is in Turkish language and reads: 
“İçimizde mutlaka geçmiş dönemde bazı siyasi partilerle bağı olanlar vardır. Ama biz o elbiseyi dışarıda bıraktık 
…” See: Gürel, "Türk Siyasi Tarihinde ‘Muhafazakârlık’ Kimliği ve AKP Örneği İncelemesi [Conservatism Identity 
in Turkish Political History and a Study on AKP Sample]," 141. 
502See: Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 62. See also: "AKP’s 10 years: Are 
justice and development enough?," (2011), http://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2011/08/27/akps-10-
years-are-justice-and-development-enough/ [last accessed on 18.02.2016].  
Erdoğan’s original statement reads: “Milli Görüş gömleğini çıkardık”. 
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NOM.503 As party leaders, they now describe themselves in secular terms. Gülalp explains the 
transformation of the JDP leaders to democracy and the success of the JDP as follows: 
Even though the JDP’s roots lie in National View [Milli 
Görüş], the JDP’s political ideology and party program is 
not based on Islamism. The Muslim identity of the 
executives of the party, which is very important, 
demonstrates the only connection with the National View. 
Though the JDP wholeheartedly adopted the normative 
values and rules of the liberal democracy and represents a 
leading successful trend in Islamic world. 504 
Similarly, Menderes Cinar points out very clearly that the JDP does not frame itself in 
religious terms, as distinct from its predecessors:505 Further, as a party espousing policies 
compatible with global trends, the JDP described itself as “a non-ideological, non-Islamist 
political party”506 which aims to serve the people without restricting its scope solely to religious 
issues or religious people.507 In this regard, Erdoğan illustrated the JDP’s position on 
politicization of religion as: “Using religion for political purposes, turning religion into a tool, 
adopting an exclusionary approach in the name of religion … harms societal peace, political 
pluralism and religion itself.”508 
At the party meeting in Abant in May, 2001, a meeting aimed at forming the JDP’s 
political identity, policies and its organisational structure, Erdoğan showed his adherence to 
                                                 
503Bilal Sambur, "The Great Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: The Case of Justice and Development 
Party and Erdogan," European Journal of Economic and Political Studies (ejeps) 2, no. 2 (2009): 121. 
504Haldun Gülalp, Kimlikler Siyaseti [The Politics of Identities] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları [Metis Publications], 
2003). 181. Cited by: Gürel, "Türk Siyasi Tarihinde ‘Muhafazakârlık’ Kimliği ve AKP Örneği İncelemesi 
[Conservatism Identity in Turkish Political History and a Study on AKP Sample]," 142. Please note that the text 
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democracy and secularism stating: “Religion will not be a reference point for our party works. 
Though we are not at loggerheads with the religion.”509 On another occasion he stated: 
While attaching importance to religion as a social value, we 
do not think it right to conduct politics through religion [or] 
to attempt to transform government ideologically by using 
religion. Religion is a sacred and collective value. It should 
not be made a subject of political partisanship causing 
divisiveness.510  
  
The JDP: Ideological Orientation? 
On the basis of its party program, it could be stated that the JDP is not an Islamist party 
as the program does not place any stress on Islam as a political ideology. The party program of 
the JDP is rather based on the benchmarks of the “new world order”511 which could be 
considered as the core values of the political order in the 21st century, namely “globalism, 
democracy, human rights and free market economy”.512 It must also be noted that at the core 
of Islamism in Turkey lies anti-Westernism and anti-Westernisation.513 Thus, since the JDP’s 
party program, as well as its political discourse, are in line with Westernism and 
Westernisation, contrary to the NOM parties, and it sought membership of the EU, the JDP 
could not be regarded as an Islamist party, and even not as a post-Islamist-, new Islamist- or 
moderate Islamist party. It is rather a ‘centre right party’,514 self-labelled ‘conservative 
                                                 
509This is a translation of Erdoğan’s statement by the author of this thesis. The original statement is in Turkish 
language and reads: “Parti calismalarimizda din referansimiz olmayacak. Din ile bir kavgamiz yok ...” See: Ruşen 
Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan-Bir Dönüşümün Öyküsü [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan-The Story of a 
Transformation] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001). 188-89. Cited by: Gürel, "Türk Siyasi Tarihinde ‘Muhafazakârlık’ 
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140. 
510Turkish Daily News, Internet Edition, www.turkishdailynews.com, January 31, 2004. Cited by: William Hale, 
"Christian democracy and the JDP: parallels and contrasts," in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, 
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512Ibid. 
513Ibid. 
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democratic’, that is Islamic in its political roots but espousing belief in the nation’s 
constitutional secularism notwithstanding Prime Minister and President Erdoğan’s actions 
since 2012.515 The JDP appeals to those segments of the community who are seeking stability 
and it can accommodate the majority who want the economic opportunities of a modern state 
but with an Islamic cultural backdrop. The JDP’s continuing electoral success is testament to 
the widespread appeal of its democratic ‘third way’.516  
Şahin Alpay, the columnist of the newspaper Today’s Zaman, explained the democratic 
and not-Islamist character of the JDP as follows: 
Judged on its own discourse and performance, the [JDP] 
cannot be regarded as even mildly Islamist, even with the 
broadest definition of the term. [It] is a ‘conservative 
democratic’ party, that is, a party committed to 
conservative religious values in culture, but to democratic 
principles in politics. [It] has put forward the most liberal 
political and economic platform thus far in the history of 
the Turkish Republic. The [party] is the unifying centrist 
party of Turkey that garners votes from all social segments 
and regions of the country.517  
                                                 
515Post-2012 political actions on the part of Erdoğan that reflect a leader, both of the nation and of his party, 
under an existential threat whether justified or not. ‘Actions’ that jettison fundamental democratisation 
principles in an endeavour to ‘save’ the nation or maybe just to save Erdoğan’s political career. Actions on the 
part of their leader that may become an unacceptable political liability for those parts of the parliamentary JDP 
who see their chosen strategic path, democratisation towards a liberal democratic Turkey, at serious risk of 
derailment. 
516The ‘third way’ in late-20th century political discussion and policy was an attempt to create a new political 
economic narrative that identified and addressed the contradictions in practice of economic socialism (for 
example, state owned industries) and free market global capitalism. “UK Politics : What is the Third Way?” BBC 
News Monday, September 27, 1999 Published at 17:21 GMT 18:21 UK. In the context of Turkey and this thesis, 
the reference to ‘third way’ is to a similar, in form only though, identification and addressing of the significant 
political and social contradictions, and hence tensions, arising from a society, such as Turkey, that has a relatively 
new but well entrenched secular written constitutional superstructure on top of a deep cultural faith-based 
foundation. This is not new in the history of modern human development. However, for Turkey, and others like 
it, the resurgence of political Islam in the 20th century, partly as a reaction to colonialism, has made the search 
for a ‘third way’ that much more compelling and urgent. This thesis argues that the JDP’s promotion of 
democratisation in Turkey is a tool to address this issue on an ongoing basis because the JDP believes that 
‘democratisation’ has the maximum chance of success in resolving these contradictions for the long term with 
the minimum of risk in the short to medium terms.  
517Şahin Alpay, "AKP is not even ‘mildly’ Islamist," Today’s Zaman, 7 April 2008. 
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Likewise, Yavuz points out that a political movement could be considered Islamic on 
the basis of its arguments emphasising religious-Islamic values.518 He adds that such a 
movement is non-Islamic to the extent that it enunciates its policies with regard to public 
reasoning rather than to an Islamic identity.519 Therefore, he argues, the JDP should be 
categorised as a non-Islamist party. 
Most of the party representatives I interviewed for  this thesis (8 out of 9 participants) 
clearly stated that the JDP is a conservative democratic party,520 notwithstanding JDP deputy 
for Trabzon, Cemal Yılmaz Demir, interestingly describing the party as a centre right party.521 
This could be regarded as a substantial divergence of opinion within the party as some other 
party members522 are of the belief that the JDP does not fall into any categorisation of a right 
wing or a left wing party. Similarly, Dr. Burak Küntay, a respected academic of Bahçeşehir 
University, explains the unique nature of the JDP as follows: 
It is not going to be so correct to categorise [the JDP] either 
on the right wing, centre right, Islamist or even left. 
Because sometimes you see certain moves of [the JDP] 
from left, you see certain moves of [the JDP] from centre 
right or even far right… And this can easily show us that 
the [the JDP] is not a specifically traditional party mark 
[brand] but it is a combination of all these ideological 
stances.523 
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In contrast with my view, various participants in the survey categorised the JDP as an 
Islamic democratic party;524 a Muslim democratic party similar to the Christian Democratic 
Party in European countries;525 a new Islamist party;526 a post-Islamist party;527 and a moderate 
Islamist party.528 In contrast, and somewhat in extremis, Ali Resul Usul, an associate professor 
at Bahçeşehir University, believes that the JDP is a self-seeking, leadership-based party which 
has no established ideology or corporate identity.529 But then again what political party that 
genuinely aspires to be in government, and hold on to government, is not “self-seeking [and] 
leadership-based”; these traits are in the ‘DNA’ of politicians and politics (especially intra-
party politics) everywhere there is open competition for political office. As for Usul’s criticism 
that the party “has no established ideology or corporate identity”, this is unfair given that the 
JDP is a relatively new party, has arisen from a political ideology that it now eschews, and, 
virtually from its inception, has held, uninterrupted, national office in Turkey. When a party is 
in opposition it merely has to keep the faithful and convert the rest; when in government, a 
party is obliged to govern for all. Party political ideologies and corporate identities can become 
an obstacle to new parties forging new politics. A party in government can be ‘self-seeking and 
leadership based’ and still effect appropriate policies for the nation’s long term well-being; it 
is not the ideal combination but not necessarily mutually exclusive. As for the criticism that 
the JDP allows a pious flavour in its political demeanour, this can be argued as merely 
packaging, albeit important packaging, for a society still imbued with faith.  
The JDP’s ‘Conservative Democracy’  
As mentioned previously, the JDP promotes its political ideology as conservative 
democratic. Before dealing with this ideological identification, it is important to state that Islam 
                                                 
524The interviewees who categorised the JDP as an Islamic democratic party are William Hale (a British specialist 
on Turkey) and Oxford Professor Othon Anastasokis. See: Author’s interview with William Hale, Istanbul, 
September 2011 & Author’s interview with Othon Anastasokis, Istanbul, September 2011. 
525Those interviewees are Cengiz Aktar (a columnist of Vatan newspaper and Today’s Zaman newspaper) and 
Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı (Ankara Director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States) and, See: Author’s 
interview with Cengiz Aktar, Istanbul, September 2011 and with Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, Ankara, October 2011. 
526 Ayşe Jale Ağırbaş, the Vice President of the Democratic Leftist Party (the DSP) considers the JDP as a new 
Islamist party. See: Author’s interview with Ayşe Jale Ağırbaş, 23 September 2011 (e-mail interview). 
527Prof. Dr. Süheyl Batum regards the JDP as a post-Islamist party. Batum is a former Eskisehir deputy of the main 
opposition party, the CHP and currently an Independent deputy of Eskisehir in Turkish parliament. See: Author’s 
interview with Süheyl Batum, Ankara, October 2011. 
528Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı considers the JDP as a moderate Islamist party. Sayari is the Executive Director of the 
Institute of Turkish Studies and Research Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. 
Author’s interview with Sabri Sayarı, 21 October 2011 (e-mail interview). 
529Author’s interview with Ali Resul Usul, Istanbul, September 2011. 
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remains only a part of the JDP’s socio-cultural identity, rather than a part of its political 
ideology.530 In this regard, Sambur points out that the conservative democratic ideology of the 
JDP signifies its rejection of political Islam as it tries to combine conservative values (morality, 
national identity, historical pride, etc.) with “democracy, free market economy, pluralism, the 
rule of law and human rights”.531 In Sambur’s words: 
[The] JDP as a conservative democrat party is no longer the 
representative of political Islam…The JDP is not a 
religionist party, but religiosity is the aspect of its many 
members. Making religiosity, instead of religion, an 
implicit part of its political discourse is a novel 
development, which is one of the original dimensions of 
JDP ideology.532 
But what does ‘conservative democratic’ mean? What are the basic parameters of a 
conservative democratic party? Why does the party not identify itself in religious terms as a 
Muslim democratic party? Is ‘conservative democratic’ an appropriate or a mistaken political 
approach? These are some of the essential questions constituting the conceptual core of this 
chapter.  
In the aftermath of the oppressive restrictions of the Kemalist establishment, the JDP 
cadre realised that the party, in order to survive, should not define itself in religious terms. 
Therefore, it avoided such identification and chose conservative democratic as a political 
identity. The components of the new conservative democratic rhetoric of the JDP place 
emphasis on the preservation of moral and religious values in socio-cultural terms (the 
conservative dimension), and on modern governance, rule by the people, and a justice based 
society (the democratic dimension). Thus, the JDP clearly declared its conservative democratic 
political identity in its election declaration albeit putting a heavy emphasis on its conservative 
character.533 
                                                 
530Sambur, "The Great Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: The Case of Justice and Development Party 
and Erdogan," 121. 
531Ibid. 
532In the article, Sambur identifies the JDP with AKP. See: Sambur, "The Great Transformation of Political Islam 
in Turkey: The Case of Justice and Development Party and Erdogan," 122. 
533See: AK Parti Secim Beyannamesi [Election Declaration of the JDP], “1. Ilkeli Siyaset [Principled Politics] ”, 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname2011.pdf See also: 
http://www.tokayhaber.com/secim_beyannamesi/I.htm [last accessed on 05.06.2013]. 
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The term “conservative democratic”, according to Kenan Çayır, shows two parallel 
processes: a new ‘Muslim self’ on the one side which combines Islam and democracy and 
which “favours the possibility of a mutual borrowing”.534 In this case, conservative democratic 
specifies a rejection of a former Islamist assertion that Islam was completely distinct from 
Western frames of reference.535 As for the first word, ‘conservative’, it demonstrates “Muslim 
actors’ long lasting desire to blend democracy with conservative values such as an emphasis 
on the family or the prohibition of pornography.”536 The new Muslim self, Çayır states, is “an 
outcome of factors inside and outside of Islamic movements.”537 Finally, he underlines that the 
fate of ‘conservative democracy’ is seemingly dependent on both Islamic and secular actors’ 
positioning on Islam, secularism and democracy.538 
The JDP’s conservatism is not based on preserving the status quo at all costs. It is rather 
a modern political approach which is open to innovation, new conceptions and perspectives, 
mainly based on the preservation of special values and change embraced by the community.539 
In this regard, any change should be consistent with cultural and social traditions, along with 
the religious/Islamic values.540 
                                                 
Despite the heavy emphasis on its conservative nature in the election declaration, “there is not much emphasis 
on conservative values in ‘its’ programme, except for the passages supporting family values and emphasising 
the need to strengthen the family”. See: Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 24. 
534Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 76. 
535“According to Burhanettin Duran, a new interpretation of ‘Islamic civilization’ rather than ‘Islamic state’ 
provides a platform for the JDP which aims to synthesize modern (democratic) and conservative (Islamic) values. 
The JDP’s discourse on Islamic civilization does not essentialize the categories of the West and Islam, hence, it 
opens up a realm for a synthesis of Islamic and Western values.” See: Burhanettin Duran, "JDP and Foreign Policy 
as an Agent of Transformation," in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party, ed. M. Hakan 
Yavuz (ed.) (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), 284-85. Cited by:  
Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 76. 
536Çayır, "The emergence of Turkey’s contemporary ‘Muslim democrats’," 76.  
537Ibid. 
538Ibid. 
539 ‘Co152nservatism’, crudely defined as the preservation of the status quo, has been with us from the beginning 
of human social development, especially in relation to the physical infrastructure around us as individuals and 
as groups. Change means increased risk to the status quo for some but not for all, and therein lies the need for 
and the art of politics. Societies must change in order to survive as new needs arise, needs within their control 
and needs not within their control. It is the level of pressure to change and how that pressure is addressed, 
compromise or violence, sometimes both, that determines how change is accommodated in nation states like 
Turkey. However, history tells us that following change, either evolutionary or revolutionary, a new type of 
‘conservatism’ is created to preserve the new status quo which in turn, as new needs arise, creates the next 
cycle of change necessary to survive as a nation state. 
540“The [JDP]’s understanding of conservatism is not the preservation of the existing institutions and 
relationships, but the preservation of certain values and acquisitions [traditional moral and cultural values that 
reach back to Ottoman/Turkish ancestors]. Such preservation does not mean being closed to change and 
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Conservatism has always been a part of politics in Turkey and was represented in 
several party platforms.541 It has been a component of the centre right parties542 and has been 
espoused by the Democrat Party, the Justice Party, and the Motherland Party in Turkish 
political history.543 Within the conservative political framework of Turkey, the JDP signifies a 
new political approach. Distinct from the former conservative parties, the JDP’s line of politics 
has been able to make conservatism the engine of change;544 thus, the JDP favours change in 
the sense of development and progress, and advocates change on the basis of “an evolutionary, 
gradual, and natural societal transformation”.545 In addition to this, the JDP places a heavier 
stress on “tradition, religion, social values, and the spiritual”546 than the former centre-right 
parties such as AP and DYP.  
Notwithstanding the inevitable cut and thrust of day-to-day politics which at times leads 
politicians of all sorts to self-inflict unactioned comments and undelivered promises, the 
conservative democratic JDP considers politics, at least in theory and aspiration, as an activity 
based on the culture of reconciliation and uses it as a tool to solve social differences and 
disagreements in the political field.547 In this regard, politics should be firmly grounded in 
“reconciliation, integration and tolerance”548 rather than “conflict, the formation of cliques, and 
                                                 
progress, but adaptation to development without losing the essence.” See: Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s 
ideology: Conservative democracy," 24. 
541Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 53. 
542“It has also been espoused by parties on the left.”  
See: Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 53. 
543Ibid. 
544Ibid. 
545Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 24. In this context, Akdoğan’s statements 
are noteworthy:  
“Presently, a radical rejection of the existing political structure through the establishment of a totally new order 
is not viewed as viable or feasible. In order to enable gradual change vis-à-vis the overall structure, it is necessary 
to maintain some of the values and features of the existing culture.” See: Akdoğan, "The Meaning of 
Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 51. 
Erdoğan’s statement on innovation and change is as follows:  
“Bizim muhafazakarlığımız: yeniliğe ve değişime açık bir muhafazakarlıktır. Kökü mazide, ama yüzü geleceğe 
dönük çağdaş ve yenilikçi bir muhafazakarlık anlayışını temsil eden bir partiyiz biz”. The English Translation of 
Erdoğan’s statement by the author of this thesis reads: “Our Conservatism is open to innovation and change. 
We are a party whose root lies in past, but its face turned toward future and our party represents a Conservatism 
which is modern and progressive”. See: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Uluslararası muhafazakarlık ve demokrasi 
sempozyumu açılış konuşması [Opening Speech for International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy], 
Uluslararası muhafazakarlık ve demokrasi sempozyumu [International Symposium on Conservatism and 
Democracy] (AK Parti Publication, 2004). 14.  
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polarization”.549 It lays a heavy emphasis on the representation of the differing views of a 
variety of social and cultural groups in the political arena, within a participatory democratic 
framework and democratic pluralism.550 And all this fits with this thesis’s argument that liberal 
democracy has been chosen by the JDP leadership, since its inception, because it ‘ticks so many 
boxes’ for the JDP’s medium to long term strategy for Turkey. The biggest ‘box’, of course, is 
the political management and mitigation of the tension between Turkey, the modern secular 
state, and Turkey, the inheritor of a deep and still politically active faith-based culture.  
Importantly, the JDP’s ‘democratisation’ strategy sees the short term as something to 
get through by whatever means in order to maintain the ‘democratisation’ journey. And holding 
on to power, between successful elections, sometimes means taking a less democratic detour 
in order to resume the journey later; a journey that promises the best opportunity, as argued in 
this thesis, to manage Turkey’s future with minimum risk to that future.  
Conservative democracy advocates “a limited and defined form of political power”551 
opposing authoritarian and totalitarian policies that would create a repressive state.552 
Notwithstanding the accusations by his political opponents that he has more recently been 
exhibiting authoritarian tendencies, party leader Erdoğan, at the International Symposium on 
Conservatism and Democracy in January 2004, clearly stated that the JDP is in favour of a state 
that adopts the norms of the rule of law and performs its core functions dynamically and 
effectively.553 He further emphasised that the party strongly opposes “all kinds of social and 
                                                 
549Ibid. 
550Ibid., 50. 
551In this regard Akdoğan adds: “The greatest enemies of civil and democratic politics are authoritarian and 
totalitarian tendencies that, if not curtailed, lead to arbitrariness in application of laws, a downplaying of genuine 
representation and participation, and disregard for individual and collective freedoms.” See: Akdoğan, "The 
Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 50. 
552Akdoğan explains conservative democrats’ understanding of “state” with the following statements: 
“By necessity, political power and institutions must remain within a designated legal framework, thereby 
ensuring rule of law. The state should be functioning, small but dynamic, and effective, and excessiveness and 
waste in government should be prevented. The state should never insist on specific preferences for its citizens, 
or retreat to dogmatic and ideological stances. Instead, the state must be defined, shaped and controlled by its 
citizens.” He adds: “Democracy becomes acceptable if it is able to mix a wide variety of social and cultural 
differences and demands in the political arena. A truly democratic political arena is one in which all of society’s 
problems are referred and discussed, all social demands are given a voice, and social programs can be tested 
and modified. In the case of Turkey, the heterogeneity of its society will work to enrich a pluralist democracy” 
See: Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 50-51. 
553Erdoğan’s original statement is as follows: “AK Parti hukuk devleti normalarini benimseyen, asli 
fonksiyonlarina cekilmis, kucuk ama dinamik ve etkili bir devletten yanadir.” See: Mir Mehmet Dengir Fırat, 
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political engineering”.554 In this context, Hale and Özbudun describe the JDP’s conservatism 
as “an attitude in favour of natural and evolutionary change, and a posture against social 
engineering”.555 Along with social and political engineering, the JDP, and conservative 
democracy respectively, reject radicalism.556 
Conservative democracy promotes popular sovereignty and the rule of law as the main 
bases of political legitimacy.557 Accordingly, political power is firmly grounded in 
constitutionality and universally accepted norms,558 and political legitimacy can be achieved 
only by accepting the “will of the nation”,559 here meaning inclusive democratic processes. 
This is all based on the “common acceptance of a national identity that expresses itself in 
commonly held norms regarding action, rules and collective worth”.560 Aziz Babuşcu, the JDP 
Istanbul Province Chairman, lists the basic characteristics of conservative democratic politics 
as carrying out politics for people and with people in accordance with moral, cultural and 
religious values, accepting the nation as a unique source of legitimacy and surrendering to no 
force other than the nation.561 Babuşcu regards these criteria as the fundamental criteria of the 
JDP for providing public services to the Turkish people, adding that the JDP’s people-based 
                                                 
Uluslararasi Muhafazakarlik ve Demokrasi Sempozyumu [International Symposium on Conservatism and 
Democracy], (Ankara: AK Parti, 2004): 20. 
554“Erdoğan makes this clear when he states that ‘all efforts that impose or order certain principles and aim at a 
homogeneous society, or are based on social engineering are obstacles to a healthy democratic system ... Our 
identity as conservative democrats makes us oppose all kinds of social and political engineering.’” 
See: Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 24-25. 
555Ibid., 24. 
The conservative democratic position with regard to change and social engineering is emphasised by Akdoğan 
as follows: “The use of totalitarian means and forcible methods to change society is deemed unacceptable 
because of the negative socioeconomic, cultural and political effects such methods have historically produced. 
Instead, conservative democracy supports a gradual and progressive transformation of its functions in order to 
bring about significant, even revolutionary change for the betterment of society. Such gradual improvements, 
by genuinely reflecting what has been acquired historically by a society and what gains can naturally evolve in 
the future, can produce societal transformations that are both fundamental and permanent. Changes that have 
not materialized gradually are not considered viable and permanent.” See:  
Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 51. 
556Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 51.  
557Ibid. 
558In Erdoğan’s words: “…the concept of conservative democracy that we are developing is being shaped by the 
Turkish people’s experiences in history and their multidimensional cultural accumulation. And yet, this concept 
incorporates universal values that allow it to serve as a source of inspiration for other countries…” See: Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, "Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom," in The Emergence of a New 
Turkey: Islam, Democracy, and the AK Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.) (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
2006), 337. 
559In this context “which” refers to political legitimacy. 
560Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 50. 
561Author’s interview with Aziz Babuşcu, Istanbul, September 2011. 
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political and service approach looks ahead to the ‘Turkey of 2023’ celebrations in order to 
launch from then the policies that will guide Turkey’s values and future.562 In other words, 
conservative democratic politics are very much focused on services for people through policies 
that embrace all segments of the society. The service based politics of the JDP is not only 
emphasised by the JDP itself, but also by the intellectuals outside the party. In this regard, Fuat 
Keyman563 considers the JDP’s service based politics as one of the main dimensions of the 
JDP’s electoral strategy through which the JDP has achieved its persistent power.564 
One further characteristics of conservative democracy is its “opposition to ethnic, 
religious, and regional nationalism”.565 Akdoğan states that, in Turkish political history,  
success of a political party has historically been based on its “implicit acceptance of ‘the 
irrevocable principles of the state’ and the ‘indispensable values of the nation’”.566 Hence, those 
parties which failed to accept these principles have been marginalised and kept out of the 
centre.567 Therefore, in order to be “a significant and successful force in Turkish politics”, 
“successful articulation and representation of societal demands” is a sine qua non requirement 
for the JDP, Ali Bulaç argues.568 Further, Yavuz simply places stress on the embracing and 
service based character of the JDP stating that the JDP is “not a party of identity but rather a 
party that strives to provide better services.”569 
                                                 
562Ibid.  
The Year 2023 is the centennial of the Foundation of the Republic of Turkey. The AK Party took 2023 as a turning 
point and determined important goals to develop the country further by then. For more information see: 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/hedefler 
563Fuat Keyman is the Director of Istanbul Policy Centre and Professor of International Relations at Sabancı 
University.  
564In this context, Keyman lists the main dimensions of the JDP’s electoral strategy as follows: 1) Conservative 
democracy 2) Philantropic and regulated neoliberalism 3) Service-based politics 4)Pro-active foreign policy. See: 
E. Fuat Keyman, "The Question of Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," The Council on Islamic Education (CIE)., 
http://www.ciee.org/conference/downloads/past/istanbul/KeymanDemocraticConsolidationTurkey.pdf  
[last accessed on 07.06.2013]. 
565Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 60. 
Erdoğan repudiates religious, ethnic, and regional nationalism as the ‘red lines’ of the JDP. See: Hale and 
Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 25. 
566Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 25. 
Indispensable values of the nation cover those values that are common among the Turks. However, being Turk 
does not necessarily mean being of Turkish ethnic origin. An ethnically Kurd or even a Jew can be Turk; he/she 
can acquire Turkish citizenship.  
567Ibid. 
568Ibid. 
569M. Hakan Yavuz, The emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of 
Utah Press, 2006): 3. Cited by: Duran, "The Justice and Development Party’s ‘new politics’. Steering toward 
conservative democracy, a revised Islamic agenda or management of new crises?," 83. 
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 In relation to politics and religion, Akdoğan, the ideologue of ‘conservative 
democracy’, believes the latter emphasises the reflection of individuals’ feelings and thoughts, 
including a spiritual dimension, on politics as a normal condition and a sociological 
phenomenon which can be accepted.570 However, he considers manipulation of politics through 
religion and religious exclusivism anathema to conservative democracy.571 In this context, 
conservative democrats regard secularism as a tool for avoiding perpetual tension and 
maintaining social diversity peacefully and independently, rather than as a tool for intervening 
in the affairs of religion and religious people and keeping religion under the control of the 
government.572 According to the JDP, as emphasised by Akdoğan, conservative democracy 
does not promote its utopian visions by forceful means, nor does it insist on the truth of these 
visions over the truth of others.573 
Conservative democracy also places significant importance on civil society and the 
community’s sense of belonging as a single group while avoiding the sectarian perspective.574 
In summary, the JDP’s conservative democratic manifesto continuously emphasises such 
democratic and liberal values as ‘limited government, the rule of law, the centrality of the 
individual, free market economy, strong civil society, universal human rights, the importance 
of dialogue and toleration”, as William Hale and Ergun Özbudun underline.575 It places stress 
on “a concept of modernity that does not reject tradition, a belief of universalism that accepts 
localism, an understanding of rationalism that does not disregard the spiritual meaning of life, 
                                                 
570In his work “Muhafazakar Demokrasi”, Akdoğan attributes the main characteristics of conservative democracy 
to the AK Party (JDP).  
571Yalçın Akdoğan, Muhafazakâr Demokrasi [Conservative Democracy] (Ankara: AK Parti [AK Party], 2003): 116. 
In this context, the JDP’s leader Erdoğan’s following statements reflect conservative democratic position on 
religion and politics: “We are against the employment of discourses and organizational approaches that create 
divisions of Us and Them and make one specific fact—ideology, political identity, ethnic element, or religious 
thought—the center of the polity, thereby antagonizing all other choices. We don’t accept that kind of an 
approach. This supposition is also the most effective measure against those who try to abuse people’s spiritual 
and moral feelings, including religion as for secularism ....” See: Erdoğan, "Conservative Democracy and the 
Globalization of Freedom," 336. 
572Erdoğan, "Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom," 115-16. 
Erdoğan defines Secularism “as an institutional attitude and method which ensures the state to remain impartial 
and equidistant to all religions and thoughts, a principle which aims to ensure peaceful social coexistence 
between different creeds, sects, and school of thought.” See: Erdoğan, "Conservative Democracy and the 
Globalization of Freedom," 336.  
573“There must be an established balance between idealism and realism. It is natural that some people possess 
utopian visions, but conservative democracy does not implement these utopian ideals by forceful means and 
does not insist on the truth of these ideals over the truth of others. It insists on balance and on gradual, 
evolutionary change.” See: Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 51.  
574Ibid. 
575Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 24. 
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and a choice for change that is not fundamentalist” which from the JDP’s perspective, answers 
to the desire of the Turkish people.576 
‘Conservative Democracy’: What Others Say 
Having interpreted conservative democracy on the basis of the JDP’s standpoint and 
the views of intellectuals outside the party, it is now important to consider debates surrounding 
conservative democracy.  
The JDP’s conservative democratic political identity has been the subject of intellectual 
debate among scholars and a number of questions have been raised about this concept.577 
Conservative democracy is subject to debate surely because it is regarded as unscientific and 
does not exist as a concept in the political science literature.578 Hence, conservative democracy 
is often criticised on the basis of its lack of conceptual and political legitimacy.579 In this regard, 
one major debate within national and international circles is the question of whether it is an 
appropriate or a mistaken political approach. The JDP emphasises that conservative 
democracy, despite its absence in political literature, can be regarded as an appropriate political 
approach. In Erdoğan’s words: 
We can say that there may not have been any concepts of 
conservative democracy, but it is not necessary to always 
act on the previously established ideas and approaches. We 
are bringing about a new concept not only in an abstract 
manner, but also in a concrete manner, and this is something 
that needs to be discussed, debated…580 
Similarly, Atilla Yayla, a Professor of Politics at Gazi University in Turkey argues that, 
in due course, conservative democracy might develop a specific socio-political ideological line 
like social democracy.581 He further argues that “[i]f conservative democracy becomes an 
                                                 
576Erdoğan, "Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom," 335. 
577Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 54.  
578Ibid., 55. 
579Ibid. 
580Erdoğan, "Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom," 334. 
581Atilla Yayla, "Muhafazakar Demokrasi ve Muhafazakar Demokratlar [Conservative Democracy and 
Conservative Democrats]," 5 February (2004),  
http://www.liberal-dt.org.tr/guncel/Yayla/ay_muhafazakar%20demokrasi.htm [last accessed on 26.02.2016].   
Cited by: Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 65. 
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accepted term in political science this will only occur in the future, maybe in 5 to 10 years, 
maybe in 50 years.”582 
Unlike Erdoğan and Yayla, Ali Bayramoğlu, a columnist of the daily Yeni Şafak, 
describes conservative democracy as a mistaken political approach on the grounds that there is 
no literature on the concept of “conservative democracy”.583 Thus, he argues, “conservatism” 
and “democracy” cannot be combined together to create a new political identity.584 The Muslim 
intellectual Ali Bulaç regards conservative democracy as a doctrine that aims to secularise 
Muslims and depriving them of the capacity for disagreement and opposition.585 In response to 
these criticisms, the JDP argues that as a newly formed political narrative, conservative 
democracy can gain some respect, at least, as “a positive development for Turkish politics to 
be able to discuss the concept and the associations around it”.586 
Mümtaz'er Türköne, a professor of political science at Gazi University, gives a nuanced 
argument against the criticism of the term ‘conservative democracy’ on the basis of its absence 
in the political science literature, indicating that theory occurs as a result of political action: 
Political thought always comes after action in order to 
explain events that have taken place. The leader who is in 
the firing line makes a decision and then puts it into 
practice; the masses react after the fact. Intellectuals 
attempt to create “novelties” or new ideas to either 
legitimize or object to certain world conceptualizations. No 
                                                 
“... As for social democracy, though it is mistakenly assumed to be a type of democracy, it essentially indicates 
an ideological location. Furthermore, social democracy, with respect to its structure, is often at odds with 
representative liberal democracy more than liberalism or conservatism...” See: Akdoğan, "The Meaning of 
Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 56. 
582Yayla, "Muhafazakar Demokrasi ve Muhafazakar Demokratlar [Conservative Democracy and Conservative 
Democrats]". 
583Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 55. 
584Ali Bayramoğlu, "Hem Muhafazakar, hem Demokrat Olunur mu? [Can One Be Both Conservative and 
Democrat?]," Yeni Şafak, 13 January 2004, 65. 
According to Bayramoğlu, conservative democracy “is not merely a misnomer; it is also unfair to the reformist 
oriented constituency of the JDP, that tries to carve out new opportunity spaces and freedoms against the 
backdrop of an authoritarian establishment while being engaged in a struggle to democratize politics and 
modernize the Islamic sector.” See: Yıldız, "Problematizing the intellectual and political vestiges. From 'welfare' 
to 'justice and development'," 44. See also: Erdoğan, Uluslararası muhafazakarlık ve demokrasi sempozyumu 
açılış konuşması [Opening Speech for International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy]: 225-29. 
585Ali Bulaç, "AK Parti ve İktidarını Niçin Eleştiriyoruz? [Why Do We Criticise the AK Party and Its Government?]," 
(2006), www.bilgihikmet.com. 
586Erdoğan, Uluslararası muhafazakarlık ve demokrasi sempozyumu açılış konuşması [Opening Speech for 
International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy].  
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leader looks at the books before acting; at most the leader 
will defend his actions by using extant thoughts, hoping to 
sustain support for that action. Thus, the essential duty of 
intellectuals lies not in creating utopian scenarios for 
politicians, but in regenerating theories that will help the 
leader explain and gain support for his/her actions.587 
If Türköne’s analysis is appropriate for the JDP, and Erdoğan in particular, then it must 
be to the JDP leadership’s actions that we must look to understand the political path it has taken 
The name, the political doctrine, is merely ‘marketing’ to manage the ‘slings and arrows’ of 
opposition, from within and without the party, so that the path can be continued, hopefully for 
the leadership, to the sunny uplands of normalcy, if not widespread acceptability. Change takes 
time to become the new ‘normal’, but with time comes risk and the need for on-going 
‘marketing’ and defending. As such, and in the context of ‘marketing’, it can be argued that 
the JDP’s conservative democratic identity is not to be denigrated or verified “only on the basis 
of its success in generating scientific inquiry”.588 The efforts of the JDP, at the very least, 
should be regarded as “a modest contribution to Turkish political life”.589 
Hakan Yavuz, who is an academic at the University of Utah, likens the JDP’s 
conservative democratic identity to a “space” where people with distinct identities and interests 
come together to declare their intention to change the status quo.590 Further, Erol Kaya, the 
Mayor of Pendik argues that the JDP is a “supermarket” where people come to be catered to 
and, per se, in itself, “it has not formed an identity”, adding that its proposed identity is rather 
“an identity tool for external legitimacy” which does not necessarily reflect all its policies.591 
Ahmet Yıldız argues that the conservative democracy of the JDP mainly seeks to allay the 
suspicions of the international community, especially the USA and the EU countries, and 
therefore does not have real content.592 According to Yıldız, the party’s conservative 
                                                 
587Mümtaz'er Türköne, "Devrimci Muhafazakarlık [Revolutionary Conservatism]," Zaman, 15 January 2004. 
588Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," 56. 
589Ibid. 
590Yavuz, “The emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti,” 10. 
591Ibid.  
592Ahmet Yıldız, "Muhafazakarlığın Yerlileştirilmesi ya da AKP’nin ‘Yeni Muhafazakar Demokratlığı' [Localisation 
of Conservatism or the 'New Conservative Democratism' of the AKP]," Karizma 7 (2004): 54.; Fahrettin Altun, 
"Islamcılık ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi [Islamism and Conservative Democracy]," Anlayış (2005): 41-43.; 
Fahrettin Altun, "AK Parti’nin Topuğu [The Heel of the AK Party]," Anlayış (2006): 26-28.; Yasin Aktay, "Ikrar ile 
Ikrar Arasinda AK Parti’nin Kimliği [The Identity of the AK Party Between Confession and Confession]," Anlayış 
(2005): 51-54.; Necdet Subaşı, Ara Dönem Din Politikaları [Religion Policy of Interim Period] (Küre Yayıncılık, 
2005): 155-73. Cited by: Yavuz, “The emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti,” 10. 
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democratic identity creates a footprint that covers the centre-right of Turkish politics in order 
to manage the political pressures that come from its immediate neighbours on both sides of that 
footprint, allaying secularist suspicions from the left and encouraging accommodations with 
Islamist-oriented bodies from the right.593 Yıldız concludes that the JDP uses the conservative 
democratic label with the aim of defining itself for others rather than creating a guiding 
ideology for itself.594 This conclusion is supported by Yavuz.595 Like all new political ‘labels’ 
in their early days, ‘conservative democracy’ for the JDP is as much about packaging as 
content. Especially as the latter, content, is usually a work-in-progress in the short term as the 
ideology is ‘road-tested’. The ‘packaging’ (partly Yıldız’s “defining itself for others”) is merely 
a quick study to ensure there is a response to the inevitable, critical analysis from opponents, 
as well as to reassure the ‘faithful’. 
The ‘Hidden Agenda’  
Having discussed the main opinions on the JDP’s description of its political ideology 
as conservative democratic, I would like now to deal with the suspicions and fears that surround 
the JDP. 
While others are suspicious, Turkey’s secularists claim that the JDP is an Islamist party 
with a hidden agenda to establish an Islamist regime in Turkey. They argue that the JDP, hiding 
its real face, performs a game of dissimulation (takiyye) with the aim of gaining legitimacy in 
Turkish politics in order to consolidate its political power to achieve, in time, its hidden 
agenda.596 In Hale’s and Özbudun’s words: “Such bitter and heated debates attest to the fact 
that Turkey is still very far from arriving at a consensus on the true meaning of secularism”.597 
Without doubt, the Islamist past of its leadership throws a shadow over the secularist 
compatible reforms initiated by the JDP. The reforms have been looked on with scepticism on 
the grounds that the party’s hidden agenda, an Islamic State, when realised, would sweep away 
these reforms and show them for what they are, just token gestures with short ‘use-by dates’.598 
                                                 
593Yavuz, “The emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti,” 10. 
594Ibid. 
595Ibid. 
596Hale and Özbudun, "The AKP’s ideology: Conservative democracy," 22. 
597Ibid. 
598Duran, "The Justice and Development Party’s ‘new politics’. Steering toward conservative democracy, a 
revised Islamic agenda or management of new crises?," 90.  
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The JDP’s urge to ‘Europeanisation’ triggered Kemalist circles to position themselves 
against the European project as they associated the project with the JDP’s perceived hidden 
Islamist agenda.599 Arguably, that is the function of parliamentary oppositions, to oppose 
‘loyally’ within the constitutional framework. Further, the main opposition party, the CHP, as 
its main anti-JDP political strategy, argues that the JDP is misusing the EU project.600 While 
approving, albeit with some hesitation, the government’s goal to become an EU member, some 
senior personnel in Turkey’s military consider the EU as “an entity that is untrustworthy and 
hostile towards Turkey”.601 This opposition includes, in some military garrisons, indoctrination 
of conscripts with anti-EU sentiments identifying “pro-EU stances with the betrayal of the 
country”.602 The JDP’s response to these assertions is to prove that a pro-EU political party 
cannot have a hidden Islamist agenda, for realisation of such an agenda would be found to be 
inconsistent with on-going EU membership.603 
It is probable that the political opposition to the JDP governments’ EU policy also stems 
from the fear that JDP-in-government led accession to the EU will be so successful, 
economically, that it will lock the JDP into government for many more years than the 
opposition would like. 
When we review the JDP’s party program604 and other official party documents, we 
find them compatible with generally accepted democratic standards. We do not find within 
these documents any explicit or implicit evidence of an Islamist agenda. The ‘hidden agenda’ 
assertion of the JDP’s critics cannot be disproved, but neither can it be proved from the JDP’s 
party programme or party documents. The party programme, in one of its founding principles, 
aims to expand democracy, transparency and freedom in the Republic and to bring them to all 
                                                 
599Menderes Çınar, "The Justice and Development Party and the Kemalist Establishment," in Secular and Islamic 
Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. Ümit Cizre (New York: Routledge Studies 
in Middle eastern Politics, 2008). 
600"AB'yi Hedeflerine Kilif Yapiyorlar," Cumhuriyet, 4 June 2003. 
I. Berkan, "Baykal Neyin Pesinde," Radikal, 25 June 2003. 
601M. Çolgeçen, "Iste Çantadaki Kılınç Dosyası," Aksam, 29 April 2003. 
S. Arat, "AB ile Tokalasınca Parmakları Sayalım," Hürriyet 4 October 2005. 
602Ertuğrul Özkök, "Komutanların dikkatine," Hürriyet, 14 March 2005. 
603Çınar, "The Justice and Development Party and the Kemalist Establishment." 126. 
604JDP, "Party Programme: The East and the Southeast," Justice and Development Party, 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_. [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
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sections of Turkish society.605 The JDP lays particular emphasis on the importance of a genuine 
democratic republic and the need to ensure continual democratic improvements, stating the 
following in the conclusion of its party program: 
The Republic is one of the most important gains we 
obtained within our history of thousands of years. Despite 
all the efforts and developments, [the JDP] believes that the 
distance taken until today for our Republic to become a 
democratic republic is quite inadequate.606 
The JDP believes that democracy, in particular further improvement in democratic 
rights and freedoms, has become a sine qua non for progress and development in all areas of 
Turkey’s community, especially economic development.607 Today, having a strong economy, 
being active in international affairs and maintaining public security very much depend on the 
improvement of democratic standards.608 
The validity, if any, of the ‘hidden agenda’ hypothesis is a function of many variables 
that in themselves wax and wane with events that the JDP faces and its internal factions use to 
retain or gain advantage. Given the party’s political Islamic roots, it surely must be that there 
are factions within the party that represent the reality of the ‘hidden agenda’. Whether or not 
they gain control of the party and the government, sustainably, is a matter of key importance 
for Turkey’s democratic progress. The 2013 investigation of alleged corruption by some senior 
government leaders and their associates, an investigation branded by the government as  Gülen 
inspired, may indicate the culmination of an accumulating disenchantment with the JDP 
leadership from within; and, a concerted attempt to shift the internal balance of the JDP in 
favour the more fundamentalist component of the party by significantly weakening party leader  
Erdoğan and his close political coterie.  
The real ‘agenda’ of the JDP might be ‘hiding’ in the full glare of the public arena. The 
JDP’s real agenda may not be constitutional Islam but a sustainable democratisation process 
that it espoused and acted upon in its early days in government. In this understanding, the 
realpolitik of managing a modern state with significant unresolved social and political tensions 
                                                 
605"Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi," (Ankara: AK Parti Tanıtım 
ve Medya Başkanlığı January 2010), 11. 
606Ibid.  
607"Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi," 8. 
608Ibid., 9. 
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informs practical implementation of democratization. For the JDP leadership, the agenda may 
well be to deliver a stable democratic Turkey in the medium to long term, along the way 
managing tensions long enough to safely bury what they see as the errors of pre-2002 semi-
democracy. In order to survive in power to re-establish the democratizing momentum, the 
agenda can include going off "democratic message" in the short term. 
Conclusion 
The JDP is a political party whose ‘business model’ was established at its inception in 
2001 to resolve the one persistent and significant political tension that has plagued the Republic 
of Turkey since its foundation in 1923: the tension between a secular constitutional republic 
and its mono-faith based community. The JDP, whose direct roots include political Islam, 
rejected the latter publicly and chose the path of democratisation because it believed 
democratisation was the best political arrangement to achieve stability in a country that had 
seen significant political instability and military intervention in the second half of the 20th 
century. It felt that a political party that ‘came from’ political Islam, and supported secular 
constitutional democratisation could mute the extremes of both sides of the tension whilst at 
the same time appeal to the moderates of both sides, and the ‘silent’ middle, in their hopes for 
genuine accommodation and sustainable stability. 
The JDP’s model, liberal democratisation, is the political trajectory that best minimises 
the risks to a nation state of accommodating significant change: change that it seeks or that is 
thrust upon it. The party’s political identity, Conservative Democracy, appeals, in whole or in 
part, to the vast majority of Turkish voters who seek sustainable political stability and this is 
why the party has continued in office, from 2002 to date. However, significant ‘events’ will 
always have the potential to derail democratisation, usually temporarily, in major democracies. 
Turkey can cite the events of 2013 and 2014, and subsequently.  
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Chapter 5: ANALYSIS OF THE JDP’S GOVERNANCE & REFORMS 
Introduction  
This chapter discusses the actions taken by the JDP that impact on Turkey’s 
democratisation process, from the party’s coming to power in November 2002 until December 
2014. The chapter looks at the more salient areas of government administration and reform in 
this period in order to draw a conclusion on the JDP’s ‘democratisation’ actions. In order to 
achieve its objective, the chapter sets out an inventory of JDP actions in areas relevant to the 
democratisation process. The areas are: EU accession, military tutelage, ethnic and religious 
diversity, gender equality and children’s rights, civil society, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, democratic initiatives and, constitutional reform. The actions will be used to 
‘measure’ the party’s contribution, in government, to that process. The JDP did not start 
Turkey’s latest concerted push for democratisation, but has maintained and added to the 
momentum. Nonetheless its commitment to sustainable democratic processes remains in 
question not only in the face of short term political exigencies but at the core of its raison d'être. 
This chapter looks at a number of issues inherited by the JDP when it first came to office in 
2002 and what it has done to address those issues including the military tutelage, ethnic and 
religious diversity, gender equality and children’s rights, civil society and human rights. The 
chapter also discusses the formal catalysts for reform being the EU Harmonisation Packages, 
the JDP’s Constitutional Reform Package and the Democratic Opening Initiative. The JDP’s 
democratisation ‘scorecard’ will be marked for each issue. The chapter’s conclusion 
summarises the marking results.  
The JDP’s Inheritance 
Before the JDP came to power in 2002, Turkey had a multi-party system constrained 
by military and civil service tutelages, and a constitution and judiciary that impeded democratic 
processes and progress. It was a situation that created barriers to the full democratic benefits 
of a multi-party political system and which prolonged significant deficiencies in the rights for 
individuals, groups of individuals and religious minorities. Further, the media through 
government pressure or self-censorship was hampered in its democratic role, and civil society 
was officially discouraged directly or by lack of support. 
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The Turkish military had significant constitutional and political power and had 
intervened several times in Turkish politics since the republic’s establishment in 1923 
including replacing the properly elected civilian governments. These interventions weakened 
the consolidation of democracy in Turkey and delayed its democratisation progress. Though 
Turkey’s judiciary was an important actor whose decisions were binding and not subject to the 
control of any governmental body, the undemocratic constraints built into the constitution and 
the nature of the judiciary prevented it from becoming an effective body in the necessary checks 
and balances of a modern democratic state. The judiciary did not represent the Turkish military 
and bureaucracy in the affairs of the nation but it conspired, at times, to maintain those tutelages 
by non-intervention and the misuse of its powers.  
Human rights deficiencies included ‘torture and ill-treatment, long detention periods, 
lack of an efficient dialogue between the government and civil society, low level of 
participation of civil society in the public decision-making process, and imprisonment of 
journalists for crimes relating to freedom of expression and social conscience’. These were 
subjected to intense criticism in the international arena.609 Further, ethnic and religious 
minorities such as Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslim minorities, were considered as “others” by 
the state. Their rights were restricted and assimilation policies were imposed upon them. 
Though more liberal policies were pursued in the years between 1983 and 1989 under Prime 
                                                 
609European Commission, "2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accesssion," Commission Staff 
Working Document (2002): 25-42. 
“European efforts to come to terms with diversity became ever more critical with the European Union's rapidly 
approaching eastward expansion, set in motion in the heady, early post-Cold War years. With as many as ten 
countries to be admitted by 2004, much remained to be done to restructure E.U. institutions, as well as to adjust 
applicant states' laws to E.U. norms. In the field of human rights, poor treatment of Roma remained a challenge 
for nearly all applicant states. Turkey's persistent problems relating to torture, free expression, and minority 
rights kept it as a case apart among applicant states. Its National Program for Accession to the E.U. announced 
in March and the constitutional amendments adopted in October were both disappointing. The national 
program was too vague to raise any hope of meaningful change. Not surprisingly then, incommunicado 
detention, the death penalty, and emergency rule remained in place, and important free expression guarantees 
were neglected. Having missed these important opportunities for meaningful reform, Turkey continued to face 
a long road to E.U. membership.” See: "Europe and Central Asia," in World Report 2002 (Human Rights Watch, 
2002). 
“The Turkish government made almost no progress on key human rights reforms in 2000, and failed to take 
advantage of the opportunity presented by a marked reduction in armed violence by illegal organizations. This 
was in spite of the strong incentive coming from the European Union, which offered long-awaited recognition 
to Turkey as a candidate for membership, subject to its meeting human rights conditions. While the government 
procrastinated, politicians and writers were prosecuted and imprisoned for expressing their nonviolent opinions, 
and detainees in police custody remained at risk of ill-treatment, torture, or death in custody. A reduction in 
political violence contributed to a decrease in the overall volume of abuses. There were fewer deaths in custody, 
suggesting that public and international pressure may have had some inhibiting effect on police interrogators.” 
See: "Europe and Central Asia: Turkey," in World Report 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2001). 
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Minister Turgut Özal, the Turkish state considered these minority groups as a threat to the unity 
of the Turkish nation and attempted to deny their identities. Methods included prohibiting the 
use of minority languages in public places, banning or hindering their worship practice, and 
not recognising their legal personality and property rights. A monolithic, security based 
approach was officially and in practice espoused, rather than an inclusive, liberal/pluralist 
approach.  
In pre-JDP Turkey, the principle of equal treatment for men and women was violated 
in private and public spheres; gender equality was not ensured by law until January 2002. 
Violence against women including honour killings was at a very high level. Children were tried 
at the State Security Courts rather than children’s courts (for crimes against the security of the 
state and organised crime) and child labour was a major problem. However, with the revision 
of the civil law in January 2002, the former coalition government of DSP-MHP and ANAP 
made some progress in improving gender equality in the country.610 These reforms included 
abolition of the concept of “head of family”, the increase in the marital age to 18 for both 
genders (previously it was 17 year of age for men and 15 for women), granting the same 
inheritance rights to children of unmarried parents as those of married parents, and granting 
single parent families the right to adopt children. Despite these reforms, women’s and 
children’s rights before the JDP fell far short of international standards in law and even more 
so in practice.611 
                                                 
610Zuhal Yeşilyurt Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," KAS-
Auslandsinformationen (2004): 59. 
611“In Turkey, in both urban and rural areas, family members murder an estimated two hundred girls and women 
in the name of honour each year. In 2001, judges trying ‘honour’ killing cases often reduced the penalties for 
perpetrators, holding that the victim had "provoked" the murder by transgressing codes of conduct imposed on 
women by society. Older relatives sometimes arranged for underage boys in the family to commit ‘honour’ 
murders because penalties for minors were lower, in some cases as little as two years in prison. Domestic 
violence was also pervasive in Turkey; women's human rights activists condemned the authorities' lack of 
response to domestic violence and called for increased government funding to establish shelters and provide 
legal services. The government, however, appeared intent to reinstate virginity tests for women students 
wishing to become nurses and medical technicians. In July, Minister of Health Osman Durmus issued a directive 
to circumvent a 1999 ban on virginity tests and permit girls to be examined with parental permission and a 
judge's order if the nursing school suspected them of ‘immoral behaviour.’ Local women's rights groups 
condemned the directive, saying schools would use it to expel girls that they wanted to dismiss for other reasons. 
Amid the outcry provoked by the decree, Durmus denied that he had authorized the reinstatement of the exams 
but the directive was not rescinded.” See: "Women's Human Rights," in World Report 2002 (Human Rights 
Watch, 2002). 
“Turkey prevented girls from attending most government schools if they chose to wear hijab, and after 1997 
enforced this policy increasingly energetically. Girls who continued to wear religious attire to school could be 
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EU Harmonisation Packages  
Turkey’s acceptance as an EU Candidate Country by the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999 represents the key contextual event.612 No doubt, as a result of Turkey’s 
acceptance as an EU Candidate Country, the reform process gained noticeable momentum as 
Turkey showed itself capable of realising various reforms in the political, economic, cultural 
and social fields.613 The JDP government implemented a large number of constitutional 
amendments and six legislative harmonisation packages614 after coming to power in November 
2002. The former coalition government of DSP-MHP and ANAP initiated reforms based on 
                                                 
charged with ‘interrupting education,’ a criminal offence punished by incarceration for up to two years. Turkish 
law also allowed schools to expel girls deemed to be ‘unchaste,’ an accusation officials often made against girls 
who challenged conservative social norms. A 1995 Ministry of Education circular provided for high school 
students' ‘expulsion from the formal education system’ based on ‘proof of chastity,’ and in July 2001 Minister of 
Health Osman Durmus decreed that ‘virginity tests’ could be performed on medical high school students ‘known 
to be having sex or engaging in prostitution.’ Banned since 1999, such gynaecological exams involved 
intimidation and pain and violated girls' right to bodily integrity. Prior to the ban, some girls attempted suicide 
rather than submit to this abusive examination. The minister of health indicated that the implementation of 
such examinations was not planned, but the circular remains in force” See: "Children's Human Rights," in World 
Report 2002 (Human Rights Watch, 2002).  
612“A major breakthrough in Turkish relations with the EU took place at the Helsinki European Council of 
December 1999 which accepted Turkey as a EU candidate country on equal footing with other potential 
candidates. With this decision, Turkey was integrated into the accession strategy, and an accession partnership 
was developed in which the EU listed the short and middle term objectives of Turkey on the basis of the 
Copenhagen criteria. In return, Turkey prepared national programs, which set out the required reforms en-route 
to EU membership and set a timetable for them.” See: Nilay Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural 
Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe? (Norderstedt Germany: GRIN Verlag, 2009), 50-51. 
See also: Amnesty International, "Turkey Amnesty International’s Continuing Concerns and the Eu Accession 
Partnership with Turkey," (2000). 
613Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 
51. 
614“During the reform process, a ‘harmonization package’ came to be the term of reference for draft law 
consisting of a collection of amendments to different laws, designed to amend more than one code or law at a 
time, and which was approved or rejected in a single voting session in Parliament. Using this approach, legislation 
that was not in line with EU standards in such areas as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly or gender 
equality was targeted. Bearing this in mind, the revision of fundamental laws is an ongoing process that 
will continue during the accession negotiations.” See: Egemen Bağış, "Political Reforms in Turkey," ed. Republic 
of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Secretariat General for EU Affairs (Ankara: M&B Tanıtım Hizmetleri ve 
Tic. Ltd, 2007), 4. 
“In order to satisfy the expectations of the EU, and achieve a better future for itself, Turkey has already 
implemented a large number of constitutional amendments and nine legislative harmonisation packages.” See: 
Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 51. 
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the Demirok report,615 along with the first,616 second,617 and third legislative harmonisation 
packages.618 The EU accession process served as a catalyst for this reform process, the JDP 
government clearly stated that all of the reforms were undertaken primarily in the interests of 
the nation, not just to meet Brussels’ expectations. 619 
                                                 
615In July 2000 the DSP-MHP and ANAP coalition government prepared the Demirok-report which represented 
Turkey’s Five Year Plan on the way to democratisation. The Demirok-report set out the necessary political 
reforms to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. In the light of this report, several reforms were undertaken 
by the former government being, the revision of the official law (December 1999), revision of Article 143 of the 
Constitution on the composition of the National Security Council (22 June 1999), revision of Articles 243 and 245 
of the Penal Code in order to increase the penalties for the torture and mistreatment of detainees (1 November 
1999). See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for 
Europe?, 51-52. 
616“The main reform which forming the basis of all the eight legislative harmonisation packages is the 
constitutional reform executed in October 2001. These constitutional changes strengthened the rights and 
freedoms of the individual; especially freedom of expression and freedom of thought. To address the problem 
of torture, the length of time a suspect could be detained before being placed before a judge, was reduced to 
four days, consistent with EU standards.” See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of 
Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 52. 
617“The second harmonisation package was published in October 2001 and came into force on the 15th. March 
2002. It reformed legislation on freedom of the press-, and the rights of individuals to associate together, to 
assemble, and to demonstrate for their rights, and to form political parties to meet the Acquis communautaire. 
It also modified existing national legislation setting out the role of the Security Council, the Constabulary, and 
administration of the provinces.” See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s 
Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 52. 
“The Turkish National Assembly revised in January 2002 the civil law by enabling the women more equality with 
men. The article which accepted men as the patriarch was abolished, the legal marital age was raised both for 
women and men to 18 years (afore 17 for men and 15 for women). Children born to unmarried parents got the 
same rights of inheritance like the others; single parent families gained the right to adopt and raise children.” 
See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 
52-53. 
618“The context of the third harmonisation package, that was approved on the 3rd. August 2002 in Turkish 
National Assembly, was a response to further EU demands. The most important reform of this package was the 
abolition of death penalty (already not enforced for over 20 years) except in time of war and imminent threat 
of war. This was to be consistent with protocol no. 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. With this reform package, freedom of expression and freedom of thought were 
broadened, the laws on associations and foundations were revised, the broadcasting of TV- and radio programs 
were enabled in the mother-tongues of the population, as well as instruction in these languages in private 
schools. Furthermore, the award of prison sentences for breaches of laws controlling press freedoms was 
abolished, and the conditions for acquisition of the real estate property were liberalised, rights to bring lawsuits 
to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against the violation of human rights was facilitated through 
allowing appeals against previously closed general- and criminal cases in the light of the decisions of EctHR and 
the crime of people smuggling was recognised as an offence by the Turkish Penal Code.” See: Baycar, Turkish 
Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 53. 
619M. Ahtisaari et al., "Turkey in Europe: More Than a Promise?," URL (consulted 12 June 2006): 
http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/english.pdf (2004): 19. 
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Within the framework of the fourth harmonisation package, approved on the 2nd 
January 2003620 by the JDP government, several legal provisions on torture and abuse, on 
freedom of opinion, on freedom of the press and freedom of association were reformulated, 
along with the powers of arrest and conditions of detention imposed by the police.621 The law 
on political parties was modified to restrict the government’s powers to ban and close political 
parties.622 Additionally, through an amendment to the law of association, the acquisition of real 
estate property was made easier for non-Muslim foundations.623  
The fifth harmonisation package of 23rd. January 2003 further expanded the right to 
re-open and appeal general and criminal cases to the ECtHR. The re-opening of such cases was 
facilitated in accordance with acquis communautaire624 and legally closed cases were taken 
into the scope of the re-opening provisions. Furthermore, “several amendments were made to 
the law of association.”625 
In December 2002,626 the Copenhagen European Council recognised that Turkey had 
achieved substantial progress in fulfilling the criteria for EU accession (Copenhagen 
criteria).627 However, at that time, the Council pointed out some shortcomings in relation to 
                                                 
620Mesut Yılmaz, Türkei Und Eu. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-
Verlag, 2004), 61. See also: Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 
60. 
621"Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 60. 
622Yılmaz, Türkei Und Eu. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft, 61. 
623Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 60. 
624Acquis communautaire is “a French term meaning, [literally], 'the EU as it is' – in other words, the rights and 
obligations that EU countries share. The 'acquis' includes all the EU's treaties and laws, declarations and 
resolutions, international agreements on EU affairs and the judgments given by the [European] Court of Justice. 
It also includes actions that EU governments take together in the area of 'justice and home affairs' and on the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 'Accepting the acquis' therefore means taking the EU as you find it. 
Candidate countries have to accept the ‘acquis’ before they can join the EU, and make EU law part of their own 
national legislation.” See: 3.Sources of Community legislation, http://elib.kkf.hu/jogaink/data/4.htm 
625Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 62. Cited by: Baycar, 
Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 54. 
“The amendment to Article 82 of the Law on Associations replaced prison sentences with fines for offences such 
as failure to obtain permission for contacts with foreign associations and organizations, failure to fulfill auditing 
obligations and failure to declare real estate holdings.” See: Bağış, "Political Reforms in Turkey," 13. 
626Martti Ahtisaari et al., "Turkey in Europe: The Imperative for Change," (Brussels: Independent Commission on 
Turkey, 2014). 
627Any country seeking membership of the European Union (EU) must conform to the conditions set out in Article 
49 and the principles laid down in Article 6 (1) of the Treaty on European Union. Relevant criteria were 
established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 
1995. 
To join the EU, a prospective Member State must meet three criteria: 
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Turkey’s implementation of its reform legislation. In December 2004628 the European Council 
decided to formally review the reforms made by Turkey to that date. The purpose of the review 
was to ascertain if Turkey had met the Copenhagen political criteria and if it did, to open the 
accession negotiations without delay.629 In order to assist Turkey towards membership of the 
EU, the Accession Partnership was strengthened through the increasing pre-accession financial 
aid and the expansion and deepening of the EU -Turkey Customs Union.  
In response to the EU’s demands, the new Turkish government “dramatically 
accelerated and intensified its reform efforts” emphasising its determination to fulfil the 
membership criteria.630 
The sixth harmonisation package of 12th July 2003631 abolished Article 8 of the anti-
terrorism law632 in order to expand the scope of freedom of thought and freedom of expression. 
Additionally, both private and public TV channels were permitted to broadcast programmes in 
the languages and dialects used in the everyday lives of Turkish citizens. Furthermore, religious 
                                                 
Political, being stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities; 
Economic, being existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union; and 
acceptance of the Community acquis, being the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
For the European Council to decide to open negotiations, the political criterion must be satisfied. 
Any country that wishes to join the Union must meet the accession criteria. The pre-accession strategy and 
accession negotiations provide the necessary framework and instruments. See: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html?locale=en  
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
628Ahtisaari et al., "Turkey in Europe: More Than a Promise?," 14. 
629“The European Council recalled its previous conclusions regarding Turkey, in which, at Helsinki, it agreed that 
Turkey was a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other 
candidate states and, subsequently, concluded that, if it were to decide at its December 2004 meeting, on the 
basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, 
the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.” See: "Presidency Conclusions," 
ed. Brussels European Council (Brussels16/17 December 2004), 4. Available at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/.../en/ec/83201.pdf [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
630See: "Turkey in Europe: More Than a Promise?," 14. 
See also: Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 60. 
631See: "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 60. 
632“Written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the 
indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are forbidden, regardless of the methods, 
intentions and ideas behind such activities. Those conducting such activities shall be punished with a sentence 
of between 2 and 5 years’ imprisonment and with a fine of between 50 million and 100 million Turkish liras.” 
See: F. Stephen Larrabee and Gonul Tol, "Turkey’s Kurdish Challenge," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53, 
no. 4 (2011). 
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freedoms were strengthened through the re-opening of the places of worship of several 
religions.633 Further reforms were also undertaken with respect to the re-opening of closed 
cases of the ECtHR.634 With the abolition of Article 462635 of the Turkish Penal Code, which 
had reduced prison sentences in cases of murder for crimes of passion involving adultery and 
illicit sexual relations, a significant step was taken towards compliance with EU standards.636  
With the seventh harmonisation package of 23rd. July 2003,637 along with the revision 
of the duties and competences of the National Security Council, freedom of thought, freedom 
of expression and the rights of children638 were expanded. 
In the area of human rights, the investigation and prosecution of acts of torture and 
mistreatment were given priority; case proceedings commenced immediately or within 30 days 
of the claim.639 Other reforms included significant restrictions on Military Courts’ judicial 
powers over civilians, greater transparency of public expenditure, and broadening the right to 
establish associations along with the rights of freedom regarding association.640 Also, 
procedures were simplified surrounding faith-based foundations and their interaction with 
offshore groups and organisations.641 Provisions were also introduced to facilitate cultural 
rights and freedoms. 
The constitutional amendments put forward in 2004 by the JDP government included 
provisions to provide harmonisation with EU standards. One amendment gave precedence to 
Turkey’s international agreements, in situations where the international agreement and Turkish 
domestic law conflicted.642 Gender equality before the law was also established in Turkey as a 
                                                 
633See: “Ethnic and Religious Diversity” section of this chapter, in particular “Non-Muslim Minorities and the 
New Law on Foreigners”.  
634Yılmaz, Türkei Und EU. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft, 62. See also: Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der 
Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 60.  
635"Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 60. 
636Ibid., 60-61. 
637Ibid., 61. 
638According to the reform, by children it is understood that they mean people under 18 and the exceptions 
were abrogated under the competence of juvenile courts. See: Yılmaz, Türkei Und EU. Die Suche Nach Einer 
Ehrlichen Partnerschaft, 62. 
639Ibid., 61. 
640These rights are freedom of assembly and freedom of demonstrations (Freiheit von Versammlung und 
Demonstration) amongst others. See: Yılmaz, Türkei Und EU. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft, 62. 
641Ibid. 
642“… International agreements duly put into effect bear the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court 
shall be made with regard to these agreements, on the grounds that they are unconstitutional. In the case of a 
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result of the harmonisation with EU standards.643 The right of the Military (General Staff) to 
nominate a deputy in the Higher Education Committee was abolished.644 The National Security 
Courts were abolished645 and any reference to the death penalty in the Constitution was 
extinguished.646 For the first time, the defence budget became subject to external review by the 
Court of Audit.647 Trial by jury was allowed for accused persons in cases of terrorism.648 
The ninth harmonisation package of 24th July 2004649 abolished the death penalty under 
military jurisdiction, even in wartime,650 extended press freedom,651 and further reduced the 
influence of the Turkish military.652 
To ensure effective implementation of the reforms, the JDP government appointed an 
inter-ministerial working group guided by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs653 to monitor the 
implementation of the reforms including the early detection and resolution of problems 
hindering their delivery.654 To that end, this working group organised regular meetings from 
September 2003,655 made decisions and presented weekly reports to the government.656 
                                                 
conflict between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect 
and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international 
agreements shall prevail. See: M. Hakan Yavuz, "Erbakan'dan Erdoğan'a. Laiklik, Demokrasi, Kürt Sorunu Ve 
İslam" [from Erbakan to Erdoğan. Laicism, Kurdish Problem and Islam], trans. Leman Adalı (İstanbul: Kitap 
Yayınevi, 2011), Translation, 29-30. 
643Yılmaz, Türkei Und EU. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft, 62. See also: “Gender Equality and 
Children’s Rights” section of this chapter. 
644Ibid. 
645Yılmaz, “Türkei Und EU. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft,” 62. 
646Ibid. 
647Ibid. 




652To this end, the military members of the Higher Education Committee and of equivalent committees in 
relation to television and radio, were replaced by civilian members. See: Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen 
Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 61. 
653“Despite the comprehensive and quite radical reforms described previously, some european critics have 
commented that it was not enough to carry out reforms on paper only; that concrete evidence of their effect 
was required. However the [JDP] government remains determined to accelerate the implementation of the 
reforms and has been endeavouring to do so. For this purpose, [the] inter-ministerial work group was 
appointed…” See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity 
for Europe?, 61. 
654Yılmaz, Türkei Und Eu. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft, 63. 
655Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 
61. 
656Yılmaz, Türkei Und EU. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft, 53. 
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Improvements in the freedom of religion for non-Muslims were introduced, inter alia, through 
the efforts of this important body.657  
In relation to fundamental rights and freedoms, the annual progress reports by the 
European Commission 658 identified areas in Turkey’s democratisation process that did not 
meet EU expectations. These areas were human and minority rights, torture and freedom of 
expression.659 However, the EU progress reports also indicated that Turkey possessed the basic 
characteristics of a democratic state.660 
At the Copenhagen European Council meeting in June 1993, the EU set out political 
criteria that were to be met by candidate countries for EU accession. The political criteria 
stipulated that “[candidate] countries must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”,661 in 
order that  formal accession negotiations could begin between Turkey and the EU. In October 
2005, formal accession negotiations commenced between Turkey and the EU. For this 
significant breakthrough I score the JDP government’s democratisation scorecard as a 
significant advance across all ‘characteristics of democracy’. 
Military Tutelage 
As discussed in the chapter on Turkish democracy, the Turkish military had had 
significant control over Turkish politics, having intervened several times in the past including 
the removal of elected governments. In the context of democratisation, the reform of Turkey’s 
military aims to eliminate its role in policy development and law enforcement,662 and as in 
most democratic countries, subordinate its role to the elected government. EU membership has 
                                                 
657In the 2009 National Program, Turkey declared that the status of non-Muslims was improved and these 
improvements had been put into practice. See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of 
Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 61. 
658The European Commission has been publishing annual reports about the progress of candidate countries since 
1998. 
659Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 58. 
In addition, the role of the National Security Council and the size of the Turkish Armed Forces used to be further 
problematic issues addressed by the European Union before the civil-military reforms were undertaken by the 
JDP government, which were already discussed in this thesis. See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural 
Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 51. 
660Gündüz, "Der Einfluss Der Europäischen Union Auf Die Demokratisierung Der Türkei," 58. 
661European Commission, “2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”, 9.10.2002, 15  
662Barın Kayaoğlu, "Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences at the Turn of the 
Millennium. Abingdon and New York by Karabekir Akkoyunlu," (2007): 2. 
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been a force behind the military reforms in Turkey as democratic control of the military is sine 
qua non for EU membership.663  
Since 2002, under the JDP government, the involvement of Turkey’s military 
establishment in Turkey’s politics has been dramatically reduced. With the modification of 
Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, the power of the National Security Council (the ‘NSC’)664 
to draft the national security and foreign policy was abolished;665 the NSC is now an advisory 
body.666 Further, the composition of the NSC was changed, with an increase in the number of 
the civilian members.667 In addition, the Court of Auditors now has the authority to audit the 
accounts and transactions of all types of government organisations, including entities owned 
by the armed forces.668 Further, the reforms have given Turkey’s parliament greater oversight 
of the military.669 
                                                 
663“After the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country, the main criticism of the accession partnership 
document, annual reports and progress reports on Turkey concerned the perceived lack of democratic control 
over the country’s military. The main criticisms of these documents were generally in regards to the institutional 
aspect of democratic control. In this respect, the status of the Chief of the General Staff under the prime 
minister, the role of the National Security Council in Turkish political life and the lack of an effective civilian 
control over the military budget constitute main reform areas.” See:  
Çağrı Yıldırım, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics and European Union Membership Negotiations," 
Balkananalysis (2010), http://www.balkanalysis.com/turkey/2010/12/02/the-role-of-the-military-in-turkish-
politics-and-european-union-membership-negotiations/. [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
664“Turkey's National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, or NSC), formed after the 1960 military coup d'état, 
consists of the president (the chair of the NSC); the prime minister; ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and the 
interior; the chief of the general staff; and commanders of the army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie. Its 
composition and duties are stipulated in Turkey's 1961 constitution. The function of the NSC is to maintain the 
military's position as guardian of the principles of Kemalism within the institutions of the state. Following the 
1980 military coup, the new 1982 constitution not only retained the NSC but also enhanced its powers, 
stipulating, for example, that the cabinet must give priority to NSC recommendations. The military's influence 
on government has proved to be an impediment to Turkey's efforts to become a member of the European Union; 
in order to comply with criteria set forth by the European Union, constitutional amendments in 2001 curtailed 
the role of the military within the NSC. For example, the civilian members of the NSC have been increased, and 
the NSC no longer recommends policies to the cabinet, but rather conveys its views informally.” See: Erik Jan 
Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History revised edition (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010).  
“The duties, powers and functioning of the National Security Council (NSC) have been substantially amended, 
bringing the framework of civil-military relations closer to accepted practice in EU member states. These and 
related measures, including full parliamentary control over military expenditures, should further reduce military 
interference in the political process of the country.” See: Ahtisaari et al., "Turkey in Europe: The Imperative for 
Change," 20. 
665Ibid. 
666“With the seventh harmonisation package of the 23rd. July 2003 the duties and competences of the National 
Security Council ... were revised, so ... it became [solely] an advisory body”. See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The 
Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 55. 
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Military representatives were removed from civilian boards. As part of the sixth 
harmonisation package, the military’s authority over the policies of educational, arts and 
broadcasting institutions was reduced. To this end, the NSC members on the supervisory Board 
of Cinema, Video and Music were withdrawn. Military members on the Higher Education 
Board and the Higher Broadcasting Board were also removed.670  
The Military’s court system was another area of legal reform. Criticism was levelled at 
the excessive powers of the State Security Courts which had been established to try cases 
involving crimes against the security of the state and organised crime. Further, as “one in three 
State Security Court judges were military judges”, the impartiality of the State Security Courts 
was in question.671 Effectively, civilians, at least in part, were tried by military judges; a 
situation not found anywhere in Europe. Thus, “the legal basis for the existence of State 
Security Courts has been removed”.672 Further, in the context of the seventh harmonization 
package,673 the trial of civilians in military courts ceased,674 new provisions were made in 
relation to transparency of public expenditures,675 and “the right to establish associations and 
rights of freedom regarding this matter were broadened.”676 Eventually, the State Security 
Courts were abolished in 2004.677 
                                                 
670Ibid. 
671“According to the Accession Partnership Documents, the European Commission’s main criticism was of the 
excessive power of the State Security Courts that deal with political crime. The Commission also had doubts 
about the impartiality of judges, since one in three State Security Court judges were military judges …”  See: 
Yıldırım, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics and European Union Membership Negotiations". 
672Ibid. 
673The seventh harmonisation package was processed on the 23rd of July 2003 in order to revise the duties and 
competences of the National Security Council. See: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of 
Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 55. 
674Yıldırım, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics and European Union Membership Negotiations". 
675Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 
55. 
676These rights are freedom of assembly and freedom of demonstrations (in German: Freiheit von Versammlung 
und Demonstration) amongst others.  
See: Yılmaz, "Türkei und EU. Die Suche Nach Einer Ehrlichen Partnerschaft", 55. 
677“The judiciary system in Turkey is beset by problems, which undoubtedly have serious consequences for the 
opponents of the regime. This group includes progressive, revolutionary and socialist-minded individuals, who 
constantly find themselves before the Constitutional Court. Laws passed to counter threats to the regime (for 
example, the anti-terrorism law) and the State Security Courts established to deal with such threats have a 
unique function in this area. State Security Courts (SSC) were initially established in 1973, but they were 
abolished by the [Constitutional] Court in 1975. They re-emerged in the aftermath of the 12 September military 
coup. SSCs were founded for a second time on [the 18th of June] 1983 and served the function of maintaining 
the institutional continuity of the repressive regime created by the coup. Therefore, for more than 25 years, 
progressive-democratic-socialist sectors of society in Turkey have waged an effective struggle against them...”  
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Although the JDP democratised civil-military relations in line with the EU accession 
requirements through the afore-mentioned reforms, it remained unclear to what extent these 
reforms would be successful in enforcing full civilian control over Turkey’s military 
establishment. Nevertheless, the reforms were successful in that the former NSC executive is 
now a solely advisory body, defence expenditure is more transparent, and the powers of 
military courts over civilians has been significantly reduced.678 
Notwithstanding the above caveats, the reforms represent a significant advance in the 
democratic underpinnings of the republic in that non-elected officials (the Turkish military) 
now have significantly less unchecked official political authority. This goes to the core of two 
of the basic political principles that I argue in Chapter 2 should underpin a nation state that 
aspires to the democratic ideal: Political representatives that are exclusively appointed from 
‘free, fair and regular elections’, and ‘toleration, cooperation and compromise’. In relation to 
the latter, the Turkish military’s previous political influence, by office and by presence, and its 
security only outlook and long tradition as defender of Turkey’s constitutional secularism could 
not sit well or embrace the democratic values of toleration, cooperation and compromise in 
public affairs. 
Ethnic and Religious Diversity 
The Kurds 
The JDP’s position on the Kurdish issue can be traced back to the Welfare Party’s 1991 
Kurdish Report.679 The report was issued by the Istanbul Division of the Welfare Party when 
Erdoğan was the Division’s Chairman and echoed the wish of Turgut Özal, the then Turkish 
President, to resolve the Kurdish issue politically. Though Özal died in 1993 in office, his party 
                                                 
“The European Court of Human Rights, which Turkey has accepted as having a supervisory authority, has issued 
hundreds of verdicts regarding this judicial practice…”  
For more information see: "State Security Courts-Turkey," (2010), http://iapl.net/index.php/en/third-
congress/75-state-security-courts-turkey. [last accessed on 16.05.2014]. See also: Author’s interview with 
Mustafa Ataş, Istanbul, September 2011. 
678Yıldırım, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics and European Union Membership Negotiations". & 
Uğur Burç Yildiz, "Re-Thinking Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: The Problems of the Democratic Governance of 
the Defense and Security Sectors," Turkish Studies 15, no. 3 (2014). 
679E. Efegil, "Analysis of the AKP Government's Policy toward the Kurdish Issue," Turkish Studies 12, no. 1 (2011): 
30. 
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(ANAVATAN) was supported by the Welfare Party and the latter’s successors, the Virtue 
Party and the JDP.680  
The 1991 Kurdish Report included recommendations to ease military tensions in 
Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia region.681 The report recommended measures to help build 
trust between the State and the Kurdish population in the region. These measures included: 
“the end of punitive measures against local people; ensuring regional economic development; 
the improvement of human rights; development of the Kurdish culture; the establishment of a 
Kurdish institute; the free publication of Kurdish newspapers and journals; the formation of 
local parliaments; decreasing the central government’s powers and, allowing the free use of the 
mother tongue.”682 Calling Southeastern Anatolia “Kurdistan”, the report underlined that an 
exclusive military solution to the Kurdish question was not possible. The use of military options 
had to be combined with the granting of equal political, social and cultural rights to the Kurdish 
population within a fully democratic Turkey.683 
The report is of particular importance since, for the first time in modern Turkish 
political history, it recognised “the existence of a Kurdish question” and offered a direction 
that could bring peace and the promise of a sustainable solution.684 Recognising a political 
problem between two intertwined communities is the first step in resolving it, albeit one of 
many steps that usually get progressively more challenging. 
A review of the JDP strategy towards the Kurdish question indicates that there is no 
“clearly articulated policy”.685 Nevertheless, unlike former Turkish administrations, the JDP 
                                                 
680Ibid., 28. 
681Ibid., 30. 
682"Erdoğan'ın, Erbakan'a Sunduğu Kürt Raporu [Kurdish Report Presented by Erdoğan to Erbakan]," Online 
Bulletin, (2007), http://www.dunyabulteni.net/news_detail.php?id=30433. [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
In this context, “the formation of local parliaments” could be understood as diminishing the role of the central 
government and strengthening the local government system. 
683"Erdoğan'ın, Erbakan'a Sunduğu Kürt Raporu [Kurdish Report Presented by Erdoğan to Erbakan]," Online 
Bulletin, (2007), http://www.dunyabulteni.net/news_detail.php?id=30433. [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
684"Analysis of the AKP Government's Policy toward the Kurdish Issue," 30. 
Erdoğan acknowledges the existence of the Kurdish issue: “… Halkımızın makul, masum, meşru ve mantıklı 
taleplerini görmezden gelmek, duymazdan gelmek, sorumlu bir iktidarin tavrı olamaz. Bir sorunu yok saymak, 
onu yok etmiyor. Gündüz ortasında gözünü kapatan sadece kendisine gece yapar.” See: "Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla 
Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik Ve Kardeşlik Projesi," (Ankara: AK Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı January 
2010), 32. 
685M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Kurdish Question and the AKP," in Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, ed. M. 
Hakan Yavuz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 185.  
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government repeatedly emphasises the “Kurds’ right to express their culture and identity”686 as 
a significant group but within one nation that is Turkey and Turkish. Before coming to power 
in 2002, the JDP emphasised its “opposition to state ideology” and “the use of the military in 
Kurdish populated regions”.687 As Yavuz highlights, JDP members share the following 
common understanding “in the ethnically Kurdish-dominated regions”:688 “We have suffered 
from this Kemalist ideological state and its associated military as much as you Kurds have. 
When we come to power, our first priority will be to redefine the state and deconstruct its 
Kemalist ideology.” 
“While approving of cultural pluralism”, Prime Minister Erdoğan strongly opposed 
“any regional and ethnic separatist movements”689 and made a clear distinction between the 
Kurdish question and “PKK terrorism”. The JDP granted some cultural and political rights to 
the Kurds690 but demanded the disarming of the PKK,691 a necessary requirement for any 
sovereign government in the face of civil war, but also a policy that undermined any excuse 
for the Turkish military to intervene without political authority. The JDP also sought “to 
improve the economic and social conditions of the region” in order to decrease the support for 
political parties sympathetic to Kurdish separatist aspirations692 including the People’s 
Democracy Party (HADEP),693 the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the Peoples’ 
                                                 
686R.K. Polat, "The AKP and the Kurdish Issue: What Went Wrong?," SETA Policy Brief 14 (2008): 1. 
687Yavuz, "The Kurdish Question and the AKP," 185-86. 
688Ibid., 186. 
689Efegil, "Analysis of the AKP Government's Policy toward the Kurdish Issue," 31. 
690These rights can be summarised as follows. 
-All of the hindrances beyond the use of the mother tongue were abolished. 
-Speaking Kurdish during the visits in prisons was allowed. 
-Hindrances beyond speaking Kurdish in public places were extinguished.  
-Giving of Kurdish names to infants was made possible. 
-Important works of the Kurdish language were published by the Culture Ministry of Turkey. 
-Kurdish plays were staged in state theatres. 
-Divisions of the Kurdish language and literature were opened at universities which give students bachelor and 
masters levels of education. 
-The TV Channel TRT Ses was opened which broadcasts in Kurdish 24 hours a day. 
-The emergency state (Turkish: OHAL) was abolished, along with the unsolved cases, extra judicial execution and 
ill-treatment. 
-The damages caused directly by terrorism or by the fight against terrorism for which disadvantaged people 
were compensated whose villages were vacated and burnt. See: ibid. 
These reforms are also summarised in the following official document of the JDP: Larrabee and Tol, "Turkey’s 
Kurdish Challenge," 96-103. 
691Efegil, "Analysis of the AKP Government's Policy toward the Kurdish Issue," 31. 
692Ibid.  
693People’s Democracy Party (Turkish: Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP) was a Kurdish nationalist political party 
in Turkey. The party was formed in May 1994 by Murat Bozlak, a lawyer of Kurdish origin. The party adopted a 
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Democratic Party (HDP).694 The JDP, by seeking to reduce political support for the PKK, 
countered criticism that its policies endangered the unity of the Turkish state without having to 
resort to the undemocratic measure of banning political parties. The JDP took some lessons 
from the British government’s 1995 ‘peaceful’ resolution of the civil war in its Northern Ireland 
province.  
The JDP’s Kurdish policy has also been shaped by the external actors.695 The EU has 
played a transformative role in this process demanding: “to restructure the Kemalist republic 
to open political spaces for the Kurds” and other minorities; to reduce the ten per cent political 
party electoral threshold requirement to allow “the possibility of ethnic Kurdish representation 
in parliament; and, to declare a general amnesty for PKK guerrillas and members.”696 In 
Yavuz’s words, “the issue has been the redefinition of sovereignty and enhancement of local 
municipalities”.697 
Efegil explains the JDP’s position towards the Kurdish issue as follows: 
For the [JDP], Kurdish demands are reasonable, innocent, 
legitimate and plausible. As a result of former faulty 
policies, the Kurds and other groups have become the others 
in Turkey; the question can be solved on the basis of more 
democracy and more freedom for the people.698 
The JDP’s initial policy framework for the Kurds addressed matters relating to Kurds 
as Turkish citizens and, indirectly, addressed issues of human rights that adversely affected 
                                                 
moderate course and kept its distance from the issue of the PKK. See: Christoph Marcinkowski, The Islamic World 
and the West: Managing Religious and Cultural Identities in the Age of Globalisation (Münster: LIT Verlag 2009), 
168.  
See also: Lenore G. Martin, New Frontiers in Middle East Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 140. 
694The Peace and Democracy Party (Turkish: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) was a pro-Kurdish party in Turkey 
that existed between 3 May 2008 and 11 July 2014. The party was succeeded by the Peoples' Democratic Party 
(Turkish: Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, HDP) and Democratic Regions Party (Turkish: Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi, 
DBP), each represented by 1 deputy in the parliament as of 31 December 2014. See: TBMM Website, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/milletvekillerimiz_sd.dagilim [last accessed on 31.12.2014]. 
695These actors are the US and EU. See: Hakan Yavuz, "6 the Kurdish Question and the AKP," in "Secularism and 
Muslim Democracy in Turkey" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 185. 
696Yavuz, "Erbakan'dan Erdoğan'a. Laiklik, Demokrasi, Kürt Sorunu ve İslam [from Erbakan to Erdoğan. Laicism, 
Kurdish Problem and Islam]”, 185. 
697Ibid. 
698Efegil, "Analysis of the AKP Government's Policy toward the Kurdish Issue," 31. 
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many Turkish citizens but disproportionately affected Kurds. In its 2002 general election party 
programme, the JDP pledged to work towards the following goals:  
 To protect the well-being, welfare, rights and freedoms of the Kurdish community. 
 To regard inter-community differences as enriching the whole Turkish community. 
 To encourage multi-cultural activities including broadcasting in languages other than 
Turkish. 
 To abolish practices which adversely impact the public, especially states of 
emergency. 
 To act in a manner that is dissuasive towards criminals but protective towards 
innocent people. 
 To treat the citizen and the citizen’s daily life with respect. 
 To endeavour to eliminate regional economic inequalities. 
 To address the unfair treatment of citizens who suffered during periods of terrorism.  
 To remove the obstacles and practices that encourage terrorism. 
 To make the South Eastern Anatolian region more attractive for economic activity.699 
Since assuming office in 2002, successive JDP governments took steps to achieve the above 
goals, including:700 
 Statutory and regulatory hindrances to the use of minority languages have been 
abolished (2002-2003 & 2008-2009). 
                                                 
699"Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi," 49-50. 
The JDP has worked for all of these purposes under its government, many of the issues were resolved and big 
progress was made in other issues. See: "Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik ve 
Kardeşlik Projesi," 50. 
700For a detailed information about the democratic reforms on the Kurdish issue and timetable for the reforms 
see: Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim Ve Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2012 [the Silent Revolution: 
Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012] (Ankara: Prime Ministry of Republic of 
Turkey. Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security. Democratization Policies Working Group, 2013). 
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 Speaking Kurdish during prison visits is now allowed (2009). 
 Speaking Kurdish in public places is freely allowed (2010). 
 Infants can be registered with Kurdish names (2003). 
 Important works in the Kurdish language have been published by the Turkish 
Ministry of Culture (2010). 
 Kurdish theatrical plays can now be staged in state theatres (2009). 
 University departments have been opened to teach the Kurdish language and Kurdish 
literature providing students with Bachelor and Master’s levels of education (2009). 
 The Kurdish language became an elective course for intermediate and high school 
students (2012).  
 The television channel TRT 6 was opened broadcasting in Kurdish 24 hours a day 
(2009). 
 The State of Emergency (Turkish: OHAL) was lifted, and investigations resumed 
into claims of extra judicial executions, torture and ill-treatment (2002). 
 Claims for compensation were considered in situations where villages had been 
cleared and destroyed as part of the Government’s anti-terrorist actions (2004). 
 
F. Stephan Larrabee and Gonul Tol list the following changes that are required for 
further progress to settle the Kurdish issue at the constitutional level: “first, recognition and 
safeguarding of education in Kurdish...”; “second, amendment of the definition of citizenship 
based on the ‘Turkish’ ethnic identity and its replacement with a constitutional citizenship that 
stands at an equal distance to all ethnic identities; and third, the empowerment of local 
administration.”701 
The Kurdish issue has had a significant impact on Turkey’s internal and external 
policies over the past twenty years. The JDP government’s initial military response between 
                                                 
701Larrabee and Tol, "Turkey’s Kurdish Challenge," 150. 
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March and May 2011 to the PKK’s resumption of terrorism led to a halt in reforms for Kurds, 
as well as wider political freedoms and human rights; this initial military response to domestic 
terrorism reduced Turkey’s democratisation progress.702 
The JDP government and the wider political elite recognised the deep and complex 
nature of the Kurdish issue. This recognition can be summed up as: The Kurdish issue is 
essentially a political problem and can only be effectively resolved by measures that address 
the political, economic and social roots of Kurdish grievances. The issue is part of the broader 
issue of internal democratisation and constitutional reform in Turkey.703 
The JDP government organised frequent talks with the leaders of Iraq’s Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) in a cooperative effort to eliminate “PKK terrorism”.704 Also, in 
the European Commission’s 2009 Report on Turkey, it is clearly stated that the visit of 
President Gül to Iraq and Turkish rapprochement with the leaders of the KRG created a positive 
environment for a solution to existing problems.705 Further, the JDP government’s South-East 
Anatolia Project (GAP) aims to contribute to the region’s “economic growth, social stability, 
export promotion and socio economic development”706 through “additional resources and 
investments on irrigation, road, transport, health and education”.707 The JDP believes that 
economic progress will assist the undermining of terrorism as a solution.708  
In its 2011 Progress Report on Turkey, the European Commission raised the following 
concerns about the Kurdish issue:709 the large number of legal actions initiated by the JDP 
                                                 
702Yavuz, "Erbakan'dan Erdoğan'a. Laiklik, Demokrasi, Kürt Sorunu Ve İslam" [from Erbakan to Erdoğan. Laicism, 
Kurdish Problem and Islam], 206.  
703Larrabee and Tol, "Turkey’s Kurdish Challenge," 145. 
704Mahir Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Istanbul: Economic Development Foundation 2010), 33. 
705European Commission, COM (2009) 533, Turkey 2009 Progress Report, 2009, Brussels,  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf  
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
706"Official Gap Website. Objectives of Gap," http://Www.Gap.Gov.Tr/About-Gap/Objectives-of-Gap. and 
http://www.gap.gov.tr/about-gap/objectives-of-gap [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
707Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 33. 
708Serkan Yolaçan and TESEV, "A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the 
Region for the Government," ed. Laurie Freeman (Istanbul, 2008): 7. 
709“… The judiciary issued contradictory decisions in court cases against Kurdish politicians and human rights 
defenders. In May 2011, the Doğubayazıt Criminal Court sentenced the former Mayor of Doğubayazıt and 
members of the municipal council for violating the Law on the use of Turkish letters by naming a park in Kurdish 
back in 2007. 
Restrictions are still reported on the use of Kurdish in prisons, during visits and exchanges of letters.” See: 
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government “against writers and journalists writing on the Kurdish issue”; the on-going 
“pressure on newspapers which report on the Kurdish question or publish in Kurdish”; and, the 
conviction of the “left-wing and Kurdish journalists” for disseminating terrorist propaganda.710 
In the 2012 Progress Report, the European Commission stated that debates on cultural 
rights and education in mother tongues were ongoing,711 but though there had been progress in 
cultural rights, the use of languages other than Turkish was limited.712 The report highlighted 
the incentives package713 which aimed at increasing investment in the least developed regions 
to reduce regional disparities.714 In relation to terrorism, the report noted the continued 
abduction of security forces’ personnel and civilians and the increase in terrorist attacks by the 
PKK.715 However, the Commission’s report concluded that there had been no substantive 
progress to a conclusive solution of the Kurdish issue.716 
As opposed to its 2011 and 2012 Progress Reports, the European Commission’s 2013 
Progress Report on Turkey made mostly positive comments on the JDP’s policies related to 
the Kurdish question. In the report, the European Commission welcomed “[the devolution of 
powers] to local governments” and the Peace Process in the Southeast.717 The Report further 
emphasized that Turkey made progress in terms of granting cultural rights such as “the right of 
the accused to use a language of their preference other than Turkish at certain stages of judicial 
proceedings” and “education in languages and dialects other than Turkish in private 
                                                 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper: Turkey 2011 Progress Report, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-
2012, COM (2011) 666, 12.10.2011, SEC (2011) 1201, 2911, 40, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf  
[last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
710Ibid.,25. 
711European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2012," Commission Staff Working Document (2012): 
32. 
712Ibid., 33. 
713Incentives package is known as ‘Teşvik Paketi’ in Turkey. 
714Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2012," 33. 
715Ibid., 34. 
716“Overall, there was no progress towards a solution as regards the Kurdish issue. Terrorist attacks intensified, 
as did military operations. The detention of elected politicians and human rights defenders gives rise to serious 
concerns. In incidents such as the Uludere killings of civilians, calls on the authorities for effective and swift 
investigation and a transparent public inquiry have not been met. The truth about extra-judicial killings and 
torture in the south-east in the 1980s and 1990s has yet to be established following the due process of law. The 
statute of limitations deadline will soon bring an end to judicial investigations on past crimes, without result. 
Landmines and the village guard system are still causes for concern.” See: Commission, "EU Progress Report on 
Turkey 2012," 34. 
717"EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," Commission Staff Working Document (2013): 8&15. 
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schools”.718 However, the absence of a “general right to mother-tongue education” and “[the 
restriction of] the use of languages other than Turkish” by legislation remained subject to 
criticism by the European Commission.719  
The EU Commission’s 2014 Progress Report on Turkey acknowledges that there have 
been positive developments recently in relation to the Kurdish issue and recognises the JDP’s 
Democratisation Package as an effective tool in the democratic solution of the issue.720 
The Alevis 
The Alevi issue emerged as a result of the restrictive policies pursued by the Turkish 
state and its unwillingness to recognise officially the Alevi identity. Alevis, a large religious 
sectarian minority representing approximately 13-20% of Turkey’s population,721 expressed 
their concerns about three forms of political marginalisation by the state:722 The Religious 
Affairs Directorate (DIB),723 mandatory religious instruction in schools and discrimination in 
government employment positions. 
The Religious Affairs Directorate (DIB) in Turkey solely represents the Hanafi School 
of Law of Sunni Islam.724 All the other Schools of Islamic Law including Alevism (a Shi’ite 
                                                 
718Ibid., 14-15. 
719Ibid. 
720“EU Progress Report on Turkey 2014," Commission Staff Working Document (2014), 
ec.europa.eu/.../pdf/key.../2014/20141008-turkey-progress-report_en.pdf [last accessed on 18.02.2016]. 
721According to Al Jazeera, “[an] estimated 10 to 15 million people in Turkey, a country of 76 million, belong to 
the Alevi sect. A 2012 research report by [Sabahat] Akkiraz, an MP of the CHP, estimated that there were 12.5 
million Alevis in Turkey.” See: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/turkey-guilty-religious-
discrimination-2014123105736700367.html [last accessed on 18.02.2016]. 
722Umut Uras, "Turkey 'Guilty of Religious Discrimination'," News Article, (2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/turkey-guilty-religious-discrimination-
2014123105736700367.html. [last accessed on 18.02.2016]. 
See also: Rostom Mahmoud, "The Alevi Issue in Turkey," (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, April 
2012), 2-4. 
723The Religious Affairs Directorate is also known as the Department for Religious Affairs or Presidency of 
Religious Affairs. In Turkish it is called Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB).  
“This department controls and administers the mosques, employs the religious functionaries employed there, 
arranges the official Quran courses and [dictates] the nationwide distribution of the texts of the [preachers], on 
Fridays. Furthermore, it presents to Muslims the ‘religious guidance on conducting their everyday lives’, 
manages the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and publishes numerous religious books and pamphlets.” See: Baycar, 
Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 72-73. For 
more information on the duties and roles of the DIB, visit the following official website: 
 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
724Ibid., 73. 
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sect within Islam) are considered unofficial.725 The DIB does not offer funds to religious 
institutions other than those of Sunni Muslims.726 Alevis are displeased with the taxes collected 
for the funding of the DIB by the state as this institution does not employ Alevi preachers and 
disregards their interests.727 However, Deputy Prime Minister, Bekir Bozdağ (6 July 2011 to 
29 August 2014), emphasised that most of the existing Alevi places of social gathering and 
worship (cemevis) were established during the JDP’s terms in government.728 The JDP 
government recognises the cemevis as cultural centres rather than worship venues.729 Although 
the JDP government does not formally recognise cemevis as worship venues, the JDP leaders 
“have given implicit recognition, by visiting cemevis including a visit by President Abdullah 
Gül to a cemevi in the predominantly Alevi city Tunceli in 2009.”730 The JDP leaders justify 
the refusal of cemevis as places of worship stating that Alevism is a sect within Islam, and there 
is a single worship venue in Islam which is not the cemevi but the mosque.731 They do not 
refuse to grant a legal status to cemevis,732 but believe that offering the cemevis worship status 
will lead to separatist movements within Islam. In this regard, Hayrettin Karaman, a columnist 
of the Yeni Şafak newspaper, states:  
The demands that Alevis have long been making should be 
divided into two main categories: (1) the demands which 
are directly related to the issue and which aim to settle it 
and give relief to the Alevis, and (2) the demands which are 
                                                 
725Ibid. 
726"A Quest for Equality: Minorities in Turkey," (Minority Rights Group International [MRG], 2007), 21. 
727Mahmoud, "The Alevi Issue in Turkey," 3. 
Nevertheless, the JDP government initiated a project in the year 2011 to employ 1000 meles (local clergymen), 
some of whom belong to the Caferi branch of Alevism, to serve in some East Anatolian cities such as Iğdır and 
Ardahan, from 2012. Those meles were bound to and integrated into the DIB by a contract under 4-B insurance 
category. Here, however, it is important to note that the meles’ employment by the DIB was a one-off 
application. See: Nuray Babacan, "Diyanet’te ‘Mele’ Dönemi ['Mele' Period at the Directorate General for 
Religious Affairs]," Hürriyet, 12 December 2011. See also: Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim Ve 
Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2012 [the Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation 
Inventory 2002-2012], 108.; The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 
2002-2012, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Prime Ministry of Republic of Turkey. Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security. 
Democratization Policies Working Group, 2013), 110. 
728“The deputy prime minister stated that there were 106 cemevis before 1990 and that the number rose to 163 
between 1990 and 2000. ‘Since that period we have n a total of 329 cemevis established. This means the most 
cemevis were established during our party’s term in government.’” See: "329 Cemevis Established under AK 
Party, Says Deputy PM," Today's Zaman 7 January 2013.  
729BBC 19 Mar. 2008; HRWF 26 July 2006; US 14 Sept. 2007, Sec. II Cited by: "Turkey: Situation of Alevis (2005- 
May 2008)," ed. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (27 May 2008). 
730"329 Cemevis Established under AK Party, Says Deputy PM." 
731Ibid. 
See also: Author’s interview with JDP deputy Ayhan Sefer Üstün, Ankara, September 2011. 
732"329 Cemevis Established under AK Party, Says Deputy PM." 
  
   167 
 
not directly related to the solution of the issue because they 
are tainted by political or ideological motivations and 
which undermine the rights or freedoms of other groups. 
If Alevis do not stop making their demands which fall into 
the second category, the Alevi issue will continue to exist. 
‘Cemevis should be recognized as Alevis places of 
worship’, they say. But, we should note that claiming that 
Alevis are Muslims on one hand and searching for other 
places of worship for Alevis on the other is not only a 
contradiction, but also an implicit declaration of seeking 
separation.733 
 
In withholding official recognition, the JDP may be addressing, by subterfuge, 
Karaman’s ‘second category of Alevis demands’. If this is the case, the subterfuge itself, no 
official recognition of Alevi places of worship because of separate location and different name, 
has little to commend it. Islam and Christianity, with their various sects, have rigid separation 
of places of worship for each sect within each faith, albeit commonly called mosques and 
churches, respectively. For the Alevis, the name (cemevi) is the only outward point of 
difference and “what’s in a name?”734 
The Alevis’ second claim to marginalisation states that mandatory school religious 
instruction in Turkey solely teaches Sunni Islam to the exclusion of other sects or religions, 
including the Alevis.735 The ECtHR emphasised that religious convictions of parents must be 
respected in teaching religion in schools.736 Similarly, in March 2008, the Turkish Council of 
State decided that mandatory religious instruction is illegal, religion should be taught in an 
objective and pluralistic manner, and the religious and philosophical convictions of parents 
must be respected.737 This decision was insufficient to satisfy the expectations of the Alevi 
citizens mainly because the religious instruction at secondary schools remains mandatory 
although as in other fields, recently, there has been remarkable progress in regards to Alevis in 
Turkey. In the new secondary school curriculum of 2007-2008 academic year there are 
                                                 
733Hayrettin Karaman, "Alevi Meselesi [the Alevi Issue]," Yeni Şafak, 22 November 2009. Translation taken from: 
"The Alevi Issue," (2009), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-193667-the-alevi-issue.html  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
734Juliet: "What's in a name? That which we call a rose/ By any other name would smell as sweet." 
Romeo and Juliet (II, ii, 1-2), William Shakespeare. 
735Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 30. 
736Hasan & Eylem Zengin v. Turkey. 
737"Danıştay: Zorunlu Din Dersi Hukuksuz (Turkish Council of State: Mandatory Religious Instruction Is Illegal)," 
(NTVMSNBC, 4 March 2008). 
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references to Alevis, however, a revision of the Turkish curriculum is still required to adopt a 
more comprehensive approach for religions other than Sunni Islam .738 A section about the 
Alevi belief system was incorporated into new religious education textbooks.739 In support of 
the Alevis’ demands, the ECtHR ruled in 2007 and 2014 that religious instruction should not 
be mandatory at Turkish secondary schools.740 Within the framework of the ‘Alevi 
Opening’,741 which is a part of the JDP’s Democratic Opening initiative, the first Alevi Institute 
was opened in December 2008 and several workshops were organised to openly discuss 
problems and expectations of Alevis.742 Whilst the state does not recognise the cemevis as place 
of worship, three municipal councils have already done so.743 Moreover, “administrative courts 
in Antalya, Ankara and Istanbul ruled that the Alevi students should be exempted from 
attending the mandatory religion and ethics course.”744 
Thirdly, Alevis express concern about their inadequate representation in the state’s 
legislature, executive and judiciary , and more specifically, their inadequate representation in 
the administrative leaderships of the departments of state, the judiciary and the military.745 
There is only one JDP deputy of Alevi origin in parliament and not one provincial governor in 
Turkey’s 81 provinces.746 The last Alevi Minister of Justice held office between July 1994 and 
October 1995.747 The JDP has not addressed this issue and Alevi representation in the organs 
of the Turkish state “remains unfair and inequitable.”748 
                                                 
738Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 30. See also: Gökhan Özdağ, "Danıştay’dan Emsal Din Dersi Kararı 
[Council of State's Precedent Decision on the Religious Lesson]," Bugün Gazetesi [Bugün Newspaper], 4 July 
2013. 
739Kerim Balcı and Burak Kılıç, "‘Alevism Made Part of Curriculum So Sunnis Can Learn’," Today's Zaman 10 April 
2009. 
740Işık Tüzün, "Zorunlu Din Dersi Ve Aİhm Kararı [Mandatory Religious Instruction and Ecthr Decision]," Article, 
(2014), http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/zorunlu-din-dersi-ve-aihm-karari [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
741See: “Democratic Opening Initiative” section of this chapter.  
742Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 30. 
743Ibid. 
744Likewise, it is not mandatory for non-Muslim students to attend obligatory religious culture and ethics course. 
See: Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 30. See also: European Commission, "EU Progress Report on 
Turkey 2009," Commission Staff Working Document (2009): 21. 
745Mahmoud, "The Alevi Issue in Turkey," 4. 
746This deputy is İbrahim Yiğit who was elected from Istanbul. The JDP, which has been in power since November 
2002, has more than 300 representatives in Turkish parliament. See: Mahmoud, "The Alevi Issue in Turkey," 4. 
747It was Mehmet Moğultay who acted as Justice Minister for the period between 27 July 1994 and 5 October 
1995.  
748Mahmoud, "The Alevi Issue in Turkey," 4. 
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In order to address their complaints and improve their rights, the JDP government 
initiated a dialogue with the Alevis. The initiative was named the ‘Alevi opening’. Discussions, 
within a formal framework, took place “among intellectuals, Alevi community leaders, 
academics and politicians” but came to an end on 30 January 2010. Although all parties to the 
process mutually and genuinely declared their goodwill and prepared several preliminary 
reports, the initiative lacked of a “conclusive strategy towards the problems of this ethno-
religious community”. As a result, the JDP government was “accused of being too slow and 
even hypocritical” in responding to the needs and demands of the Alevi community.749  
Non-Muslim Minorities and the New Law on Foreigners 
In contrast to the official religious toleration of the Ottoman Empire,750 minorities 
within Turkey have been regarded as a “problem” throughout the relatively short history of the 
Republic, and a threat to the “purity” of the Turkish nation.751 As a result of this negative view, 
minorities have been exposed to discrimination by the State since its inception.752 The term 
“minority” in Turkey is commonly associated with non-Muslim communities,753 a definition 
set out in the Lausanne Treaty.754 Accordingly, of the main minorities in Turkey, only Greek 
and Armenian Christians, and Jews, fell under the protection of the Treaty.755 
Turkey, as a secular country, prohibits by law discrimination based on religion. In its 
2012 Progress Report on Turkey, the European Commission underlined that “freedom of 
                                                 
749See: Ulusoy, “The ‘Democratic Opening’ in Turkey: A Historical/Comparative Perspective”, 85-86.  
750For more information, see: Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 27-28. 




754“Treaty of Lausanne, (1923), final treaty concluding World War I. It was signed by representatives of Turkey 
(successor to the Ottoman Empire) on one side and by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) on the other. The treaty was signed at Lausanne, Switz., on 
July 24, 1923, after a seven-month conference.” For more information see: "Treaty of Lausanne ", in 
Encyclopædia Britannica (2013). Available at:  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/332502/Treaty-of-Lausanne [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
“Articles 38 to 45 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty cover the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Article 39 
expressly states, ‘non-Muslim religious minorities are subject to the same civil and political rights as Muslims, 
and all citizens of Turkey are equal before the law regardless of religion.” See: Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present 
and Future, 28. 
755"World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Turkey: Overview," (November 2011), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,MRGI,,TUR,4954ce3fc,0.html [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
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worship continues to be generally respected”,756 but Turkey’s approach to minority rights was 
quite restrictive.757 Further, some aspects of religious freedom are still subject to criticism,758 
most prominently property rights of non-Muslim communities.759 
The Democratisation Process and recent legislative changes in this area have 
contributed to an improvement of minority rights in Turkey. The most recent amendment of 
Foundations Law (No.5737), which came into force on February 28, 2008,760 is meant to ease 
the situation concerning property rights of non-Muslim minorities.761 The law was further 
amended in August 2011.762 Before the revision, religious communities - including the Muslim 
community - did not have legal status in their own right and, as a consequence, did not have 
the right “to own property in their own name”.763 The revised Foundations Law permits the 
community foundations of non-Muslim citizens to make application for recovery of seized 
properties, “if they are still in the hands of the state” and allows Muslim and non-Muslim 
foundations to receive foreign funding.764 It also allows non-Muslim foundations to “‘engage 
in international activities and opportunities for cooperation, establish branches and 
representation offices abroad, set up umbrella organizations and become members of 
                                                 
756Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2012," 24. The former 2011 Progress Report also mentions about 
that point, see: "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2011," Commission Staff Working Document (2011): 28. 
757See: "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2012," 24. 
758“Non-Muslim communities—as organised structures of religious groups—continued to face problems due to 
their lack of legal personality, with adverse effects on property rights, access to justice, the ability to obtain 
work, residence permits for foreign clergy and fundraising. The relevant 2010 Council of Europe Venice 
Commission recommendations have yet to be implemented.”  
See: "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2012," 24-25. 
759“Successive court decisions in [the] 1970’s recognized the 1936 property declarations as acts of foundations. 
At that time minority issues and rights were perceived as a threat to security, independence and national 
sovereignty of Turkey, especially because of historical evolution of the state and its relations with its non-Muslim 
citizens. Consequently, some property acquired by foundations of non-Muslim communities after 1936 were 
either returned to previous owners or taken over by the [State] …” See: Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and 
Future, 28. 
760Yunus Emre Özer, "Vakıflar Kanunu [Foundations Law]," (2008), 10243. 
761Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 28. 
Real estate property was returned to non-Muslim minority congregations; acquiring and disposing of real estate 
was made easier for non-Muslim minorities through amendments to the Law on Foundations and related 
regulations in 2008. Further, the obligation to seek “permission from the Council of Ministers to register real 
estate property under the name of a community” was abrogated and “the application [time] period granted to 
community foundations for registering real property, identified as those that the foundation can dispose of, was 
extended from six months to 18 months”. Further, under the amended law, “a large number of properties were 
registered [automatically] as community foundations upon their application”. See: The Silent Revolution: 
Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 77&79-80. 
762Çiğdem Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition) (Istanbul: Economic 
Development Foundation, 2012): 40. 
763Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 28. 
764Ibid., 40. 
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organizations established abroad’”, provided that their governing charter (vakıf senedi) makes 
reference to these activities.765 
The positive changes towards non-Muslim minorities reflected the new inclusive 
approach taken by the JDP government since it first took office. In confirming this new 
approach, the Office of Prime Minister stated that citizens belonging to religions other than 
Islam are an inseparable part of the Turkish nation. The 2010 circular went on to instruct all 
public institutions to avoid or minimise minor bureaucratic difficulties encountered by non-
Islamic citizens, and reminded government officials not to violate the constitutional rights of 
non-Muslim minorities.766  
The 2010 official circular was preceded and followed by tangible reforms and actions 
taken by the JDP government in relation to non-Muslim minorities, including: 
 The return of the Büyükada Orphanage to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in 
late November 2010,767 as well as over 180 other properties to community 
foundations through a Decree on property return or compensation dated 27 
August 2011.768 
 Legal recognition, for the first time ever, of a Christian Protestant church opened 
in August 2006,769 although there had been resistance from the judiciary and 
provincial governors to the building of churches and synagogues.770  
                                                 
765Ibid., 28-29. 
766See: Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim Ve Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2012 [the Silent Revolution: 
Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012], 78. See also:  
The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 80. 
767Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 40. 
See also: Achilles G. Adamantiades and Archon Protector of Letters, "The Status and Issues of the Greek-
Orthodox Minority in Turkey," in 2013 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (Warsaw, Poland: The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], 2013), 3. 
768Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 40. 
“The Decree is dated 27‐August‐2011 but the announcement by P.M. Erdoğan was made on 28‐August‐2011.” 
See: Adamantiades and Letters, "The Status and Issues of the Greek-Orthodox Minority in Turkey," 3. 
769Tebernüş Kireççi, "Türk Kilisesi Açıldı [the Turkish Church Was Opened]," Milliyet, 31 August 2006.  
770Karaosmanoğlu, "Reimagining Minorities in Turkey: Before and after the Akp," 203. 
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 Existing churches and synagogues were granted “‘places of worship’ status” as 
early as 2003 under the first JDP government.771  
 The Higher Council of Minorities (Azınlıklar Tali Komisyonu), whose task had 
been to monitor non-Muslim minorities activities for many years, was abolished 
in 2004.772  
 In July 2008, Parliament passed an amendment which exempted churches and 
synagogues (as places of worship) from municipal electricity and water charges, 
bringing them in to line with mosques.773 
 In July 2011, following its restoration, the Surp Giragos Church in Diyarbakır 
was opened to worship, and the Vortvoks Vorodman Church, owned by the 
Kumkapı Virgin Mary Church and School Foundation, was opened in December 
2011.774 
 ‘Democratic’ reforms in education included the publication of text books by the 
Ministry of Education in the Armenian language; these text books have been 
distributed free of charge since the 2010-2011 school-year.775  
 The financial viability of the non-Muslim owned press was assisted in 2012 
when the Press Association’s General Board allowed the placement of official 
government announcements in such publications.776  
                                                 
771B. Ali Soner, "The Justice and Development Party's Policies Towards Non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey," Journal 
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (2010): 29. 
772Ibid. 
773Mosques, churches and synagogues were already recognized as places of worship through the 2003 
amendment. See: "Meclis Genel Kurulunda Yasada Değişiklik Yapıldı: Artık Sadece Camiler Değil, Kilise ve 
Havralar Da Elektrik Parasından Muaf Olabilir," (2008). 
774Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim Ve Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2012 [the Silent Revolution: 
Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012], 78. See also: The Silent Revolution: 
Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 81. 
775Ibid. 
776For that purpose, a Greek publishing firm started to operate on the 4th of June, 2012. See: Sessiz Devrim: 
Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim Ve Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2012 [the Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic 
Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012], 78. See also: The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic 
Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 81. 
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Yet there are still some critical issues concerning non-Muslim minorities which remain 
unresolved. These include “the use of the title ‘Ecumenical’ for the Patriarch”,777 “the problem 
of the Greek Orthodox seminary of Halki”,778 and “[the] religious education of the Greek 
Orthodox community as being under the monopoly of the state”.779 In this context, Turkey was 
criticised in the 2010 report on minorities prepared by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE), along with Greece.780 In that report, the hold-up of reform progress, 
due to the continuing use of the reciprocity principle between Turkey and Greece, was 
underlined as a matter of concern.781 The reciprocity principle was used by the then Prime 
Minister Erdoğan as a response to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew’s complaint 
about the status of the Theological School of Halki (Turkish: Heybeliada) when the former 
insisted on opening of a mosque in Athens.782  
Prime Minister Erdoğan criticised the past Kemalist policies on, and campaigns against, 
non-Muslim minorities stating: “That was the outcome of [the] fascistic approach”.783 When 
                                                 
777“Some controversial issues remain with regard to the Greek minority and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in 
Turkey. These are the issue concerning the use of the term ‘Ecumenical’ by the Patriarch and the status of the 
Greek Orthodox seminary of Halki. Turkey does not recognize the use of the title ‘ecumenical’ by the Greek 
Orthodox Patriarchate. In June 2007 the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the use of the Ecumenical 
title in relation with the Patriarchate would be against the principle of equality enshrined in the Constitution as 
it would mean granting a special status to a portion of the population. The decision is highly controversial and 
the opposition [to it] mainly arises out of the Court of Appeals’ competence to rule on religious matters. Except 
for this political dispute, the fact that most of the Orthodox Christian Churches in other countries do not 
recognize the Ecumenical status of the Patriarch makes the issue more controversial. This title creates a dispute 
between the Patriarchate in Istanbul and the one in Russia too.” See: Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future 
(Revised and Updated Second Edition), 40. 
778“The other controversial issue concerns the Halki seminary established for the education of [Greek] Orthodox 
clerics. Before it was closed down, the seminary was primarily concerned with educating Greek Orthodox priests. 
The seminary was shut down as a side effect of the 1971 law prohibiting private universities. Since then, 
dwindling numbers of the Greek Orthodox population in general and its clerics in particular called for the 
reopening of the seminary. Yet the seminary still remains closed due to legal loopholes and bureaucratic barriers. 
Religious education is under the monopoly of the state in Turkey and defendants of the current position argue 
that if the seminary started functioning again, the Greek Orthodox community would be the only religious group 
in Turkey to have its own autonomous institution for religious education and this would be contrary to principles 
of secular public education...” See: Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second 
Edition), 41. 
779Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 29. 
780"Avrupa Konseyi'nden Türkiye Ve Yunanistan'a Azınlık Ödevleri [Homework on Minorities for Turkey and 
Greece from European Council]," (Bianet). 
781Ibid. 
“Today, the so-called principle of reciprocity can hardly support a legitimate argument to be used against rights 
on equal citizenship and human rights and liberties in general. However, as a rhetorical tool, its popularity does 
not fade away in time.” See: Karaosmanoğlu, "Reimagining Minorities in Turkey: Before and after the AKP," 203. 
782"Ben Okul Diyorum Başbakan Cami [I Say School and Prime Minister Says Mosque]," Habertürk, December 19 
2009. 
783Roni Marguiles, "Faşizan Bir Yaklaşım [a Fascistic Approach]," Taraf 2009. 
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the Prime Ministere visited Büyükada in the Summer of 2009, he promised to deal with the 
problems of non-Muslim minorities living in Turkey.784 In 2009, the then Minister of National 
Education, Hüseyin Çelik (March 2003-May 2009), gave the green light for the re-opening of 
the Theological School of Halki, but as part of the Ministry of National Education.785 In an 
interview for the daily newspaper, Zaman, in February 2010, the then Minister of National 
Education, Nimet Çubukçu (May 2009-July 2011), also underlined the need for the 
implementation of unconditional and unilateral policies for non-Muslim minorities’ problems: 
The era of the Lausanne Treaty was a time when minorities 
were not accorded many rights; these were conventions 
defining minimum rights. We cannot base ourselves on a 
human rights philosophy that still remains within that 
framework. We are now in the 21st century. We are in an 
entirely different world. I find it very bizarre that some 
circles have anxieties about minorities. As I said, I find this 
very difficult to understand.786 
In spite of good intentions, there is a lot of work that needs to be done in terms of 
minority rights in Turkey. In the 2012 Progress Report on Turkey,787 the European Commission 
underlined that Turkey’s approach to minorities remains restrictive although dialogue between 
the government and minorities continues in relation to protection of minorities and their 
cultural rights. The report emphasised that Turkey did not sign some of the relevant 
international treaties and covenants or was chary of those treaties. The report also pointed out 
that Turkey should adopt a comprehensive approach to minorities based on tolerance, security 
and participation, adding that mechanisms should be created in order to combat racism, 
xenophobia and anti-semitism. Further, the report’s conclusion stated that, for the Turkish 
government, some critical issues remain unresolved.788 
                                                 
784Markar Esayan, "Aram Tigran, Dink, Norşen ve İçimizdeki O Yüzde Yirmibeş [Aram Tigran, Dink, Norşen and 
That Twenty Five Percent inside Us]," ibid., 17 August 2009.  
785Karaosmanoğlu, "Reimagining Minorities in Turkey: Before and after the AKP," 204. 
786Nimet Çubukçu, "Anxieties over Minorities Must Be Eliminated," Agos, 21 February 2010. 
The current Minister of National Education is Nabi Avci who has been in office since 25 January 2013. See: Official 
Website of Turkish Ministry of National Education, 
http://www.meb.gov.tr/meb/bakan/ozgecmis.html [last accessed on 08.08.2014]. 
For the list of Ministers of National Education and their terms of office see also: 
http://www.meb.gov.tr/meb/index3.html [last accessed on 08.08.2014]. 
787European Commission, Turkey 2012 Progress Report, 24. 
788“Turkey’s approach to minorities remains restrictive, although for the first time representatives of minority 
groups, not limited to those minorities officially recognised by Turkey, were invited to Parliament to express 
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Another step forward in Turkey’s democratic development has been the approval of the 
new Turkish law on foreigners which includes “key elements of international humanitarian and 
human rights law”.789 The new law is considered “an important advancement for international 
protection [of foreigners]” and has been welcomed by the UN refugee agency790 and the 
European Union.791 This law is also an important step in Turkey’s transformation and 
regulation of asylum and migration since the ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention.792 
The new law regulates the entry, exit and stay of migrants in Turkey, assures 
international protection for asylum seekers in the country, and brings major changes to the 
main part of the current foreigners’ law.793 As a result, “the Law on Sojourn and Movement of 
Foreigners in Turkey”794 was abolished, the law surrounding passports was significantly 
amended, and “the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners”795 was amended in accordance with 
European and international standards.796 According to the new law, foreigners and 
                                                 
their views on a new Constitution. Full respect and protection of language, culture and fundamental rights in 
accordance with European standards has yet to be achieved. Turkey needs to take a comprehensive approach 
and make further efforts to enhance tolerance, security and promote inclusiveness vis-à-vis minorities. Existing 
legislation needs to be revised, comprehensive legislation to combat discrimination needs to be introduced and 
protection mechanisms or specific bodies to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance need to 
be established. Relevant Covenants and Conventions should be applied.” See: Conclusions on Turkey (extract 
from the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council "Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013", COM(2012)600 final), 4. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/tr_conclusions_2012_en.pdf  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
789"Turkish Law on Protection of Foreigners Wins Un Praise," UN News Centre, 12 April 2013. 
790“UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Spokesperson Melissa Fleming told a news briefing in Geneva, 
stressing that High Commissioner António Guterres welcomes it as a reflection of Turkey’s strong commitment 
to humanitarian values and principles.” See: "Turkish Law on Protection of Foreigners Wins Un Praise," UN News 
Centre, 12 April 2013. 
791“The European Union has welcomed a new Turkish law on foreigners and international protection, hailing the 
move by the Turkish Parliament as a ‘clear sign’ of Turkey's efforts to establish a sound legal and institutional 
framework for migration and asylum. 
A joint statement released by EU commissioners Stefan Füle and Cecilia Malmström on Friday [the 5th of April, 
2013] said the European Commission welcomes the adoption by the Turkish Parliament of the law on foreigners 
and international protection. It added that this law and the institutions that it provides for indicate Turkey's clear 
commitment to build an effective migration management system in line with EU and international standards.” 
See:  
Mehmet Kaman, "EU Welcomes New Turkish Law on Foreigners," Today's Zaman, 5 April 2013. Available at: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-311762-eu-welcomes-new-turkish-law-on-foreigners.html  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
792Cavidan Soykan, "The New Draft Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey," Oxford Monitor 




796Kaman, "EU Welcomes New Turkish Law on Foreigners." 
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internationally protected persons cannot be deported back to countries where they could be 
exposed to “torture, inhumane treatment or humiliating punishment”, or where they would be 
under threat due to their race, religion, or membership of a particular group.797 The law 
stipulates that foreigners who are subject to official investigations while in Turkey can only be 
held for questioning up to a maximum of four hours. Further, foreigners can only be banned 
from Turkey up to a maximum of five years; foreign persons considered a serious threat to 
Turkey’s public order or national security can be banned up to a maximum of ten years. In the 
situation where foreigners with expired residence permits appeal to a governor’s office, they 
will be given only a year’s ban.798 The law further stipulates that foreigners should apply for a 
residence permit in case they stay for more than 90 days in the country. This residence permit 
will be invalidated if not used for six months.799 “In the case of ‘reasonable suspicions’ of 
fraud”, the new law gives the Turkish authorities the right to investigate the marriages of 
foreigners to Turkish citizens. An unlimited residence permit can be given to those foreigners 
who have stayed in Turkey with a valid residence permit for eight years uninterruptedly.800 
The EU commission stated it is certain that, with its proper implementation, this law 
paved the way for visa liberalisation by addressing “several issues identified in the Commission 
Roadmap which [formed] the basis for the visa liberalisation dialogue” that was initiated in 
December 2013.801 The issues identified were “Documents security; migration and border 
management; public order and security; and fundamental rights” in which “[all] the [important] 
legislation and measures [were adopted and implemented by Turkey] and the requirements 
[fulfilled for the] visa liberalisation [with the EU]”.802 





801Kaman, "EU Welcomes New Turkish Law on Foreigners." 
“On the 16th of December 2013 the EU-Turkey Visa liberalisation dialogue was initiated. EU Commissioner for 
Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, in Ankara at the invitation of the Turkish authorities, initiated, jointly with the 
[former] Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, the EU-Turkey Visa liberalisation dialogue with 
the participation of the [former] Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the [former] Turkish Minister 
for European Affairs, Egemen Bağış, and the Ambassadors of all the EU Member States represented in Turkey. 
[...] The aim of the [dialogue] is to make progress towards the elimination of the visa obligation currently 
imposed on the Turkish citizens travelling to the Schengen area for a short term visit.” See: European 
Commission, "EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement Signed and Visa Liberalization Dialogue Launched," News 
Home Affairs (2013),  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/20131216_01_en.htm. [last accessed on 
26.02.2016]. 
802"Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey," (European Commission, 2013). 
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This law could be regarded as an advanced step taken by Turkey in the area of human 
rights, and, it is closely related to Turkey’s democratisation process. 
Significant progress on the Kurdish issue between 2003 and 2014 was offset by the 
government’s lack of meaningful political action on the other significant Turkish minority, the 
Alevis. The former reflected the significant threat to Turkey’s stability and territorial integrity 
and the government’s emphasis on a political solution. It can be argued that the government 
was using its energies and ‘capital’ in addressing the more pressing need and that in time a JDP 
government will bring in reform directed towards the Alevis’ ethnic and religious rights. 
At the time, the government’s positive turnaround on the Kurdish issue augured well 
for other minorities. On this basis, I consider the government scored a ‘significant advance’ on 
its democratic scorecard under ‘political equality’, one of the basic political principles that I 
argue in Chapter 2 should underpin a nation state that aspires to the democratic ideal. 
With Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian civil war after 2014, the sharp and vicious 
slide back to military confrontation with Kurdish militant groups unravelled all the good work 
done up to 2014. The outlook for Turkey’s Kurdish issue is bleak with an increasing Gordian 
knot complexity. 
Gender Equality and Children’s Rights  
One of the main criteria for democratisation in current times is gender equality and the 
extent to which it is ensured by the state.  
 Turkey has signed and ratified several conventions, protocols and declarations on 
women’s rights.803 Article 10 of Turkey’s 1982 Constitution ensures gender equality in 
                                                 
803“In 1985, Turkey signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), and in 2000, it signed the Additional Protocol to CEDAW. Turkey initially had reservations 
against CEDAW’s Articles 15 and 16, but lifted them in 1999. In 2002, Turkey signed the Optional Protocol (of 
CEDAW) that allowed the right of individual petition to the Convention’s Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women. In 2008, Turkey submitted its 6th Periodic Report on eliminating gender based 
discrimination and defended the report in front of the CEDAW Committee in 2010. In addition, in 1995, the 
Turkish government signed the Beijing Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on Women, and committed 
itself to its Action Plan.” See: "Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey," (European Commission, 
2013): 4-5. 
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legislation, thus “envisages ‘equality before law’”.804 Turkish men and women are granted 
equal rights by law in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination.805 The Turkish 
Penal Code was amended in 2003 to increase penalties “on perpetrators of the crime of 
‘murdering a child for honour’”. Further, the law that granted sentence reduction for “honour 
killings” was abrogated and the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children” approved which was “one of the Additional 
Protocols to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”.806 In 
addition, within the framework of the constitutional amendments that became effective in 2004, 
Article 10 of the Constitution was amended to ensure that “men and women shall have equal 
rights and it shall be the responsibility of the State to ensure that equality becomes a reality”. 
Subsequent to this amendment, the same article was further amended in 2010 stipulating “the 
precautions taken for this end may not be interpreted as violating the principle of equality” 
which clearly granted “positive discrimination towards women”.807  
In 2005, an investigation commission was established by Parliament to “identify 
precautions required to be taken after investigating reasons for honour killings and violence 
against children and women”. “A Circular from the Prime Minister’s Office” was issued to 
deal with the matter of “precautions required to be taken to prevent violent acts against children 
and women and honour killings”, which aimed to follow up the reports published by the 
Commission.808 In 2009, the “Law on Commission on Equal Opportunities for Women and 
Men” was adopted. As part of this law, a Parliamentary Commission on Equal Opportunities 
for Women and Men was established to investigate and report on the “protection and promotion 
of women’s rights”.809 In 2012, through an amendment to the Municipalities Law, 
municipalities were given the role of “providing service to women who are victims of 
violence”. The amendment authorises “metropolitan municipalities as well as municipalities 
with a population of more than 50,000” to establish “shelter houses for [at risk] women and 
children”.810 The government adopted the “Law on Protection of Families and Prevention of 
                                                 
804"Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey," (European Commission, 2013): 5.  
805Ibid., 5. 
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Violence against Women”811 in 2012 and approved the “Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence”.812 
Turkey had a female Prime Minister before many European countries,813 and is the first 
country to have a female President of its Constitutional Court.814 Also, Turkey had “female 
ministers of foreign affairs, [the] economy, social affairs, [the] interior and a Supreme Court 
judge.”815 In addition, the percentage of women “in the liberal professions, arts and academia” 
is high, in comparison with many European countries.816 Even though Turkish women’s 
participation in the labour market is far below the European average, “an upward trend is 
visible.”817  
Today, notwithstanding the above comments, gender equality in Turkey is far below 
European standards. Indeed, the issue of gender equality plays an important role in Turkey’s 
accession to the European Union, and more specifically “for Turkey’s adoption of EU norms 
and acquis”.818 In relation to the obstacles to women’s rights, the European Parliament sets out 
the main issues for Turkey as follows: “violence against women, equal opportunities at the 
workplace, paid and unpaid labour, hidden forms of discrimination and access to political 
decision-making and representation.”819 
                                                 
811“The aim of [the] Law is to define principles and procedures regarding precautions required to be taken to 
protect women, children, family members and victims of stalking who have been subjected to, or are at the risk 
of being subjected to, violence and to prevent such violence.” See: The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic 
Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 88. 
812Turkey “became the first country to approve this convention as of 8 March 2012. This Convention defines 
forced marriage and other kinds of violent acts along with physical, sexual and psychological violence and 
sanctions for such violent acts”. See: The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation 
Inventory 2002-2012, 88. 
813In the early 1990s Tansu Çiller became the first female Prime Minister of Turkey. 
814Tülay Tuğcu, as a female President of Turkey’s Constitutional Court, stayed in office between 25 July 2005 and 
12 June 2007. See: Reporter unknown, "Anayasa Mahkemesi'ne Ilk Kadın Başkan [First Female President to the 
Constitutional Court] " Sabah, 25 July 2005. 
815Kader Sevinç, "Gender Equality and the EU’s Transformational Power in Turkey," Social Europe Journal (Online 
Journal) (2012). 
816The percentage of female teaching staff in academia is around 40 percent. See: OSYM Higher Education 
Statistics 2008-2009. Cited by: Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 37. 
817The EU average was 58.2% in 2010 whereas it is 27.6% in Turkey. See: Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and 
Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 51. 
818Müftüler-Baç, "Gender Equality in Turkey," 1. 
819Ibid. 
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The underrepresentation of women in Turkish politics is one of the factors that hinders 
the development of women’s rights in Turkey.820 Only 45 Parliamentary Deputies out of a total 
312 JDP Deputies are female.821 However, such underrepresentation is a world-wide issue.822 
Nevertheless, the JDP’s Women’s Branch Organisation823 is, at present, the largest women’s 
organisation in the world, with 3.8 million registered women representatives.824 In order to 
improve gender equality, the JDP government has proposed and implemented several 
projects.825 Prime Minister Erdoğan appointed a female Education Minister in his former 
cabinet.826 The JDP government took further important steps on an institutional level by 
                                                 
820“... Women are greatly underrepresented in the Turkish parliament and in politics generally. As women are 
usually best situated to look out for women’s rights, this fact greatly hampers overall development in this area. 
Recently, there have been discussions about possible affirmative action to increase the rate of women in 
representation. A quota system is being advocated by NGOs specializing in women rights. If implemented, such 
a system would increase the number of women in parliament. Following the general elections of July 2007, the 
number of female parliamentarians nearly doubled to 47 (around 10%) from the previous number of 24. 
However, little progress was recorded in the representation of women in local administrative bodies. During the 
campaigns of 2009 local elections in Turkey, women’s NGOs launched the ‘50/50 equality’ campaign 
simultaneously with the European Women’s Lobby’s ‘50/50 no modern European democracy without gender 
equality’ campaign. The situation of women in political participation did not change after the elections: there 
are only two female mayors at provincial capital level and seventeen at district town level in Turkey…” 
See: Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 53. 
821See: Official Website of Turkish Grand National Assembly, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/milletvekillerimiz_sd.dagilim [last accessed on 08.08.2014]. 
822As reported from Kader Sevinç, “Turkey ranks 90th among 96 countries in women representation rates in 
cabinet, having one minister in charge of family policies”. See: Sevinç, "Gender Equality and the EU’s 
Transformational Power in Turkey." 
823“The women’s branch organization, which is positioned within the AK Party organization as ‘a subsidiary 
organ’ by force of the political parties act, continues its work under two main headings. 
1- To get organized in the form of village, county, town and province, and headquarters organization, to provide 
being institutionalized, to increase performance, to audit and to guide. 
2- By means of the national and international projects and activities, increasing women’s social, political and 
economic participation and raising awareness in this field”. See: "AK Party Women's Branch Headquarters." 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/brosur.pdf [last accessed on 13.05.2014]. 
824See: http://www.akparti.org.tr/kadinkollari [last accessed on 13.05.2014]. 
See also: http://www.bizimbolgehaber.com/haber/81-ile-81-orman- [last accessed on 13.05.2014]. 
825Many great projects have been put into practice on Education of Women.  
The project called “Hey Girls, Let’s Go to School”, has enrolled 350 000 girls to school. The project called “Mother 
and Daughter, We are at School” plans that 3 million women will become literate. The project “Training of the 
Mother, Father and the Children”, has reached out to families by means of conferences, panel discussions, 
courses, home visits and villlage visits. Courses have been given on subjects such as ‘violence in the family, family 
planning, protection of youth from bad habits, honor killings, violence against women, and abuse of children’. 
See: "AK Parti İktidarında Kadın [Women During Ak Party Rule]," ed. AK Parti Genel Merkez Kadın Kolları [AK 
Party Women's Branch Headquarters] (Ankara, 2011). (no page number available). 
826Erdoğan appointed Nimet Baş (previously Çubukçu) as Minister of National Education for the term between 
2009 and 2011. See:  
Göksel Bozkurt, "New Cabinet Revisions Radicalizes Turkish Government," Hurriyet DailyNews.com (2009). 
Later, on 26 December 2013, Erdoğan appointed Ayşenur İslam as Family and Social Policies Minister. See: 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2013/12/26/aysenur-islamin-esi-bakin-kim-cikti  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
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establishing several committees in the Parliament with the aim of improving gender equality. 
To this end, the Government established a Gender Equality Commission and a Consultative 
Parliamentary Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women in March 2009. The 
corresponding bill on the establishment of the Gender Equality Commission was adopted by 
the Parliament in February 2009, enacted on March 24th, 2009, and came into force as the Law 
Nr. 5840. 827  
The Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women is authorised to follow 
national and international developments in the field of gender equality, to give information to 
the Parliament about these developments and to offer opinions to Special Committees “about 
certain bills and decrees.” In addition, the Committee “examines complaints about violations 
of equality between women and men and gender-based discriminations.”828  
Despite these developments, gender equality in Turkey, and more specifically the 
Government’s performance in this area are criticised in the international community.  
According to “The Global Gender Gap Report 2012”, Turkey’s performance in 
ensuring gender equality is strikingly low. Turkey ranks at 108829 out of 135 countries on the 
basis of the following categories: “economic participation and opportunity, educational 
attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment.”830 The report states that though 
the problems concerning gender equality are more visible in less urbanised parts of the country, 
the main urban regions are “not entirely immune to the problems of gender inequality.”831 
In terms of gender equality, many women in Turkey, especially those living in rural 
provinces face severe problems. For instance, women in Southeastern Anatolia still suffer from 
“violence, forced marriages and the so-called ‘honour killings’”.832 The JDP goverment has 
taken action against the latter; persons convicted of this crime are sentenced to life 
                                                 
827Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 39. 
828Ibid. 
829Ricardo Hausmann, Laura D. Tyson, and Saadia Zahidi, "Table 5: Rankings by Subindex, 2012 (Cont’d.)," in The 
Global Gender Gap Report (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2012), 15. 
830Ibid., 4. 
831Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 38. 
832Ibid.  
For more information on honour killings in Turkey see: Filiz Kardam, "The Dynamics of Honor Killings in Turkey: 
Prospects for Action," (United Nations Population Fund, 2005). 
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imprisonment according to the new Turkish Penal Code of 2004.833 In 2008, the JDP 
government conducted research in order to illustrate the severity of the problem of “domestic 
violence, honour killings and forced marriages in Turkey”.834 According to that research “most 
Turkish women are still not fully aware of their rights and significant further efforts are needed 
in this regard”. This part of the research was taken up in the European Commission’s 2009 
Progress Report. Nevertheless, Women’s NGO’s in Turkey play a significant role in building 
awareness among women of their rights and the actions they need to take to resolve the 
problems they face.835 A specific criticism in the European Commission’s 2011 Report on 
Turkey concerns the inadequate provision of shelters for women at risk and that “local services 
and support mechanisms” fail to adequately satisfy the needs of those women.836 
The Ministry of Women and Family Affairs was replaced by the Ministry of Family 
and Social Policy on the 3rd of June, 2011.837 This change by the JDP Government, regrettably, 
weakened “the mechanism to ensure gender equality”.838 The change, at least on an institutional 
level, indicates a political back-step for women and women’s rights in that politically, and 
undemocratically, ‘women’ are subsumed in to the ‘family’ and are no longer recognised as 
“individuals with civil rights”.839 As reported by Kader Sevinç,840 Emma Sinclair Webb, 
Researcher on Human Rights Watch in Turkey criticised this development stating: “This is a 
very risky step to take in a country where violence against women is so common.” In response 
to the criticisms of that nature, the JDP government publicly declared that the replacement was 
necessary in order to strengthen women’s rights in the country.841  
                                                 
833Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 38. 
834Ibid. 
835See: “Civil Society” section in this chapter. 
836European Commission, Turkey 2011 Progress Report, 32. 
In Turkey “it is a legal obligation of the municipalities with a population of 50,000 or more to establish shelters 
for women”, yet “this provision is not being fully implemented”. See: Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future 
(Revised and Updated Second Edition), 52. 
837"Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı [Ministry of Policy and Social Policy]," (Prime Ministry of Turkey, 2012). 
838Sevinç, "Gender Equality and the EU’s Transformational Power in Turkey." 
839Ibid. 
840Ibid. 
841According to the government, the dynamic character of the social services and public assistance, the 
emergence of new problems and new needy groups caused a failure to meet the expectations of these groups 
from the state. In order to meet the increasing demands of the public and increase the efficiency of the services 
provided for those needy groups, the JDP combined those public units that were responsible for policy making 
and the provincial units that were responsible for applying those policies under a single framework. This 
framework is the newly constructed ‘Ministry of Family and Social Policies (Turkish: Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar 
Bakanlığı)’ where the issues related to women are addressed by the unit ‘Directorate General for Women’s 
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Indeed, the newly established Ministry of Family and Social Policy has been working 
on solving the problems of women living in Turkey.842 For instance, this Ministry’s law on 
reducing violence against women (The Draft Law to Protect Women and Family Members 
from Violence) is of particular importance:843 The law was approved on the 3rd of March 2012 
and “applies to all women subjected to violence without considering their marital status, it 
provides housing if an abused individual and her children require it, as well as temporary 
financial assistance”.844 Furthermore, the law enables “issuing an order of protection for 
individuals without asking for proof of violence”.845  
Another important step taken by the JDP Government in terms of women’s rights is 
“the announcement made by Minister of Family and Social Policy that husbands who exert 
violence on their wives will be barred from their own homes and tracked by a monitoring 
system that will utilize electronic handcuffs”.846 
The JDP government is also planning to make legal changes for the improvement of 
“standards for women’s shelters”.847 Despite the many and continuing problems, the JDP 
                                                 
Status (Turkish: Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü)’. Other units of the Ministry include ‘Directorate General for 
Social Services and Child Protection (Turkish: Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu Genel Müdürlüğü), 
Directorate General of Social Assistance and Solidarity (Turkish: Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma genel 
Müdürlüğü), Directorate General of Family and Social Researches (Turkish: Aile ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Genel 
Müdürlüğü) and Administration for Disabled People (Turkish: Özürlüler İdaresi Başkanlığı). The construction of 
the Ministry of Family and Social Policies was realised on 3 June 2011 through a statutory decree numbered 633 
(Turkish: Kanun Hükmünde Kararname [KHK]/633) (Summary of a public document No./Sayı: 
B.02.0.KKG.0.10/102-2/1866 published by the Directorate General for the Prime Ministry Office’s Laws and 
Decisions [Turkish: Başbakanlık Kanunlar ve Kararlar Genel Müdürlüğü] on 8 June 2011). See also: Statutory 
decree no.633 on the governance and duties of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (Turkish: Aile ve Sosyal 
Politikalar Bakanlığı’nın Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname [KHK/633]) For more 
information on ‘the Ministry of Family and Social Policies’ please refer to the official web-site of the Ministry: 
www.aile.gov.tr/English 
842Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 52. 
843Ibid., 52-53. 
844"Ailenin Korunması ve Kadına Karşı Şiddetin Önlenmesine Dair Kanun [the Draft Law to Protect Women and 
Family Members from Violence]," (Ankara: Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], 2012). 
845Ibid.  
See also: Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 53. 
846Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 53.  
847Ibid.  
See also: Reporter unknown, "AK Parti'den Ayvalıklı Kadınlara 'Sığınma Evi' Müjdesi [Good Tidings of 'Shelter' 
from the AK Party to the Women of Ayvalık]," Medya73, 7 March 2011. 
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Government has been genuinely working to carry forward “the implementation of legislation 
on women’s rights”.848  
The JDP strongly supports active participation of women in social and political life and 
it is known as a party being “sensitive in condemning honor killings”. The JDP prescribed a 
heavy life sentence for honor killings and adopted “positive discrimination for women in the 
retirement process”.849 Further, within the framework of the Constitutional Package of 
September 2010, other positive discrimination measures were adopted in favour of women.850 
The JDP government developed several policy documents in order “to promote the role of 
women and girls in economic and social development.”851 These include “Turkey’s National 
Development Strategy,852 Gender Equality National Action Plan 2008-2013,853 National 
Action Plan on Violence against Women 2012-2015,854 Prime Minister’s Circular on 
Increasing Female Employment and Achieving Equality of Opportunities (2010)855 and a draft 
                                                 
848Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 53. 
849Ahmet Yıldız, "Problematizing the Intellectual and Political Vestiges. From 'Welfare' to 'Justice and 
Development'," in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. The Making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. 
Ümit Cizre (New York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2008), 52. 
850Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 53. 
See also: This thesis at “Constitutional Reform Package”, in particular Personal Freedoms. 
851"Towards Gender Equality in Turkey: A Summary Assessment," (Turkey Country Management Unit Europe and 
Central Asia Region, 2012), 9. 
852“The 9th Development Plan 2007-2013 stipulates that the rate of female participation in the labor force will 
increase by 2.1 percentage points over the planning period by raising the level of education, enhancing 
employability through active labor force policies and by facilitating and promoting access to the labor market. 
Female labor force participation is targeted at 29.6 percent by 2013 (it was 28.8 percent in 2011). The 10th 
Development Plan is currently under preparation”. See: "Towards Gender Equality in Turkey: A Summary 
Assessment," (Turkey Country Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region, 2012), 9. 
853“This Action Plan was an important milestone for improving gender equity. Designed along principal themes 
identified in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 30 Turkey’s Action Plan specifically covers the 
economy, poverty, participation in the power and decision-making processes, health, media, environment, 
education and institutional mechanisms. This Action Plan identifies a comprehensive set of actions and the 
responsible agencies but does not take the step to define results to be achieved making monitoring less 
powerful. The 2011 Progress report is expected by mid-2012. A second five-year Gender Action Plan to begin in 
2014 is now under preparation”. See: "Towards Gender Equality in Turkey: A Summary Assessment," (Turkey 
Country Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region, 2012), 9. See also: United Nations, “The Fourth 
World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace,” 1995: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/beijingdeclaration.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
854“The Plan identifies actions against both domestic violence as well as violence at the work place. Mobbing and 
sexual harassment have been identified as a significant barrier to women’s employment”. See: United Nations, 
“The Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace”. 
The Action Plan is presently only available in Turkish.  
http://www.kadininstatusu.gov.tr/tr/html/120/Kadina+Yonelik+Siddetle+Mucadele+Ulusal+Eylem+Plani/  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
855This “includes measures such as (1) monitoring and enforcing gender equality in the work place; (2) 
engendering non-formal educational activities and vocational training (including increased female participation 
in Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Boards); and (3) enforcement of a 2008 law requiring firms 
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Action Plan [of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock] for Women’s Empowerment 
in Rural Areas.”856 
Under the JDP governments, children were granted better rights, their living standards 
improved, and “Child Rights Monitoring and Evaluation Boards and Child Surveillance 
Centres” were established with the aim of preventing child abuse and taking effective action 
“in cases of child abuse”.857 In August 2003, consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, “anyone who is below 18 years of age” was defined as a child. Prior to this, a 
‘child’ in Turkey, for legal purposes, was defined as 15 years of age or younger.858 Further, it 
became compulsory to set up juvenile courts “in all provinces that have a population of more 
than 100,000”. Children charged with relevant criminal acts are no longer tried in State Security 
Courts but instead, now, in the newly established Juvenile Courts. What is more, “stone 
throwing children” involved in crimes and/or violent acts, as defined by the Counterterrorism 
Act, are no longer tried in Assize Courts, but in new Juvenile Courts.859 
Through the “Law on the amendment of the social security and universal health 
insurance law” dated 21 May 2013, health care was to be provided “to children under 18 
unconditionally and any problems in regards to the free benefit of health services for children 
under 18 have been eliminated”. Further, in accordance with the provisions of Law No: 6284, 
“the individuals for whom precautionary measures are taken but who do not have a universal 
health insurance or who are not covered by the universal health insurance of those who are 
responsible of them and therefore cannot benefit from the health services” are granted the rights 
to get access to “Universal health insurance”.860 
                                                 
with 150 and more workers to provide child care services (before 2008 firms were required to provide these 
services in-house while after 2008 these can be contracted out)”. See: United Nations, “The Fourth World 
Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace,” 9-10. 
856“Notably, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock has developed a draft Action Plan for Women’s 
Empowerment in Rural Areas”. See: United Nations, “The Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for 
Equality, Development and Peace,” 10. 
857The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 72. 
Please note that the date of this reform is not mentioned in the above mentioned primary source. 
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The approval of the “Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children 
against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse” by the Government in April 2012861 was also 
an important step for the improvement of Children’s Rights.862 
In its 2014 Progress Report, the EU Commission indicated that the following issues 
remained as matters of concern in relation to women’s and children’s rights: low participation 
of women into the workplace; ineffective policy-building/decision-making processes and 
politics; early and forced marriages; lack of equal opportunities for women; child labour; child 
poverty; ill-treatment, violence and bad conditions for children in prisons; compulsory 
religious indoctrination in secondary schools; insufficient coordination between the Ministry, 
agencies and institutions associated with children’s rights; and, lack of an effective and 
comprehensive monitoring and notification system, nationally, for children’s rights.863 
Although there has been some improvement in the rights of women and children, the JDP’s 
reforms did not go far beyond legal amendments on paper; implementation and acceptance fall 
far short. 
In the context of two of the core political principles, political equality and individual 
freedoms, the JDP government has not made any significant advances in the areas of gender 
equality and children’s rights. However, both social issue areas have not gone into reverse since 
the JDP took office in 2002. 
The democratic scorecard for gender equality and children’s rights must be scored ‘no 
significant’ change, along the line: Did attend class but could do better. 
Civil Society 
 According to Civil Society Index (CSI) Project,864 the main characteristics of Civil 
Society in Turkey could be summarised as follows:865 Civil Society in Turkey has undergone 
                                                 
861Ibid., 243-44. 
862Ibid., 72. 
863European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2014," Commission Staff Working Document (2014). 
864The Civil Society Index (CSI) project is “the first comprehensive and internationally comparative study on civil 
society’s structure, environment, values and impact in Turkey. The purpose of this report is to convey current 
challenges and opportunities facing civil society in Turkey, and ultimately simulate greater discussion and action 
to strengthen its ability to promote a sustainable and democratic society.” See:  
Filiz Bikmen and Zeynep Meydanoglu, "Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition," CIVICUS Civil (2006): 10. 
865Ibid., 13-14. 
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a significant period of positive transformation but remains relatively weak compared to 
European organisations. Civic participation is not widespread in Turkey and has shallow roots. 
CSOs in Turkey require great resources especially personnel with high skill sets. Links between 
CSOs are underdeveloped and hindered by a lack of adherence to the rule of law in the areas 
that are of interest to them due to corruption and a highly centralised state administration. 
However, recent reforms suggest a progressively more sympathetic legal framework for CSOs 
within expanded civic rights and liberties. Within Turkish CSOs, there is a limited adoption of 
practices such as tolerance, democratic practices and good governance. There is limited action 
on the part of the CSOs to promote poverty eradication, though they are capable of “promoting 
gender equity, non-violence and environmental sustainability”. Further, CSOs in Turkey need 
to be more “[active] in holding the state and private sector accountable and [responsive] to 
social interests.” Nevertheless, Turkish CSOs have a strong role to play in meeting societal 
needs, empowering citizens and increasing the level of engagement around policy issues. 
Civil Society in Turkey was weak during the 1980’s due to the effects of the 1980 
military coup but slowly recovered in the 1990’s866 partly due to reductions in the legal 
prohibitions imposed on the activities of non-government organisations (NGO’s) in Turkey.867 
During the mid-1990s, civil society actors began to penetrate “the political life of Turkey.”868  
 The JDP has undertaken important reforms to remove barriers between the state and 
Turkish society by reducing the ‘footprint’ of the state, encouraging and supporting civil 
society, and strengthening the rights of the individual in Turkish society.869 In order to 
empower civil society, the JDP introduced a new Law of Associations in 2004.870 The former 
Law of Associations regarded “organized society as a potential danger that needed to be 
controlled”, the new law aimed to strengthen democratic governance and freedom of 
association and abolished “the limitations to the right to association”.871 Further, the 2010 
‘Directive on Supporting Associations from the Budget of the Ministry of Interior’ provided 
                                                 
866Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 44. 
“Women’s rights NGOs are among the most active and well organized parts of the Turkish civil society. However, 
much more dialogue between these women NGOs, civil society organizations and government is needed.” See: 
Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 38. 
867Ibid., 44-45. 
868Ibid., 45. 
869The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 23. 
870Law No: 5253 dated 4/11/2004, Official Gazette: 23/11/2004, 25649 
871The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 78. 
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grant support for associations’ projects.872 This Directive was issued as a direct encouragement 
to Turkey’ civil society associations as was the 2013 regulation change which allowed civil 
society organisations, for the first time, to solicit for donations.873 The move to join the EU was 
an important catalyst affecting the development of “Turkey’s civic landscape on a political 
level”.874 The political desire to join the EU created “an effective impulse on the repeal [of 
severe] legislative restrictions” on the formation of NGO’s in Turkey, and “on means of 
funding and democratic capabilities of the organizations”.875  
Critics, however, argue that the JDP government wants to control the whole of Turkish 
civil society by misusing the EU integration process with the intention of transforming 
Turkey’s cultural capital.876 In this context, Can Büyükbay claims that the JDP uses the EU 
integration process as a “room to manoeuvre in domestic politics and as a tool for [further 
government control]”.877 His argument is based on the statements of a group of influential 
social scientists claiming that the JDP practices insidious discrimination among civil society 
organisations with the aim of strengthening its cultural and moral leadership.878 He further 
refers to the critics’ argument on the basis that the JDP government “is closer to those groups 
with which it has ideological or political similarities”.879 According to the critics, by way of 
example, the JDP government supported the conservative charity organisation Denizfeneri 
                                                 
872Ibid., 233. 
873Ibid. 
“Although [Turkish] citizens in general have the right to collect donations within the context of civil society 
actions and social responsibility, this freedom has been restricted in certain periods under various justifications. 
The authority vested in the Turkish Aeronautical Association to collect slaughtered sheep/cattle skin, alms and 
devotions constitutes one such example. In this regard, the Turkish Aeronautical Association had exclusive 
authority to collect donations by collecting slaughtered sheep/cattle skin and guts and distribution of envelopes 
for alms and devotions. […] Considering the level of democratization attained by our country, the 
aforementioned provision of the Regulation has been abolished whereby the Turkish Aeronautical Association 
is no longer the sole authorized institution to collect slaughtered sheep/cattle skin and guts as well as alms and 
devotions”. See: The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 
267-68. 
The JDP regards the related provision as being one of the provisions of “Article 5 of ‘Regulation Relating to the 
Procedure and Principles Applicable to Collection of Aid’”. This provision was also part of “the ‘Social Assistance 
and Solidarity Law’ No.3294”. See: The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation 
Inventory 2002-2012, 268. 
874"Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition," in Civicus Civil Society Index Report for Turkey. Executive 
Summary (Türkiye Üçüncü Sektör Vakfı [Third Sector Foundation of Turkey, TÜSEV], year not mentioned), 7. 
875Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 45. 
876Can Büyükbay, "Limited Autonomy of the Civil Society and the Misuse of the EU Accession Process," Centre 
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(Lighthouse), whose representatives were JDP members. The JDP is being accused of 
“protecting the accomplices in the Lighthouse Affair, the biggest charity corruption case in 
Germany’s history, and of using the embezzled money to support the [JDP’s] political aims”.880 
As reported by Büyükbay, the main opposition party, the CHP argued that the JDP utilised the 
money to support media organisations friendly to the party.881 Moreover, the three prosecutors 
involved were abruptly removed from the case for criminal behaviour, convicted and 
imprisoned, and expelled from their profession.882 It would appear that the Lighthouse 
prosecutors fell afoul of a judiciary controlled by the JDP.883 
Turkey’s main civil society leaders were interviewed in relation to their views on the 
government’s democratisation programme, and its attitude and actions to their sector. The 31 
interviewees, in the main, regarded the JDP’s democratisation discourse as superficial.884 These 
leaders also argued that civil society in Turkey had been repressed and were subject to 
discrimination by the JDP government, which is accused of legitimising only those CSOs 
whose “ideological or political standing” are compatible with its political preferences.885 
Despite the aforementioned accusations, the JDP seems to be in favour of developing 
relations with Turkey’s civil society including making statements in that regard and having 
regular meetings with CSO leaders . The JDP continues to build cooperation between the CSOs 
and the party, organising visits to some of the leading CSOs in Turkey such as Kamu-Sen and 
Memur-Sen. The visitors included JDP leaders:  Akif Gülle (Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
advisor), Hüseyin Tanrıverdi (former deputy of Manisa) and Dr. Şükrü Ayalan (former deputy 
of Tokat).886 Ekrem Erdem, the JDP vice chairman for party organisation, underlined the 
importance of the CSOs stating: 




883"Former Lighthouse Prosecutors Indicted, Kılıçdaroğlu Outraged," in Turkish News Folder (CHP European 
Union Representation Brussels, 2012). 
884"Limited Autonomy of the Civil Society and the Misuse of the EU Accession Process." 
The interviews were conducted by Can Büyükbay on behalf of the Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey 
(Research Turkey). Büyükbay is an Assistant Professor at the Turkish-German University in Istanbul. 
885"Limited Autonomy of the Civil Society and the Misuse of the EU Accession Process." 
886"Halkla İlişkiler Başkanlığı Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Siyasal Parti İşbirliğini Geliştirmeye Devam Ediyor [Ministry 
of Public Relations Continues to Improve Cooperation between Civil Society Organisations and the Political 
Party]," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. 
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Politics and the CSOs are intertwined. The CSOs are 
indispensable for democracy just like political parties are. 
As elements of opposition, they exert strong pressure, 
especially on politicians, to realise the goals they set forth 
in accordance with the foundation goals of their parties. 
Hence, as a person who has been dealing with the civil 
society for many years, I attach great importance to 
CSOs.887 
Considering the accusations against the JDP in terms of its relations with the Turkish 
civil society and the party’s statements about this matter, it is difficult to assess if the JDP is 
genuine in its efforts to recognise and empower civil society in Turkey. However, the JDP is 
slower than its official pronouncements for what appears political reasons, wanting a gradualist 
approach to maintain control of the civil society agenda as well as manage adverse political 
reactions from both the secular opposition as well as opposition from within its own party and 
other political parties in Turkey. 
For the new JDP government in 2002 there were many pressing issues, engagement 
with Turkey’s civil society was not one as evidenced by a Council of Europe initiated seminar 
on civil society which was held in Ankara in May 2002 attended by NGOs and Turkish 
authorities. “Those present concluded that there should be closer co-operation between civil 
society and the authorities, and that NGOs should be involved in the drafting of a new law on 
associations.”888 By 2014, the EU Turkey Progress Report stated:  
Overall, there is a growing rights-based civil society in 
Turkey insisting that the citizen is prioritised in policy 
making and administration and that the exercise of 
fundamental rights is guaranteed by law. Government- and 
parliament-civil society relations should be improved 
through systematic, permanent and structured consultation 
mechanisms at policy level, notably as part of the legislative 
process. The legal, financial and administrative 
environment for civil society needs to better support an 
open society, encouraging active citizenship.889 
                                                 
887"Siyaset ve Sivil Toplum Örgütleri İçiçedir [Politics and Civil Society Organisations Are Intertwined]," Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi. 
The original statement of Erdem is in Turkish, it was translated into English by the author of this PhD thesis. 
888 European Commission “ 2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”, 9.10.2002, p36. 
889 European Commission: “Turkey Progress Report” Oct 2014, 13. 
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I have scored the JDP’s engagement with civil society in Turkey up to 2014 as a 
significant advance, albeit from a low base, in the context of all the core democratic political 
principles set out in Chapter 2, being: political equality; alternative government; free, fair and 
regular elections; majority rule; the rule of law; individual freedom; and, tolerance, cooperation 
and compromise. Civil society, in one form or another in Turkey, covers all of these areas and, 
as the JDP government engaged with civil society organisations in Turkey, it signalled its 
willingness to use CSOs as another forum for its positive engagement with core democratic 
principles. Albeit, a positive engagement that has , and continues to have, 890 its recidevist 
tendencies at the sharper end of day-to-day politics, especially for a government that sees the 
nation, and the JDP itself, under threat 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
In terms of human rights, Turkey has had a poor reputation in the international arena 
for most of its history, especially in matters of torture and ill-treatment.891  
In 2004 the JDP government declared zero tolerance policy against torture and ill-
treatment.892 Legislation in Turkey prohibits torture and ill-treatment,893 but there is an 
implementation gap.894 In June 2005, the Government issued a Regulation on Apprehension, 
Detention and Statement Taking which introduced further safeguards, specifically in regard to 
“medical examinations and the right of defence”.895 In addition, the maximum term of 
imprisonment for the conviction of torture and ill-treatment was increased to fifteen years.896 
Further, the Human Rights Investigation Committee established four parliamentary sub-
committees which focus on “torture, ill treatment and prisons; freedom of thought, expression, 
                                                 
890 ”Civil society organisations continued to be subject to disproportionate state supervision affecting their 
operations, in particular through auditing.” Ibid. Being audited by the state has a ‘ring’ of a begrudging 
acceptance by the body politic. 
891Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 34. 
892"Eradicating Torture in Turkey’s Police Stations: Analysis and Recommendations [Human Rights Watch 
Briefing Paper]," (Human Rights Watch, 2004), 3. 
893“The 2006 regular progress report of the European Commission confirmed that Turkey had a comprehensive 
legislative system of safeguards and guarantees against torture and ill-treatment.” See:  
Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 24.  
894Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 34. 
895Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 24. 
896Ibid. 
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religion and conscience; economic and social rights (including children’s rights); and 
harmonisation of legislation with the EU acquis”.897  
Based on the work of experts and the reports of Turkish and international non-
governmental organisations,898 the level of torture and ill-treatment decreased in the early 
2000’s but then increased over the last few years. The former President of the Council of 
Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) stated on October 13, 2004: “It would 
be difficult to find a Council of Europe member state with a more advanced set of provisions 
[in combating torture than Turkey]”899 adding that, however, it is “right to underline that 
Turkey needs to pursue vigorously its efforts to combat torture and other forms of ill-
treatment.”900 Further, the EU Commission’s 2009 Progress Report on Turkey highlighted 
Government’s performance in combating torture and ill-treatment, stating:901 “the government 
pursued its efforts to ensure compliance with the legal safeguards to prevent torture and ill-
treatment. Training for health personnel, judges and prosecutors on effective investigation and 
documentation of torture and ill-treatment cases was stepped up in 2000, with a view to 
implementation of the Istanbul Protocol in Turkey.”902 
The 2010 and 2011 EU Progress Reports also underlined that there is a positive trend 
on combating torture and ill-treatment.903 Despite the “disproportionate use of force by law 
enforcement officials”, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment noted a decline “in both the incidence and severity of ill-treatment” 
by those officials in its report issued after “its fifth periodic visit to Turkey”.904 In September 
2011, the Government ratified the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture 
(OPCAT) which required member states to establish “a national mechanism to prevent torture 
                                                 
897European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2009," 14. 
898Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 34. 
899Abdullah Gül, "Speech Delivered by the President at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly," 
(Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2007). 
900European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2005," Commission Staff Working Document (2005): 
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901"EU Progress Report on Turkey 2009," 15. 
902“Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, submitted to the United National Human Rights Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 9 August 1999”. See: "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2009," 15. 
903"EU Progress Report on Turkey 2010," 17. See also: 
"EU Progress Report on Turkey 2011," 23. 
904See: "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2011," 22-23. 
See also: Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 35. 
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within one year and regular reports on measures to implement the Protocol”.905 However, 
Amnesty International noted that “the required domestic implementing mechanism had not 
[yet] been established”.906  
 The positive downward trend changed in 2012. The Human Rights Association (IHD) 
Diyarbakır Branch Executive Ercan Dönmez stated in June 2012 that “instances of torture and 
ill-treatment continue to be on the rise in Turkey, in the Kurdish region in particular”.907 
Dönmez underlined that “the number of cases of torture and ill-treatment in Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolia regions”908 rose from 741 in 2010 to 1555 in 2011 and criticised the 
dramatic situation in Turkey as follows:  
Cases of torture and ill treatment, which remarkably 
decreased in early 2000’s within the scope of law of 
harmonization code of the EU, have recorded an increase 
since the inurement of the new Turkish Penal Code in 
2005, the amendments made in Anti-Terror Law in 2006 
and in the Law of Police Powers in 2007. Police powers 
not only intervene in almost all activities and meetings but 
also use disproportionate force on people. As intense 
torture and ill treatment continue after social events as 
well, the most recent instance was seen in Diyarbakir 
where a citizen was subjected to torture both during and 
after his detention. One other case was experienced in 
Istanbul where a citizen suffered brutal violence from a 
group of police officers on the street.909 
Also the 2012 World Report of Human Rights Watch declared that the use of torture, 
ill-treatment and lethal force by security forces in Turkey remains a matter of concern.910 
Notwithstanding reversals in 2012, the government’s declaration of a ‘zero tolerance’ policy 
                                                 
905"EU Progress Report on Turkey 2011," 21.  
906Amnesty International Annual Report on Turkey 2014/15,  
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
907Ercan Dönmez, " 281 People Subjected to Torture in Turkey's Kurdish Region in 2012," 26 June 2012. 
908Ibid. 
909Ibid. 
910Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2012: Turkey," (2012). 
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against torture and ill-treatment could be considered one of the major achievements of the JDP 
government.911  
A new Turkish Penal Code (TPC) was introduced as a penal-law reform package prior 
to the opening of the EU-Turkey accession negotiations, and it entered into force on the 1st of 
June 2005. The new code included Article 301 which was particularly important for freedom 
of expression. Before the revision, this article was criticised by both national and international 
authorities, and it was considered a “direct threat to freedom of expression” by Amnesty 
International which called on Turkey to abolish Article 301.912 Article 301 was formulated to 
protect “Turkishness,913 the Republic, the Parliament, the Government, the judicial institutions, 
the military and security structures” against public denigration.914 Before its most recent 
revision on the 8th of May 2008, Article 301 stated the following:  
 (1) A person who explicitly insults being a Turk, the 
Republic or Turkish Grand National Assembly, shall be 
imposed a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months 
to three years. (2) A person who explicitly insults the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial bodies 
of the State, the military or security organisation shall be 
imposed a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months 
to two years. (3) Where insulting being a Turk is committed 
by a Turkish citizen in a foreign country, the penalty to be 
imposed shall be increased by one third. (4) Expression of 
                                                 
911The JDP took a really important step in reducing the high volume of torture and ill-treatment, not only by 
declaring ‘zero tolerance’ policy against torture and ill-treatment but also by putting this policy into practice. 
Despite the upward trend in 2012, Turkey is more advanced today than before November 2002. In its 2014 
report, Amnesty International noted that “reported cases of torture in [Turkey’s] official places of detention 
remained far fewer [in 2014] than in previous years” although Turkey’s human rights record as a whole worsened 
in that year.  
See: Amnesty International Report on Turkey 2014/15, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-
central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/ [last accessed on 18.02.2016]. 
See also: Howard Eissenstat (2015), “Amnesty on Turkey’s Worsening Human Rights Record: 11 key Issues”, 24 
February, http://humanrightsturkey.org/2015/02/24/amnesty-on-turkeys-worsening-human-rights-record-11-
key-issues/ [last accessed on 18.02.2016]. 
912"Turkey. Article 301: How the Law on 'Denigrating Turkishness' Is an Insult to Free Expression," Amnesty 
International USA. Public Document EUR 44/003/2006 (2006): 1. 
913“What is meant by the term ‘Turkishness’ in the article is, a common entity which has come into being as a 
result of the common culture peculiar to the Turks living anywhere around the world. This entity is wider than 
the term ‘Turkish Nation’ and it encompasses the societies who live outside Turkey and who are participants of 
the same culture. What is meant by the term Republic is, the State of the Republic of Turkey.” See: TBMM, 22. 
Dönem, Yasama Yılı, Sıra Sayısı: 664, 688. Cited by: Bülent Algan, "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of 
Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey," German Law Journal 9, no. 12 
(2008): 2240. 
914Algan, "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression 
Cases in Turkey," 2240. 
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opinions with the purpose of criticism does not require 
penalties.915  
Before its revision, Article 301 significantly restricted freedom of non-violent 
expression.916 Thirty five non-governmental organisations including Amnesty International 
have called for the abrogation of the Article 301 and all other Penal Code impediments to the 
freedom of expression in Turkey.917 In response, the JDP government amended and clarified 
Article 301, along with other Penal Code Articles in June 2005918 (the 7th revision), on the 30th 
April 2008919 (the 8th revision) and finally on the 8th May 2008920 (the 9th revision). This, in 
turn, had the effect of reducing the number of the legal cases in ECtHR against Turkey related 
to freedom of expression.921  
Article 301 was open to wide interpretation because of the ambiguity surrounding the 
term ‘denigration’.922 Consequently, its application by state organs, particularly by the 
judiciary, varied greatly but tended to be a function of prevailing government policies and the 
                                                 
915Miklos Haraszti, “Review of the Draft Turkish Penal Code: Freedom of Media Concerns”, Vienna (2005): 10, 
available at: www.osce.org/fom/14672?download=true [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
916European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2006,": 14-15. See also: Algan, "The Brand New Version 
of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey," 2239. 
917"Turkey. Article 301: How the Law on 'Denigrating Turkishness' Is an Insult to Free Expression," 1. See also: 
Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for Europe?, 57. 
918For the revised version of Article 301 see: Algan, "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code 
and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey," 2238. 
919Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 38. 
920For the recent version of Article 301 see: Algan, "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code 
and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey," 2239. 
“Facing both domestic and international criticism the government at first advocated a wait-and- policy, claiming 
that once the necessary case law was established cases against opinion of people would disappear. However, 
the establishment of a viable case law body is a lengthy process. On November 5, 2006, government officials 
and civil society representatives met to discuss article 301. Consequently several amendments to the 
controversial article were presented in early 2007. Finally, on 30 April, 2008 the article was changed by an 
amendment to change ‘Turkishness’ into ‘the Turkish Nation’…” See: Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future 
(Revised and Updated Second Edition), 37-38. 
921“In the context of Article 301 of the TPC numerous cases and criminal investigations were presented [in 
February 2006] against the following popular elites: Orhan Pamuk: Nobel Laureate and the Turkish author, Hrant 
Dink: the journalist and the editor of the Armenian newspaper Agos, Selmus Ulek: the Vice-President of the 
human rights based Turkish NGO Mazlum Der, Perihan Mağden and Elif Şafak: Turkish writers, and Joost 
Lagendijk: [former] chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee...” See: “Writer Hrant Dink 
Acquitted; Trials Against Other Journalists Continue”, IFEX, 9 February 2006,  
http://www.ifex.org/turkey/2006/02/09/writer_hrant_dink_acquitted_trials/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
See also: Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for 
Europe?, 57-58. 
922Algan, "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression 
Cases in Turkey," 2245. 
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ensuing political climate.923 This of course meant uncertainty in a part of the law that could 
easily affect all Turkish citizens as they go about their daily lives both at work and socially, 
and could be subject to widespread abuse for political reasons. 
With the ninth (and last) revision of Article 301 on the 8th May 2008, the vague term 
‘Turkishness’ was replaced by the more exact term ‘Turkish Nation’,924 and the term 
‘Republic’ by ‘the State of the Republic of Turkey’. In addition, the maximum penalty for 
denigration of ‘the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the judicial bodies of the State’ 
was reduced to two years, thus the accused could be placed on probation.925 Also, the approval 
of the Ministry of Justice became compulsory for public prosecutors to open legal proceedings 
under Article 301.926  
The new Article 301 states: 
Denigrating the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish 
Republic, the Institutions and Organs of the State: (1) A 
person who explicitly insults Turkish Nation, the State of 
the Republic of Turkey, […] Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, [or the judicial institutions of the State] shall be 
imposed a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months 
to two years. (2) A person who explicitly insults the 
military or security structures shall be punishable 
according to the first paragraph. (3) Expressions of thought 
intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime. (4) The 
prosecution under this article shall be subject to the 
approval of the Minister of Justice.927  
The above revision of Article 301 provided greater certainty to its scope and, in so 
doing, improved freedom of expression in Turkey. Further, the revised Article, as part of the 
legal provisions, has to be interpreted928 in favour of liberties in accordance with the principle 
                                                 
923Ibid., 2240. 
924Nordirak-Turabdin (online), "Türkisches Parlament Ändert Art. 301 Im Strafgesetzbuch, Den Sog. Türkentum 
Paragrafen," (2008): 1. See also: Algan, "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the 
Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey," 2242. 
925"Türkisches Parlament Ändert Art. 301 Im Strafgesetzbuch, Den Sog. Türkentum Paragrafen." 
926Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 38. 
927Algan, "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression 
Cases in Turkey," 2239-40.  
928Ibid., 2247. 
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in dubio pro libertate (if in doubt favour liberty).929 The amendment to Article 301 can 
strengthen freedom of expression in Turkey, and achieve closer uniformity with case law930 of 
the European Court of Human Rights931 and the framework of freedom of expression set out in 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.932 Failure to fully realise the potential 
of this amendment in practice will be a lost opportunity to strengthen the protection of freedom 
of expression in Turkey. In addition to Article 301, there were other provisions that restricted 
                                                 
929“In dubio pro libertate is a principle of interpretation which is indispensable for a true democratic society. This 
principle functions to steer the thoughts of the interpreter in the direction of expanding basic rights.” See: Algan, 
"The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in 
Turkey," 2247. 
930Case law is the body of available writings explaining the basis of the courts’ verdicts. Case law “is most often 
created by judges in their rulings, when they write their decisions and give the reasoning behind them, as well 
as citing precedents in other cases and statutes that had a bearing on their decision.” For further information 
see: Brendan McGuigan (ed.), “What is Case Law?”, 2013, http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-case-law.htm [last 
accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
931Official Website of the ECHR: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home [last accessed on 
26.02.2016]. 
932European Convention on Human Rights is also known as “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms”. For the summary of the treaty see:  
Council of Europe, “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, Summary of 
the Treaty, ETS No. 005, Rome, 3 September 1953,  
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/005.htm [last accessed on 15.05.2014].  
For further information see: Council of Europe, ibid., CETS No.:005, Rome, 3 September 1953, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG 
[last accessed on 15.05.2014] 
Article 10-Freedom of Expression: 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary. See: Council of Europe, “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13”,  
Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, September 2003, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
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freedom of expression in the Penal Code. These restrictions were abrogated by the 3rd 933 and 
4th Judicial Packages934 by the JDP government. 
Freedom of the press and the media generally in Turkey has also been the subject of 
criticism against the JDP government. Critics argue that aspects of the new Penal Code935 
concerning the media are vague and may violate freedom of the media. Furthermore, two 
significant tax-related judicial cases were opened in 2009 against Doğan Media Holding (a 
leading national media group in Turkey). These cases were included in the EU’s 2009 and 2010 
progress reports on Turkey.936 The reports stated that the judicial actions against the media 
organisation adversely “affect freedom of the press in practice” in Turkey.937 
The EU Commission’s Progress Reports on Turkey also highlighted the large number 
of violations, in practice, of freedom of expression and restraints on media freedom. The JDP 
government was criticised in the progress reports, citing the detention of journalists in solitary 
                                                 
933“[The] third judicial reform package was adopted in July 2012. It includes amendments to a number of laws 
and aims amongst others at accelerating judicial procedures. A Law on Mediation, which should ease the burden 
on the judiciary, entered into force in June 2012.  
Under the new legislation it will no longer be possible for courts to ban publications; put time limits on 
defendants and prosecutors in the context of judicial processes; expel the accused or the defence from any 
future or all hearings on the grounds of behaviour deemed to disturb court order and discipline; limit to one the 
number of defence lawyers while the suspect’s statement is being taken or during custody; issue notifications 
through mass media depending on the urgency of the case. The upper three-year limit for judicial control was 
lifted: under former practice, only those accused for crimes carrying a maximum prison sentence of less than 
three years could be put under judicial control rather than prison before or during trial. New forms of judicial 
control were introduced.” See: European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2012," 15. For detailed 
information on the reforms see the following link: 
http://www.abgm.adalet.gov.tr/english/dosyalar/3.yargipaketi.pdf [last accessed on 25.02.2016]. 
934“The [4th Judicial] package is intended to eliminate rulings against Turkey in the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) for human rights violations, especially regarding the situation of convicts charged with 
membership in a terrorist organization. 
The legal reform package was widely debated in Parliament and sparked controversy when it arrived in 
Parliament on March 7, as it did not meet the high expectations that had built up over time in its original state. 
However, according to an amendment introduced to the fourth judicial package, no punishment will be inflicted 
for ‘being a member of a terrorist organization,’ once the defendant is charged for committing propaganda 
crimes.  
Charges of affiliation with a terrorist organization will no longer be held once the crimes of publishing and 
distributing leaflets and statements by terrorist organizations, making the propaganda of a terrorist organization 
and participating in illegal meetings and protest marches have been penalized.” See: 
"Turkey's 4th Judicial Package Passes into Law with Critical Last-Minute Amendment," Hürriyet Daily News, 11 
April 2013. 
The 4th Judicial Package also includes amendments on defence in mother tongue, the right to get public services 
in mother language, the return of the Kurdish names of some places and the eviction of numerous KCK prisoners. 
935Turkish Penal Code was amended in 2004 in order to strengthen human rights and freedom of expression.  
936European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2009," 18; "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2010," 21. 
937Ibid. 
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confinement, the confiscation of an unpublished book in relation to the Ergenekon case, and 
the detention of a large number of journalists connected with the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
trials.938 
In summary, and as the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) reports, problems 
relating to freedom of expression and media continue in Turkey. However, it is fair to state 
that “traditionally sensitive issues [including freedom of expression and the media] are 
discussed openly and freely both in public and amongst the elites [in Turkey]”.939In this 
section, I have looked at human rights in relation to government agencies’ use of torture in 
Turkey, one aspect of Turkey’s penal code in relation to freedom of expression and, freedom 
of the press and other media. 
With the cooling down of the enthusiasm for EU accession in the middle of the JDP’s 
period in office, the JDP’s push for improved human rights in the iconic context of torture, and 
the fundamental freedom of the press, the democratic scorecard is marked as no significant 
advance or significant reversal. Though the new penal code removed the offence of denigrating 
‘Turkishness’ which had seriously undermined freedom expression, my conclusion is that it is 
not sufficient to make up for the lost opportunity to make significant strides in two areas, torture 
and press freedom, that continued to represent tangible blots on Turkey’s international 
reputation and on its aspirations to be recognised as a regional leader in world forums. 
Democratic Opening Initiative 
In order to expand the scope of democratic freedoms and find solutions to some of 
Turkey’s chronic problems such as the rights of Kurds and Alevis, minority rights, and “PKK 
                                                 
938Nas et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future (Revised and Updated Second Edition), 38. 
939Ibid. 
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terrorism”940 the JDP launched a “Democratic Opening” process (Demokratik Açılım süreci) 
in summer 2009.941 The reforms, inter alia, included “partial amnesty for PKK fighters”.942 
The reforms were first identified as The Kurdish Opening,943 and then renamed The 
National Unity and Fraternity Project by the JDP government.944 The JDP declares that the 
party’s main goal, since its foundation in August 2001, has been to maintain the national unity 
of, and community solidarity within, the Turkish nation945 and that its “Democratic Opening” 
initiative is part of achieving that fundamental goal. Thus, the National Unity and Fraternity 
Project946 intends to solve the problems in the Eastern and South-Eastern regions of Turkey,947 
                                                 
940“The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation internationally by states and organisations, including [the] United 
Nations, NATO, the United States and the European Union.” See: "Foreign Terrorist Organizations List," ed. U.S. 
Department of State (Washington, DC: Office of Counterterrorism, 2002). 
“The PKK is a Kurdish separatist terrorist organization. […] According to the British MI5 reports, it is one of the 
bloodiest terrorist organizations in the world. It means that there is no difference between Al Qaeda and the 
PKK before the Western legal system.” See: Sedat Laciner, "The PKK: A Privileged Terrorist Organization?," 
http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=612 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
“The PKK is recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU, the United States of America (USA), 
Australia, Canada, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
also recognize PKK as a terrorist organization.” See: Ilgaz et al., Turkey: Past, Present and Future, 31. 
941"World Report 2012: Turkey," (Human Rights Watch, 2012), 1. 
The JDP published a booklet to introduce the aims and the content of its policy of "democratic opening" and its 
vision for the future of democracy in Turkey. See: “Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik 
ve Kardeşlik Projesi.” (Ankara: AK Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı, 2010). 
942Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's Kurdish Achilles' Heel," The National Interest (2011). 
943The Kurdish Opening is an initiative of the JDP which aims to solve the Kurdish issue in Turkey. 
944"Soruları Ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik Ve Kardeşlik Projesi," 25. 
945Ibid. 
946The democratic opening process is also called the National Unity and Fraternity Project by the JDP. 
Additionally, the process is given the name of Kurdish Opening on the grounds that the most problematic areas 
in Turkey’s democratisation are terrorism and the Kurdish issue. See: "Soruları Ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım 
Süreci. Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi," 24. 
Ulusoy explains the reasons why the democratic opening was first called Kurdish opening: “… the democratic 
opening started with a label of 'Kurdish opening' for two principal reasons arising from interlinked domestic and 
international factors. Although the normalization of the political situation in the southeast increased hopes for 
further democratic and economic prosperity, the [JDP]’s strategy of incorporating the Kurds by using religious 
roots and economic carrots, applied in the previous two general elections, seems to have reached its limits. The 
[JDP] lost some of the eastern and the south eastern municipalities that were previously controlled by the [JDP] 
in the latest local elections held in 2009. It was clear that this new period required the government to seriously 
respond to Kurdish demands regarding freedom of expression, cultural rights and governance. The other major 
reason was related with the international conjuncture, particularly resulting from the US declaration of 
withdrawal from Iraq. The US government was stuck in Iraq and the [JDP] seems to see this as a window of 
opportunity, a positive international environment, to initiate such a difficult process of political transformation. 
The EU also would fully support such a democratic initiative. Such a kind of political opening has long been 
needed for further democratization of Turkey, faced with the growing deterioration of the Kurdish issue. 
However, the [JDP]’s evaluation of the conjuncture of both domestic and international linkages seems crucial in 
engaging such a radical democratic initiative." See: Kıvanç Ulusoy, "The 'Democratic Opening' in Turkey: A 
Historical/Comparative Perspective," Insight Turkey 12, no. 2 (2010): 84. 
947In those regions of Turkey, the main problem is “PKK terrorism”.  
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and improve the rights of the Alevis as discussed earlier in this chapter, as well as the rights of 
the non-Muslim minority groups living in Turkey,948 as already mentioned. Furthermore, it 
aims to address the economic problems of Turkey, especially unemployment,949 and to 
entrench civilian control over the Turkish military.950 Ulusoy broadly illustrates the goals of 
the JDP’s “Democratic Opening” initiative as: 
continuing with a large constitutional reform package, the 
ruling [JDP] seems to be engaged in a huge task of deeply 
transforming the basic institutional structure of the post-
1980 regime … The rise of such a radical democratic 
initiative, aiming at responding to various forms of societal 
demands coming from widely marginalized sectors, 
ranging from conservatives defending the right to use 
headscarves to the demands of the working classes and the 
religious and ethnic minorities, has been the result of the 
mobilization of civil society forces through European 
linkages. The current policy of the democratic opening 
responds to these societal demands with a redefinition of 
the political community (through the inclusion of qualities 
to the understanding of citizenship), the recognition of the 
autonomy of civil society (through supporting grassroots 
participation and associability), and administrative 
restructuring (through the creation of autonomous regional 
and provincial levels of government carefully integrated to 
the national one and functioning in a transparent way).951 
                                                 
For more information on disparities between eastern and western regions of Turkey, please see the following 
journal article: McClure, Kevin R. "Turkey’s Eastern Question: Educational Disparities and EU Accession." The 
Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs (February 2011). 
948"Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi," 25. 
See also: Thesis Section “Ethnic and Religious Diversity”. 
949Ibid. 
950“In addition to the Kurdish opening, another crucial dimension of current democratic initiative was furthering 
the civilian control of the military. Having survived the closure case, and acknowledging the fact that furthering 
the reform process would consolidate its power in domestic politics, the [JDP] started to take bold steps in the 
area of civil-military relations. In addition to the steps taken in the ‘Ergenekon’ case, which revealed a network 
organizing acts of political violence in Turkey, and the exposure of the ‘Sledgehammer’ plan against the [JDP] 
government - a coup plot organized by a group of military officers led by the ex-head of the First Army General 
Çetin Doğan in 2003 - the prestigious role of the army in Turkeys politics was damaged. In addition to the arrest 
of a number of retired and active duty officers, including General Doğan, the government furthered its efforts 
to marginalize the role of the military in Turkeys politics by annulling the controversial Protocol on Cooperation 
for Security and Public Order (EMASYA), which allowed for military operations to be carried out for internal 
security under certain conditions without authorization from civilian authorities. The gradual marginalization of 
the army from politics has been expected to give the government the chance to deepen the democratization 
and implement the policies of the democratic opening.” 
Cited from: Ulusoy, "The 'Democratic Opening' in Turkey: A Historical/Comparative Perspective," 85. 
951Ibid., 72. 
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The “Democratic Opening” initiative represents “a radical approach to the Kurdish 
question” in the sense that the Government carries out direct negotiations with the “non-civilian 
Kurdish actors and notably with [PKK leader Abdullah] Ocalan”952 to achieve “a peaceful 
solution to the on-going dispute”.953 
In his speech at Dicle University on the 20th October 2008,954 the Prime Minister stated 
that the PKK intimidates society out of fear and panic. It responds with terror and violence 
where there is a strong will for democratisation and improvement in civil society.955 Further, 
he stated that the PKK could never be regarded as the representative of Turkish citizens with 
Kurdish ethnic origin, because the PKK poses a significant threat to the tranquillity, stability 
and security of the Turkish community as it targets the lives of Turkey’s police officers and 
soldiers,956 and because it is used by others, in and outside Turkey, to destabilise Turkish 
society while dealing in drug smuggling and human trafficking to achieve its own ends.957 The 
Prime Minister had to ‘secure his back’ while his mediators talked with Öcalan. 
The “Democratic Opening” was subject to widespread criticism, especially by the 
political opposition. While government circles maintain that domestic factors played a 
fundamental role in the reforms, the political opposition claimed that the changes were 
triggered mainly from the EU and the USA.958 As the experience of the 2009 reforms shows, 
democratic developments “are rather fragile and could easily be sabotaged”.959 With the attack 
of the terrorist organisation PKK,960 the reform initiative had its first crisis.961 The December 
2009 terrorist attack in Tokat was followed by mass nationwide protests, “almost leading to a 
                                                 
952 Abdullah Öcalan, who has been jailed for life on Imrali Island since 1999, is the leader of the PKK (the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) terrorist organisation. Since the year 1984, the PKK has been actively involved in attacks against 
government forces, as well as civilians, aiming at establishing an independent Kurdish state. See: Federation of 
American Scientists’ web-page, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/studies1.htm 
953Ziya Öniş, "Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony," Insight 
Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013): 146-47. 




958Ulusoy, "The 'Democratic Opening' in Turkey: A Historical/Comparative Perspective," 84. 
959Ibid. 
960As Ulusoy reports, it was “… a PKK terrorist attack in Tokat, a central Anatolian province, on December 7, 2009. 
Seven soldiers died in this attack. The government regarded the attack as an open provocation aiming to 
sabotage the opening.” See:  
Ulusoy, "The 'Democratic Opening' in Turkey: A Historical/Comparative Perspective," 84. 
961Ibid. 
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dangerous level of inter-communal violence between Turks and Kurds”.962 Shortly after the 
terrorist attack, and the consequent breakdown of the reforms, the Constitutional Court closed 
the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) due to “its 
alleged links with the PKK”,963 thus finalising the Court’s legal case against “the terrorist 
organisation”.964 The JDP government considered the terrorist attack as an attempt to sabotage 
the democratic opening. Although the attack led to a temporary slow-down of the reforms, the 
JDP government did not step back from its ‘democratic opening’ initiative.  
 Despite the belief of some, including Ulusoy, that implementation of the reform 
initiative had stopped, Prime Minister Erdoğan clearly stated that the democratic opening 
process was ongoing.965 On another occasion, he emphasised the importance of the process as 
follows:966 “There is no other remedy than the democratic opening”.967 In response to 
accusations that the reform initiative was launched with no comprehensive plan and lacked 
content, the Prime Minister invited a contribution from the opposition parties, stating:968 
“Those who allege that the Democratic Opening has no content, they can fill it themselves. We 
are ready for this, [for it] is impossible to solve an issue that has occurred over centuries in one 
night”, he underlined.969 Nevertheless, there was no response from the opposition.970 
According to the report of the Hürriyet Daily News, a solution was within the realm of 
possibility, as confirmed by the Prime Minster who stated:971 “It is understood that a solution 
is possible. The die is not cast.” To this end, for the JDP to add more content to the “Democratic 
Opening”, the government identified some short, medium and long-term programs.972 




965“... Erdoğan rejected criticisms that the government’s democratic opening has stopped in a speech made 
Sunday during his meeting with representatives of women’s NGOs.” See:  
"PM Says Democratic Opening Goes On," (Istanbul: Hürriyet Daily News, 18 July 2010). 
966Ibid. 
967This was a “meeting, which was held as part of a series of meetings to tell about government work on 
democratic opening.” See:  
"PM Says Democratic Opening Goes On," (Istanbul: Hürriyet Daily News, 18 July 2010). 
968Ibid. 
969Ibid. 
970"PM Says Democratic Opening Goes On." 
971Ibid. 
972Ibid.  
“Describing the initiative as a ‘dynamic process with an open end,’” former Interior Minister Beşir Atalay 
identified “some of the short-, medium-, and long-term steps the AKP hopes to accomplish. He highlighted the 
two most recent short-term goals: an amendment to an anti-terrorism law to ensure that children under 18 are 
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 For their part, the opposition parties maintained that the “Democratic Opening” 
initiative will weaken the unitary structure of the state and eventually divide the country.973 
The JDP responds to these claims putting a heavy emphasis on its strong adherence to the 
principle of a single state, a single nation and the single flag.974 In its party programme, the 
JDP confirms its allegiance to the maintenance of the unity and integrity of the state and the 
country.975 In this regard, the JDP sets out the principles that underpin its Democratic Opening 
process, being:976  
 The maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish state and its unitary structure 
 A lasting determination to combat terrorism, however, tempered with respect 
for the sensitivities of the whole society for a permanent solution to terrorism; 
                                                 
tried in juvenile courts and are not given harsh sentences under anti-terrorism legislation, and an amended 
regulation under Turkey's broadcast laws that would allow 24-hour broadcasts on television and radio in 
languages other than Turkish. He also promised similar changes to come, such as allowing politicians to conduct 
election campaigns in languages other than Turkish. In the medium-term, Atalay proposed two new 
administrative bodies. The legislation for founding the first -- an independent Anti-Discrimination Committee -- 
is already underway. The second would remove the Human Rights Directorate from the Prime Ministry to create 
an independent human rights watchdog, a development the government has been promising for a while. These 
two organizations would consist of representatives from universities, bar associations, human rights 
organizations, and civil society organizations. Atalay envisions liaison offices in every district of Turkey holding 
roundtables and consultations with citizens to identify and help resolve cases of discrimination. Atalay said the 
government would also ratify the additional protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture, which would allow 
inspection of police detention areas by international observers. He also claimed that the government would 
improve implementation of legislation against hate-crimes and discrimination, stopping short of calling for hate 
crime legislation. Finally, he announced that the government would create an independent body to handle 
complaints against law enforcement officials. In the long-term, Atalay repeated the government's position in 
favor of creating a fully democratic civilian constitution…” See: "Democratic Opening" Debate Underscores Rifts 
in Parliament," (Ankara: Wikileaks, 2009). 
973"Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi," 18. 
974Ibid., 16. 
975In its party programme, the JDP declared its commitment to the protection of the state’s unity and integrity 
as follows: “The event, which some of us call the Southeastern, others call the Kurdish or the Terror problem, is 
unfortunately a reality in Turkey. In cognizance of the negative issues caused by this problem in our social life, 
our Party shall follow a policy guarding the happiness, welfare, rights and freedoms of the regional population, 
in a manner not to create a weakness in a sustainable policy which goes beyond the identification of the reality 
the prevention of the terror threatening the region, the integrity of Turkey, as well as the unitary State structure; 
a sustainable policy which goes beyond the identification of the reality respectful to the sensitivities of the entire 
society, efficient and aimed at solving problems at the root.” See:  
JDP, "Party Programme: The East and the Southeast," Justice and Development Party, 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
Available at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_ 
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
976"Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci. Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi," 54-55. 
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 Acknowledgement that terrorism is a domestic political issue and that security, 
freedom and the economic progress for all are integral parts of its solution; 
 Avoidance of an authoritarian, bureaucratic state model based on public 
perception of security;  
 Fostering the democratic understanding of the state in order to strengthen the 
unity and integrity of the nation in the long term;  
 Understanding that the Kurdish issue is not solely an economic issue; 
 Solutions are sought within the framework of law; and,  
 An acknowledgement that diversity means cultural richness without 
subordination of national interests.  
Emphasising the cultural diversity of the country and its support for the Turkish 
language, the JDP responded to allegations, made by the opposition parties that languages other 
than Turkish will be made the language of instruction, as follows:  
The cultural diversity within Turkey is highly valued by our 
Party. On condition that the Turkish language remains the 
official language and the language of instruction, our Party 
regards cultural activities in languages other than Turkish, 
including broadcasting, as assets which support and 
reinforce the unity and integrity of our country, rather than 
weaken it. The elimination of certain troubles originating 
from under-development will be achieved within the scope 
of the general democratization project, rather than special 
arrangements aimed at specific regions or groups. 977 
I argue in this thesis that the JDP is sincere in its intention to transform Turkey through 
its “Democratic Opening” initiative, while, at the same time, restraining and decreasing the 
influence of the various separatist movements. Notwithstanding recent events, the JDP’s 
                                                 
977In one of its party documents, the JDP clearly states that Turkish is the official language and this will remain 
so adding that there is no agenda, so far, for change with respect to the official language of the country. Though 
the party took important steps to remove restrictions on people with different ethnic identities to learn, teach 
and speak their mother languages, to make and listen to music in these languages, and to broadcast on radio 
and TV channels in languages other than Turkish or dialects. See: "Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım 
Süreci. Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi," 21-22. 
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policies to date do not appear to threaten a serious deterioration in the State’s unity and 
integrity.  
The JDP government’s Democratic Opening, in its vision and roll-out, squarely 
addressed the Kurdish question, and its economic roots, albeit in language and actions that 
mollified opponents. The Kurdish question and Turkey’s territorial integrity are linked. The 
Democratic Opening was a significant beginning in resolving the former without endangering 
the latter. Events after 2014 have returned Turkey to the worst days of Kurdish militancy and 
the JDP government’s concomitant military response. The Democratic Opening, for all intents 
and purposes, is shelved but its underlying raison d'être remains available at some time in the 
medium term future.  
For creating the vehicle for a long term non-military solution of the Kurdish question, 
I score the JDP government a significant advance on its democratic scorecard. 
Constitutional Reform Package 
In addition to its Democratic Opening initiative, the JDP government commenced a 
reform process on 22 March 2010 known as the “constitutional reform package”.978 The 
existing 1982 Constitution was framed by Turkey’s military establishment. The 2010 reforms 
aimed to amend or replace significant parts of the 1982 Constitution with provisions that 
reflected developments in Turkish society since 1982 that were widely agreed and that 
formalised Turkey’s continuing journey to a fully democratic nation state. The constitutional 
amendment package promoted by the JDP government was submitted to the Turkish Grand 
                                                 
978According to the 08/2010 policy brief of the SETA Foundation the idea of a constitutional reform package was 
developed by passing through the following stages: “Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, four 
constitutions have been adopted (1921, 1924, 1961, and 1982), which were significantly amended by the 
successive parliaments in light of new developments, yet remained short of meeting universal democratic 
standards. The last two constitutions were drafted in the aftermath of military interventions, and none of them 
have been produced out of negotiation, bargaining or a compromise process. Within the framework of the EU 
reforms, Turkey’s most recent constitution of 1982 has been amended several times – so much so that almost 
one third of the constitution has been reconstructed. There have been demands for the drawing up of a new 
constitution from both right and left wing parties, but the idea has never been realized. 
The JDP announced the constitutional reform package on March 22 and the Turkish parliament approved the 
bill to reform the constitution on May 7, 2010. The Turkish public voted on the whole package on September 12, 
2010; the date of the referendum has a symbolic meaning, as the current constitution is the product of the coup 
d’état of September 12, 1980.” See: Selin M. Bölme and Taha Özhan, "Constitutional Referendum in Turkey," in 
SETA Policy Brief No:47 (Ankara: SETA Foundation, 2010): 3. See also: Anonymous, "Can Erdogan Pull It Off? 
Turkey's Constitutional Referendum," The Economist 396, no. 8699 (2010): 3. 
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National Assembly on 30 March 2010.979 The package was adopted by a majority of 336 
votes980 in the Assembly on 7 May 2010,981 and published in the Official Gazette on 13 May 
2010.982 The constitutional reforms, comprising 26 articles983 amending significant parts of the 
existing constitution, were subject to popular referendum on 12 September 2010.984 
Approximately 77% 985 of Turkey’s eligible voting population took part in the referendum and, 
approximately 58% of votes counted986 were in favour of the constitutional amendments,987 
being approximately 44% of eligible voters. 
The 2010 constitutional reforms had two main aims: Increasing the rights and freedoms 
of citizens and reorganising the judiciary in a more democratic manner. However, before 
dealing with the details of the constitutional amendments, I would like to briefly touch upon 
the importance of the 12 September 2010 referendum. 
Though referenda to amend various constitutions were nothing new for the Turkish 
republic,988 the 2010 referendum had been the most significant.989 The amendments proposed 
significant changes to the political and institutional arrangements established by the 1960 and 
1980 military coups.990 Further, the amendments removed the virtual immunity from legal 
                                                 




983Egemen Bağış, "What Does the Constitutional Amendment Package Bring?," (2010), 
http://egemenbagis.com/en/1568 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
984The date of the referendum has a symbolic meaning, as the current constitution is the product of the coup 
d'état of September 12, 1980. See:  
Anonymous, "Can Erdogan Pull It Off? Turkey's Constitutional Referendum," 2.  
985Sinan Ciddi, "Turkey's September 12, 2010, Referendum," MERIA Journal 15, no. 4 (2011). 
986Ibid. 
987“On March 22, 2010, the [JDP] announced a constitutional reform package that would include amendments 
to 24 articles of the current constitution and add three new provisional articles. The package also included the 
elimination of Article 15, a ‘provisional’ article that has been in the constitution since the 1980s, preventing the 
trials of officials involved in the 1980 military coup. The largest reform package amending the 1982 Constitution 
made its way to Parliament at the end of March, 2010. During the voting process, the article regarding the 
closure of political parties was dropped from the package as it could not receive the necessary 330 votes.” See: 
Anonymous, "Can Erdogan Pull It Off? Turkey's Constitutional Referendum," 4. 
988Porter Barney, "Turkey Backs Constitutional Changes," ed. U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International 
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accountability enjoyed by the military and civilian bureaucracy, and democratised the political 
system.991 
With the 2010 constitutional referendum, the Turkish public was given the opportunity 
for the first time ever to authorise a Turkish government (the JDP government) to amend the 
constitution. Given that the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions were imposed by military juntas 
without consultation or negotiation, the 2010 referendum represented legitimate constitutional 
reform and marked an important step in the JDP’s democratisation process for Turkey.992 
Unlike the processes surrounding former constitutional changes, the 2010 constitutional 
referendum valued the input of the public in order to create a more civil democratic 
constitution. In a SETA report, Ete, Üstün and Yılmaz illustrate the importance of the 
referendum as follows: 
The constitutional referendum of September 2010 was a 
historic moment and a milestone in modern Turkey’s 
democratization journey. Serving as the public’s “final 
say” on the question of democracy in Turkey and paving 
the way for a new civilian constitution, the referendum will 
have far-reaching consequences for civil-military relations, 
independence of the judicial system, and 
institutionalization of democracy in Turkey.993 
According to the JDP, the 2010 referendum “represented a choice between old-style 
tutelary politics [and] real democracy.”994 The referendum also indicated to the international 
community that a majority of Turkish voters was in favour of institutional democratisation and 
valued highly “a focus on the content of political debates as opposed to old-style partisan 
politics.”995 The referendum also illustrated that those political groups which opposed “further 
enhancement of basic rights and freedoms”996 would likely get less support in the future and 
                                                 
991Aiming to diversify the membership cadres of the High Judiciary by opening up to more societal and political 
participation, the package is a serious attempt to liberalise and democratise the political system. See: Porter 
Barney, "Turkey Backs Constitutional Changes," ed. U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International 
Information Programs (2010): 6. 
992The making process of the former constitutions is a top-down process. 
993Barney, "Turkey Backs Constitutional Changes," 5. 
994Ibid., 8. 
995Ibid. 
996Barney, "Turkey Backs Constitutional Changes," 8. 
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the mantra of “guardianship of the Republic” was only supported by a small minority of 
Turkish citizens.997 
Using the SETA policy report998 as the main reference base, I want, now, to provide 
some background information on the proposed constitutional amendments999 that are relevant 
to my thesis and relate to personal freedoms, judicial reforms, coup leaders and military 
personnel and economic and social rights. These amendments came into force on the 23 
September 2010,1000 and are, in summary: 
Personal Freedoms: The first part of the constitutional amendment package covers 
amendments relating to fundamental rights and freedoms, and represents a more liberal and 
rights-based approach to the relationship between the individual and the state. The reforms 
prioritise the individual vis-à-vis the state, offer greater freedoms for individuals, extend the 
scope of opportunities for women and minorities and increase the democratic nature of state 
institutions. Specifically, the following key changes were introduced: 
 The institution of Ombudsman had been established to resolve complaints 
against the Turkish state by its citizens in the conduct of government 
administrative practice and operation, including central, regional and local 
governments as well as state economic enterprises and other government 
agencies. Complaints about military and penal institutions and operations are 
outside the Ombudsman’s authority, and complaints in relation to the judiciary 
are handled exclusively by the Constitutional Court. 
                                                 
997Ibid. 
998Anonymous, "Can Erdogan Pull It Off? Turkey's Constitutional Referendum," 5-6. SETA: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve 
Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (English: Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research). SETA is a 
Washington DC based independent and nonpartisan think tank and press organisation. On its web-site, SETA is 
defined as “a non-profit research institute [that] dedicated [itself] to innovative studies on national, regional, 
and international issues.” SETA aims “to produce up-to-date and accurate knowledge and analyses in the fields 
of politics, economy and society and inform policy makers and the public on changing political, economic, social 
and cultural conditions.” SETA makes analysis on several “national and international issues in an historical and 
cultural context.” See: Foundation’s web-page, http://setav.org/About  
999See: Metin Arslan, "Anayasa Değişikliği Yürürlüğe Girdi, Yargıda Demokratik Seçim Süreci Başladı 
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 In relation to personal privacy, personal information (e.g. names, photographs 
and ID information) provided by citizens remain confidential and only retained 
if the individual provides consent. Where personal information is being 
misused, an individual is able to make a claim against the relevant entities.1001  
 Laws and regulations introduced to promote positive discrimination, also known 
as affirmative action, towards women are no longer considered contrary to the 
Constitutional principle of equality, or laws and regulations taken to protect 
children, the elderly, disabled people, the widows and orphans of those who 
have died for the state, and veterans.1002 
 Deputies, whose party is subject to closure, can retain their parliamentary seats 
until the next term.1003 With the change in structure of the Constitutional Court, 
closing-down of political parties was restricted. 
 Government workers, who previously could only be a member of one labour 
union, were granted the right to become a member of several labour unions.1004 
Further, employment warnings and reprimands for civil servants became open 
to judicial review.1005 
Judicial reforms: The second part of the package, which contains amendments relating 
to the judiciary, aims to transform the judiciary to a more democratic and participatory 
organisation. The Constitutional Court and the High Council for Judges and Public Prosecutors 
(Turkish: Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu, the ‘HSYK’) were restructured with regard to 
their composition and powers. These reforms also restrict the judicial authority of Turkey’s 
military courts to military offences by military staff. Specifically, the amendments introduced 
the following key changes: 
                                                 
1001Euronews, "Turkey’s Constitutional Groundshift," (2010), http://euronews.com/2010/09/10/turkey-s-
constitutional-groundshift/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1002"Factbox: Turkey's Constitutional Amendments," (Reuters, 2010). 
1003Barney, "Turkey Backs Constitutional Changes." 
1004"Factbox: Turkey's Constitutional Amendments." 
1005Ömer Şahin and Dilek Hayırlı, "What Will the Sept. 12 Referendum Bring?," (2010), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=1076DFDBA0E8302948D2125EF39
F29C8?newsId=218436 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
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 Under the current provisions, unlike before, Turkey’s Parliament has now the 
authority to choose some of the members of the Constitutional Court. And the 
number of members in the Court increased.1006 Parliament was given the 
authority to appoint three members whereas the President of Turkey appoints, 
directly or indirectly, 14 members of the court, being: three members from the 
Supreme Court of Appeals; two from the Council of State; one from the Military 
Supreme Court of Appeals; one from the Military High Court of Administration; 
three from the Higher Education Council; and, four members directly among 
senior civil service officials, senior judges and public prosecutors, self-
employed lawyers or rapporteurs of the Constitutional Court.1007 All 
institutional appointments made by the President to the Constitutional Court are 
currently based on nominations by the various institutions.  
 Members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) were 
increased from 7 to 22. The Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State 
no longer remain the ultimate bodies to elect HSYK members.1008 Eleven 
members can now be appointed to the broader HSYK from the ‘wider 
judiciary’.1009 
 Dismissed judges were given the choice to appeal to the judiciary. Just like the 
decisions of the of the Supreme Military Council (Turkish: Yüksek Askeri Şura, 
YAŞ),1010 the HSYK’s decisions can now be taken to judicial review. Further, 
the prosecutors and judges, who are dismissed by the Board, gained the right to 
make a claim in court for unfair dismissal. 
 All citizens were granted the authority to file a petition with the Constitutional 
Court.1011 Previously, recourse was only possible at the European Court of 
Human Rights.1012 
                                                 
1006Anonymous, "Can Erdogan Pull It Off? Turkey's Constitutional Referendum." 
1007Ciddi, "Turkey's September 12, 2010, Referendum." 
1008Anonymous, "Can Erdogan Pull It Off? Turkey's Constitutional Referendum." 
1009There are approximately 13,000 judges in Turkey. 
1010The Supreme Military Council is a committee of the Turkish Armed Forces which convenes twice a year to 
decide upon the military's agenda. 
1011"Factbox: Turkey's Constitutional Amendments." 
1012Şahin and Hayırlı, "What Will the Sept. 12 Referendum Bring?". 
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 The Chairman of the Parliament, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish 
Armed Forces, the Ministers and other senior government officials were given 
the right to appear before the Supreme State Council (Turkish: Yüce Divan) for 
crimes in relation to their duties.1013  
Coup leaders and military personnel: Provisional Article 15 of the 1982 Constitution 
was abolished and the leaders of the 1980 military coup lost constitutional immunity from legal 
proceedings arising from the coup.1014 Officers in the military who prepare coup plans or 
commit any other crime against the state became subject to trial in civilian courts.1015 However, 
dismissed military personnel received the right of appeal to the judiciary, the right to legal 
remedies and the right of defence.1016 
Economic and social rights: Travel restrictions on business individuals with tax debts 
were lifted. Business individuals under tax investigation or prosecution were not allowed to 
travel abroad under previous regulations. Under the amendments, travelling abroad became 
possible where there is no court decision restricting travel.1017 
Civil servants gained the right to bargain collectively and the Public Employees’ 
Arbitration Board, which is the body consisting of representatives of government employees, 
was given the final say. This right also applies to retired civil servants. Civil servants who 
complain of unfair treatment became able to make a claim in court.1018 
Restrictions on politically motivated strikes and lock-outs to advance workers’ rights 
were also removed.1019 Labour unions were released from liability for material damage to a 
workplace even if the damage resulted from deliberate negligent behaviour by the workers and 
the labour union.1020 
                                                 
1013"Factbox: Turkey's Constitutional Amendments." See also: Sağam Fazıl, "Orhan Pamuk ve Referandum," 
Hakimiyet (2010). 
1014Anonymous, "Can Erdogan Pull It Off? Turkey's Constitutional Referendum." 
1015Barney, "Turkey Backs Constitutional Changes." 
1016Ibid. 
1017Şahin and Hayırlı, "What Will the Sept. 12 Referendum Bring?". 
1018Ibid. 
1019"What Will the Constitutional Changes Mean for Turkey?," Hürriyet Daily News, 9 December 2010. 
1020"What Will the Sept. 12 Referendum Bring?". 
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The Economic and Social Council, comprising representatives from unions, and 
employer associations and confederations, received constitutional protection. The Council was 
given the competence to determine its internal finances, with the government no longer 
involved in council activities. 
The reform of Turkey’s 1982 Constitution was long overdue by the time the JDP gained 
power. By 2010, the JDP had been in office for eight years and had taken that time to embed 
much of its professed liberal democratic policy outlook. The 2010 constitutional referendum 
was as important as the substance of the reforms. Both process and substance were at the heart, 
as I argue in this thesis, of the party’s acceptance in 2001 that liberal democracy was the best 
risk adjusted way forward for Turkey. But just as important, the party chose liberal democracy 
as the safest route for it to become the natural party of power in a republic infused with a faith 
based culture. The party’s democratic outlook was much more pragmatic than idealistic. 
For its promotion of the 2010 constitutional reforms, I score the JDP government a 
significant advance on its democratisation scorecard. 
Conclusion 
In its first term of office, the JDP government passed six legislative EU harmonisation 
packages and various constitutional amendments which, in many key areas, aligned Turkish 
law with EU standards.. Through these reforms, freedom of opinion, freedom of thought, 
freedom of the press, freedom of association, and religious freedoms were strengthened. 
Civilian control of the military is generally considered the sine qua non for democratic states. 
However, until recently, Turkey has had a poor record in terms of its military’s role in politics. 
Several military interventions in politics after 1960 significantly weakened Turkish democracy 
and its development potential; as a result, decades were lost in Turkey’s democratisation 
progress. The JDP has significantly reduced the military’s tutelage and this could be considered 
the party’s biggest achievement in the democratisation of Turkey.  
The JDP also abandoned the former state policy of denying ethnic identities other than 
Turkish, including the Kurdish identity, and put an end to related assimilation policies, and laid 
the groundwork for political dialogue with those ethnic groups. To those ends, the JDP 
introduced its “Democratic Opening” initiative in July 2013, which, in a broader sense, 
strengthened democratic freedoms in Turkey and marginalised the issue of “PKK terrorism”. 
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The “Democratic Opening” initiative was in stark contrast to the exclusively security-based 
policies of previous governments. The JDP placed more emphasis on, and assigned a primary 
role to, the “human rights and democratisation dimension” of the initiative1021 and maintained 
open relations with Barzani’s Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This new strategy was 
promising and challenging at the same time. This is nothing new in the many ‘worlds’ of 
historical and seemingly intractable group conflicts. Time and the determination of both parties 
may, I argue in this thesis, permanently resolve this ‘troublesome’ matter. What remains clear 
is that the start of the process “constitutes a positive development” and more importantly, led 
to a considerable decrease in PKK terrorist attacks, at least until the end of 2014. These 
developments, together with at least temporary marginalisation of the PKK as a result, are 
considered an important achievement of the JDP at the time. 
Further, in terms of ‘democratisation’ under the JDP, the cultural rights of Kurds were 
expanded, and the scope of democratic rights of Alevis and non-Muslim minorities living in 
Turkey extended. In this process, the party espoused a more pluralistic approach towards 
Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslim groups. While there was a major improvement in terms of the 
Kurdish rights under the JDP governments until the end of the year 2014, the progress in the 
rights of the non-Muslim minorities was tardy and the development in the rights of the Alevis 
remained marginal.1022 
 Despite its professed multi-cultural approach, and its formal overtures towards the 
Alevi community, the JDP government did not formulate or implement any conclusive strategy 
that addressed the significant Alevi concerns. Though the JDP’s ‘Alevi Opening’ initiative was 
the first of its kind in modern Turkish political history, it was only a start that went nowhere: 
better late than never, and better workshops than violence. However, with a conclusive strategy 
there for the making but not ‘made’, the JDP’s failure represents a minus score on its 
democratisation ‘score card’.1023  
                                                 
1021Öniş, "Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony," 115. 
1022Martti Ahtisaari et al., "Turkey in Europe: The Imperative for Change," (Brussels: Independent Commission 
on Turkey, 2014): 14. 
1023Talha Köse, "The AKP and the 'Alevi Opening': Understanding the Dynamics of the Rapprochement," Insight 
Turkey 12, no. 2 (2010): 147. 
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In relation to non-Muslim minorities, their congregations were granted improved 
religious, property and educational rights and conditions, as well as better access to freedom 
of the press.1024 Nevertheless, the issue of state recognition of the ‘Ecumenical’ status of the 
Greek Orthodox Patriarch, the issue of the Greek Orthodox seminary of Halki, and the 
monopolisation of Greek Orthodox religious education by the state, remain unresolved, as 
previously mentioned.  
In relation to women and children, the JDP government took several legislative 
measures in order to improve their rights, as well as promote gender equality. However, 
important aspects of women’s rights remain subject to criticism. These include “educational 
attainment”,1025 “violence against women, equal opportunities at the workplace, paid and 
unpaid labour, hidden forms of discrimination and access to political decision-making and 
representation.” 1026 
Under JDP governments, civil society organisations in Turkey have gained significant 
influence compared to their status throughout the republic’s history. Through the various EU 
harmonisation reforms, especially between the years 2002 and 2004, CSOs were granted 
improved rights and received greater official recognition by the JDP government.1027 However, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s polarising rhetoric towards dissident groups and the CSOs criticising 
him constitutes a severe political problem for the JDP government. Another major problem is 
that the CSOs, especially those who oppose government policies, are no longer involved in the 
formal consultations for policy making process.  
As previously discussed, Turkey has had a bleak record in the field of human rights 
throughout its political history, especially before the year 2000. Some Turkish government 
agencies were not strangers to “systematic torture […] abundance of violations of right to life, 
ill-treatment practices in prisons and police stations and poor physical conditions in these 
premises”.1028 However, important steps were taken by the JDP government in 2002 to improve 
                                                 
1024Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim Ve Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2012 [the Silent Revolution: 
Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012], 78. See also:  
The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 80. 
1025Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi, "Table 5: Rankings by Subindex, 2012 (Cont’d.)," 15. 
1026Müftüler-Baç, "Gender Equality in Turkey," 1. 
1027For the reforms undertaken by the JDP to strengthen civil society organisations in Turkey see: “Civil Society” 
section in this chapter. 
1028The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory 2002-2012, 70. 
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human rights standards in Turkey. Through several important JDP measures including its 
initiation of a zero tolerance policy, the torture and ill-treatment of Turkish residents was for a time 
significantly reduced. Those measures were welcomed by the Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture of the Council of Europe, and the EU Commission in its 2009, 2010 and 2011 Progress 
Reports on Turkey. However, there is still a significant implementation deficit in the area, 
especially since 2012. The use of torture and ill-treatment, and the use of lethal force by security 
forces, remain subject to criticism.  
I argue in this thesis that the JDP led a successful democratisation process during its 
terms in power, particularly up to Turkey’s 12 June 2011 general elections. It can be well 
argued that the JDP has secured the ‘beachhead’ that its ‘democratisation’ invasion required. 
The JDP’s ‘democratisation’ invasion acted against the established Kemalist and 
military/bureaucratic political order that had become pre-JDP modern Turkey and whose end 
was necessary for the emergence of an outward looking Turkey in what was then the fast 
approaching 21st century. 
I have marked the JDP government’s democratic scorecard in relation to the various 
areas of discussion in this chapter as follows: 
 EU Accession - significant advance  
 Military Tutelage - significant advance  
 Ethnic and Religious Diversity - significant advance  
 Gender Equality and Children’s Rights - no significant change 
 Civil Society - significant advance 
 Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - no significant change  
 Democratic Opening Initiative - significant advance 
 Constitutional Reform - significant advance 
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Chapter 6: YEAR 2013 - A TURNING POINT? 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses key developments of the years 2013 and 2014 that led to a 
significant loss of the ‘democratisation’ momentum that the JDP had built-up during its first 
ten years in government. The events are briefly described and provide an opportunity to ‘road 
test’ the JDP government’s democratisation credentials in answer to the question: Are the 
reforms a convenient sham or are they genuine reforms that have suffered, temporarily, from 
events? The two developments described in this chapter are the early-2013 Taksim Gezi Park 
civil protest and its nationwide consequences, and the late-2013 corruption allegations that 
engulfed the JDP’s leadership. Both brought immediate and sharp responses from the JDP 
government, responses that were violent as well as undemocratic when measured against those 
characteristics of democracy that I have set out in Chapter 2 of this thesis under the heading 
‘Characteristics of democracy’ (refer page 46), specifically: majority rule (avoidance of 
tyranny of the majority), the rule of law (equality before and access to the law), individual 
freedom (freedoms of association, assembly and expression) and, tolerance, cooperation and 
compromise (the solution is, ultimately, dialogue). 
The JDP government’s responses to the events of 2013 tested the above characteristics. 
The discussion in this chapter is to assess whether they were being tested to destruction. 
The chapter explores the wider issues stemming from the park protest and the 
government’s response, issues that provide key litmus tests of ‘democratisation’ progress. The 
chapter also discusses the conflict between the JDP and the Gülen community, a conflict 
exposed publicly for the first time as a result of the allegations. The chapter explores the 
complexities around this explosive fall-out of ‘old friends’, and what it says about the JDP 
leadership’s ‘democratisation’ genuineness and sustainability. Both events were ‘witnessed’ 
by the EU as part of the Turkey/EU accession process and reported by the EU in its 2013 and 
2014 Turkey Progress Reports, which are discussed in this chapter. Apart from reputable 
academics, the EU was best positioned to provide a balanced and constructive view on the 
events and their impact on the JDP’s democratisation progress. 
The chapter also discusses the significant polarising effect of the two developments on 
the JDP’s standing post 2012 between the government leadership and the nation, and between 
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the JDP leadership and its political hinterland. These polarisations re-exposed the tensions 
between secular Turkey and Turkey’s Islamic culture, tensions that the JDP’s democratic 
reforms were targeted to manage and relegate, in time, to the past. This thesis argues that 
managing these tensions, with minimum risk and high expectancy of relegating them to the 
past was the main reason the JDP chose the ‘democratisation’ journey. 
Taksim Gezi Park Protest 
The Taksim Gezi Park protest and the JDP government’s responses have raised 
questions relevant to this thesis: What is the impact of the protest and its immediate 
consequences on the evolution of Turkish democracy? Can an analysis of the events provide a 
clearer measure of the JDP’s commitment to ‘democratisation’, in particular the commitment 
of the government party leader and Prime Minister, now President, Erdoğan?  
The Taksim Gezi Park protests have been “the most extensive and persistent protest” 
in Turkish political history.1029 Social media played a key role in the protests.1030 The initial 
protest started in late May 2013 in response to the government’s urban management project to 
redevelop the Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park into a large shopping mall complex and a new 
mosque.1031 The park, though small, was an important recreational area for the city’s downtown 
area on its European side. The protest, led by a small group of environmentalists, was peaceful 
in nature with the aim of retaining the existing park.1032 Later, the protest turned into an anti-
government riot. The Wall Street Journal reported: “[the] small green space in Istanbul became 
the epicentre of nationwide anti-government demonstrations after a heavy police response to 
                                                 
1029Howard Eissenstat to Amnesty International – USA: Turkey Regional Action Network 2013, 
http://humanrightsturkey.org/2013/11/01/more-police-violence-in-turkey-amnestys-statement-on-excessive-
force-at-middle-east-technical-university/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1030Protestors “used Twitter to share information about how to survive the protests; Facebook sites provided 
news updates on the situation in occupied Gezi Park; while photographs of the protests have been shared on 
Flickr and Tumblr and video on sites such as YouTube.” 
Thus “Social media networks have played a major role in the recent anti-government demonstrations in Turkey. 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recognised this and blamed them for the problems, calling Twitter a 
‘menace’”. See: European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," Commission Staff Working 
Document (2013). 
1031İpek Demirsu, "Gezi Protests in Turkey: Lessons of Democracy and Novel Forms of Resistance" in National 
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2013 Seminar Series The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 
(Dunedin: University of Otago, 2013), 1. 
1032Ibid. 
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protesters who objected to plans to raze [the park for development]”.1033 Excessive use of force 
by the police against the protesters provoked nationwide anti-government protests.1034 
Notwithstanding world-wide criticism and strong opposition within the country, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan endorsed the violent tactics of the Turkish police force towards the protesters. 
He claimed that the police did not use undemocratic methods or restrict the freedoms of Turkish 
citizens in its operations. He further pointed out that the police successfully performed their 
tasks in accordance with the law and the lawful commands of their superiors, stating: “Our 
police passed a tough test of democracy successfully [...] they stood against attacks and 
provocations that would not be tolerated in some other countries; in a way, [the action of the 
police] was a heroic story.”1035 These statements by the Prime Minister at the time were not 
based on the facts on the ground. The response of the police was recorded by many personal 
videos and shown to be excessive and at times brutal against the Gezi Park protesters. The 
recordings were uploaded to social media websites and set-out in international human rights 
reports. The Prime Minister further stated: “Only our police could keep going in such a long-
lasting struggle without losing their dignity and discipline and by lasting 48 hours straight 
without food or water.”1036 He stated that internal (unnamed by the Prime Minister but, by 
implication, believed to be the main opposition party and the terrorist organisations in the 
country) and external forces provoked the protests: “Starting from the very beginning of the 
protests, our police were targeted [as well as] the government, our democracy and national will. 
                                                 
1033Ayla Albayrak, "Half of Turks Say Erdogan Is Becoming Authoritarian," (Europe: The Wall Street Journal, 17 
June 2013). 
1034“The protests were countered by police force. Some police used excessive force in response to the major 
wave of protests which resulted in 10 deaths, 14 people losing their eyes, 200 brain traumas and more than 
8,000 injuries. The police’s excessive use of force was condemned in the international arena and human rights 
organisations such as Amnesty International, as well as the European Union.”  
The European Commission condemned the police’s use of excessive force in its annual progress report on 
Turkey. See: European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 5. 
See also:  
Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Siyasal Çatışma Ve Uzlaşma [Political Conflict and Reconciliation], 3rd ed. (Ankara: İmge 
Kitabevi, 1995). 
“ … At several instances the police used excessive force against demonstrators. Six people died, including one 
policeman, thousands were injured, some of them severely, over 3,500 were taken into police custody, of whom 
over 112 remained in detention on [the] judge’s decision, including members of NGOs participating in the Taksim 
Solidarity Platform (a grouping of associations active on the Gezi Park issue). Out of [those taken into custody], 
108 persons were detained on suspicion of being a member of a terror organisation.” See: 
Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 5. 
1035"Erdoğan Hails Turkish Police, Says They Were Unfairly Targeted," (Istanbul: Today's Zaman, 2013). 
1036Ibid. 
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Some national and international media [outlets] and [foreign] parliaments targeted our police 
as well.”1037  
There is “no doubt” that terrorist organisations such as the communist-inspired splinter 
groups, the DHKP-C, MLKP, TKP-ML and THKP-C, as well as the Kurdish independence 
confederation, the PKK/KCK, and some external forces, instigated or even led some anti-
government protests, as part of the overall groundswell of protest throughout the country.1038 
However, the Prime Minister’s assertions that the protests and the criticism of the police were 
a concerted criticism of the Turkish nation, for many, simply amounted to a government 
manufactured conspiracy theory. The JDP government’s need for an all-encompassing 
narrative around the protests, a narrative of national security, unity and national will, did not 
bode well for the democratisation process the JDP government had so ably promoted in its first 
two terms of office. The government’s actions raised questions about its long term democratic 
credentials and unsettled the firm belief, held by many in and out of the party, that there was 
no ‘hidden agenda’-- an ‘agenda’, real or imagined, that had been the JDP’s Achilles heel since 
its inception.  
The subsequent protests and anti-government riots spread quickly and widely 
throughout the country. One explanation was that they reflected a wide-spread conviction that 
Prime Minister Erdoğan and his JDP government were not governing in the interests of all 
Turkish citizens and were happy to pursue projects against the common good. Further, as a 
result of its swift and at times draconian response to protests, the government was accused of 
violating fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of demonstration, assembly, 
expression and the media, as well as encroaching on Turkey’s constitutional secularism.  
The Gezi Park protests could be considered a reaction, not unusual in democratic 
nations, to a political party that has held government, without interruption, for more than eleven 
years. From this perspective, it has similarities with the “May 68” movement in France.1039 The 
                                                 
1037Ibid. 
1038See: Atilla Sandıklı and Erdem Kaya, "The Gezi Park Protests: The Lessons Turkey Should Take," (2013), 
http://www.bilgesam.org/en//incele/1406/-the-gezi-park-protests--the-lessons-turkey-should-take/#.VhQ-
SkbwDB4 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1039In May 1968 a general uprising (known as “May 68”) occurred across France. It quickly reached near-
revolutionary proportions before being discouraged by the French Communist Party which was Stalinist 
oriented, and finally suppressed by the government that blamed the Communists for leading an insurrection 
against the Republic.  
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Gezi Park demonstration has also been compared to other “social protest movements” such as 
the anti-capitalist “Occupy Wall Street” and “Les Indignes” movements.1040 Some 
commentators consider the Gezi movement to be a part of the Arab Spring1041 with similarities 
to the Tahrir Square movement,1042 even calling it the Turkish Spring.1043 However, the ‘Arab 
                                                 
May 68 events started as a series of student strikes that occurred at many universities and high schools in Paris, 
subsequent to the conflict of students with university administrators and the police. 
Some philosophers and historians considered the uprising as “the single most important revolutionary event of 
the 20th century” as it didn’t include a sole demographic like “workers and racial minorities”, but was rather a 
truly popular uprising that superseded “ethnic, cultural, age and class boundaries.” See: Martin Frost, "French 
Riots May 1968," http://martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/paris_1968.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
During the 1968 movement in Paris, the slogan was “enough is enough (In French: ça suffit!)” and protestors 
demonstrated against Charles De Gaulle for staying in power for ten years. Likewise, the Gezi Park protest aimed 
against the JDP government and said “enough” to the JDP’s rule. See:  
Martin Frost, "French Riots May 1968," http://martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/paris_1968.html  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
 
1040Ibid. 
“The Occupy Wall Street movement began in New York City when thousands of protesters descended on Wall 
Street, which is seen by most citizens as the center of the American financial sector, to show widespread 
dissatisfaction with corporate greed and wealth disparity. Occupy Wall Street protesters have adopted "We are 
the 99%" as their motto, which has become ubiquitous in their street and Internet campaigns.” See: Zoe, “What 
is the Occupy Wall Street movement fighting for and how does it fit into the larger liberal ideology?”, Yo Expert, 
http://us-liberal-politics.yoexpert.com/us-liberal-politics-general/what-is-the-occupy-wall-street-movement-
fighting-f-13024.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
“What has become known as the Occupy movement in the English-speaking world, or Indignados and Indignés 
in Spain and France respectively, is a loose network of separate protests or protest movements in over 80 
countries that broadly question the [conventional] wisdom of modern economic thinking, and deplore the 
[inequalities] it causes.  
The initial impetus for the movement came from Spain, the European country with the highest number of 
unemployed, where tens of thousands of largely younger people started to stage sit-ins on major city squares 
across the country on 15 May 2011. They soon assumed the collective title of Los Indignados (the indignant or 
outraged ones).” See: William Daniels, “Les Indignés”, panos pictures, http://www.panos.co.uk/stories/2-13-
1356-1851/William-Daniels/Les-Indigneacute%3Bs/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1041The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across 
the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011. For more information see: 
"Divergence and Decline: The Middle East and the World after the Arab Spring," in Countries at the Crossroads 
2012 (Washington & New York: Freedom House, 2012). 
1042Egyptians calling for an end to President Hosni Mubarak's 30-year rule captured the world's attention with 
mass protests from January 25, 2011, across the country, especially in Cairo's central Tahrir Square which citizens 
occupied for more than two weeks. Originally inspired by the Tunisian uprisings that began in December 2010, 
the Egyptian protests [inspired new] hope for change. Initially, the government blocked the internet and mobile 
phone communication, but news of arrests and police repression still circulated online. According to Human 
Rights Watch, police but news of arrests and police repression still circulated online. According to Human Rights 
Watch, police violence against protesters (especially tear gas canisters and rubber bullets fired at people's 
heads) led to the deaths of at least 300 people. Victory finally came on 11 February, when President Mubarak 
stepped down. See: Aamir Raz Soomro, “Egypt Revolution 2011”, 
globalvoicesonline.org (ed.), 26 January 2011, http://globalvoicesonline.org/specialcoverage/2011-special-
coverage/egypt-protests-2011/  [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1043The violent incidents across Turkey, including crowds chanting anti-government slogans in Istanbul’s Taksim 
Square, have been dubbed “The Turkish Spring”, by some international media. The euronews Istanbul 
correspondent Bora Bayraktar opposes this viewpoint in his following article: Bora Bayraktar, “Is this the Turkish 
Spring? The view from the euronews Istanbul correspondent”, euronews (ed.), 3 June 2013, 
  
   222 
 
Spring’ was a reaction to authoritarian governments, whereas democracy has existed in Turkey 
since 1946, despite some setbacks. Nevertheless, the Gezi movement could be considered as a 
call for an end of Prime Minister Erdoğan government’s authoritarian practices, and as a call 
for more democracy in the country. 
While some commentators remained moderate in assessing the impact of the protests 
and the government’s reaction, there were also two strong opposing views. Some held that the 
government should be supported even on the Prime Minister’s unqualified endorsement of the 
police’s disproportionate use of tear gas and water cannon. Others accused him of being “an 
Oriental despot” or “a dictator [like] Hitler and the Ottoman sultans”1044 or, in a less extreme 
manner in late 2013, of being “authoritarian”.1045 As a researcher I prefer to hold a moderate 
view and argue that rarely in politics are matters black and white, instead we should focus 
solely on the protests and their role in Turkey’s democratisation process. 
 The Gezi Park ‘movement’ is of particular importance for Turkey’s democratisation 
process, although it is too soon to assess its long term impact. It confirms the increasing desire 
for more democracy, as a bottom-up pressure in response to the JDP government’s unpopular 
policies and governance.1046 Further, the movement has broken new ground in Turkey by using 
                                                 
http://www.euronews.com/2013/06/03/is-this-the-turkish-spring-the-view-from-the-euronews-istanbul-
correspondent-/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1044Ömer Şener, "The Gezi Protests, Polyphony and ‘Carnivalesque Chaos’," Journal of Global Faultlines: 40. 
1045While appreciating the Justice and Development Party’s good moves in the past, Hannes Swoboda –an 
Austrian lawmaker and the president of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the 
European Parliament – stated that “it has become an Islamo-conservative movement with authoritarian 
leadership.” See:  
Sevgi Akarçeşme, "Turkey Has Increasingly Authoritarian Way of Government, Swoboda Says," Today's Zaman, 
23 November 2013. 
“As Turkey’s dominant Premier, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has done much to deepen the country’s long-troubled 
institutions of democracy. But he may be remembered instead for his authoritarian streak”, TIME World 
magazine says. See: 
Karl Vick, "Erdogan’s Paradox: Turkish Leader Struggles between Authoritarianism and Democracy," TIME World, 
24 June 2013. 
1046The loss of public space by the JDP government laid the groundwork for the Gezi Park protests. This occurred 
because of the following unwanted policies: “restrictions on the freedom of expression”, repressive actions 
against the opposition – particularly journalists who were dismissed, “and the mass media changing its editorial 
[staff]” – have put internal pressure on public discourse.  
The JDP government’s “moralising intrusions” into the people’s way of life led to the suspicion that the 
government was aiming at encroaching the secular ways of life and shaping the public life according to the 
Islamic values. For instance, “a warning [was] issued to a young couple kissing on a subway in Ankara”, “a decree 
[limited] the sale of alcohol”, “all images, advertisements andmovie scenes involving alcohol” were prohibited. 
All these measures are considered “[restrictions of the] citizens’ individual and artistic freedoms”, and invasion 
of personal space.  
  
   223 
 
protest as a means of achieving change as JDP municipalities will now seek the consent of the 
people before major projects commence. The movement “instigated a new social dynamic that 
challenges the established political norms”.1047 
In response to Prime Minister Erdoğan’s ‘majoritarian’ democracy view for Turkey,1048 
the Gezi Park protestors, and others who opposed JDP rule, rightfully support the view that 
minority voices should not be ignored. Such protests, and their deeper causes, reflect “criticism 
of [the JDP’s ‘majoritarianism’] in defence of individual, minority voices.”1049 The Gezi Park 
protestors opposed the Prime Minister’s view that elections are, and should be, the only 
mechanism to control or limit government power. This view is supported, not as an ideal but 
in practice, by Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy theory1050 and by the notable American historian 
and political scientist Howard Zinn who stated: “No matter how democratic elections are, they 
represent only fleeting and widely separated moments of popular participation. In that long 
span between elections, people are passive and captive.”1051 
                                                 
Another undesired policy of the JDP is the afore-mentioned “hyper-development project”. In Göle’s words: “… 
[Turkish protestors] refused to be the pawns of the hyper-development priojects undertaken by the [JDP] 
government.”. See:  
Nilüfer Göle, "Gezi--Anatomy of a Public Square Movement," Insight Turkey 15, no. 3 (2013): 9-10. 
1047Frost, "French Riots May 1968," 8. 
1048“Majoritarian democracy refers to democracy based upon majority rule of a society's citizens [whether it be 
electing official or voting in parliament by representatives]. Majoritarian democracy is the conventional form of 
democracy used as a political system in many countries. Though common, majoritarian democracy is not 
universally accepted - majoritarian democracy was famously criticized as having the inherent danger of 
becoming a "tyranny of the majority" whereby the majority in society could oppress or exclude minority groups. 
In contrast to majoritarian democracy and the perceived danger of a tyranny of the majority, consensus 
democracy was developed in response that emphasizes rule by as many people as possible to make government 
inclusive, with a majority of support from society merely being a minimal threshold.” See: David Arter, 
Democracy in Scandinavia: Consensual, Majoritarian or Mixed? (Manchester & England: Manchester University 
Press, 2006), 15. Please also refer to ‘Majority Rule’ in Chapter 2, under sub-section Characteristics of 
Democracy. 
1049Göle, "Gezi--Anatomy of a Public Square Movement," 9. 
1050See: Robert Michels, "The Iron Law of Oligarchy," Key ideas in sociology (2003). 
Robert Michels is a notable German sociologist. 
1051See: Nikos Christofis, "Gezi Park: The Powerfully Symbolic Chance to Act Together!," Journal of Global 
Faultlines (2013): 47. 
See also: Howard Zinn, "Non-Violent Direct Action," in Howard Zinn on History, ed. Howard Zinn (New York & 
London, Sydney & Toronto: Seven Stories Press, 2001), 40. 
The Spunk Library summarises Michel’s political theory of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ as follows: 
“Michels (1911) came to the conclusion that the formal organization of bureaucracies inevitably leads to 
oligarchy, under which organizations originally idealistic and democratic eventually come to be dominated by a 
small, self-serving group of people who achieved positions of power and responsibility. This can occur in large 
organizations because it becomes physically impossible for everyone to get together every time a decision has 
to be made. See: The Spunk Library (ed.), “The Iron Law of Oligarchy”, Germany, March 2002, 
http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/germany/sp000711.txt [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
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The protestors rejected Zinn’s “fleeting and widely separated moments of popular 
participation”,1052 by showing their opposition to this form of oligarchy and its proponent, the 
current JDP government. In this regard, the statement of Nikos Christofis, a PhD candidate in 
Turkish studies at Leiden University, was perceptive:  
The massive, dynamic…way of expressing [the protestors’] 
demands showed that something important is taking place 
in Turkey, and not just...a clichéd struggle between 
secularism and Islamism. Societies claim their place in 
History; they claim their political, economic and cultural 
emancipation. And, perhaps most importantly, they define 
the new ‘national narrative’ on their own terms, regardless 
of it being a narrative of a ‘success story’ (Turkey, Brazil), 
or a narrative of political and cultural change (Egypt). 
Societies do not allow ‘any paternalistic authority to 
appropriate the new over the old, they do not let democracy 
[pass into] the hands of those who, in the name of the new, 
undermine democracy’.1053 
In summary, the Gezi Park movement may mark a new and positive threshold for 
Turkey’s democratisation development, even if temporary. A line from the poem “On Living” 
of the internationally renowned Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet (1902-1963) reflects best the soul 
of the movement: “Live like tree lone and free, live like brothers like the trees of a forest.”1054 
 ‘Gülenists’  
On 17 December 2013, a Turkish police investigation became public. The investigation 
centred on alleged corruption involving the ruling party and led to a severe government crisis 
in Turkey. According to police reports, the alleged corruption was extensive and involved 
senior party and government figures.  
A related item was that $4.5 million was found, in cash, stored in shoe boxes in the 
home of a manager of the state-owned Halkbank. Members of the Prime Minister’s entourage 
                                                 
1052Christofis, "Gezi Park: The Powerfully Symbolic Chance to Act Together!," 47.  
1053Ibid., 47-48. Citation from: S. Salemis Anagnostopoulou, (2013) “One Turkey or Two?” Paper presented in 
Turkey 2013: Collective Action and Social Conflicts, Athens, 4 July.  
1054Nilüfer Göle, "The Gezi Occupation: For a Democracy of Public Spaces ", Article, (2013), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/nilufer-gole/gezi-occupation-for-democracy-of-public-spaces  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
  
   225 
 
became suspects. The sons of three ministers were arrested initially; eight days later their 
fathers, Zafer Çağlayan (Economy Minister), Muammer Güler (Interior Minister), and Erdoğan 
Bayraktar (Environment and Urbanisation Minister) 1055 resigned their offices. Bayraktar stated 
1056 on the commercial news channel NTV1057 that the Prime Minister should resign as well as 
he was also actively involved in the corruption. Bayraktar declared that “the majority of the 
[building] construction plans” that were under suspicion in the case “were approved on [the 
Prime Minister’s] orders”.1058 Following the resignations, the Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen 
Bağış, was removed from his post on 26 December 2013.1059 All four (former) ministers were 
excluded from the new cabinet1060 and replaced by new members.1061 
                                                 
1055Richard Spencer, "Turkey PM Faces Resignation Call as Three Ministers Quit in Corruption Scandal" The 
Telegraph, 25 December 2013. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10537670/Turkey-PM-faces-resignation-call-as-
three-ministers-quit-in-corruption-scandal.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1056Bayraktar stated: “For the sake of the wellbeing of this nation and country, I want to express my belief that 
the esteemed Prime Minister should also resign.” See: Spencer, "Turkey PM Faces Resignation Call as Three 
Ministers Quit in Corruption Scandal". 
1057Orhan Coskun and Ece Toksabay, "Hit by Scandal and Resignations, Turk PM Names New Ministers," Reuters, 
25 December 2013. Available at:  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/25/us-turkey-corruption-idUSBRE9BN0D720131225 
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1058Karl Vick, "Turkey Corruption Scandal Threatens Erdogan, but May Boost Democracy [How Erdogan’s 
Troubles Are Good for Turkey]," Time, 2 January 2014. Available at:  
http://world.time.com/2014/01/02/how-erdogans-troubles-are-good-for-turkish-democracy/  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1059"Turkish PM Reshuffles Cabinet Amid Scandal," Al Jazeera America, 26 December 2013. Available at: 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/26/turkish-pm-reshufflescabinetamidscandal.html  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1060Further, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ was appointed as new Justice Minister, after Sadullah Ergin 
announced his candidacy for the upcoming local elections in the southern province of Hatay. 
Ankara Deputy Emrullah İşler will replace Bekir Bozdağ as Deputy Prime Minister. Ayşenur İslam was named to 
replace Family and Social Affairs Minister Fatma Şahin who will run for Gaziantep mayoral post while Lütfi Elvan 
replaces Transport Minister Binali Yıldırım, who is a candidate for İzmir mayoral post. 
Sports and Youth Minister Suat Kılıç and Industry and Technology Minister Nihat Ergin also lost their ministerial 
portfolios and were replaced by Akif Çağatay Kılıç and Fikri Işık respectively. 
“Some of my friends have asked to be excused due to the recent developments, some are quitting the Cabinet 
because of their candidature [at the upcoming local elections] and others are changes proposed to the President 
within my discretion and approved by him,” Erdoğan told reporters during a press briefing. See:  
"PM Erdoğan Announces New Cabinet with 10 Changes Amid Graft Probe", Hürriyet Daily News 25 December 
2013. Available at:  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-erdogan-announces-new-cabinet-with-10-changes-amid-graft-
probe.aspx?PageID=238&NID=60149&NewsCatID=338 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1061Former interior minister Güler has been replaced by Prime Ministry Undersecretary Efkan Ala, who is one of 
Erdoğan’s closest aides. Nihat Zeybekçi assumed the position left vacant by former Economy Minister Çağlayan 
while İdris Güllüce replaced the position of Bayraktar and was appointed as the new Environment and Urban 
Planning Minister.  
Egemen Bağış, whose name was also mentioned in the investigation as a suspect involved in corruption and 
bribery, also lost his ministerial post in the reshuffle. Bağış has been replaced by Justice and Development Party’s 
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On 19 December 2013, the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) 
dismissed the public prosecutor, Muammar Akkas, from office.1062Akkas was Istanbul’s Chief 
Prosecutor and he had launched criminal investigations of the suspects in the case and had 
spoken out “about alleged police obstruction in [the] case”.1063 On the day of his dismissal, 
Akkas publicly declared that the police refused to follow his orders “to take more suspects into 
custody”. “By means of the police force, the judiciary was subjected to open pressure, and the 
execution of court orders was obstructed.” Akkas said. “A crime has been committed 
throughout the [police] chain of command...suspects have been allowed to take precautions, 
flee and tamper with the evidence”, he added.1064 The police had initiated the investigation 
process more than a year before the allegations became public, apparently, somewhat tellingly 
and not surprisingly, without the Prime Minister or his government’s knowledge.1065 
After the corruption allegations became public, the JDP government acted swiftly to 
remove public officials with known or suspected Gülenist associations. The targeted officials 
were in those government agencies involved in the corruption investigation.1066 To this end, 
thousands of police officers, together with important individuals in the state bureaucracy, 
including dozens of high-ranked bureaucrats of the Ministry of Finance,1067 and the judiciary, 
were dismissed or re-assigned by the government. They were accused of being a “state within 
                                                 
[JDP] Deputy Chair, in charge of external affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. See: "PM Erdoğan Announces New Cabinet 
with 10 Changes Amid Graft Probe" 
1062"Turkish PM Reshuffles Cabinet Amid Scandal." 
1063Catharina Moh, "Public Prosecutor Muammar Akkas Sacked in Scandal-Hit Turkey," BBC News, 27 December 
2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25523796 
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1064"Turkish PM Reshuffles Cabinet Amid Scandal." 
1065Spencer, "Turkey PM Faces Resignation Call as Three Ministers Quit in Corruption Scandal ". 
1066Following the corruption allegations, Erdoğan accused the police of attempting to overthrow the JDP 
government on the grounds that they intentionally made the allegations public. Some of the accused police 
officers were dismissed from office and the two ‘camps’ suddenly become aggressive toward each other. 
However, there were and still are some police who support Erdoğan, some for the sake of maintaining their 
positions and protecting their (self) interests. 
1067"[Event of the Week] Graft Prosecutor: I Was Threatened by Officials Sent by Erdoğan," Today's Zaman, 12 
January 2014.Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336336-event-of-the-week-graft-prosecutor-i-
was-threatened-by-officials-sent-by-erdogan.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
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the State”1068 by the Prime Minister and his supporters who labelled them ‘Gülenists’.1069 
Further, those labelled Gülenists in the judiciary were accused of being “ill-minded”,1070 “a 
                                                 
1068The operation was launched against “dozens of corruption, fraud and money laundering suspects” who were 
members of Erdoğan’s entourage. Erdoğan denounced this operation as “the workings of a state within the 
State” and reassigned or removed “more than a hundred senior police officers” from duty, together with some 
members of the judiciary. Following the corruption allegtions, ten members of Erdoğan’s government were 
replaced by new Cabinet members, “far more than had been in the offing in view of municipal elections coming 
up in March [2014]”. See: "Turkey's Winter of Anti-Corruption Justice Jars Political Stability," Electronic News, 
(2014),  
http://www.euronews.com/2014/01/08/turkey-s-winter-of-anti-corruption-justice-jars-political-stability/.  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1069Gülenists means the followers of Fethullah Gülen (a US based Sunni Muslim cleric) and his liberal Islamic 
movement, Hizme, which critics and even some [JDP] members say has inflitrated Turkey’s institutions, notably 
the police, judiciary and prosecution service”. See: Daniel Dombey, "Business Figures Questioned in Turkey Anti-
Corruption Probe," Financial Times, 17 December 2013. 
“The relationship between the [JDP] government and the Hizmet movement in Turkey was one of amity and 
collaboration roughly until 2012. Hizmet supported [JDP] initiatives of membership in the European Union, 
limiting military influence in politics and expanding [personal] rights and freedoms, largely through its media 
outlets such as Zaman daily and the Samanyolu broadcasting group. This relationship turned sour in the following 
years, after [JDP] leadership shifted its political vision from further democratization and a new civilian-drafted 
constitution to consolidation of power aimed toward an Erdogan-centred system of governance. Thus, coming 
to December 2013, this was also exacerbated by the Hizmet media’s neutral standing during the Gezi protests 
and the tension brought by the prep-school debate in November 2013, and there was not much goodwill left 
between the [JDP] and Hizmet.” See: 
"The Persecution of the Hizmet (Gülen) Movement in Turkey: A Chronicle ", (Washington,DC: Rethink Institute, 
2014). Available at: http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Persecution-of-Hizmet-in-
Turkey.pdf [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1070"Erdoğan: Gülenists Faked Ergenekon Evidence," Aydınlık Daily, 15 January 2014. Available at:  
http://www.aydinlikdaily.coMoh, "Public Prosecutor Muammar Akkas Sacked in Scandal-Hit Turkey." Available 
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25523796 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1070"Turkish PM Reshuffles Cabinet Amid Scandal." 
1070Spencer, "Turkey Pm Faces Resignation Call as Three Ministers Quit in Corruption Scandal ". 
1070"[Event of the Week] Graft Prosecutor: I Was Threatened by Officials Sent by Erdoğan." Available at: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336336-event-of-the-week-graft-prosecutor-i-was-threatened-by-
officials-sent-by-erdogan.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1070The operation was launched against “dozens of corruption, fraud and money laundering suspects” who were 
members of Erdoğan’s entourage. Erdoğan denounced this operation as “the workings of a state within the 
State” and reassigned or removed “more than a hundred senior police officers” from duty, together with some 
members of the judiciary. Following the allegations, ten members of Erdoğan’s government were replaced by 
new Cabinet members, “far more than had been in the offing in view of municipal elections coming up in March 
[2014]”. See: "Turkey's Winter of Anti-Corruption Justice Jars Political Stability". 
1070Gülenists means the followers of Fethullah Gülen who is “a Pennsylvania-based [Islamic cleric], which critics 
and even some [JDP] members say has inflitrated Turkey’s institutions, notably the police, judiciary and 
prosecution service”. See: Dombey, "Business Figures Questioned in Turkey Anti-Corruption Probe." 
1070"Erdoğan: Gülenists Faked Ergenekon Evidence." Available at:  
http://nsnbc.me/2014/01/15/erdogan-gulenists-faked-ergenekon-evidence/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
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ravenous underground community and a virus”,1071 “haşhaşiler”,1072 trying to overthrow, 
undemocratically, the Prime Minister and his government and creating a so-called “‘parallel 
state’ within the bureaucracy”.1073 “This conspiracy eclipses all other coup attempts in Turkey. 
It is a virus bent on taking power,” Prime Minister Erdoğan told JDP lawmakers in Ankara, in 
January 2014. “Fortunately our body is healthy. We will triumph”, he added.1074 The Prime 
Minister also accused “‘foreign countries’ and other malign forces”1075 of conspiring against 
the JDP government since violent protests against the JDP rule broke out and spread to the 
whole country in June 2013.1076 Thus, according to the Prime Minister, the arrests were linked 
to these anti-government protests1077 and were part of a “dirty operation” against his 
government that “aimed at smearing his administration and undermining the country’s 
progress”.1078 In his opinion, the main actors who plotted against the government were internal 
Gülenist elements and external forces, the latter being the USA and Israel.1079  
                                                 
1071Aydınlık Daily reported: “’There is an ill-minded plot established in the state itself, and you will see that there 
will be more to it,” said Erdoğan. “We need to reveal them, whoever they are. The vital point of the matter is 
that if you show mercy, you will be the victim of those who do not. The kind of hypocrisy and rottenness taking 
place will reveal itself. I also told the press in Malaysia: The virüs is in the system, it has insidiously embedded 
itself and multiplied. It started to move to take over the whole body. Yet, this body is not the kind of body weak 
enough to just surrender to virüses,’” See: "Erdoğan: Gülenists Faked Ergenekon Evidence." 
1072Haşhaşiler means Assassins in English.  
Further, “Erdoğan claimed that they had looked into history and found out that a similiar clandestine structure 
had also been established in the Seljuk Empire by the Assassins, a group of ravenous murderers from whom the 
English term originated. Erdoğan's comparison of the Gülenist movement to the Assassins [was heavily resorted 
in] the Turkish press,” Aydınlık Daily reported. See: "Erdoğan: Gülenists Faked Ergenekon Evidence." 
1073Joe Parkinson and Ayla Albayrak, "From His Refuge in the Poconos, Reclusive Imam Fethullah Gulen Roils 
Turkey," The Wall Street Journal, 20 January 2014. Available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304027204579332670740491570?mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304027204579332670740491570.h
tml [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1074Ibid. 
1075Spencer, "Turkey Pm Faces Resignation Call as Three Ministers Quit in Corruption Scandal" 
In a news conference held in 2013 Erdoğan stated: “As we fight to make Turkey in the top 10 countries of the 
world … some are engaged in an effort to halt our fast growth. There are those abroad … and there are 
extensions of them within our country.” See:  
Constanze Letsch, "Turkish PM: Corruption Probe Part of 'Dirty Operation' against Administration," The 
Guardian, 18 December 2013. Available at:  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/18/turkish-pm-corruption-probe-dirty-operation [last accessed 
on 26.02.2016]. 
1076See: Thesis section on Taksim Gezi Park Protest. 
1077Letsch, "Turkish PM: Corruption Probe Part of 'Dirty Operation' against Administration." 
1078"Turkish PM Reshuffles Cabinet Amid Scandal." 
1079See: Tulin Daloglu, "Erdogan Goes on Offense against Corruption Charges," Article, Turkey Pulse (2013), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/turkey-erdogan-corruption-foreign-plot-offense-
charges.html#. [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
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Many commentators within Turkey and in other countries, including EU 
representatives, were not convinced by the Prime Minister’s conspiracy statements.1080 There 
may be elements of truth in each accusation, but that is the nature of domestic and international 
politics. Whether it be citizens, or other countries pursuing their national interests, opportunism 
is a far cry from a well-planned and cohesive plot. More likely, Prime Minister Erdoğan has 
been creating a smokescreen to mask his extreme reaction to the corruption story, a reaction 
whose aim is to dismiss the corruption charges, terminate the investigations, and move forward 
politically. But the stakes for the Prime Minister and his JDP government rarely get higher: for 
the charges go to the centre of his close political entourage, and may taint him personally with 
corruption.  
In response to the corruption case, Prime Minister Erdoğan made a sweeping statement 
concerning Gülenists in the judiciary, accusing them of unfairly condemning the defendants in 
the Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and similar trials through sham evidence and “adjust[ing] the 
courts to manipulate the results of the trials”.1081 Ironically, in 2008, five years before making 
that statement, he defended the imprisonment of the accused, even regarded himself as “the 
prosecutor in the Ergenekon case”.1082 Following the accusations against the so-called 
Gülenists, that reached its peak after the corruption allegations broke, the Prime Minister 
declared, during a speech in the Turkish Parliament on 14 January 2014, that the Gülenists pose 
an enormous threat to Turkey’s justice system.1083 He even explicitly admitted their wrongful 
doings in those trials and their “abuse of the judicial system”.1084 This dramatic change in the 
Prime Minister’s position towards the above-mentioned trials might signify that Erdoğan 
misused the judicial apparatus at the time against those convicted whom he implicitly 
considered to be part of a parallel state. When in late 2013 the allegations ‘exploded’, Prime 
Minister, in his narrative to contain the affair, referred to the convicted Ergenekon individuals 
as “victims”, and the Gülenists, his former collaborators in the Ergenekon prosecution, as 
                                                 
1080 Hürriyet Daily News reports: “The leaders of the second biggest group in European Parliament, such as 
Hannes Swoboda and other leaders of the social democratic wing, have stated that what Erdoğan has said about 
the graft operations is nonsense, and that his parallel state claims are not plausible.” See: Koray Çalışkan, 
"Erdoğan’s Major Strike Might Come in Brussels " Hürriyet Daily News, 18 January 2014. Available at: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-major-strike-might-come-in-
brussels.aspx?pageID=449&nID=61211&NewsCatID=396 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1081"Erdoğan: Gülenists Faked Ergenekon Evidence." 
1082Ibid. 
1083It was that moment he called the Gülenist community “a ravenous underground community and a virus.” 
See: "Erdoğan: Gülenists Faked Ergenekon Evidence." 
1084"Erdoğan: Gülenists Faked Ergenekon Evidence." 
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constituting a “parallel state”. It would appear that those who oppose the Prime Minister and 
his leadership of the JDP government are branded a “parallel state” whether they be ‘old 
friends’ who later oppose him, or old foes whom he later needs to challenge those ‘old friends’. 
His about-face seemed political hypocrisy on a grand scale and reflected the actions of a gifted 
but determined politician in the face of a clear and present existential threat to himself and his 
government. Like another place and another time, party leader Erdoğan may be “destroying” 
the JDP’s democratisation progress “in order to save it”.1085 Though this may appear a trite 
observation, it goes to the core of this thesis’s argument that the Erdoğan led JDP has chosen 
democratisation as its long term strategic path albeit in the short term it will at times take 
authoritarian deviations. 
Referring to the previously mentioned trials, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated; “We are 
now able to see more clearly that some of the trials in the past are seriously questionable, and 
how people were condemned by juridical authorities through fake informing letters, illegal 
wiretapping, and invented sham evidence.”1086 The Prime Minister threw the blame on 
Gülenists in the judiciary by stating that during the course of the judgment process they were 
not objective, so they did not act in a truthful manner. On behalf of his party, he said that they 
cannot allow an “underground group” to completely control and manipulate “the justice 
system”, so the “virus” in the system should be cleansed.1087 In order to disrupt the judicial 
probing of his entourage and to justify his argument that the judicial system in Turkey is corrupt 
due to the Gülenists, the Prime Minister expressed his determination to retry the defendants of 
the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon cases. The accused were imprisoned in 2012 and 2013 for 
“plotting to overthrow the government”. “Our position on a retrial is a favourable one,” he 
stated. “First we must establish the legal grounding for fresh trials”, he continued. It is 
important to note here that the Prime Minister came up with the plan to seek a retrial of those 
                                                 
1085“It became necessary to destroy the town to save it”: This statement was attributed to an unnamed U.S. 
officer by AP correspondent Peter Arnett in his writing about Bến Tre city on 7 February 1968. "Major Describes 
Move". See: New York Times. 8 February 1968. The statement has become famous as it summed up, for many, 
the US military strategy in the Vietnam War which through ‘mission creep’ saw an awesome military capabiity, 
relentlessly delivered, fail due to evaporating political will in Washington.  
1086Erdoğan: "Gülenists Faked Ergenekon Evidence." 
1087Ibid. 
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defendants after his senior MIT1088 adviser Hakan Fidan “suggested that the [military] officers 
had been framed by the police and judiciary”.1089 
The JDP’s Central Executive Committee member Associate Professor Osman Can drew 
attention to the fact that the discussion on the “re-trial” started only after the corruption 
operation of the 17 December 2013 became public. On his Twitter account, Can admitted that 
“re-trial” would not have been on the agenda if the massive corruption close to the Prime 
Minister had not been alleged, as Zaman newspaper reported.1090 MHP deputy of Istanbul and 
former Interior Minister, Meral Akşener, also raised concern over the government’s “shifting 
stance on the coup trials”. She questioned “why the government, which once [in 2008] 
applauded the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, is now considering allowing the retrial of 
convicted defendants in the cases”. “Those who change their positions have discovered that the 
judiciary in Turkey is not impartial. What they will do if they change their minds once again is 
a source of concern,” Akşener stated.1091 Further, she ironically suggested Parliament “pass a 
law preventing suspects from being tried without the Prime Minister's permission” adding that 
“Such a law would solve all of Turkey's problems.”1092 
“Prime Minister Erdoğan’s plan to retry the convicted defendants in the Ergenekon and 
Sledgehammer cases has put him on the side of the military he formerly resisted”, BBC reporter 
James Reynolds stated.1093 Reynolds suggested also that the Prime Minister, during the early 
years under the JDP rule, built up an “unofficial alliance with prosecutors” with the aim of fully 
eliminating military’s influence in politics.1094 As a result of the investigation of those 
prosecutors, hundreds of military officers were arrested and imprisoned in the Ergenekon and 
                                                 
1088MIT refers to Milli Istihbarat Teskilati in Turkish and means “National Intelligence Organization”. For more 
information see: http://www.mit.gov.tr/eng/index.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1089Erdoğan talked to the reporters in Istanbul on the 5 January 2014. 
It is important to note that in January 2014 the army filed a criminal complaint calling for retrials. See: 
James Reynolds, "Turkey 'Coup Plot': Pm Erdogan 'Favours Retrial'," BBC News, 6 January 2014. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25617637 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1090"17 Aralık Olmasaydı ‘Yeniden Yargılama’ Gündeme Gelmezdi [a 'Re-Trial' Would Not Have Been on the 
Agenda If the Corruption of 17 December Had Not Been Revealed]," Zaman, 7 January 2014. Available at: 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_17-aralik-olmasaydi-yeniden-yargilama-gundeme-gelmezdi_2191925.html 
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1091That statement was tweeted by Akşener on 6 January 2014. 
1092"Feyzioğlu-Bozdağ Meeting Rescheduled for Wednesday," Today's Zaman 7 January 2014. Available at: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336012-feyzioglu-bozdag-meeting-rescheduled-for-wednesday.html  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1093Reynolds, "Turkey 'Coup Plot': PM Erdogan 'Favours Retrial'." 
1094Ibid. 
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Sledgehammer cases that were regarded “as major challenges to Turkey’s secularist 
traditions”.1095 However, in December 2013, “some of the same prosecutors involved in those 
[earlier] investigations” filed a criminal lawsuit against persons related to the Prime Minister’s 
entourage.1096 
The JDP’s Legal Response 
During the corruption investigation, some measures were taken by the JDP government 
to contain the political fall-out. 
The government passed a judicial police regulation that allows the Justice Minister a 
dominant position to control The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the 
Justice Academy of Turkey (The JAT, The Academy).1097 This regulation triggered significant 
concern among Turkish lawyers who interpreted the regulation as an opportunity to increase 
the JDP’s capacity to intervene in the judicial sphere. HSYK described the regulation as 
“unconstitutional” on the grounds that it obliges “those carrying out investigations to inform 
[political] superiors”.1098 This undemocratic regulation “clearly [breaches] the constitution 
[and contradicts the principle of separation of powers],” the HSYK added in its statement of 
26 December 2013.1099 The proposed regulation, and the large scale reassignment and dismissal 
of police officers and prosecutors, led to strong criticism from the international media and 
political leaders including the EU.1100 However, this controversial regulation was annulled by 
                                                 
1095Ibid. 
In this context, “[the] major challanges” refer to Sledgehammer and Ergenekon cases.  
1096"Government Plans to Change Turkey's Justice System ", Hürriyet Daily News, 2 January 2014. Available at:  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/government-plans-to-change-turkeys-justice-
system.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60443&NewsCatID=338 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1097The Justice Academy of Turkey (The JAT, The Academy) is an administrative body of Turkey’s judicial system 
that was established to “meet the training needs of the judicial professionals” of this system. The JAT is a body 
which has “scientific, administrative and financial autonomy”. For more information see: İsmail Aksel, "Turkish 
Judicial System - Bodies, Duties and Officials," ed. The Department for Strategy Development (Ankara: The 
Ministry of Justice of Turkey, 2013). Available at: http://www.justice.gov.tr/judicialsystem.pdf  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1098"Government Plans to Change Turkey's Justice System ". 
1099Anadolu Agency, "Justice Minister Slams Judges Board over Statement on Judicial Police Regulation" 27 
December 2013. 
1100350 police officers were fired by Erdoğan’s government. The EU strongly criticised the wave of police firings, 
stating the issue might become an obstacle to Turkey’s EU membership. “The removal of a large number of 
police officers from their posts ... is a matter of concern”, EU spokesman Peter Stano stated. “We urge Turkey 
... to take all the necessary measures to ensure that allegations of wrongdoing are addressed without 
discrimination or preference in a transparent and impartial manner”, Stano continued. See: Suzan Fraser, 
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the Council of State on 27 December 2013 following a lawsuit by the Ankara Bar Association 
at the Council of State.1101 
The annulment was welcomed by the EU Commission.1102 Stefan Füle, the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, favourably noted 
Turkey's Council of State's decision to annul the controversial regulation describing it as 
“lifting investigation secrecy”.1103 “In recent days, the change introduced to the judicial police 
regulation has undermined the independence of the judiciary and its capacity to act. The 
application of this regulation has been suspended by the Council of State. I welcome this 
suspension and hope the Council's decision will be finalised quickly”, he stated.1104 
 Besides the judicial police regulation of the year 2013, legislation introduced by the 
JDP government in 2014 represented a sharp reversal of democratic reforms, as well as a 
                                                 
"Turkish Govt Removes Police Who Launched New Probe," Electronic News, (2014), 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/turkey-police-dismissed-launching-probe-21457955.  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. Elmar Brok, who chairs the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee, also 
criticized the Turkish government for the decree. "The government is exercising dramatic influence on the 
independence of the judiciary," Brok told German public broadcaster Deutschlandfunk on 28 December 2013. 
See: "Turkey’s Freshly Appointed EU Minister Warns Enlargement Commissioner Füle for Graft Statement," 
TREND, 29 December 2013. Available at: http://en.trend.az/regions/met/turkey/2226463.html  
last accessed on 26.02.2016].  
1101"Turkey's Council of State Annuls Controversial Regulation Lifting Investigation Secrecy ", Hürriyet Daily 
News, 27 December 2013. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-council-of-state-annuls-
controversial-regulation-lifting-investigation-secrecy.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60215&NewsCatID=341 [last 
accessed on 26.02.2016].  
“The Council of State is the Superior Court for administrative justice and, as such, is the Court of last instance. It 
reviews all rulings rendered by Administrative Courts, unless the laws specifically refer them to other judicial 
authorities. Similar to the Court of Appeals, the Council of State is also the court of first and final instance for 
specific cases as defined by law. It ensures the consistency of rulings among the administrative courts. The 
Council of State is the highest consultative body of the state, and in this capacity, expresses its opinions on draft 
legislation upon the request of the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers [Cabinet]. It also examines draft 
regulations and concession contracts. It is responsible for resolving administrative disputes.” See: "Higher Courts 
in Turkey. The Council of State," turkishelections.com, 
http://www.turkishelections.com/political_structure/higher_courts/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016].  
While ¾ of the members are elected by the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) ¼ of the members 
are elected by the President. The head of Council of State, chief prosecutor, deputy chairmen and heads of the 
departments are elected for 4 years by the Council of State’s General Assembly. Those members are elected by 
secret ballot through absolute majority voting and re-election is possible. See: "Yargı Teşkilatının Yapısı Ve 
Görevleri [Structure and Functions of the Judiciary]," http://muhasebedersleri.com/hukuk/danistay-askeri-
yargitay.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016].  
1102"EU Welcomes Annulation of Controversial Regulation Lifting Investigation Secrecy ", Hürriyet Daily News, 27 
December 2013. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-welcomes-annulation-of-controversial-
regulation-lifting-investigation-secrecy.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60253&NewsCatID=351  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016].  
1103"Turkey's Council of State Annuls Controversial Regulation Lifting Investigation Secrecy". 
1104"Turkey’s Freshly Appointed EU Minister Warns Enlargement Commissioner Füle for Graft Statement." 
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dramatic loss of momentum in the government’s democratisation process since 2002. The new 
and controversial legislation related to restrictions on the popular use of the internet, 
Presidential appointments to the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors and significant 
expansion of the National Intelligence Agency’s authority. These measures undermined 
Turkey’s constitutional ‘separation of powers’, a fundamental principle of democracy.  
The 2014 legislation relating to the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Law 
No. 6524) was introduced in haste.1105 It was proposed by the JDP in early January 2014 and 
took effect on 27 February 2014. This law change gave the President additional powers to 
appoint members to the Supreme Board which undermined its autonomy and also other powers 
surrounding the administration of the Board.1106 Following on from the latter, many judicial 
and administrative staff of the Board dealing with judicial disciplinary matters were dismissed 
from their posts.1107 However, a challenge to Law No. 6524 was partially successful when its 
more constitutionally problematic provisions were annulled by the Constitutional Court on the 
10 April 2014 on the basis of protection of “the principles of the independence of the 
courts.”1108 However, Court decisions have no retrospective effect; actions, and their 
                                                 
1105This law change is a continuation of the earlier process. However, while the former is only a regulation, the 
latter is series of legal amendments under Law No. 6524. Both the law change and legal amendments threatened 
the judicial independence principle before they were annulled. These two are interrelated containment 
measures taken by the JDP against the Gülenists during the course of the corruption investigation. 
1106Fevzi Bilgin, "The Turkish Constitutional Court’s Struggle for Democracy and the Rule of Law," Electronic 
article, (2014), http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/turkish-constitutional-courts-struggle-democracy-rule-law/ 
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1107Ibid. 
1108“The basic function of the Constitutional Court, established in the 1961 Constitution, is to examine the 
constitutionality, in both form and substance, of laws, and decrees with the power of law and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Other functions of the Court are as follows: -With the 
capacity of the High Tribunal, the Constitutional Court judges the following: the President, members of the 
Council of Ministers (Cabinet), members of supreme courts, the chairman and members of the Supreme Council 
of Judges and Public Prosecutors and of the Supreme Council of Public Accounts, the Chief Republic Prosecutors 
and the Deputy Republic Chief Prosecutors for crimes related to their offices. -It audits the finances of political 
parties. 
-It examines [Parliament’s] decisions to revoke the immunities of deputies, or to dismiss members of parliament. 
-It chooses the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Jurisdictional Conflicts. […] The decisions of the 
Constitutional Court are final. See: "Higher Courts in Turkey. The Constitutional Court," turkishelections.com, 
http://www.turkishelections.com/political_structure/higher_courts/ [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. These 
decisions cannot be amended in any manner and their application cannot be delayed.” Previously, “the 
Constitutional Court [was] composed of 11 regular and four substitute members. Decisions [were] made when 
the eleven members convene.” With the 2010 Constitutional Amendment, the number of members increased 
to 17. Out of those, 14 members are elected by President whilst 3 members are elected by the Parliament. See: 
"Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court]," kpsshazirlik.net, http://kpsshazirlik.net/genel-
kultur/vatandaslik/item/206-anayasa-mahkemesi.html  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016].  
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consequences, arising from legislation subsequently found unconstitutional, remain 
unaffected.1109 This would have been well known to the JDP government beforehand indicating 
that, maybe, the momentous challenge to Turkey’s constitutional and democratic judicial 
framework that was Law No. 6524 was tactical (short term to address real-time political 
exigencies) not strategic (fundamental and long term). 
Since the Taksim Gezi Park protests of May 2013 freedom of expression has been under 
government pressure, “both online and offline”, and the internet-related legislation of February 
2014 “threatens digital civil society [by] granting the government excessive and arbitrary 
power to monitor the web.”1110 Experts argue that the legislation (Law No. 5651) is solely an 
instrument “for increased surveillance and politically motivated tracking down of dissident 
voices [and will be] used for political reasons to block access to so called [politically] damaging 
videos or to block access to leaked documents.”1111 Previous legislation, introduced in 2007, 
when challenged, was found to violate the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The undemocratic characteristics of the new internet law were addressed by Jussi 
Parikka and Burak Arikan who stated: 
                                                 
“The Court’s basic reasoning was that, while the last paragraph of Article 159 of the Constitution (…) entitled the 
legislature to regulate by law certain matters concerning the HSYK, the scope of its competence should be 
interpreted in the light of the first paragraph of the same article, which states that ‘The High Council of Judges 
and Public Prosecutors is established and shall function in accordance with the principles of the independence 
of the courts and the tenure guarantees for judges [the ‘principles’].’ Thus, the Court argued, ‘While the HSYK is 
an administrative body, no hierarchical relation with the central public administration is established, and it is 
stipulated that it shall be established and function in accordance with the [principles] […] This is not a privilege 
granted to the members of the HSYK, but it is a necessary and natural consequence of the principle that judges 
and public prosecutors, about whom the HSYK makes decisions, shall function in accordance with the 
[principles].’” Constitutional Court decision E. 2014/57, K. 2014/81 dated 14 April 2014, in Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette), No. 29000 (14 May 2014), http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/05/20140514-21.pdf. For an 
analysis of this decision, see Levent Gönenç, Siyasi İktidarın Denetlenmesi-Dengelenmesi ve Yargı (The Checks 
and Balances on Political Power and the Judiciary) (Ankara: Adaket, 2014,):178-215;  
Ergun Özbudun, “Anayasa Mahkemesi ve HSYK” (Constitutional Court and the HSYK), in Haşim Kılıç’a Armağan 
(Essays in Honor of Haşim Kılıç), forthcoming. See p.4: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_pb_20.pdf 
1109From: Peer Review Mission on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (6 – 8 May 2014) - Report on the 
Reform of the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors by Law No. 6524 of February 2014. Professor Dr. 
iur. Thomas Giegerich, 18 December 2014. Page 4, Section 2. Available at: http://www.jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Report052014.pdf [last accessed on 26.02.2016].  
1110Jussi Parikka and Burak Arikan, "Turkey’s New Internet Law: Policing the Online Mall ", Electronic Article, 
(2014),  
https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/jussi-parikka-burak-arikan/turkey%E2%80%99s-new-internet-
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The new law moves beyond the DNS (Domain Name 
System) and IP based censorship to URL-based censorship. 
This means that the government and Internet Service 
Providers (‘ISPs’) [can] engage in deep packet inspection 
[interception and storage of information transmitted 
electronically] on user activities. ISPs are expected to 
follow direct request from the Telecommunications 
Communication Presidency (‘TİB’), a body [overseen by] 
the Prime Minister’s Office and [that can be directed for 
political ends]. Furthermore, the new law allows the Head 
of the TIB to personally decide which websites to censor 
without a court order. The internet law also provides the 
TIB Head with specific powers of exemption without 
[external check]. The Prime Minister [could request 
blocking of] access to certain websites in under four hours. 
Further, the possibilities of control extend to the future: 
service providers are expected keep a record of internet 
activities of users for up to two years. Besides the political 
advantage to [the JDP government] now, it gives a huge 
mandate to any future governments who will be able to 
benefit from an unprecedented level of authority when it 
comes to online activities of the citizens.1112 
 
In summary, the updated internet law threatens internet freedom, thus freedom of 
expression, and paves the way for internet censorship. The government’s statements about ‘the 
absence of internet censorship in Turkey’ are unconvincing. On 2 October 2014, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court annulled various “pieces of legislation that had been hastily introduced in 
an omnibus bill.” The Court overturned the legislation “that gave the state-controlled 
Telecommunications Directorate the power to block access to websites within four hours 
without a court order.” In addition, the Court found unconstitutional part of the omnibus 
legislation that prevented dismissed senior civil servants “from returning their posts for two 
years”. Opponents of the JDP government argued that the government introduced the 
legislation “[in order] to prevent the return of senior police officers who had been removed 
from their posts in an effort to obstruct the corruption probe.”1113 
Another controversial law introduced by the JDP government in April 2014 is the new 
MIT (acronym in Turkish for National Intelligence Agency) law which brings significant 
changes to the scope and authority of the MIT. MIT is Turkey’s intelligence gathering 
                                                 
1112Ibid. 
1113Bilgin, "The Turkish Constitutional Court’s Struggle for Democracy and the Rule of Law". 
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organisation for the purposes of national security and reports directly to the Office of the Prime 
Minister. The April 2014 legislation significantly increases MIT’s powers and gives MIT the 
right to “carry out duties assigned by the Council of Ministers on external security, combating 
terror and national security”, “establish contacts with local and foreign institutions, 
organizations, movements or individuals”, and “ask for all kinds of data, documents and 
archives from public institutions and banks.” Further, the legislation gives MIT the authority 
to “establish contacts with all bodies threatening national security, including terror 
organizations”. This latter authority is granted to legitimise “[the government’s] contacts with 
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.” Under the new law, MIT will be the first contact body for 
prosecutors in cases where the latter are “informed of any unauthorized acts related to [the 
operations] of the MIT and its personnel.” However, the legislation proscribes state prosecutors 
from taking any actions in relation to authorised MIT operations. Further, MIT is given the 
authority to “use the infrastructure of data processing centres” and, if required, “all equipment, 
supplies and systems used by the [state] bodies” will be transferred to MIT. The establishment 
of a National Intelligence Coordination Council is anticipated in the April 2014 legislation 
under the Prime Minister’s Chairmanship, consisting of “Ministers and senior officials 
determined by the Prime Minister”; the Council’s decisions will bind all government 
institutions. In addition, the legislation restricted actions against the Head of MIT (the 
Undersecretary) to the Court of Appeal only, and the penalty for conviction for unauthorised 
release or publication of information and documents about the MIT is imprisonment for 3 to 
12 years.1114 
Several criticisms have been raised against the new MIT law. While increasing the 
MIT’s scope and authority significantly, MIT is free from effective oversight and has virtual 
legal immunity. Further criticism maintains that the MIT is becoming a government tool to 
maintain “the [JDP] government’s agenda and interests”. This criticism is supported by the fact 
that MIT has been given the authority to manage “the national monitoring centre GES” which 
gives it the ability to “monitor all internal and external communications.” As significant, MIT 
                                                 
1114Fehim Taştekin, "Is Turkey Reverting to a 'Muhaberat' State?," (2014), http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/erdogan-mit-interference-authoritarian.html#.  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. See also:  
"İşte Yeni MIT Yasası [Here Is the New MIT Law]," Milliyet, 17 April 2014. Available at: 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/iste-yeni-mit-yasasi/gundem/detay/1868696/default.htm  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
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is losing its former and exclusive role as a surveillance organisation and becoming, in addition, 
an operational organisation.1115 
The Sinop Parliamentary Deputy from the main opposition party, Engin Altay, stated 
that the government was creating its own ‘deep state’. “The MIT has given up foreign 
intelligence and dedicates itself to saving Erdoğan’s future,” he commented. Faruk Bal, the 
opposition MHP party’s Deputy for Konya, stated that the new law gives MIT the right to “ask 
for tanks, artillery, planes and missiles from the military and even [to] launch foreign 
operations if it chooses”. Hurşit Güneş, the CHP Deputy for Kocaeli, expressed his concern, 
stating that “the MIT will become untouchable [unless Prime Minister Davutoğlu prevents 
it]”.1116 
Beşir Atalay, the Deputy Prime Minister, justified the new MIT law by stating that the 
law was being updated as required in the wake of the demands of the time. Atalay said that 
with this law the MIT’s “international functions” would increase and MIT was becoming a 
transparent organisation. He further argued that the new law is required because of MIT’s 
active engagement “in the solution process with the Kurds.”1117 The government’s justification 
was seen inadequate by non-parliamentarians as well. Professor Mehmet Altan commented as 
follows:  
The more the Prime Minister strives to cover up corruption 
and bribery, the more pronounced is the progress to 
fascism. … To try to impose absolute silence via the MIT 
will cause major troubles. By transforming the MIT into a 
'Gestapo' outfit authorized to stalk and suppress its own 
citizens will consolidate fascism and encourage more 
crimes by the government.1118 
And Former Minister of Justice Sakir Seker stated: 
The MIT is being made a core of oppression, power and 
threats. The purpose is to intimidate everyone who is 
against it. The MIT is about to become a feared terror 
organization. We are on the way to becoming 
a muhaberat [police] state. 
                                                 
1115"Is Turkey Reverting to a 'Muhaberat' State?".  
1116Ibid. 
1117Ibid. 
1118"Is Turkey Reverting to a 'Muhaberat' State?". 
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The then President, Abdullah Gül, expressed his unease with the new MIT law stating 
that Turkey should follow “freedom-seeking policies” rather than legislation based on security-
based policies. Arising from Gül’s reservations, a parliamentary commission was established 
“to supervise intelligence and security-related issues.” Nevertheless, despite Gül’s discontent 
with the new MIT law, the MIT law became effective on the 17 April 2014.1119 
More controversy arose in late 2014 when President Erdoğan made four judicial 
appointments. On the 26 October 2014, four new members were appointed by the President to 
Turkey’s Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors all of whom had direct links or 
affiliations to the JDP. Further, at the Council’s elections on the 12 October 2014, all the 
candidates elected as full or substitute members were, reportedly, close to the government. 
Thus, the members who gathered under the Unity in Justice Platform (YBP) were granted all 
the seven seats: six members in the civil judiciary and one member in the administrative 
judiciary.1120 These appointments and elections point to a JDP plan to impinge on judicial 
autonomy for the purpose of gaining greater political influence over Turkey’s judiciary. Critics 
warned that the legislation and appointments placed the judiciary under a new form of tutelage, 
which could be described as ‘the JDP tutelage’.  
The EU’s Response 
 The European Commission’s 2013 Progress Report on Turkey (the ‘2013 report’) was 
published on 16 October 2013 and covered the period from October 2012 to September 
2013.1121 The 2013 report was written in a moderate and constructive style and contained 
important messages on Turkey’s democratisation. 
Included in the main points of its 2013 report, the Commission:1122 
                                                 
1119Ibid. 
1120Mesut Hasan Benli, "Turkish President Sends AKP [JDP]-Linked Lawyers to Key Judges and Prosecutors 
Council," Hurriyet Daily News, 27 October 2014. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-
president-sends-akp-linked-lawyers-to-key-judges-and-prosecutors-
council.aspx?pageID=238&nID=73513&NewsCatID=338 [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
Some of the provisions that were constitutionally problematic were annulled, except the one giving the 
President powers of appointment. Please refer to p.23: “However, a challenge to Law No. 6524 was partially 
successful when its more constitutionally problematic provisions were annulled by the Constitutional Court on 
the 10 April 2014 on the basis of protection of “the principles of the independence of the courts.” 
1121European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 3 
1122IKV, "IKV Press Release on Turkey Progress Report 2013," (Istanbul, 2013). 
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1) stressed the importance of Turkey’s relations with the EU in achieving Turkey’s 
accession ‘roadmap’  
2) drew attention to the EU’s view that Turkey needs the EU in order to strengthen 
its democracy 
3) stressed the rule of law, fundamental rights and the participation of civil society, 
in Turkey’s democratisation process; and stated that an active civil society is 
required for the continuation of Turkey’s political reforms 
4)  stated that the benefits of the EU’s transformative power required an entrenched 
and sustainable democracy in Turkey 
5)  demanded improvements in freedom, democracy and justice for the citizens of 
Turkey 
6) reminded Turkey that the EU remained the benchmark for reforms in Turkey, 
and  
7) restated that both Turkey and the EU have responsibilities in the accession 
process. 
The report recognised and applauded Turkey’s democratisation progress, its 
democratisation package announced on the 30th of September 2013,1123 and the political 
reforms introduced by the government. The issues that were well received by the Commission 
included:1124 the delegation of authority to local governments; the establishment of Turkey’s 
Ombudsman Office; the third and the fourth judicial packages; the formation of human rights’ 
institutions and mechanisms; civilian control over the security forces; and, the peace process 
in south eastern Anatolia. 
Further, the 2013 report welcomed the Turkish government’s intention to abolish the 
10% election threshold as a part of the government’s new democratisation package announced 
                                                 
1123"EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 6. 
1124IKV, "Iktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı E-Bülteni," ed. Economic Development Foundation, Iktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı E - 
Bülteni (Istanbul: Economic Development Foundation, 2013), 3. See also: Commission, "EU Progress Report on 
Turkey 2013," 10&49. 
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on the 30th of September.1125 The report also underlined the need for new laws and decrees to 
support this electoral amendment in practice.1126 As part of this latest democratisation package, 
the report further applauded the proposals on: Kurdish education in private schools; increased 
penalties for discrimination and hate/bias-motivated crimes; the return of Mor Gabriel 
Monastery lands to the Syriac community; and, new arrangements on data protection.1127 
However, the 2013 report expressed criticism on several issues including: the 
government’s response to the Gezi Park protests; the use of excessive police force during the 
protests; the polarised political climate in Turkey; and, the Prime Minister’s negative comments 
towards some Turkish citizen groups, NGOs and the business groups.1128 The report also 
criticised the continuing poor consultation processes surrounding the initiation of significant 
policies and laws, the lack of improvement in the regulatory impact analysis for improving the 
quality of laws and regulations, the poor relations between the state and Turkey’s civil society, 
the press and the judiciary. The report commented adversely on the independence, impartiality 
and efficiency of the judiciary, in particular the criminal justice system, as well as freedom of 
expression and the media. The latter included; restrictions on the media; media self-censorship; 
the dismissal and arrest of numerous journalists; and, the blocking of some internet 
websites.1129 
The 2013 report also points to the critical resolution of the European Parliament in May 
2013,1130 concerning the Turkish government’s response to the Gezi Park protests. In this 
matter, the European Commission emphasised that even though the demonstration was 
peaceful in nature, excessive force was used by the police against demonstrators which led to 
injuries, deaths and arrests including some members of the Taksim Solidarity Platform.1131 
Further, the report stated that it would be difficult for Turkey to keep to its democratic roadmap, 
                                                 
1125Please note that the 10% election threshold is still valid in Turkey. 
"EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 6. See also: IKV, "Iktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı E - Bülteni," 4 & 
"IKV Press Release on Turkey Progress Report 2013." 
1126Ibid. 
1127European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 6. See also: Zaman, "AB'nin Türkiye İlerleme 
Raporu Açıklandı [the EU's Turkey Report Was Announced]," Zaman, 16 October 2013. 
The JDP government increased the punishment for discrimination and hate/bias-motivated crimes from 
maximum 1 year to maximum 3 years. 
1128European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 8. 
1129IKV, "Iktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı E - Bülteni," 3. 
1130European Parliament, "Joint Motion for a Resolution on the Situation in Turkey," (Strasbourg: European 
Parliament, 12 June 2013), 3-5. See also: IKV, "IKV Press Release on Turkey Progress Report 2013." 
1131European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2013," 5. 
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and by implication its hopes for EU accession, if as a result of the Gezi Park protests and 
subsequent government “crack-down”, fundamental freedoms such the right to demonstrate 
were abolished.1132 
 The European Commission published its latest Progress Report for Turkey (the 2014 
report) on 8 October 2014.1133 It is the 17th Progress Report published for Turkey by the 
Commission.1134 The report assessed Turkey’s progress in respect of each negotiation chapter 
for the period between October 2013 and September 2014.1135 Turkey was strongly criticised 
by the Commission in the 2014 report. The criticisms related to: the independence, impartiality 
and efficiency of the judiciary; separation of powers; the rule of law; increasing political 
polarization; the government’s efforts against corruption; parliamentary immunities; freedom 
of thought and expression; freedom of the media; the right to assembly; and, the freedom of 
association.1136  Further criticisms were made in relation to the government’s slow progress on 
Alevi and minority rights.1137 The report stressed that it is crucial for Turkey to take European 
                                                 
1132Ibid. 
IKV, "IKV Press Release on Turkey Progress Report 2013.": “It is worrying that Turkey came to a situation where 
it is debating on whether the right to demonstrate or not can be truly exercised in the country”. 
1133European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2014," (2014). 
1134Ibid. 
1135Ibid.  
A significant “distinctive characteristic” of the Report is that it is “the last Progress Report prepared by 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso and the Cabinet that was in office for two consecutive terms almost 
10 years”. Thus, it is also final Progress Report prepared by European Commissioner for Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood Policy ŠtefanFüle who was in office between 2010 and 2014. See: IKV, "Why Commission's 17th 
Progress Report for Turkey Is Different from the Previous Report," news release, 2015, 
http://oldweb.ikv.org.tr/icerik_en.asp?konu=haberler&id=744&baslik=WHY%20COMMISSION%92S%2017TH%
20PROGRESS%20REPORT%20FOR%20TURKEY%20IS%20DIFFERENT%20FROM%20THE%20PREVIOUS%20REPOR
T? [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
See also: "Who Is Who – Barroso Commission – European Commission," in European Commission Commissioners 
2010-2014 (European Commission, 2014). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-
2014/members/index_en.htm  
1136European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2014." IKV, "Avrupa Komisyonu’nun 2014 Yılı Türkiye 
İlerleme Raporu Açıklandı [the European Commission's 2014 Progress Report on Turkey Was Announced]," news 
release, 3-12 October, 2014, http://bulten.ikv.org.tr/?ust_id=5950&id=5942. [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
Selçuk Gültaşlı, "AB İlerleme Raporu, Türkiye'nin Fotoğrafını Çekti: Genişleme Komiseri’nden ‘Çok Acil’ Uyarı [EU 
Progress Report Took Turkey's Picture: A 'Very Urgent' Warning from the Enlargement Commissioner]," Zaman, 
9 October 2014. Available at: http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_genisleme-komiserinden-cok-acil-
uyari_2249345.html [last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1137See: Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2014." See also: Gültaşlı, "AB İlerleme Raporu, Türkiye'nin 
Fotoğrafını Çekti: Genişleme Komiseri’nden ‘Çok Acil’ Uyarı [Eu Progress Report Took Turkey's Picture: A 'Very 
Urgent' Warning from the Enlargement Commissioner]." 
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norms seriously in order to advance democratic structures that respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.1138 
The Commission, in the 2014 report, commented on the JDP government’s reaction to 
the December 2013 corruption allegations. The Commission expressed its concern about the 
reassignment, dismissal and detention of thousands of police and judicial officers after the 
allegations became public. In the report, the Commission placed emphasis on the importance 
of investigating the corruption allegations in a transparent manner and, to that end, asked the 
JDP government to secure operational independence and capacity for police and judiciary 
involved in the allegations investigation. The Commission pointed out that the Government’s 
swift retaliatory actions against Turkey’s judiciary and judicial framework raised concerns 
around the latter’s continued capacity for independence, impartiality and efficiency, and, as a 
consequence, raised concerns about those fundamental democratic principles, the rule of law 
and the separation of powers in Turkey.1139 
The 2014 report criticised the JDP government’s restrictions on freedom of expression 
as a result of the Gezi Park protests, specifically the new laws that restricted freedom of 
expression. The new law banned the social network website YouTube and the social network 
service Twitter in March 2014 and imposed restrictions which limited other social media.1140 
The report pointed out that, arising from the government’s reaction to the protests and the 
corruption investigation, alterations to Turkey’s legal system were made in haste and without 
due consultation. The Commission points out that related laws were passed in the Turkish 
parliament without appropriate parliamentary process. In addition, whilst it was stated that “the 
                                                 
1138European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2014." See also: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-turkey-progress-report_en.pdf  
[last accessed on 26.02.2016]. 
1139Gültaşlı, "AB İlerleme Raporu, Türkiye'nin Fotoğrafını Çekti: Genişleme Komiseri’nden ‘Çok Acil’ Uyarı [EU 
Progress Report Took Turkey's Picture: A 'Very Urgent' Warning from the Enlargement Commissioner]." See also: 
Melih Özsöz, Mathematics of Progress: A Different Look at European Commission's Turkey Progress Reports, 
trans. Dr. Zeynep Özkurt (Istanbul: Dunya Publishing Ic. , 2014): 11. 
1140Gültaşlı, "Ab İlerleme Raporu, Türkiye'nin Fotoğrafını Çekti: Genişleme Komiseri’nden ‘Çok Acil’ Uyarı [Eu 
Progress Report Took Turkey's Picture: A 'Very Urgent' Warning from the Enlargement Commissioner]." 
“Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ban of YouTube occurred after a conversation was leaked 
between Head of Turkish Intelligence Hakan Fidan and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu that he 
wanted removed from the video-sharing web-site. The leaked call details Erdogan’s thoughts that an attack on 
Syria ‘must be seen an opportunity for us [Turkey]’”. For full transcript of the conversation see: Jack Moore, 
"Turkey Youtube Ban: Full Transcript of Leaked Syria 'War' Conversation between Erdogan Officials," 
International Business Times, 27 March 2014. 
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local elections and the Presidential elections” of the year 2014 were carried out “in a generally 
peaceful environment”, the record number of objections to the election results and 
discrepancies in Presidential election indicated violations of the principle of free and fair 
elections.1141 
It can be argued that the 2014 report overreacted to the JDP government’s response to 
the events of 2013. Though the government’s responses were fast and brutal, the events 
themselves can be portrayed as extreme civil disorder, the nationwide riots that followed-on 
but were not directly linked to the Gezi Park issue, and an alleged attempt to topple a 
democratic and democratically elected government from within, using a clandestine corruption 
investigation as a Trojan horse. A duly elected government has a duty to protect the community 
it governs from internal violence that threatens life, limb and property on a wide scale 
indiscriminately as was the situation in Northern Ireland throughout the 30 years of its recent 
‘Troubles’. A democratic nation state has a right to defend itself from an ‘enemy within’ if the 
latter uses extreme and undemocratic means to gain control,  a right, for example, the 
government of Fiji chose not to act upon in face of the ostensible military coup of 1987. 
The history of nation states is not bereft of examples of democratic governments, 
genuinely elected, doing ‘bad things to good people’ in times of national emergencies. 
Examples could include: the internment of Japanese American residents after the December 
1941 Japanese military attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbour and throughout the 
ensuing conflict; the British government’s provocative actions at times, through its police and 
security organisations, during the 1985 national coal miners’ industrial strike; and, the 
government inspired response of forceful confrontation to the 1968 student led general strikes 
in France. 
It can also be argued that the 2014 report, in its sharp criticism of the government’s 
responses to the 2013 events, was an attempt by the Commission to deflect criticism from those 
in Europe who held long standing opposition to Turkey’s EU accession aspirations. Pointing 
                                                 
1141See: European Commission, "EU Progress Report on Turkey 2014," 7.  
See also: Özsöz, Mathematics of Progress: A Different Look at European Commission's Turkey Progress Reports, 
11. 
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out a friend’s obvious weaknesses to others is one way of increasing the acceptability of one’s 
praise and promotion off that same friend. 
I do agree with the 2014 report that there was significant regression in democratic 
qualities resulting from the JDP’s response to the 2013 events. However, as discussed above, 
such regression is not an unnatural response from most democratic governments to explosive 
and egregious events that undermine the realm when looked at as a temporary deviation from 
democracy’s ‘straight and narrow’. Of course, the ‘rub’ is: How long is temporary? We can 
estimate that time span but only with the future’s concomitant uncertainty. With that proviso, 
and within the democratisation framework I argue in this thesis that the JDP has placed itself 
in, Turkey remains a functioning pluralist arena with the bulk of the JDP’s reforms since 2002 
still in place. A politically dynamic arena in which democratisation, albeit checked with ‘one 
step’ back, will resurge as well as contract. If one stands back for perspective, Turkey’s 
democratic progress since the 1950s was a switchback of advances and reverses and positive 
and negative features, but with a longue durée improvement. 
The irony of the 2014 report’s criticisms of the JDP’s actions against the Turkish 
judiciary and freedom of expression in Turkey was that the two related areas of accession 
negotiations (‘justice and fundamental rights’, and ‘justice, freedom and security’) had been 
'blocked' for negotiation since 2009. They had not been negotiated (successfully closed) and 
were not the subject of EU-Turkey accession negotiations in 2014. The one thing, accession 
negotiation, that might have tempered the JDP’s reaction to the events of 2013, was off the 
table for the two areas that took the brunt of the JDP’s actions in 2014. The ‘blocking’ of these 
two negotiation areas may have been a factor in the JDP calculations in its 2014 actions, if so, 
it does no credit to the JDP. Neither did the ‘blocking’ reflect well on the EU at a time when 
Turkish 'democratisation' could have benefited from the leverage of negotiations in its cause; 
negotiations for a prize the JDP wanted, in fact, needed, as a key part of its 'democratisation' 
strategy.  
Indeed, a continuing underlying JDP impetus for democratisation is demonstrated in 
European Commission commendations on a range of subjects. The 2014 report welcomed: 
the announcement of the EU Strategy by the 62nd 
Government, the adoption by the [Turkish Parliament] of 
the legal framework in regards to the [Kurdish] settlement 
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process […], the presence of an active civil society, [...] the 
adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection, and the Action Plan for Prevention of 
Violations of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”.1142  
The Commission also welcomed the declaration of a new Democratisation Package in 
September 2014;1143 acceptance of the 3rd and 4th judicial reform packages; individual 
application to the Constitutional Court in regards to violation of human rights; and the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions that aimed to protect fundamental rights and freedoms.1144 The 
report highlighted Turkey’s further progress in its legislative alignment with the EU in the areas 
of “women’s rights, children’s rights, the rights of people with disabilities and the rights of 
minorities”.1145  
Overall the two reports expressed strong concerns about damaging trends in Turkey, 
but in the spirit of constructive criticism of what was still a working pluralist system, albeit 
under duress.  
Conclusion 
There is always a need to ensure an appropriate balance between civil liberties and 
national security in times of national threat or significant civil unrest. However, when national 
security is used as a smokescreen for political expediency, as the JDP government showed in 
its response to the ‘events’ of 2013, the infringements of civil liberties can become permanent 
and represent a backward step in a nation’s democratisation progress. This possibility can be 
                                                 
1142See: IKV, "IKV's Evaluation Regarding European Commission's 2014 Turkey Progress Report." 
“Turkey has outlined a new strategy to secure accession to the European Union that vows determination in the 
political reform process, continuity in socio-economic transformation during the process, and effectiveness in 
communication. ‘Prioritizing Turkey’s interests and the benefits of the citizens, the new strategy will lead to a 
boost in the reform process and the establishment of new communication channels between Turkey and the 
EU,’ said a written statement from the EU Ministry on Sept. 18. [...] The European Union Strategy consists of the 
following parts: the political reform process, socio-economic transformation in the accession process and EU 
communication strategy, according to the paper.” See: "EU Minister Promotes Turkey’s New EU Strategy," 
Hürriyet Daily News, 18 September 2014. For the full text of EU Strategy document see: "Turkey's New European 
Union Strategy: Determination in the Political Reform Process Continuity in Socio-Economic Transformation 
Effectiveness in Communication," (Ankara: Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EU Affairs, 2014). 
1143IKV, "Avrupa Komisyonu’nun 2014 Yılı Türkiye İlerleme Raporu Açıklandı [the European Commission's 2014 
Progress Report on Turkey Was Announced]." 
1144Gültaşlı, "AB İlerleme Raporu, Türkiye'nin Fotoğrafını Çekti: Genişleme Komiseri’nden ‘Çok Acil’ Uyarı [EU 
Progress Report Took Turkey's Picture: A 'Very Urgent' Warning from the Enlargement Commissioner]." 
1145Özsöz, Mathematics of Progress: A Different Look at European Commission's Turkey Progress Reports, 12. 
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seen in the ascendancy of national security, in varying degrees, over civil liberties as nation 
states allied with the US accommodate the latter’s War on Terror in their own countries.  
The commendable reforms by the first two JDP administrations to establish a 
‘democratisation’ reform process in Turkey with ‘critical mass’ appeared to have been stymied 
by the government’s explosive reactions to the Gezi Park related national protests and the 
corruption allegations. These events were perceived by Prime Minister Erdoğan, quite rightly, 
as threats to his survival and that of his government, not necessarily one and the same; threats 
that, in most part, arose from the functioning of Turkey’s democratic processes. The JDP 
government’s reaction placed restrictions on judicial and police independence, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of the media. These restrictions may, permanently or temporarily, 
reverse the JDP government’s democratisation progress in these areas. The question is: will the 
JDP be in government long enough to choose the latter? When it comes to planning for or 
predicting the future, and especially the political future of nation states, the ‘jury is always out’. 
For Turkey, given the explosive events of 2013 and 2014, and even more so 2015, the future 
of its “democratisation” progress is significantly more uncertain than it was up to 2012 and 
may even reverse in the short to medium term if the JDP government perceives the threat to its 
existence continuing. If that is the case then it might decide to go for ‘broke’ and retreat to the 
‘bolthole’ that is political Islam. This may be a bolthole with egregious consequences for 
Turkey, its people and the region; a bolthole for now President Erdoğan and his close political 
coterie, not necessarily a preferred place for the wider JDP party and the country.  
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Chapter 7: THESIS CONCLUSION 
The central research question of this thesis is: What is the contribution of the JDP to 
the progress of democratisation in the Republic of Turkey in the period 2002 to 2014? I have 
also posed associated research questions which are repeated and answered later in this 
concluding chapter. 
In addressing the central and associated research questions I have explored the concept 
and history of democracy as a form of political arrangement for nation states. Further, I have 
discussed the Republic’s democratic framework; provided background on the history and 
policy outlook of the JDP; analysed the strengths and weaknesses of the party’s democratic 
reforms; and the impact on those reforms of the significant and adverse domestic events of 
2013.  
Though the scope period of this thesis is from 2002 to 2014, I have briefly addressed in 
this conclusion the unprecedented regional events arising from the civil war in Syria and their 
impact on the JDP’s domestic outlook. These events, post 2014, have tested, and will continue 
to test, the ‘democratisation’ resolve of the JDP government and significantly more so than the 
domestic events of 2013. The collateral impact of its neighbour’s civil war is possibly the final 
‘road’ test for the party’s adherence to the ‘democratisation’ modus operandi it kick-started in 
government in late 2002. 
My main research findings are: 
First, democratisation is a dynamic process that consists of the following stages: 
liberalisation, transition and consolidation. This thesis focuses on the consolidation phase that 
Turkey is currently experiencing. Turkey has been regarded as an ‘effective’ democracy since 
1946. The first two phases, democratic liberalisation and transition, were completed well before 
late 2002, the start of the JDP’s first period in national government. Nevertheless, with the start 
of the JDP’s third term in office in mid-2011, the consolidation phase of democracy in Turkey 
had lost momentum.  
Second, liberal democracy is not the only ‘game in town’ for nation states in the 21st 
century. In the current array of so-called, and mostly self-styled, liberal democratic nations 
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there are ‘the good, the bad and the ugly’, to borrow a phrase from the Spaghetti subgenre of 
Western films. Notwithstanding this, liberal democracy is a form of political arrangement, in 
theory and in developing practice, that this thesis holds up as the ‘gold standard’ for nation 
states that wish to survive ‘well’ as communities in the long term .1146 And, surviving well in 
the long term assumes sorting out, with minimal civil disruption, the inevitable vicissitudes in 
their political affairs that such communities are heir to. It is in the short term that this ‘gold 
standard’ can be tarnished, and often is, but not necessarily irretrievably. 
Third, I argue in this thesis that an effective liberal democratic government can only be 
achieved in a secular environment and that secularism is a prerequisite for democracy.    
Given the imposition of secularism on the new republic of Turkey at its establishment, 
I argue that it is necessary to recognise the need for reconciliation of Turkey’s modern 
secularism with its present, and past infused, Islamic culture in order to answer the thesis’s 
central research question. Secularism is not necessarily antithetical to faith-based beliefs. It is 
as much about protecting religious beliefs and practices from the state or from any form of 
threat within the community whether from the non-religious or from other religious groups, as 
it is about separating state institutions, laws and practices from faith-based dogmas. To ensure 
freedom of worship, the state has to stand aside from religion, although in some cases like 
England it is still nominally connected. In Western Europe, this separation of state and religion 
arose with the fragmentation of the Christian faith in the late medieval age and the rise of the 
modern nation state as mercantile and then industrial economies. Reason and the non-local 
search for profit slowly but inexorably replaced faith and the local land based economy in the 
affairs of European states.  
For modern Turkey, this separation of state and religion was forcibly built into the 
founding constitution of the republic in 1923.  Though modern European secularism is infused 
with the ancient tenets of previous faith-based cultures such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, 
the secular framework of law, government, diplomacy and economic activity is devoid of direct 
faith-based struts. However, the members of these faiths who are voting citizens and their faith-
based organisations are not without political influence and remain relevant in today’s mainly 
secular societies. More so in modern Turkey, where an overzealous containment of political 
                                                 
1146Whether or not there is a ‘long term’ for communities as ‘nation states’ is not the subject of this thesis. 
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Islam created a strong push-back which led to military interventions, or sometimes just the 
threat of such, from the mid- to late 20th century. Understanding the interaction of secularism 
and political Islam is an important, some could argue the most important, component in the 
analysis of the democratic process in modern Turkey, and particularly the democratisation 
progress under the JDP. 
It could be argued that this is an old and clichéd analysis template when applied to 
Turkey’s 21st century challenges and, on the face of it, it is. However, from a deeper 
perspective it is not “old and clichéd”, far from it as I argue in this thesis. ‘Rallying round the 
cause’, the various causes within a community, has divided communities internally throughout 
history, whether it be the Sunni/Shi’ite divide in Islamic faith-based nation states, or the 
centuries-old Catholic and Protestant faith divide of Northern Ireland, or the current civil war 
between nationalist Ukraine and its citizens of Russian descent in Eastern Ukraine. For some 
in such communities, either individually or in groups, the ‘cause’ is deeply felt and acted upon; 
for others, it is a means of applying political leverage to every significant community issue. 
Either way, significant community divides can and will continue to count until, as I argue in 
this thesis, intra-community political arrangements can be found, nurtured and embedded that 
allow non-violent resolution of the new challenges that nation states meet each new day. I argue 
in this thesis that liberal democracy is one such political arrangement and, in the long term for 
nation states, the most flexible and effective political arrangements to avoid civil disorder and 
all those possible subsequent degradations that can end with a failed state. 
Fourth, the JDP has championed democratisation as its strategic policy to underpin its 
self-proclaimed role as an ‘honest broker’ in finding workable and sustainable political 
arrangements to address the significant political tensions arising from secular constitutionalism 
in an Islamic culture. The JDP was specifically established to address this challenge on the 
back of multiple failures of the Turkish body politic through the second half of the 20th century. 
However, the path the relatively new party has taken to maintain power is as pragmatic as it is 
reformist. The impact of events, both domestic and external, test the reformist agenda of all 
political parties in government, even more so the JDP. As a self-professed non-Islamic party 
that has emerged from political Islam, the JDP is well placed to reconcile Turkey’s past with 
the needs of its future, and its secular political arrangements with its faith-based community. It 
would appear that the current JDP leaders, in steering a political path between the well-
defended ‘rock’ of constitutional secularism, and the ‘hard place’ that is Turkey’s cultural and 
  
   251 
 
religious essence, are playing a game which has no other political options. They are affirming 
the old adage that politics is the art of the possible. 
In relation to the above finding, my interviewees agreed that secularism had 
traditionally been used as separation of politics and religion in Turkey and some of them 
emphasised that it had been implemented as a policy of state control over religion in practice. 
The JDP deputies and most of the academics expressed their concern over radical secularism 
which attempted to suppress religion in Turkey and considered this a stumbling block to 
Turkey’s democratisation progress since its foundation. 
Fifth, the JDP is largely justified in claiming itself to be “conservative democratic” 
rather than Islamist. JDP parliamentarians and most of the academics I interviewed supported 
the view that JDP’s conservative democratic political identity is an appropriate and justified 
political approach for Turkey. However, the representatives of the opposition parties I 
interviewed considered JDP’s political identity as a mistaken approach. Other interviewees 
described the JDP as either an Islamic democratic, new Islamist, moderate Islamist, or post-
Islamist party. Further, as opposed to the mainstream JDP representatives, the JDP deputy for 
Sakarya, Ayhan Sefer Üstün, emphasised that the party is neither a right nor a left wing party 
but instead uses the arguments of both, depending on the matter at hand. He also described the 
JDP as a reformist party. Moreover, all interviewees agreed that the JDP’s political ideology 
was not in line with Turkey’s main Islamic political vehicle, the National Outlook Movement, 
though acknowledging the latter’s role in the early political careers of the party’s JDP’s 
leadership. 
Sixth, the JDP’s pro-Western and pro-EU development reinforced its distancing from 
its leaders’ former Islamic political roots. Of course, this could be interpreted as a pragmatic 
protective shield against the threats of the secularist forces within Turkey, both military and 
civilian. The JDP and its members, at the inception of the party, realised that they could only 
survive as a governing party by embracing democratic reforms. The presence of an entrenched 
and active military tutelage, as well as bureaucratic and judicial quasi-tutelages, required the 
JDP to reform the Turkish military, judiciary, and bureaucracy, in accordance with democratic 
principles.  
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Nevertheless, after consolidating its power with several election victories, and 
especially after the 12 June 2011 general elections, the JDP stepped back from its democratic 
reform programme and implemented policies that were intolerant towards those segments of 
the society who were not pious in their daily lives and/or opposed conservative policies. These 
policies are considered faith based (Islamic) by some and an attempt by the JDP to return to 
political Islam. Seemingly, despite the fact that Prime Minister Erdoğan declared social 
engineering as one of the JDP’s ‘red lines’, the new policies have the hallmarks of social 
engineering in that they aim to transform Turkey’s secular public life into a society whose 
public life is guided by religion. Thus, these policies aroused wide concern over Islamisation 
of the country by re-fuelling the ongoing and heated debate amongst commentators and 
opposition on the alleged hidden agenda of the JDP.  
Overall, I have argued in this thesis that the JDP has chosen democratisation as a 
strategic policy in order to manage, inter alia, the still significant tensions arising from the 
unresolved political stand-off between the Republic’s constitutional secularism and its ‘home 
grown’ version of political Islam. The above ‘faith-based policies’ are not significant when one 
looks at the major democratisation reforms embedded by the JDP and can be interpreted, with 
all due respect, as a sop to its roots, but more substantially, as another one of the many 
necessary short term balancing tricks required to manage those ‘still significant tensions’ 
referred to above.  
In fact, the problem is not Islamisation of the country as the overwhelming majority of 
Turkey’s population is already Muslim. It is rather Prime Minister, now President, Erdoğan’s 
authoritarian tendencies that threaten Turkey’s democracy. After initial positioning to embrace 
democratic processes and manage Turkey’s traditional tutelages, the JDP, in baring 
authoritarian ‘teeth’ since the 2011 general elections, has been addressing the inevitable 
reaction to its democratic drift from its Islamic roots. All my 2011 JDP interviewees dismissed 
accusations that the party had a hidden agenda to Islamise Turkey, while most of the academics 
noted the democratic progress between 2002 and 2011. 
Seventh, as regards the JDP’s authoritarian tendencies under Prime Minister Erdoğan, 
it could also be stated that 2013 was the ‘annus horribilis’ of the JDP’s period-to-date in power. 
After eleven years in continuous government, the events of that year caught the Prime Minister 
and his government by surprise. The events were the May 2013 Taksim Gezi Park protests that 
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spread throughout the nation including riots and, the arrest of members of the Prime Minister’s 
close entourage on corruption charges. His response was swift and ‘no holds barred’ and he 
used all means to set the government’s narrative to achieve the outcome the government sought. 
The response may indicate a less than genuine motive behind the JDP government’s reforms 
and the party’s commitment to its democratisation journey. Though the May protests were 
specific and spontaneous, the ensuing national protests tapped a much wider and deeper 
resentment against the JDP government. The government’s swift and, at times, brutal response 
through the police, the halt to its democratisation programme and its about face in some areas 
of civil liberties caused huge concern among the Turkish public, the EU and the rest of the 
international community. Further, it is fair to state that the corruption allegation that became 
public in mid-December of 2013 was in a league of its own. The related arrests, appropriate or 
not, were a direct challenge to the existence of the JDP government and especially the Prime 
Minister who was later implicated in the corruption by some of those arrested. 
The government inspired political replay of the Ergenekon trial, part of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s response to the 2013 corruption allegations, supported the long held opposition 
claim that the 2008 trial was a successful JDP conspiracy to discredit the army. Though a prime 
mover in the trial, the Prime Minister’s 2013 ‘about face’ supports this conspiracy assertion: 
an example of the pressing political exigencies of the ‘present’ trumping consistency with the 
‘past’. As the 2013 corruption allegations enveloped the Prime Minister, his sudden about face 
over the 2008 trial testified to his perception that the corruption allegations represented a ‘clear 
and present’ existential danger to his government and himself, this time from within the 
apparatus of government. Maybe the Gülenist Islamists within the judiciary and the police, who 
allegedly ‘conspired’ in 2008 with Erdoğan to ensure the Ergenekon convictions, appear to 
have turned on their own, the JDP, by 2013. Apart from its irony, the about face can be 
interpreted as supporting this thesis’ argument that the JDP in government, and in particular its 
leader Erdoğan, see democratisation as a path that allows the JDP to survive in power by 
steering, legitimately, between ‘radical’ secularism and political Islam, both threats to its 
political survival but also, as a significant unresolved tension, to Turkey’s political stability, 
again as argued in this thesis. The former addressed in part by the JDP’s successful rolling back 
of decades of military tutelage; the latter, Gülenist political Islam, breaking out from within the 
state apparatus as alleged by Erdoğan and his government who in turn acted on this ‘state within 
a state’ threat with a series of swift, brutal and undemocratic response. 
  
   254 
 
Eighth, Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, especially since its formal acceptance in 
1999 as an ‘accession candidate’ country, have been the major catalytic driving force behind 
the JDP’s democratisation process and the main sponsor of this process since 2002. 
Nevertheless, the pace of the EU-related democratisation reforms since 2002 has been uneven. 
The conservative-democratic JDP government passed several important harmonisation 
packages between 2002 and 2005, moving Turkey closer to the standards of government that 
the EU expects of its member states. However, with the EU’s suspension in 2006 of eight of 
the 33 negotiation ‘chapters’ with Turkey, the pace of the JDP’s democratisation reforms 
slowed significantly.  
At the same time, political polarisation re-emerged as the JDP government moved to 
consolidate civilian control rule over its military, and to mitigate the impact of various 
Kemalist-dominated bureaucratic organs in the government. The rapid and significant 
reduction of the political power of the Turkish military since 2007 is one of the most important 
indicators of Turkey’s JDP-led democratisation, the autonomy of civilian rule, a fundamental 
requirement of nation states that aspire to democratic progress.  
While the JDP government achieved success in the area of ‘civilian only’ rule, it failed 
to solve sustainably another problematic issue for Turkey’s democratisation progress: the 
decades-long, terrorism led separatism of some of Turkey’s Kurdish community.1147 The 
complete reversal in 2015, as a consequence of developments in the Syrian civil war, of the 
JDP’s accommodation and non-military policy towards Kurdish aspirations does not augur 
well for the JDP’s democratisation reforms and progress.  
Turkey, as the country under study, surely demonstrates a peculiar case where a 
western-style democracy is practiced among a community (Turkish community) that is 
predominantly Muslim. As a result of its geographical position, as well as its historical and 
cultural connections, Turkey occupies an ideal position to act as a mediator between Europe 
                                                 
1147Mehmet Celil Çelebi, "Explaining European Union’s Impact on Turkish Democracy: A Historical-Discursive 
Approach to Justice and Development Party's Reforms ", Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Western 
Political Science Association, (2012), http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/celebi.pdf. [last accessed on 
19.02.2016].  
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and the Islamic world. Europe must trust Turkey to perform this role in a way that it would be 
in the interest of both sides.1148  
I now set out my specific conclusions on the associated research questions that I posed 
in my introductory chapter. For convenience, I repeat (in italics) the questions here: 
1. Is it appropriate to consider Turkey a nation state that aspires to the 'democratic' 
ideal?  
With the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the subsequent abolition of the 
Sultanate and the Caliphate, the Republic of Turkey was founded by the nationalist movement 
of Mustapha Kemal Pasha (later Atatürk) in 1923. The founding Constitution declared Turkey 
a secular republic and was seen as the culmination of the democratising reforms of the 
Tanzimat (1839 to 1876) and the Young Turks (1908 to 1918) periods and very much the end 
of the beginning for Turkey’s democratisation journey. I argue in Chapter 2’s introduction that 
nation states that embark on the democratisation journey, including Turkey, presuppose the 
ideal of democracy as its journey’s end. My conclusion on this associated research question is: 
Yes, it is appropriate to consider Turkey a nation state that aspires to the 'democratic' ideal.  
2. Is it appropriate to measure Turkey's progress along the 'democratisation' path 
against the yardstick of the European Enlightenment, in particular the political 
arrangement described as 'liberal democratic'? 
I argue in this thesis that nation states have chosen democracy as a form of political 
arrangement because democracy provides the mechanisms that best address the need for social 
and economic change for which nation states were primarily formed, with new needs emerging 
with the passing of time. Democratic mechanisms provide agreed resolutions based on 
compromise and minimise the risk of unmanageable civil disorder. Modern ‘democratisation’ 
emerged as a consequence of the European Enlightenment and the developing holistic needs 
of the concurrently emerging European capitalist economies. If efficient capitalism needed 
democracy to protect it from its own recurring crisis, then democracy, with universal suffrage, 
                                                 
1148Nilay Baycar, Turkish Identity: The Specific Cultural Background of Turkey’s Identity: An Opportunity for 
Europe?(Norderstedt Germany: GRIN Verlag, 2009), 95. 
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needed the freedom of the individual from the state (liberalism) as the central core of its raison 
d'être. There is no other yardstick if democratisation in Turkey is to be measured. 
3. At the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and since, but prior to the 
first JDP national government in 2002, what events significantly impacted on Turkey's 
progress along the 'democratisation' path?  
The list of events that significantly affected Turkey's progress along the 
democratisation path since its foundation includes retarding as well as ‘encouraging’ events. 
However, with no triteness intended, ‘Rome was not built in a day’ and quite rightly so if 
change in the affairs of communities of people is to be effective for the common good over the 
long term.   
Turkey’s founding constitution was democratic and allowed universal male adult 
franchise to elect representatives to the legislative national assembly. In some other 
fundamental respects Turkey was undemocratic; it was practically a one party state from 1923 
to 1945. At the time, secularism was the stumbling block for many who saw themselves as the 
natural opposition. After five centuries of centralised autocratic Ottoman rule under Sharia law, 
secularism was seen by some as the cuckoo’s egg in the historical golden nest of Islam. 
However, anti-secularism was seen as treason in the early days of the new republic, an outlook 
that stymied and eventually suffocated the early political opposition. This was a difficult time 
for many nationalist politicians who genuinely believed that secularism was not the only way 
forward for the new nation. Thus began the constitutional containment of political Islam that 
has had significant adverse influence on Turkey’s democratisation path through to the present. 
President Erdoğan’s ‘treason’ branding of opponents after the failed July 2016 coup d'état has 
ironic echoes from the early days of the republic. 
Eventually, a multi-party state emerged after World War II but so did Turkey’s military 
tutelage as the defender of the Kemalist secular heritage. There followed a succession of 
military coups that were, in hindsight, a long drawn out rear-guard action against the modern 
political Islam that surfaced as the political framework of choice for those in the Muslim world 
who sought the end of European colonialism. 
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4. What was Turkey's democratisation 'scorecard' when the JDP first took office in 
2002? 
In one phrase: “Below par”, mainly due to a constitution that had significant 
undemocratic parts, an active military tutelage and a highly polarised body politic. 
The 1982 Constitution, still in place in 2002, though secular and embodying democratic 
principles including multi-party parliamentary representative government based on universal 
suffrage and fundamental individual freedoms, gave primacy of the state over its citizens. In 
1923, the founders of the republic considered such primacy necessary. With the Ottoman 
Empire’s collapse following World War 1 and its ‘carve-up’ in to many non-Turk nation states 
under the hegemony of their European colonial ‘promoters’, France and the United Kingdom, 
Turkish nationalists feared for the integrity of what was left both economically and territorially. 
If the new republic was to survive independently in a freshly re-ordered and increasingly geo-
politically important region, its founders believed a strong state was essential. In order to 
prosper as a nation state in the long term, like Europe and North America, the founders believed 
that a secular liberal democratic state would best engender the necessary ‘modernity’ to achieve 
this. This contradiction, a strong state versus a liberal democratic state, is the inherent dynamic 
balancing act between state security and ‘the governed’. The added complication for the new 
republic was its ‘overnight’ constitutional exclusion of over 600 years of faith infused political 
arrangements and practices. Not unlike Karl Marx’s 20th century prognosis of 19th century 
problems in political economy, the republic’s founders used 20th century fundamentalist 
secularism to address the late Ottoman Empire political dysfunctionality. This unnatural, and 
arguably unnecessary, constitutional and political exclusion explains to a great extent Turkey’s 
‘below par’ democratisation scorecard at the time the JDP first held national office in late 2002. 
5. What policies did the JDP implement in government through to 2014 that 
significantly affected the democratisation scorecard that the party inherited in 
2002?  
The two main policies were its completion of civilian rule over the Turkish military and 
its active commitment to the EU accession process. The former removed the military from 
civilian aspects of government by constitutional changes as well as law and regulatory changes.  
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The JDP-energised EU accession process acted as a catalyst for democratic changes 
that impacted positively on: civilian rule over the military; separation of powers; human rights; 
fundamental freedoms of individuals, the media and religious association; the Kurdish 
‘question’; the position of women in Turkish society and the protection of children; other 
minorities; and civil society. Except for the removal of military tutelage, the momentum on all 
of these ‘democratisation’ fronts slowed down as the JDP entered its third term of office. This 
became regression after the events of 2013 and reversed in response to regional events post 
2014. The 2013 events were seen by the JDP as a significant and illegal internal threat to 
Turkey’s democratically elected government, and the post-2014 impact of regional events have 
been  seen by the JDP government as an existential threat to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Turkish state. If we draw a comparison with British measures that encroached 
upon that nation’s centuries old democratic foundations during World War II and its recent 30-
year civil war in Northern Ireland, it can be argued that the JDP’s government’s responses are 
appropriate and temporary, albeit authoritarian, in the face of a serious ‘enemy within’, as 
alleged by the JDP, and the ‘real and present’ threat to Turkey from the Syrian civil war. 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and all countries along coastal North Africa are testament to the 
contagion and dire consequences to the region of ‘regime change’ and ensuing civil war. 
Turkey does not have the deep secular democratic foundations that modern Britain has and 
maybe the JDP government sees the risks to the fledging republic require extreme measures. 
The long term risk for Turkey is that the JDP’s measures become permanent and the JDP uses 
them to contain and stifle political opposition just like Kemalism contained political Islam eight 
decades before the JDP took office. A rich irony indeed but not one, if it comes to pass, in the 
long term political interest of the JDP. 
6. Would the 'democratisation' policies implemented by the JDP in government up to 
2014 have been implemented by another party or parties had the JDP not been in 
government?  
This hypothetical question has validity if we address the hypothetical role of the JDP 
in opposition throughout the period. In a democratic parliamentary representative system the 
concept of a ‘loyal’ parliamentary opposition is fundamental. The opposition’s loyalty is not 
to the government in power but to the nation’s constitution and political precedents, and its role 
is to challenge the policies and actions of the government of the day, politically not illegally or 
violently. 
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Given Turkey’s nearly one hundred per cent Muslim population, the reasons for the 
formation of the JDP and its ‘new look’ leadership and political outlook, the JDP would have 
had significant electoral and parliamentary representation in opposition for many decades to 
come if, for whatever reasons, it failed to occupy the parliamentary government benches. This 
thesis argues that the JDP is committed to long term Turkish democratisation because the party 
sees progressive democratisation as the best tool to manage and eventually resolve the 
continuing significant tensions between democratic secularism and political Islam. A peaceful 
resolution would also, in the JDP’s calculations, underpin the party’s long term political 
relevance as the preferred party of government.  
However, it is uncertain if the role of the Turkish military would have been as 
extensively curtailed under a non-JDP government. In all likelihood, such a government would 
have been a coalition and unlikely, due to the necessary political compromises that are the sine 
qua non of most coalition governments, to have gone as far as the JDP in ‘de-fanging’ the 
military’s role in Turkish politics. Specifically, the oppositions’ uncertainty surrounding the 
JDP’s long term commitment to secularism and democratisation would have moderated any 
significant moves against the military’s tutelage, if it had held the reins of power instead of the 
JDP from 2002. 
7.   What was Turkey's democratisation scorecard at the end of 2014? 
This thesis has postulated a ‘democratisation scorecard’ to assess the JDP’s 
democratisation credentials during its period in continuous power from 2002 to 2014. This 
scorecard has been ‘marked’ in this thesis where I have discussed the JDP’s actions in a number 
of crucial areas identified in this thesis, including: EU accession, military tutelage, ethnic and 
religious diversity, gender equality and children’s rights, civil society, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, democratic initiatives and, constitutional reform. 
 This scorecard measures the JDP government’s democratisation actions comparatively 
between the start of that period to the end of that period.  
To be fair in my assessment of the democratic credentials of the JDP in government 
from 2002 to 2014, the subject period of this thesis, it is appropriate to identify the events that 
significantly and adversely impacted on the JDP’s democratisation momentum in the middle 
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and latter parts of that period. Those events were, respectively: the government’s increasing 
disenchantment with the EU accession process; the inevitable push back between 2007 and 
2012 after the relative ‘honeymoon’ period of its first five years in office; and the government’s 
response to the self-perceived existential threats to itself from the national civil disorder 
following the Gezi Park demonstrations in early 2013 and the alleged corruption scandal that 
became public at the end of that year. For a cyclist who has fallen off the bicycle due their own 
fault, or due to a pot hole in the road they saw too late, the usual procedure is to attend to one’s 
injuries and then get back on the bicycle and continue the journey, assuming no serious injury 
and the bicycle remains rideable. It is not usual, or recommended, to throw the bike away. The 
question arising from these two latter periods is not whether the JDP government has become 
fundamentally undemocratic (in my analogy, the cyclist seriously injured) but whether its 
democratic reforms have been abandoned (in my analogy, the bike thrown away). 
In relation to the comparative analysis, my findings indicate that the JDP has 
performed against the chosen democratic characteristics as follows: 
 EU Accession - significant advance 
 Military Tutelage - significant advance  
 Ethnic and Religious Diversity - significant advance  
 Gender Equality and Children’s Rights - no significant change 
 Civil Society - significant advance 
 Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - no significant change  
 Democratic Opening Initiative - significant advance 
 Constitutional Reform - significant advance 
Turkey’s democratisation scorecard shows, overall, a significant improvement during 
the JDP’s period in power up to and including 2014. In this thesis I argue that the set-backs and 
loss of democratisation momentum during this period were necessary short term political 
tactics by the JDP government leadership in response to pressures from the many political 
groups that re-calibrated their political sightings and actions as a result of the military’s 
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diminishing tutelage. Not unlike the vacuum that follows forced regime change, the perception 
that the Turkish military was under greater civilian control and removed from many of its 
political positions in government, emboldened both sides of the secularist/Islamist political 
divide. The secularists no longer had the military as a friend of last resort and so have had to 
lift their game vis-à-vis electoral relevance, and the Gülenists, both fundamental and 
democratic, saw the field cleared of the one institution, Turkey’s military, that had been the 
instrument of their political containment, and worse, since the foundation of the republic in 
1923. 
8.  Were the democratisation policies adopted by the JDP up to 2014 a reflection 
of a party that has genuine democratic credentials? 
I argue in this thesis that the JDP’s democratic credentials are based on its founders’ 
pragmatic political outlook at the party’s establishment in 2001. The new party emerged from 
an era in Turkish politics marked by military coups, real and threatened, and the constitutional 
banning of political parties and politicians deemed insufficiently secular, some of whom 
comprised the JDP’s founding members. These latest ‘bannings’, in hindsight a sort of 
Kemalist ‘last hurrah’, were in response to the re-emergence of political Islam in Turkey from 
decades of constitutional and political containment. 
Looking into the political tool box that was available, the new party took the view that 
liberal democracy was the political arrangement that had the best chance of avoiding the pitfalls 
of the similar journeys its founders had taken previously. Liberal democracy, with its 
representative government based on universal suffrage and constitutionally free elections, 
provided the JDP with a national and natural electoral hinterland built on a cultural foundation 
permeated with six centuries of pragmatic faith.  
Further, although achieving an EU-set level of liberal democracy was fully accepted 
and promoted by the JDP to gain EU membership, this thesis argues that the JDP viewed liberal 
democracy as the political arrangement that would allow it to best manage and eventually 
mitigate Turkey’s significant political tensions. Tensions that continue to exist between 
Turkey, the constitutionally secular state aspiring to modernity and regional influence, and 
Turkey, a culture deeply imbued with Islam. These tensions have been exacerbated by the re-
emergence of radical political Islam across the region and, the threat to Turkey’s territorial 
integrity from the sudden and violent re-ignition of the Kurdish issue. This balancing act, 
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courtesy of liberal democracy, means that the party has to be wary of over correcting as it meets 
events1149 out of its control. 
9. What is the impact on the findings and conclusions of this thesis of post 2014 events 
specifically in relation to the ongoing Syrian civil war? 
The continuing regional conflagrations, the Iraq war and the Syrian civil war, have 
sorely tested the JDP’s liberal democracy resolve and its democratisation momentum. This is 
to be expected when a state is confronted with populous neighbours who share extensive and 
open borders with it and who, virtually overnight, have become failed states. It would be easy 
for this author to state that, given the apparently intractable nature of these destructive events, 
‘all bets are off’ in relation to the topic of this thesis. However, that is not an option I will take 
here. 
Instead, I will briefly comment on the impact of the above two wars on the findings and 
conclusion of this thesis: ‘briefly’ because the period is outside the scope of my thesis as 
originally set and because the regional ‘merry-go-round’ has not stopped and any comments I 
make here are hostage to fortune. When writing about the past, even the recent past, the future 
can be an unforgiving editor. 
All national governments must see the security of the state as their primary goal, albeit 
the first amongst a number of equals. In times of peace, this goal sits well below the nation’s 
collective subconscious and quite rightly so. However, in times of war or significant civil 
disorder, the elected government has a duty to place the security of the state ahead of pre-
existing laws and norms, albeit in a manner proportionate to the nature and extent of the threat. 
There is no doubt that the Republic of Turkey, since 2014, has found itself under existential 
threat from both domestic and regional events. However, it is unlikely that Turkey, a significant 
regional power, will fail or be allowed to fail to the extent experienced by its neighbours Iraq 
                                                 
1149 “The British prime minister [1957 to 1963], Harold Macmillan, was once asked what was the most difficult 
thing about his job. ‘Events, dear boy, events’ was his now famous reply. Put more colloquially, and much less 
elegantly, stuff happens and politicians have to deal with it.” Tom Burk, “’Events, dear boy, events' have put 
climate change back on the agenda,” Guardian, 26 March 2014. 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/mar/26/events-climate-change-extreme-weather [last 
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and Syria. As “all these things must come to pass”,1150 so these current events must also pass 
with time if not with exhaustion. And in time, Turkey will regain the momentum of its 
democratisation progress, a momentum that this thesis argues was given a quantum boost by 
the successive JDP governments to the end of 2014. 
I propose the following as my conclusion to this thesis’ central research question: What 
is the contribution of the JDP to the progress of democratisation in the Republic of Turkey in 
the period 2002 to 2014? 
In the period under review, the JDP has taken on board the necessity for Turkey to 
enhance the momentum of its liberal democratisation development. My thesis argues that this 
necessity on the part of the JDP government and its political party is seen as the pragmatic, 
long term political arrangement that will best manage and resolve the continuing fundamental 
divide between a modernising constitutionally secular state and its significant, home grown 
and active variety of political Islam. Given the party’s political roots and its founders’ previous 
experience at the hands of official ‘radical’ secularism, the JDP believes there will be long term 
benefits for itself, as well as Turkey, by continuing the liberal democratic journey. However, 
the events of 2013 have shaken its democratisation resolve and the 2015 contagion of the Syrian 
civil war has profound implication for its continuing democratisation and the concomitant 
threat of entrenched authoritarian rule by President Erdoğan who has increasingly come to 
operate even beyond the framework of his own party. 
 
                                                 
1150 “And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars: see that ye be not troubled: for all these things 
must come to pass, but the end is not yet.” Bible, Matthew 24:6-8 (King James Version) 
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees 
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Director of the Institute of Social Sciences at 
Bahçeşehir University & President of the 
American Studies Center & International 
Leadership Application and Research Center & 
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Appendix B: Sample Interview Questions 
Note this is only a general outline of questions, as questions were tailored to each participant’s 
involvement with Turkish Politics and his/her expertise on democratic processes, and the 
interview involved more open-ended type questions which allowed the research to diverge 
where applicable. 
  
1. How would you categorize the AK Party? Select from the following options and explain your 
choice: 
a. Islamist 
b. Moderate Islamist  
c. New Islamist 
d. Post-islamist 
e. Centre-right  
 
2. How do you evaluate the period during which Turkey was governed by the AK party (i.e. 
2002-2011) relative to previous governments? For your evaluation, consider the reforms 
undertaken by the AK party in the last ten years, and the party's performance in democratising 
Turkey. Select from the following options:  
a. Much more democratic 
b. More democratic 
c. As democratic as before 
d. Less democratic 
e. Much less democratic 
 
3. How do you feel about the term 'secularism' as used in Turkey? How would you define this 
term? What is 'Kemalist Secularism'? 
 
4. The AK party arose from the National Outlook Movement. Do you think the party's political 
views are still in line with this movement? 
 
5. Does the AK party have an agenda to Islamise the country? Is bringing Turkey more in line 
with Islam a party goal? Explain your answer.  
 
6. Is 'Conservative Democracy' an appropriate political approach? Explain your answer. 
 
7. How does the AK Party relate to the media? How do they rate in terms of press freedom and 
freedom of expression? What do you think about the the recent arrests of media representatives? 
 
8. How do you feel about the recent arrests of people who might be described as members of 
the Kemalist elite? Consider the framework of the Ergenekon case in your evaluation. 
 
9. The Ergenekon case has been described as "a conspiracy by the mild Islamists ruling Turkey 
to discredit the army". What do you think about this description? 
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